Michael Bridges v. State

In The
Court of Appeals
Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
No. 07-14-00095-CR
MICHAEL BRIDGES, APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
On Appeal from the 251st District Court
Randall County, Texas
Trial Court No. 24,140-C, Honorable Ana Estevez, Presiding
December 17, 2014
OPINION
Before CAMPBELL and HANCOCK and PIRTLE, JJ.
Appellant, Michael Bridges, appeals the trial court’s judgment of conviction in
which he was sentenced to sixty-five years’ imprisonment for the offense of possession
of a controlled substance, methamphetamine, in the amount of less than one gram
within a drug-free zone.1 On appeal, appellant contends that proof of a culpable mental
state as to the location of the offense in a drug-free zone was a requisite element of the
offense charged. He also contends that the trial court’s charge to the jury was
1
See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.115(a)–(b) (West 2010), § 481.134(d) (West Supp.
2014).
egregiously harmful in that it omitted the culpable mental state as to the location of the
offense within a drug-free zone. We will affirm.
Factual and Procedural History
In February 2013, the Allante family lived within 1000 yards of an early learning
academy. One day, Mrs. Allante looked out the window and noticed that a strange
man, later identified as appellant, was in the family’s backyard and was rummaging
around the shed with his pants down. Mrs. Allante called 911 while Mr. Allante kept
appellant under control in the backyard. Officers Cynthia Palacios and Jay Puckett
responded.
When the officers approached appellant, they noticed that he wielded a remote
control, that he repeatedly insisted that he was looking for an explosive device, and that
he also explained that he was looking for a place to go to relieve himself. During the
course of their interaction, he also made several obscene comments to Officer Palacios.
The officers arrested appellant for criminal trespass and transported him to the police
station. Once at the station, he underwent a more thorough search that yielded a clear
plastic baggie that was found to have less than one gram of methamphetamine in it.
Appellant was charged with possession of that methamphetamine within a drug-free
zone, being that the Allante residence was very near the early learning academy.
The Randall County jury ultimately found him guilty of possession of a controlled
substance within a drug-free zone and recommended punishment at sixty-five years’
imprisonment. The trial court sentenced appellant accordingly.
2
Although, at trial, appellant maintained that he did not have the baggie in his
pocket at the scene, hypothesizing that the officers took the baggie from appellant’s
hotel room and later placed the baggie on appellant’s person so that it appeared
“miraculously” at the jail, appellant seems to have abandoned that position on appeal
and contends, instead, that the State was required to prove that appellant acted with a
culpable mental state as to his location within a drug-free zone. He also contends that
the trial court’s charge to the jury omitted that element and was erroneous in its
omission.
Mens Rea as to Drug-Free Zone
As a foundation to his contentions concerning this issue, appellant posits that the
Texas Health and Safety Code creates two separate offenses: (1) possession, as
outlined in sections 481.115(a) and (b); and (2) possession in a drug-free zone, as
outlined in section 481.134(d). That being the position he takes, appellant further
contends that the State was required to prove all the elements of the separate offense
criminalized by section 481.134(d), including a culpable mental state with respect to the
actor’s location in a drug-free zone.
Appellant relies heavily on language from a sister court describing delivery of a
controlled substance and delivery of a controlled substance within a drug-free zone as
“two separate and distinct offenses.” See Harris v. State, 125 S.W.3d 45, 50 (Tex.
App.—Austin 2003, pet. dism’d). And, perhaps, facially, such language could be read to
support appellant’s position. The context of the discussion, however, reveals that the
cited language deals with whether the issue of the drug-free zone is an issue to be
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addressed at the guilt/innocence phase or the punishment phase of trial. See id. at 51–
52. Harris does not lend direct support to appellant’s contention that the State must
prove a culpable mental state as to the location of the offense within a drug-free zone.
To the contrary, a good deal of authority holds that the opposite is true, that the
State need not prove a culpable mental state with respect to the location of the offense.
See Uribe v. State, 573 S.W.2d 819, 821 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (holding that it was not
necessary to allege separate culpable mental state to raise penalty for offense of
carrying handgun on premises where alcohol was sold). The Dallas Court has held that
“the offense created by sections 481.112(a) and 481.134(c) does not require a culpable
mental state beyond that contained in section 481.112(c).” See Williams v. State, 127
S.W.3d 442, 445 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, pet. ref’d) (citing Uribe, 573 S.W.2d at 821,
and United States v. Koons, 300 F.3d 985, 993 (8th Cir. 2002)). The Texarkana Court
also addressed the issue, concluding, too, that the mens rea is connected with the
wrongful act and observing that nothing suggests that there must also be a separate
intent to commit the act in a particular place. See Fluellen v. State, 104 S.W.3d 152,
165–66 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, no pet.) (citing Uribe, 573 S.W.2d at 821). This
Court has come to the same conclusion. See Shaw v. State, No. 07-03-00301-CR,
2004 Tex. App. LEXIS 3798, at *2–3 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Apr. 29, 2004, no pet.) (mem.
op., not designated for publication). We concluded that the fact that the offense took
place in a drug-free zone enhances the punishment by elevating the offense. See id. at
*2. The mens rea contemplated by the Texas Penal Code provision relates to the
wrongful act: possessing the controlled substance. Id. We concluded that the State
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need not allege or prove that an accused had a particular mens rea with regard to the
location at which he possessed the controlled substance. See id. at *2–3.
The foregoing being the state of the law on the issue, we are disinclined to hold
contrary to that law that the State must prove a culpable mental state with respect to the
location of the offense within a drug-free zone. We overrule appellant’s first point of
error.
Jury Charge Error
Appellant’s second issue takes a similar position framed as a jury charge issue.
His issue is conditioned on section 481.134(d) creating a separate offense in that the
State must prove a culpable mental state as to the location of the offense. Having
concluded that section 481.134(d) does not create a separate offense in the sense that
appellant advances, we overrule his second point of error based on the same reasoning
and the same authority as cited with respect to his first issue.
Conclusion
Having overruled appellant’s two issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgment of
conviction. See TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(a).
Mackey K. Hancock
Justice
Publish.
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