West Star Transportation, Inc. v. Charles Robison and Cherie Robison

In The
Court of Appeals
Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
________________________
No. 07-13-00109-CV
________________________
WEST STAR TRANSPORTATION, INC., APPELLANT
V.
CHARLES ROBISON AND CHERIE ROBISON, APPELLEES
On Appeal from the 72nd District Court
Lubbock County, Texas
Trial Court No.2009-546,118; Honorable Ruben G. Reyes, Presiding
January 23, 2015
OPINION
Before CAMPBELL and HANCOCK and PIRTLE, JJ.
Appellant, West Star Transportation, Inc., appeals the entry of a judgment in
favor of Appellees, Charles and his wife, Cherie Robison, for damages totaling
$5,298,590.78, for personal injuries sustained by Charles while working for West Star.
By four issues, West Star contends (1) the evidence is legally and factually insufficient
to support the jury’s finding that West Star’s negligence proximately caused the
occurrence in question, (2) the trial court erred in submitting a broad-form negligence
question, (3) the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the jury’s
findings as to damages, and (4) the trial court erred in granting summary judgment as to
West Star’s affirmative defense of settlement and counterclaim for breach of a
settlement agreement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
BACKGROUND
On April 23, 2007, Charles sustained a traumatic head injury after falling head
first from a loaded flatbed trailer which he was attempting to cover in the shipping yard
of West Star Transportation, Inc., his employer. At the time of the accident, West Star
was a nonsubscriber under the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act. It was undisputed
that the load being covered was an uneven load, containing both uncrated equipment
and pallet crates of differing heights, and was approximately thirteen feet off the ground
at its highest point, which was an unusual occurrence at West Star. In fact, West Star
did not even own the equipment needed to complete the task. Covering the load
required that a tarpaulin, which weighed approximately 150 pounds, be placed on the
highest point of the load. After the tarpaulin was removed from a West Star storage
area, it was raised to the top of the load by a forklift West Star had to borrow from a
neighboring business. Charles was also lifted to the top of the load by standing on the
pallet being lifted. While the exact cause of the fall was undetermined, it is clear the fall
occurred while Charles was standing on the surface of the load, manipulating the
tarpaulin without safety equipment or assistance. As a result of the fall, Charles
sustained a traumatic brain injury.
On January 29, 2009, Charles and Cherie brought this suit seeking recovery of
the damages they sustained as a result of those injuries. In their original petition, the
2
Robisons alleged West Star was “negligent in failing to provide a reasonably safe place
to work.” By letters dated April 13, and May 5, 2009, the Robisons offered to settle their
claims for the remaining limits of West Star’s insurance policy. The May 5 settlement
offer stated the offer would expire at 5:00 p.m., on May 8, 2009. West Star contends
that one of its attorneys, Levi McCathern II, telephoned one of the Robisons’ attorneys,
Christopher Carver, and orally attempted to accept that settlement offer prior to the
stated deadline. After the deadline passed, West Star again attempted to accept the
settlement offer by faxing a signed written memorandum to the Robisons’ attorneys.
Because the Robisons believed the offer automatically terminated when it was not
timely accepted in the manner required for a binding settlement agreement, they
rejected West Star’s purported acceptance. West Star then offered to settle the case on
May 14, 2009. When that offer was refused, West Star amended its answer to allege
the affirmative defense of settlement. West Star later filed a counterclaim against the
Robisons for breach of the settlement agreement it believed to exist between the
parties. The Robisons filed a no-evidence motion for summary judgment on the
counterclaim on the grounds there was no meeting of the minds and the settlement
offer, as presented, was not timely accepted in a manner that complied with the
requirements of Rule 11 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.
On February 5, 2010, the trial court denied West Star's motion to enforce the
settlement agreement and, at the same time, ruled that the Robisons’ motion for partial
summary judgment was moot. Six months later, on August 26, 2010, West Star filed a
motion to sever its breach of contract counterclaim from the Robisons’ personal injury
cause of action. Although the case was set for trial on September 27, 2010, on
September 14th, the trial court severed West Star’s settlement counterclaim from the
3
underlying case, abated the underlying case and set the counterclaim for trial.1 Despite
the fact that it had previously determined the alleged settlement agreement did not
comply with Rule 11, the trial court then denied the Robisons’ motion for summary
judgment as to West Star’s counterclaim. As a result, the Robisons initiated mandamus
proceedings in this Court that concluded in the conditional granting of a writ of
mandamus directing the trial court to grant summary judgment in favor of the Robisons
on West Star’s then-severed counterclaim for breach of the alleged settlement
agreement. In re Robison, 335 S.W.3d 776 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, orig.
proceeding). West Star attempted to countermand the effect of that ruling by filing a
new petition for mandamus with the Texas Supreme Court. That petition was ultimately
denied on August 31, 2012.2 On September 28, 2012, the trial court vacated the
severance and consolidated the proceedings back into a single cause of action bearing
the original cause number. The trial court then granted the Robisons’ traditional and no-
evidence motions for summary judgment, ruling that West Star take nothing by its
counterclaim.
Subsequently, the case proceeded to trial. Before trial, the parties stipulated that
Charles incurred reasonable and necessary medical expenses in the amount of
$250,618.92. Following five days of testimony, the trial court submitted the Robisons’
liability question to the jury in a single issue asking, “Did the negligence, if any, of [West
Star] proximately cause the occurrence in question?” That issue was preceded by the
“standard” instruction defining “negligence” to mean “the failure to use ordinary care;
1
The severed cause of action was assigned cause number 2009-546,118-B, under the style
“West Star Transportation, Inc., Plaintiff, versus Charles Robison and Cherie Robison.”
2
See http://www.search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID=7090f8dd-975b-4eed-
8990-0e3c658e891d&coa=cossup&DT=PET MAND DISP&MediaID=7bf0cc87-3173-4834-a638-5b080ac
14095
4
that is, failing to do that which a person of ordinary prudence would have done under
the same or similar circumstances or doing that which a person of ordinary prudence
would not have done under the same or similar circumstances.” The jury answered the
negligence question “yes” as to West Star.
In response to question two pertaining to Charles’s damages, the jury also found
(1) past physical pain and mental anguish: $300,000, (2) future physical pain and
mental anguish: $700,000, (3) past loss of earning capacity: $168,540, (4) future loss of
earning capacity: $243,184, (5) past physical impairment: $5,000, (6) past medical care:
$378,718, and (7) future medical care: $3,337,857. In response to question three
pertaining to Cherie’s damages, the jury found (1) past loss of consortium: $250,000
and (2) future loss of consortium: $150,000.
Based upon prior stipulations and the jury’s verdict, on January 18, 2013, the trial
court entered a final judgment in favor of the Robisons and against West Star. In
accordance with one of the prior stipulations, the judgment credited West Star for
benefits its insurer had already paid and awarded actual damages to Charles in the
amount of $4,898,590.78 and to Cherie in the amount of $400,000. The judgment also
awarded prejudgment interest, postjudgment interest and court costs. West Star
subsequently filed its notice of appeal. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
SINGLE OR MULTIPLE “THEORIES” OF RECOVERY
Much of West Star’s arguments pertaining to issues one and two center on its
contention that the Robisons were asserting multiple and distinct theories of liability. By
its first issue, West Star contends the evidence was legally or factually insufficient as to
5
three specific “theories” of liability: (1) failure to use fall protection or other mechanical
devices to assist tarping, (2) failure to require a pre-planning meeting, and (3) failure to
implement a policy whereby West Star would refuse to tarp over-sized loads. By its
second issue, West Star contends the trial court erred in submitting to the jury a broad-
form negligence question which allowed the jury to find it negligent based on any one of
the “multiple and distinct theories of liability” alleged by the Robisons. For purposes of
logical discussion we will address West Star’s second issue first.
ISSUE TWO—BROAD FORM SUBMISSION
Broad-form submission is the preferred method of presentation of issues to the
jury. Isaacs v. Bishop, 249 S.W.3d 100, 108 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2008, pet. denied).
In fact, Rule 277 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure explicitly provides that the court
“shall, whenever feasible, submit the cause upon broad-form submission.” See TEX. R.
CIV. P. 277. That preference notwithstanding, for many years Texas trial courts have
understood that it commits error by submitting a single broad-form liability question that
comingles “invalid” theories of liability with “valid” theories of liability. Crown Life Ins.
Co. v. Casteel, 22 S.W.3d 378, 388 (Tex. 2000).
West Star’s general contention that the trial court erred by submitting multiple
and distinct theories of recovery is misguided because the Robisons were not
submitting distinct theories of liability. From the time the Robisons filed their original
petition, they have always contended that West Star was “negligent in failing to provide
a reasonably safe place to work.” While much to-do has been made about different
“theories of liability” by focusing on various testimony offered concerning what steps
could have been taken to make West Star’s shipping yard a safe work environment, that
6
evidence was equally admissible for purposes of showing that on April 23, 2007, the
work place presented by West Star to Charles was unreasonably dangerous.
Accordingly, we find that West Star’s multiple and distinct theories argument
more appropriately goes to the evidentiary weight of various acts of purported
negligence and does not constitute a distinct “theory” of liability as contemplated by
Casteel. Because the issue was, is, and always has been the single liability theory
concerning whether West Star was negligent in failing to provide a reasonably safe
place to work, we overrule issue two and proceed to an analysis of issue one
concerning the sufficiency of the evidence as to negligence and proximate cause.
ISSUE ONE—NEGLIGENCE AND PROXIMATE CAUSE
Because West Star is a workers’ compensation nonsubscriber, it is not afforded
the common-law defenses of contributory negligence, assumption of risk, or negligence
of a fellow servant. See TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 406.033(a) (West Supp. 2014), Kroger
Co. v. Keng, 23 S.W.3d 347, 350 (Tex. 2000). Accordingly, in order to recover, Charles
and Cherie were only required to establish negligence and two causal nexuses: (1) a
causal nexus between the defendant’s conduct and the event sued upon and (2) a
causal nexus between the event sued upon and the claimant’s injuries. See Jelinek v.
Casas, 328 S.W.3d 526, 532 (Tex. 2010); Integrated of Amarillo, Inc. v. Kirkland, 424
S.W.3d 131, 136 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2014, no pet.); Forrest v. Vital Earth Res., 120
S.W.3d 480, 489 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, pet. denied).
The causal nexus required to support recovery is “proximate cause,” which
consists of two elements, cause-in-fact and foreseeability. IHS Cedars Treatment Ctr.,
7
Inc. v. Mason, 143 S.W.3d 794, 798-99 (Tex. 2004). Cause-in-fact is established when
the act or omission was a substantial factor in bringing about an event, and without
which cause such event would not have occurred. Id. The mere occurrence of an
event causing injury does not establish negligence. Allsup’s Convenience Stores, Inc.
v. Warren, 934 S.W.2d 433, 436 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1996, writ denied). In order to be
a proximate cause, the act or omission complained of must be such that a person using
ordinary care would have foreseen that the event, or some similar event, might
reasonably result therefrom. City of Gladewater v. Pike, 727 S.W.2d 514, 524 (Tex.
1987). There may be more than one proximate cause of an event. Del Lago Partners,
Inc. v. Smith, 307 S.W.3d 762, 770 (Tex. 2010). The test for cause-in-fact is whether
the act or omission was a substantial factor in bringing about the injury "and without it,
the harm would not have occurred." IHS Cedars Treatment Ctr., 143 S.W.3d at 799.
More than one act or omission may be the proximate cause of the same injury. Lee
Lewis Constr., Inc. v. Harrison, 70 S.W.3d 778, 784 (Tex. 2001). Therefore, if West
Star’s conduct was negligent and a substantial factor in bringing about Charles’s injuries
and without it the harm would not have occurred, then there is a sufficient cause-in-fact
to establish proximate cause.
To establish negligence, a party is required to establish the breach of a duty
owed to the injured party, together with damages proximately caused by that breach.
Werner v. Colwell, 909 S.W.2d 866, 869 (Tex. 1995); El Chico Corp. v. Poole, 732
S.W.2d 306, 311 (Tex. 1987). Whether a duty exists is a threshold inquiry and a
question of law. Kroger Co. v. Elwood, 197 S.W.3d 793, 794 (Tex. 2006).
8
Although an employer is not an insurer of his employee’s safety at work, every
employer owes its employees a primary, continuing, and nondelegable duty to use
ordinary care in providing a reasonably safe work place. See Farley v. M M Cattle Co.,
529 S.W.2d 751, 754 (Tex. 1975) (“It is well established that an employer has certain
nondelegable and continuous duties to his employees. Among these are the duty to . . .
furnish a reasonably safe place in which to labor and the duty to furnish reasonably safe
instrumentalities with which employees are to work.”). See also Werner, 909 S.W.2d at
869 (citing Exxon Corp. v. Tidwell, 867 S.W.2d 19, 21 (Tex. 1987)). Accordingly, an
employer may not place an employee in an unreasonably dangerous work environment
without taking appropriate precautions. Furthermore, although an employer owes no
duty to warn of hazards that are commonly known or already appreciated by the
employee, liability cannot be avoided by merely alleging the hazard is known or
appreciated when the employer has created a work environment where an employee is
required to perform a task in an unsafe manner. Elwood, 197 S.W.3d at 794. See also
Town & Country Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Bilyeu, 694 S.W.2d 651, 655 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth 1982, no writ) (employer found negligent for providing employee an unsafe
means of getting down from a trailer that was approximately four feet off the ground). In
addition to the duty to adequately warn an employee of the hazards of employment not
commonly known or appreciated, an employer must provide needed safety equipment,
suitable appliances, or sufficient assistance so that the employee may carry out his or
her assigned duties with reasonable safety. Elwood, 197 S.W.3d at 794; Forrest, 120
S.W.3d at 489. The duty to provide a safe work environment also includes an obligation
to provide adequate help under circumstances where that assistance would be
9
necessary for the safe performance of the work required. Werner, 909 S.W.2d at 869
(citing Western Union Tel. Co. v. Coker, 146 Tex. 190, 240 S.W.2d 977, 978 (1947).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When, as here, both legal and factual sufficiency challenges are raised on
appeal, the reviewing court must first examine the legal sufficiency of the evidence.
See Glover v. Tex. Gen. Indemnity Co., 619 S.W.2d 400, 401 (Tex. 1981). If the
evidence is legally sufficient, we will then proceed to an examination of the factual
sufficiency of the evidence.
LEGAL SUFFICIENCY
In conducting a legal sufficiency review, we must consider the evidence in the
light most favorable to the verdict and indulge every reasonable inference that supports
the verdict. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 821-22 (Tex. 2005). Evidence will
be found to be legally sufficient if it would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to
reach the verdict under review. Id. at 827. In conducting a legal sufficiency analysis
this Court must credit favorable evidence if reasonable jurors could and disregard
contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors could not. Id. The trier of fact is the sole
judge of the credibility of the witnesses and of the weight to be given to their testimony.
Id. at 819. The reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for that of the jury, so
long as the evidence falls within the zone of reasonable disagreement. Id. at 822. But if
the evidence allows only one inference, neither the jurors nor the reviewing court may
disregard it. Id.
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In reviewing a legal sufficiency issue, we may sustain the challenge only when
(a) there is a complete absence of evidence of a vital fact, (b) the court is barred by
rules of law or of evidence from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a
vital fact, (c) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere scintilla of
evidence, or (d) the evidence conclusively establishes the opposite of the vital fact in
question. Keller 168 S.W.3d at 810; King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742,
751 (Tex. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1030, 124 S. Ct. 2097, 158 L. Ed. 2d 711
(2004).
FACTUAL SUFFICIENCY
In reviewing factual sufficiency, the reviewing court must consider, examine, and
weigh the entire record, considering both the evidence in favor of, and contrary to, the
challenged findings. Maritime Overseas Corp. v. Ellis, 971 S.W.2d 402, 406-07 (Tex.
1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1017, 119 S. Ct. 541, 142 L. Ed. 2d 450 (1998). In doing
so, the court no longer considers the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding;
instead, the court considers and weighs all the evidence and sets aside the disputed
finding only if it is so contrary to the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as
to be clearly wrong and unjust. Id. at 407.
ANALYSIS
As a nonsubscriber, the only defense available to West Star was to show that it
was not guilty of negligence proximately causing the injuries or that Charles himself was
guilty of some act which was the sole proximate cause of the occurrence. Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. Robinson, 154 Tex. 336, 280 S.W.2d 238, 239 (1955). Accordingly, if
11
any negligent act by West Star was a substantial factor in bringing about Charles’s fall
and subsequent injuries, and if that event was a foreseeable occurrence without which
the fall and injuries would not have occurred, then liability has been established.
As previously stated, the Robisons contend West Star was negligent and
breached its duty to provide a reasonably safe place to work when it presented Charles
with the unreasonably dangerous task of tarping a thirteen foot high load. West Star
contends the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support the jury’s
conclusion that its negligence proximately caused the injuries sustained by Charles.
Specifically, West Star avers there was no evidence that it (1) failed to warn, train or
supervise Charles, (2) failed to provide adequate fall protection or other safety
equipment, (3) failed to provide a reasonably safe work place or (4) failed to act as a
reasonable employer of ordinary prudence.
Relying on Kroger Co. v. Elwood, West Star posits it owed no duty to warn, train
or supervise Charles because he was an experienced flatbed truck operator with over
thirty years of experience. In Elwood, a grocery store employee brought a negligence
action against his employer after he was injured when a customer slammed a car door
on his hand as he was transferring items from a grocery cart to her vehicle. The
Supreme Court held that, while the duty of ordinary care generally requires an employer
to “warn an employee of the hazards of employment and provide needed safety or
equipment assistance,” the employer “owes no duty to warn of hazards that are
commonly known or already appreciated by the employee.” Elwood, 197 S.W.3d at
794. Here, the dangers associated with man-handling a 150-pound tarpulin while
standing on the top of an uneven and over-sized load are not nearly as apparent as
12
placing your hand in the doorjamb of a door being operated by a third person.
Furthermore, the need for training and supervision in the two scenarios is not
comparable.
West Star further argues that, even if it did owe a duty to warn, train or supervise
Charles, there was no evidence it breached any duty owed. In support of this argument,
West Star contends it was engaged in “ongoing monitoring” and on-the-job training of its
employees. Nevertheless, the evidence shows that the load being worked on by
Charles was an unusually large load that presented an unreasonably dangerous work
environment in the absence of appropriate safety precautions or assistance. By
accepting a load of that size, West Star created an unusually precarious work
environment and an unreasonable risk of harm to its employees—a risk that proved to
be true when Charles fell and was injured. Charles was performing a task that was
unusually precarious and not of the same character of work that he customarily
performed and he was doing so without any special supervision or safety equipment. In
fact, West Star did not even own the equipment necessary to safely perform the task at
hand, choosing instead to borrow a forklift from another business in order to have a
means of raising a 150-pound tarpaulin to the top of a load reaching thirteen feet in
height. Furthermore, Charles was allowed to be lifted to the top of the load while
standing on the pallet carrying the tarpaulin, without a safety harness or other fall-
prevention equipment. Additionally, West Star did not provide other supervision or
assistance. Under these circumstances, the failure to provide needed safety
equipment, suitable tools or sufficient assistance contributed to the danger associated
with the task, and the absence of these safety policies, procedures and equipment
constitutes evidence of the unreasonableness of the task and the risks West Star was
13
willing to assume when it asked Charles to mount that trailer and cover an uncommonly
high load.
But for West Star’s decision to accept that load in the absence of those
precautions, Charles would not have been injured that day. In light of West Star’s lack
of preparedness, that decision was negligent in that it constituted the failure to use
ordinary care; that is, West Star failed to do that which a shipper of ordinary prudence
would have done under the same or similar circumstances, to-wit: either refuse a load
requiring unreasonably dangerous tarping or take appropriate safety precautions.
Furthermore, West Star did what a shipper of ordinary prudence would not have done
under the same or similar circumstances, to-wit: it accepted a load that presented an
unreasonably dangerous work environment for its employees. Because the evidence
was both legally and factually sufficient to support the jury’s verdict as to negligence and
proximate cause, we overrule issue one.
ISSUE THREE—DAMAGES
By its third issue, West Star maintains the evidence was both legally and
factually insufficient to support a portion of the jury’s award of damages. Specifically,
West Star contends Charles did not prove that, in reasonable probability, he would
sustain future pain and mental anguish. West Star further contends the jury’s award of
$243,184 for loss of future earning capacity impermissibly included sums that Charles
earned in the past and that the award of $3,337,857 in future medical expenses
impermissibly included expenses for which Charles has already been compensated.
Alternatively, West Star contends the jury’s awards are excessive.
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As a general principle, we remain mindful that the amount of damages awarded
is a matter uniquely within the prerogative of the fact finder, particularly as it pertains to
subjective damages such as pain and mental anguish. Scott’s Marina at Lake
Grapevine, Ltd. v. Brown, 365 S.W.3d 146, 158 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2012, pet.denied).
“[I]t is only when [a jury’s] award of damages is ‘flagrantly outrageous, extravagant, and
so excessive as to shock the judicial conscience,’ that it may be disturbed.” Id. (quoting
Missouri Pac. R.R. Co. v. Roberson, 25 S.W.3d 251, 257-58 (Tex. App.—Beaumont
2000, no pet). The standard of review for a challenge contending that an award of
damages was excessive is the same as the standard used in a factual sufficiency
review. Id.
FUTURE PHYSICAL PAIN AND MENTAL ANGUISH
In response to a granulated damages issue, the jury awarded $700,000 for
“physical pain and mental anguish” that, in reasonable probability, Charles would
sustain in the future. West Star contends the evidence does not support the existence
or amount of these future damages and it begins its argument by attacking the “mental
anguish” aspect of the jury’s verdict.3 See Gunn Infiniti, Inc. v. O’Byrne, 996 S.W.2d
854, 860 (Tex. 1999) (noting that courts should “closely scrutinize” awards of mental
anguish damages). The jury’s verdict was not, however, limited to mental anguish
damages, and it specifically included damages for physical pain Charles would, in
reasonable probability, sustain in the future. As it pertains to the pain aspect of the
3
West Star does not challenge the jury’s finding that Charles sustained damages of $300,000 for
physical pain and mental anguish in the past. West Star merely contends the evidence is legally and
factually insufficient to establish he will, in reasonable probability, continue to sustain similar damages in
the future.
15
jury’s verdict, West Star simply contends that neither Charles nor any physician ever
testified that he would likely never be pain-free.
In reaching its decision, the jurors had before it Charles’s medical records which
provided details regarding his injuries. In addition, they heard expert medical testimony
regarding the nature and extent of his injuries detailing how he sustained a traumatic
brain injury, including the loss of brain material, which will significantly affect him for the
remainder of his life. They also heard testimony concerning how his injuries affected his
long-term emotional stability resulting in anger management issues and depression. In
sum, this evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the jury’s damage verdict
pertaining to the future aspect of his physical pain and mental anguish.
LOST EARNING CAPACITY IN THE FUTURE
The jury also awarded Charles $243,184 for the loss of earning capacity that, in
reasonable probability, he would sustain in the future. West Star contends this figure
impermissibly includes damages that were sustained in the past. Specifically, West
Star contends the economist who testified as to the loss of earning capacity improperly
differentiated between past loss of earning capacity and future loss of earning capacity
because he drew the line between the two as of the date of his report rather than the
date of trial. See Bituminous Casualty Corp. v. Cleveland, 223 S.W.3d 485, 491 (Tex.
App.—Amarillo 2006, no pet.) (holding that “[l]oss of past earning capacity is the
plaintiff’s diminished capacity to earn a living during the period between the injury and
the date of trial,” and “[l]oss of future earning capacity is the plaintiff’s diminished
capacity to earn a living after trial”) (emphasis added). West Star reasons that it was
harmed because the jury’s award for future loss of earning capacity necessarily
16
included losses which accrued between the time the report was prepared and the date
of trial.
Testimony from the Robisons’ economist, a person West Star stipulated was
qualified to render an expert opinion, established that Charles’s lost earning capacity in
the past was $168,540, and in the future was $214,942 if he retired at age 65, or
$243,184 if he retired at age 66.4 The jury awarded $168,540 for loss of earning
capacity sustained in the past and $243,184 for loss of earning capacity that, in
reasonable probability, would be sustained in the future. As such, the jury did not award
overlapping damages for the loss of earning capacity sustained by Charles. Without
further analysis, this testimony alone is sufficient to enable any reasonable and fair-
minded person to reach the verdict under review and that verdict was not so contrary to
the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or
manifestly unjust. Accordingly, we find the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to
support the jury’s damage verdict pertaining to lost earning capacity in the future.
FUTURE MEDICAL EXPENSES
Finally, and for similar reasons, West Star contends the evidence does not
support the full award of $3,337,857 for future medical care expenses. For future
medical expenses to be recoverable, the evidence must establish that there is a
reasonable medical probability that such expenses will be incurred in the future. Scott’s
Marina, 365 S.W.3d at 160. West Star suggests the evidence is legally and factually
insufficient because that figure was based upon a life care plan prepared by a
4
Unquestionably, the line of demarcation the expert used to differentiate between past and future
loss of earning capacity was “the date of my writing the report.” That date, however, was never presented
to the jury.
17
rehabilitation physician nearly three years before trial. The life care plan contained
various estimates based on different assumptions. Option I was based on the
assumption that Charles would receive care from a spouse or family member while
remaining in the home. Under this option, the witness opined that future medical care
would cost $1,970,618. Option II assumed Charles would receive care from a facility or
institutional type model and that future medical care based on this assumption would
cost $3,717,518.28.5 A third option assumed Charles would receive care from a facility
which would provide more closely supervised care than that provided in Option II.
Using this option, the rehabilitation physician projected that future medical care could
cost as much as $5,528,824.52.6 The rehabilitation physician did not reduce any of the
figures in his plan to their present values and instead relied upon the economist to do
so.
While a jury may follow the testimony of an expert witness as to future medical
expenses, it may also consider the nature of the plaintiff’s injuries, as well as the nature
and extent of medical care rendered before trial and the plaintiff’s condition at the time
of trial. Scott’s Marina, 365 S.W.3d at 160. Because the jury verdict for future medical
care was within the range of estimates supported by the testimony of the rehabilitation
physician and the economist, we find the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to
support the jury’s damage verdict pertaining to future medical expenses. Issue three is
overruled.
5
The economist testified that the present value of this amount would be $3,337,857—the amount
actually awarded by the jury.
6
The present value of this amount was $5,412,014.
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ISSUE FOUR—SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO W EST STAR’S AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE OF
SETTLEMENT AND COUNTERCLAIM FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT
By its fourth and final issue, West Star contends the trial court erred in granting a
partial summary judgment in favor of Charles and Cherie as to its affirmative defense of
settlement and its counterclaim for breach of contract. Specifically, West Star’s
complaint has three subparts: (1) this Court should not have reviewed via mandamus
the trial court’s interlocutory orders concerning the affirmative defense of settlement or
the counterclaim for breach of contract, (2) the trial court erred in granting Charles and
Cherie’s no-evidence motion for partial summary judgment because West Star’s
affirmative defense of settlement was not based on Rule 11 and (3) the trial court erred
in granting partial summary judgment because there were genuine issues of material
fact concerning whether the settlement agreement complied with Rule 11.
While West Star spends much of its brief attempting to articulate perceived
“procedural irregularities” heretofore previously rejected by the Texas Supreme Court,7
ultimately, its complaint is that the trial court’s orders granting summary judgment
deprived it of the affirmative defense of settlement and the related counterclaim for
breach of contract. Therefore, essential to any construction of West Star’s complaint of
non-harmless error is its contention that there was, in law and in fact, a binding
agreement with Charles and Cherie to settle the claims being asserted by their lawsuit.
Without an enforceable agreement to settle, West Star’s complaints are merely
harmless error. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.1.
7
See footnote 2, supra.
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In that regard, Rule 11 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure mandates:
Unless otherwise provided in these Rules, no agreement between
attorneys or parties touching any suit pending will be enforced unless it be
in writing, signed and filed with the papers as part of the record, or unless
it be made in open court and entered of record.
(Emphasis added.)
Rule 11 was designed to avoid disputes concerning oral settlement agreements.
Padilla v. La France, 907 S.W.2d 454, 461 (Tex. 1995). In Kennedy v. Hyde, 682
S.W.2d 525 (Tex. 1984), the Supreme Court stated that the policy behind Rule 11 is
clear:
The rationale underlying Rule 11 is sensible and contributes to efficient
court administration. Agreements and stipulations are welcomed by the
courts because they limit the matters in controversy and expedite trial
proceedings. Rule 11 ensures that such agreements do not themselves
become sources of controversy, impending resolution of suits. The
requirements of Rule 11 are not onerous; the benefits are substantial.
Id. at 530 (emphasis added).
West Star contends the “in writing” requirement of Rule 11 was nonessential to
the formation of an agreement because the original offer of settlement “specified only
the time for acceptance of the offer (i.e., by 5:00 p.m. on May 8); it did not specify the
manner of acceptance or require that any acceptance be in writing.” The Robisons
disagree. West Star’s argument completely ignores the plain language of Rule 11
which requires that any settlement agreement of a pending suit be in writing and this
kind of dispute concerning the enforceability of a settlement agreement is the very
scenario the “in writing” requirement of Rule 11 was designed to prevent.
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West Star further contends that, even if Rule 11 did apply, the "in writing"
requirement was met by the written settlement offer itself and, therefore, the trial court
erred in granting summary judgment because West Star’s oral acceptance of that offer
presented a disputed fact issue. Even assuming that a factual dispute existed as to
whether West Star orally accepted the settlement offer via McCathern’s telephone
conversation with Carter, that is not a dispute pertaining to a relevant issue because
West Star's oral acceptance of the settlement offer, even if it occurred, does not comply
with the “in writing” requirement of Rule 11. Because there were no genuine issues of
material fact pertaining to the existence of an enforceable settlement agreement, the
trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of the Robisons on the
issues of the affirmative defense of settlement or the counterclaim for breach of
contract. Because there was no enforceable settlement agreement, West Star was not
harmed by the trial court’s granting of summary judgment. Accordingly, issue four is
overruled.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Patrick A. Pirtle
Justice
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