Town & Country Suites, L.C. v. Harris Country Appraisal District

Opinion issued January 27, 2015
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
————————————
NO. 01-13-00869-CV
———————————
TOWN & COUNTRY SUITES, L.C., Appellant
V.
HARRIS COUNTY APPRAISAL DISTRICT, Appellee
On Appeal from the 215th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 2012-55900
OPINION
On July 1, 2014, we issued an opinion in this case. Appellee HCAD filed a
motion for rehearing. We deny the motion but withdraw our opinion and judgment
of July 1 and issue this opinion and accompanying judgment in their stead. Our
disposition of the case remains unchanged.
This is an appeal from a property valuation dispute between the Harris
County Appraisal District and Town & Country Suites, L.C., the owner of the
property being appraised for tax purposes. In two issues, Town & Country
contends that the trial court erred by granting HCAD’s plea to the jurisdiction
because (1) a newly enacted Tax Code provision permits Town & Country to
amend the pleadings appealing an appraisal determination to correct a
misidentification 1 of the property owner and, alternatively, (2) the naming error in
this case should be considered misnomer instead of misidentification.
Because recent amendments to the Tax Code compel the conclusion that the
trial court did not lack subject matter jurisdiction, we reverse and remand.
Background
John Sheehan, Robert Gowan, and Barden Patterson formerly owned the
property that is the subject of this tax valuation dispute. On November 12, 1997,
the three conveyed their property to Town & Country.
When HCAD issued its annual notice of the property’s appraisal value in
2012, a notice of protest was filed, not by Town & Country (the current owner of
the property), but by “Gowan Sheenan & Patterson” (a grouping of the individual,
prior owners’ last names, though with a spelling error). The Harris County
1
Misidentification occurs when a pleading lists as a party to the litigation the wrong
individual or entity; on the other hand, misnomer occurs when the proper party is
included in the suit but listed with an incorrect name. See Reddy P’ship/5900 N.
Fwy. L.P. v. Harris Cnty. Appraisal Dist., 370 S.W.3d 373, 376–77 (Tex. 2012).
2
Appraisal Review Board responded with an Order Determining Protest, addressed
to “Gowan Sheenan & Patterson,” notifying “[t]he above property owner” of the
property’s assigned valuation. “Sheenan Gowan and Patterson Gowan”—another
variation of the prior owners’ last names, again with a spelling error—filed an
appeal of that decision in district court.
The parties agree that “Sheenan Gowan and Patterson Gowan” is a
misnomer for “Gowan Sheenan & Patterson” and that the filing by one has the
same legal effect as a filing in the name of the other. Thus, for the purpose of this
appeal, the party that filed the protest also appealed the Board decision. But that
party was not the current owner, Town & Country. There is no dispute that the
property was correctly identified in the appeal.
HCAD answered the Gowan suit. Seven months later, HCAD filed a plea to
the jurisdiction and attached a copy of the 1997 warranty deed listing Town &
Country as the property owner. HCAD contended that the trial court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction and was required to dismiss the suit because the true property
owner—Town & Country—had not filed an appeal within the 60-day limitations
period, as required by section 42.21(a) of the Tax Code. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN.
§ 42.21(a) (West Supp. 2014). Town & Country responded that “Gowan Sheenan
and Patterson” had been listed on the HCAD appraisal rolls as the property owner
“for at least 15 years” and that it mistakenly filed suit under the Gowan name due
3
to HCAD’s record error. Town & Country attempted to correct the error by filing
an amended petition naming Town & Country as the property owner.
HCAD filed a second plea to the jurisdiction, arguing that an amendment to
identify a different entity as the property owner is not permitted. According to
HCAD, the trial court never “acquire[d] subject-matter jurisdiction and the
[Board]’s determination became final” because the property owner was not the
party that pursued the appeal within the statutory deadline. HCAD again requested
dismissal of the suit.
Town & Country responded by alerting the trial court to an amendment to
section 42.21 of the Tax Code, which Town & Country argued changed the law to
allow the trial court to retain jurisdiction despite the naming error. See TEX. TAX
CODE ANN. § 42.21(h) (West Supp. 2014) (effective June 14, 2013). Alternatively,
Town & Country argued that the error should be viewed as a misnomer, which
may be corrected by amendment and does not require dismissal. TEX. TAX CODE
ANN. § 42.21(e).
The trial court granted HCAD’s plea to the jurisdiction. Town & Country
timely appealed.
4
Standards of Review
A. Pleas to the jurisdiction and standing
A plea to the jurisdiction challenges the trial court’s subject matter
jurisdiction to hear a case. Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 554
(Tex. 2000); Pineda v. City of Houston, 175 S.W.3d 276, 279 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.). Standing is a component of subject matter
jurisdiction and is a constitutional prerequisite to maintaining a lawsuit under
Texas law. Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 443–45
(Tex. 1993). Subject matter jurisdiction is essential to the authority of a court to
decide a case and is never presumed. Id. at 443–44.
The plaintiff has the burden to allege facts affirmatively demonstrating that
the trial court has subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 446; Richardson v. First Nat’l
Life Ins. Co., 419 S.W.2d 836, 839 (Tex. 1967). The existence of subject matter
jurisdiction is a question of law. State Dep’t of Highways & Pub. Transp. v.
Gonzalez, 82 S.W.3d 322, 327 (Tex. 2002); Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964
S.W.2d 922, 928 (Tex. 1998). Therefore, we review de novo the trial court’s ruling
on a plea to the jurisdiction. Mayhew, 964 S.W.2d at 928.
Town & Country argues that the 2013 amendment to section 42.21 of the
Tax Code has changed the law on subject matter jurisdiction concerning the
5
standing of misidentified property owners. We, therefore, consider the standard of
review for statutory construction as well.
B. Statutory construction
We review issues of statutory construction de novo. Loaisiga v. Cerda, 379
S.W.3d 248, 254–55 (Tex. 2012). The Texas Supreme Court has repeatedly held
that when courts construe statutes, they should start with the text because it is the
best indication of the Legislature’s intent. See Fresh Coat, Inc. v. K–2, Inc., 318
S.W.3d 893, 901 (Tex. 2010); Entergy Gulf States, Inc. v. Summers, 282 S.W.3d
433, 437 (Tex. 2009). “When the words of a statute are unambiguous, then, this
first canon is also the last: ‘judicial inquiry is complete.’” Conn. Nat’l Bank v.
Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254, 112 S. Ct. 1146, 1149 (1992) (quoting Rubin v.
United States, 449 U.S. 424, 430, 101 S. Ct. 698, 701 (1981)). A court should
interpret a statute by reference to its language alone when it can do so. Fresh Coat,
318 S.W.3d at 901. Courts, however, are not confined to isolated statutory words
or phrases; instead they review the entire act to determine legislative intent.
Meritor Auto., Inc. v. Ruan Leasing Co., 44 S.W.3d 86, 90 (Tex. 2001); City of
Houston v. Hildebrandt, 265 S.W.3d 22, 25 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008,
pet. denied).
6
Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Neither party disputes that the property that is the subject of the HCAD
valuation was correctly identified. Instead, the dispute is whether the correct entity
pursued the appeal of the HCAD valuation and, if not, whether a procedural
mechanism exists under the Tax Code to correct the misidentification and avoid
dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Chapter 41 of the Tax Code permits property owners to protest the appraised
value of their property to their local Board. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 41.41–.47
(West 2008 & Supp. 2014). Chapter 42 grants the right to seek judicial review of
an adverse decision by the Board on a protest. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 42.01–
.031 (West 2008 & Supp. 2014). Section 42.01 provides that a “property owner is
entitled to appeal . . . an order of the appraisal review board determining . . . a
protest by the property owner . . . .” TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 42.01(a)(1)(A) (West
Supp. 2014). “Rights under the Code are premised upon ownership of the property
at issue.” KM–Timbercreek, L.L.C. v. Harris Cnty. Appraisal Dist., 312 S.W.3d
722, 726 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.). With a few specifically
enumerated exceptions not applicable here, the property owner is the only entity
with standing to appeal a Board decision to the district court. Id. at 726–27;
Tourneau Hous., Inc. v. Harris Cnty. Appraisal Dist., 24 S.W.3d 907, 909 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.).
7
A. Pre-2011 law concerning misidentified property owners and subject
matter jurisdiction over their appeals
Before 2011, both this Court and the Fourteenth Court of Appeals
consistently held that misidentification of a property owner in an appeal of a Board
decision required dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction if the statutory
limitations period had expired and the true property owner was not yet a party to
the appeal. See, e.g., Timbercreek, 312 S.W.3d at 729; GSL Welcome BP 32 L.L.C.
v. Harris Cnty. Appraisal Dist., No. 01-10-00189-CV, 2010 WL 4484361, at *3
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 10, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“The Tax
Code procedures for adjudicating a property-tax valuation protest are the exclusive
remedies available to property owners. . . . If no proper party seeks judicial review
of the board’s decision . . . within the statutory time period, the trial court does not
acquire subject-matter jurisdiction over the protest, and the [Board’s] valuation
becomes final when the statutory time period expires.”); Woodway Drive L.L.C. v.
Harris Cnty. Appraisal Dist., 311 S.W.3d 649, 652–53 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2010, no pet.) (same).
Thus, misidentification required dismissal. Misnomer, on the other hand, did
not. See Reddy P’ship/5900 N. Fwy. L.P. v. Harris Cnty. Appraisal Dist., 370
S.W.3d 373, 376–77 (Tex. 2012).
8
Barb. 2011 amendments to Tax Code analyzed
In 2011, the Legislature amended the Tax Code to add section 42.016, which
allows a person who owned the property during the applicable tax year to intervene
in an on-going appeal and have standing. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 42.016 (West
Supp. 2014); Storguard Invs., L.L.C. v. Harris Cnty. Appraisal Dist., 369 S.W.3d
605, 613 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.).
In Storguard, this Court held that a property owner could “rely upon another
person’s completion of the administrative protest process instead of requiring that
the party seeking intervention personally exhaust its administrative remedies,” as
had been required under pre-2011 law. Storguard, 369 S.W.3d at 613. The
intervention was allowed only if the person who initially protested and appealed
the decision had standing independent of the intervening property owner’s
standing. See id. at 613–15.
The property owner in Storguard argued that another Tax Code amendment,
found in section 41.44, could provide that standing. See id. at 614. Section 41.44(e)
states as follows:
[A] notice of protest may not be found to be untimely or insufficient
based on a finding of incorrect ownership if the notice: (1) identifies
as the property owner a person who is, for the tax year at issue: . . .
(B) the person shown on the appraisal records as the owner of the
property, if that person filed the protest; . . . or (2) uses a misnomer of
a person described by Subdivision (1).
TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 41.44(e) (effective September 1, 2011).
9
This Court explained the new provision as follows:
This statute allows a . . . previous owner of the property who is still
listed as the record owner in the appraisal records to administratively
protest the property’s initial appraised value, which then provides the
basis for a person in [the current property owner]’s position to take
advantage of this protest process and intervene in the judicial review
proceeding at a later date.
Storguard, 369 S.W.3d at 613. Nonetheless, this Court held that the Storguard
property owner was unable to take advantage of section 41.44(e) because that
provision’s effective date (September 1, 2011) was after the date on which the
challenged protest had been filed. Id. at 614. As a result, the previous property
owner did not have standing to protest the appraisal or seek judicial review of that
decision, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over its appeal, and the
true property owner did not have a suit in which to properly intervene. Id. at 614–
15.
Using a similar rationale, this Court also rejected the Storguard property
owner’s alternative argument that it had standing because section 42.21(e) allows
amendment of a petition for review to “correct or change the name of a party.” Id.
at 614. That provision applies only to petitions for review that have been timely
filed under Chapter 42. See id. The protest and petition for review in Storguard
could not be considered “timely filed” because they were submitted by a party
without standing due to the inapplicability of the new section 41.44(e) provision.
10
Id. Thus, this Court concluded that the property owner could not rely on section
42.21(e) to establish standing.
As Storguard demonstrates, the 2011 amendments to the Tax Code provided
property owners new avenues for avoiding dismissal based on a lack of standing,
though the property owner in that particular case was unable to avail itself of both
amendments due to their effective dates.
C. 2013 amendment to section 42.21
The Tax Code was amended again in 2013 to add subsection (h) to section
42.21. It states as follows:
(h) The court has jurisdiction over an appeal under this chapter
brought on behalf of a property owner or lessee . . . regardless of
whether the petition correctly identifies the plaintiff as the owner or
lessee of the property or correctly describes the property so long as
[1] the property was the subject of an appraisal review board order,
[2] the petition was filed within the period required by Subsection (a),
and [3] the petition provides sufficient information to identify the
property that is the subject of the petition. Whether the plaintiff is the
proper party to bring the petition . . . must be addressed by means of a
special exception and correction of the petition by amendment as
authorized by Subsection (e) and may not be the subject of a plea to
the jurisdiction . . . . If the petition is amended to add a plaintiff, the
court on motion shall enter a docket control order to provide proper
deadlines in response to the addition of the plaintiff.
TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 42.21(h) (effective June 14, 2013) (emphasis added).
Town & Country argues that section 42.21(h) was added to allow judicial
review of tax appraisals when a protest and appeal have been filed that correctly
11
identify the property but misidentify the property owner. Town & Country also
argues that the legislative history for the 2013 amendment supports its contention.
HCAD argues that this section does not apply to cases of misidentification
but is, instead, strictly limited to cases of misnomer, meaning that the actual
property owner has appealed but is listed under the wrong name. HCAD argues
that any other reading would create constitutional standing issues and that there is
no indication the Legislature “meant to overturn the many judicial opinions
requiring a property owner to bring suit,” such as Timbercreek, 312 S.W.3d 722.
Town & Country replies that HCAD’s interpretation of the statute—limiting
it to cases of misnomer—would “strip 42.21(h) of all utility, essentially
eviscerating any remedial promise held by the rule.”
The 2013 amendment to section 42.21 has not been subject to judicial
review. Whether the 2013 amendment allows subject matter jurisdiction over tax
suits involving misidentification is a question of first impression. We construe the
statute in accordance with established rules of statutory construction.
D. Section 42.21 is not limited to cases misnomer
1. The statute’s plain language indicates that something other than
the misnaming of a single party is being addressed
Section 42.21(h) concerns appeals that have been “brought on behalf of” a
property owner. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 42.21(h). Two other subsections of
Section 42.21, by comparison, refer to petitions “filed by an owner.” TEX. TAX
12
CODE ANN. § 42.21(f), (g). We presume that every word of a statute has been
included or excluded for a reason. City of San Antonio v. City of Boerne, 111
S.W.3d 22, 29 (Tex. 2003); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 311.021(2) (West 2013).
Thus, the use of the phrase “brought on behalf of a property owner” signifies that
the Legislature was contemplating jurisdiction over suits that were not brought by
the property owner directly. This is contrary to HCAD’s interpretation of the
amendment, seeking to limit subject matter jurisdiction to cases in which the
correct entity sued but was merely misnamed.
Additionally, section 42.21(h) provides that there is subject matter
jurisdiction “regardless of whether the petition correctly identifies the plaintiff as
the owner or lessee of the property.” TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 42.21(h) (emphasis
added). When construing a statute, we will honor its plain language unless its
meaning is ambiguous or such an interpretation would lead to absurd results.
Combs v. Health Care Servs. Corp., 401 S.W.3d 623, 630 (Tex. 2013). In doing so,
“[w]ords and phrases shall be read in context and construed according to the rules
of grammar and common usage.” TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 311.011(a) (West
2013). Further, we assume the Legislature purposefully selected one word over the
other. See Old Am. Cnty. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Sanchez, 149 S.W.3d 111, 115 (Tex.
2004) (“[W]e presume that every word of a statute has been included or excluded
for a reason . . . .”).
13
The Legislature chose to include the term “identifies” instead of “names.”
The term “names” is generally associated with misnomer, while “identifies” is
linked with the concept of misidentification. Compare In re Greater Hous.
Orthopaedic Specialists, Inc., 295 S.W.3d 323, 325 (Tex. 2009) (“A misnomer
occurs when a party misnames itself or another party, but the correct parties are
involved.”) with Hernandez v. ISE, Inc., No. 04-06-00888-CV, 2008 WL 80005, at
*4 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Jan. 9, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.) (discussing claim of
misidentification in which trial court mistakenly “identifies” the defendant). We
agree with Town & Country that the choice of the term “identifies” indicates that
this provision is meant to deal with misidentification, not misnomer.
Furthermore, section 42.21(h) sets forth the mechanism that applies when
the plaintiff is not “the proper party to bring the petition.” TEX. TAX CODE ANN.
§ 42.21(h) (emphasis added). This language, likewise, speaks in terms of multiple,
alternative parties instead of the typical misnomer scenario that involves only one
party.
Lastly, section 42.21(h) specifically contemplates that a petition may be
amended to “add a plaintiff” if the plaintiff that brought the petition is not the
proper party. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 42.21(h). If misnomer were the only
application of this section, no new plaintiffs would need to be added. This
language, like the language previously discussed, supports the conclusion that
14
section 42.21(h) applies to misidentification. See Columbia Med. Ctr. of Las
Colinas, Inc. v. Hogue, 271 S.W.3d 238, 256 (Tex. 2008) (stating that construction
should be avoided that would “render[] any part of the statute meaningless or
superfluous.”).
2. Reference to section 42.21(e) does not limit application to
misnomer cases
Next we consider HCAD’s argument that reference to subsection
(e) indicates that subsection (h) applies only to misnomer.
Subsection (h) mandates that the issue of a plaintiff not being the proper
“party” to bring a petition “must be addressed by means of a special exception and
correction of the petition by amendment as authorized by subsection (e) and may
not be the subject of a plea to the jurisdiction . . . .” TEX. TAX CODE ANN.
§ 42.21(h). HCAD argues that the Legislature’s reference to subjection (e) within
subsection (h) indicates its intent that subsection (h) apply only to misnomer cases.
While it is correct that subsection (e) has been applied to misnomer cases
(see, e.g., Reddy P’ship/5900 N. Fwy. L.P., 370 S.W.3d at 373), it is not limited to
that context. As this Court discussed in Storguard, subsection (e) could also be
implicated when a previous property owner loses a protest, files a petition for
review, then seeks to amend its petition to add the current property owner as a
party. Storguard, 369 S.W.3d at 612. In that situation, a petition could be amended
under section 42.21(e) to name the current (correct) property owner after the
15
previous property owner (who has no current interest in the property) filed the
protest and appealed that decision. The parties then could argue that the previous
property owner has standing under section 41.44(e). Id. at 614–15 (concluding that,
given timing of that particular appeal, newly added section 41.44(e) could not be
relied on to satisfy standing requirement).
Thus, contrary to HCAD’s assertion, section 42.21(e) does not apply only to
cases of misnomer. Likewise, reference to subsection (e) within subsection
(h) does not indicate legislative intent that subsection (h) be limited to misnomer
cases. Furthermore, subsection (e)’s allowance of an amendment to correct
misnomer raises the issue of why the Legislature would have further amended the
statute to include subsection (h) if it accomplishes nothing more than what was
already permissible under subsection (e)—amendment to correct misnomer. We
must construe a statute to give effect to all of the statute’s provisions, leaving none
of its parts without meaning or import. See City of San Antonio, 111 S.W.3d at 29;
Harris Cnty. Water Control & Improvement Dist. No. 99 v. Duke, 59 S.W.3d 333,
336 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.); Hogue, 271 S.W.3d at 256.
3. Subsection (h) has a broader application
Before the 2013 amendment, a party had to meet three jurisdictional
requirements: 1) it had to be the property owner (or designated agent), 2) it had to
exhaust its administrative remedies, and 3) it had to file an appeal within 60 days.
16
Storguard, 369 S.W.3d at 612. In the case of misnomer, the mislabeled party met
all three of these requirements, and thus the plaintiff had standing and could
replead under (e). Reddy P’ship/5900 N. Fwy. LP, 370 S.W.3d at 377. But in a
misidentification case, no one had standing. The appealing protester was not the
property owner, and the true property owner—who never actually filed a protest—
failed to exhaust his administrative remedies; therefore, both lacked standing.
Because no one had standing, HCAD’s decision on the protest would become
unchallengeable. See KM-Timbercreek, 312 S.W.3d at 728; see also Storguard,
369 S.W.3d at 612.
Section (h) is designed to solve this problem. So long as the appeal is
“brought on behalf of a property owner,” the court has jurisdiction. TEX. TAX CODE
ANN. § 42.21(h). Even if the original petition misidentifies the plaintiff as the
property owner, the true property owner has standing because he “is considered to
have exhausted . . . administrative remedies.” Id. Therefore, (h) fills in the gaps
that otherwise would prevent the court from obtaining subject-matter jurisdiction.
Based on the text of section 42.21(h), other relevant Tax Code amendments,
and the implications of the various asserted interpretations when reading these
provisions as a whole, we conclude that 42.21(h) is not limited to cases of
misnomer and can be relied on by property owners in cases of misidentification.
17
E. HCAD’s argument that this interpretation will lead to advisory opinions
HCAD argues that this interpretation is unreasonable because it would result
in a violation of established constitutional standing requirements. See Combs, 401
S.W.3d at 630 (stating that statute should not be interpreted using plain meaning of
words if doing so would lead to absurd results). We, therefore, consider this
constitutional challenge to our interpretation of the statute.
The Legislature dictates the scope of subject matter jurisdiction for trial
courts to hear appeals of administrative tax decisions. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN.
§ 42.01 (providing that property owner is entitled to appeal Board’s order). In
addition to granting subject matter jurisdiction, the Legislature has authority to
revise its statutes to alter jurisdictional requirements. See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med.
Ctr. at Dall. v. Estate of Arancibia ex rel. Vasquez-Arancibia, 244 S.W.3d 455,
459 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007), aff’d, 324 S.W.3d 544, 547–49 (noting that
Legislature amended Government Code to make statutory prerequisites to suit
jurisdictional requirements, thereby altering subject matter jurisdiction), overruled
on other grounds, Rusk State Hosp. v. Black, 392 S.W.3d 88, 95 & n.3 (Tex. 2012).
HCAD argues that interpreting the amendment to section 42.21 to expand
subject matter jurisdiction to include cases in which property owners have been
misidentified would be “unreasonable” in that it would raise constitutional
standing concerns. Specifically, HCAD argues that it would lead to advisory
18
opinions being issued because misidentified property owners do not have standing
to challenge tax valuations in the trial courts. Instead, only the actual property
owner may appeal the tax valuation. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 42.01. As the
party challenging the constitutionality of the amended statute, as we have
interpreted it, HCAD “bears the burden of demonstrating that the enactment fails to
meet constitutional requirements.” Enron Corp. v. Spring Indep. Sch. Dist., 922
S.W.2d 931, 934 (Tex. 1996). HCAD’s argument fails for two reasons.
First, there is a statutory provision that provides a defendant aware of a
misidentification with a procedure to rectify the error and allow the correct party to
be brought into the suit. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 42.21(h) (permitting HCAD to
raise issue of misidentification through special exception and plaintiff to amend
petition to correctly identify property owner). Use of this procedure allows the
parties to correct a misidentification error, bring the proper parties before the trial
court, and avoid the issuance of an advisory opinion. That subsection
(h) contemplates that the original plaintiff might not be “the proper party to bring
the petition” and that another plaintiff might be “add[ed]” indicates that a proper
party—the true owner, lessor, or designated agent—is ultimately still required.
TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 42.21(h).
Second, it is only if HCAD fails to raise the issue of misidentification that a
final judgment could be entered in a suit brought by a person who, potentially, is
19
not the actual property owner. But that same possibility existed before the statute
was amended. There always is a possibility that a party will be misidentified and, if
uncorrected, that a judgment will result that does not affect the true parties in
interest. Cf. Sanchez v. Braden, No. 05-97-00811-CV, 1999 WL 378426, at *2
(Tex. App.—Dallas June 11, 1999, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for
publication) (refusing to modify trial court’s order to grant appellant judgment on
merits because judgment on merits in appellant’s favor would be “a purely
advisory opinion”). In this case, HCAD raised the issue by referring to the
warranty deed for the property.
The possibility that an uncorrected misidentification might result in an
“advisory opinion” is not a valid basis for rejecting the clear wording of the
amendment or refusing to give it effect. See Combs, 401 S.W.3d at 630 (requiring
reviewing courts to honor plain language of statute unless that interpretation would
lead to absurd results); see also Enron Corp., 922 S.W.2d at 934 (“In determining
the constitutionality of a statute, we begin with a presumption that it is
constitutional.”).
We reject HCAD’s argument that this interpretation of section 42.21(h) will
impermissibly lead to advisory opinions.
20
F. HCAD’s argument that the appeal was not brought “on behalf of”
Town & Country
HCAD’s final argument is that subsection (h) applies only to appeals
brought “on behalf of” the property owner and Gowan never claimed to be acting
on behalf of the property owner but, rather, to be the true property owner. While
the statute does not elaborate on what would constitutes an appeal “brought on
behalf of the property owner,” the full text of subsection (h) contemplates the
scenario of owner misidentification, as occurred with Gowan and Town
& Country. For example, subsection (h) grants jurisdiction “regardless of whether
the petition correctly identifies the plaintiff as the owner.” TEX. TAX CODE ANN.
§ 42.21(h). And the newly added provisions, when read together, extend standing
to a party who is not the true owner but is listed on the appraisal rolls and is added
to the lawsuit. Further, newly added subsection (h) provides that the identity of the
property owner is no longer a basis for a plea to the jurisdiction but should, instead,
be dealt with by another motion.
Thus, the language selected by the Legislature and included in the statutory
amendment supports the conclusion that an appeal qualifies as being “brought on
behalf of a property owner” if an entity is mistakenly listed as a property owner
due to misidentification. It would be inconsistent with the language of the statute
and the legislative intent, as expressed through that language, to require that the
party mistakenly listed as the property owner have declared that he was acting “on
21
behalf of” a different property owner—a declaration that, by its terms, would
require him to realize the concurrent misidentification error. Accordingly, we
reject HCAD’s argument that Gowan, Sheehan, and Patterson must produce
evidence that they intended to act on behalf of a separate entity when they initially
pursued the appeal.
Thus, we conclude that the newly enacted subsection 42.21(h) grants a trial
court subject matter jurisdiction over a suit appealing a Board decision as long as
the suit meets the property identification and filing requirements contained in
section 42.21(h), even if the petition misidentifies the property owner and must be
corrected through amendment. We, therefore, conclude that the trial court erred by
holding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction and by granting HCAD’s plea to
the jurisdiction. We sustain Town & Country’s first issue. We, therefore, do not
reach the second issue.
Conclusion
We reverse the trial court’s order granting HCAD’s second plea to the
jurisdiction and remand for further proceedings between Town & Country and
HCAD.
Harvey Brown
Justice
Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Higley and Brown.
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