Roland Mouton, Jr. and Delorian Morgan Jones v. Christian Faith Missionary Baptist Church, Clarence Andrews, Marvin Nixon, Walter Ervin, Corey Wilson, Marvin Rausaw, Preston Cook and Christopher Douglas

Opinion issued May 24, 2016
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
————————————
NO. 01-15-00088-CV
———————————
ROLAND MOUTON, JR. AND DELORIAN MORGAN JONES, Appellants
V.
CHRISTIAN FAITH MISSIONARY BAPTIST CHURCH, CLARENCE
ANDREWS, MARVIN NIXON, WALTER ERVIN, COREY WILSON,
MARVIN RAUSAW, PRESTON COOK, AND CHRISTOPHER DOUGLAS,
Appellees
On Appeal from the 127th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 2012-73452
OPINION
Appellants Roland Mouton, Jr. and Delorian Morgan Jones sued Christian
Faith Missionary Baptist Church, its pastor, Corey Wilson, and other church
members, including Clarence Andrews, Marvin Nixon, Walter Ervin, Marvin
Rausaw, Preston Cook, and Christopher Douglas, after appellants were expelled
from church membership and Wilson was elected as the church’s pastor.
Appellants sought various declarations and money damages related to appellants’
expulsion and the church’s purported failures to follow its bylaws regarding
pastoral selection. The trial court granted the appellees’ plea to the jurisdiction
based upon the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine and dismissed appellants’ claims
for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Because the trial court was without
jurisdiction to resolve the controversy, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Background
The church’s incorporation
Christian Faith Missionary Baptist Church was incorporated as a Texas non-
profit corporation on June 12, 1969. The articles of incorporation provide that
“[t]he management of the affairs of the Corporation shall be vested in the Official
Board without the authority of a majority of the membership present and voting at
any business meeting.” On April 1, 1999, the church adopted its presently-
effective constitution and bylaws.
Pastoral dispute and expulsion of members
In January 2012, Roland Mouton, Sr., the church’s pastor and appellant
Mouton’s father, died. The parties’ dispute centers around the church’s efforts to
fill the pastoral vacancy. With respect to a vacancy, the church’s bylaws provided:
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In the event of a vacancy, a pulpit committee composed of Deacons
and members (five (5) people on the committee) shall be appointed by
the church to seek out a suitable Pastor and their recommendations
will constitute a nomination though any member has the privilege of
naming other nominations according to the policy established by the
church. The committee shall bring to the consideration of the church
on [sic] only one (1) minister at a time. Elections shall be by secret
ballot; an affirmative vote of three-fourth (3/4) of those present being
necessary for a choice. The Chairman of Deacons and Trustees shall
have the right to meet with the Pulpit Committee at any time.
(emphasis added.)
Jones, who then served as the church clerk and secretary, convened a
meeting to elect a pulpit committee on February 8, 2012. The pulpit committee
was comprised of Jones and other individuals and eventually selected Mouton as
their nominee for pastor. However, other members of the church, including
Preston Cook, who was Chairman of the Deacons, and Marvin Rausaw, who was
Chairman of the Trustees, opposed the actions of the pulpit committee on the
grounds that its members were engaging in “negative behavior not befitting the
name of Christian and action not becoming of respectable church members.” In
September 2012, Cook and Rausaw filed an application on behalf of the church for
a temporary and permanent injunction to restrain Jones and “the alleged pulpit
committee from causing an illegal vote to appoint a Pastor, which is not in the will
of the members.” That action was non-suited on October 8, 2012.
On October 13, 2012, a meeting was held at which the deacons, trustees, and
congregation voted to adopt a “resolution to restore order in the church.” The
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resolution, signed by Cook and Rausaw, found that Jones, Mouton, and others
involved with the pulpit committee “have engaged in a campaign of intimidation,
threats, assault, falsehoods, and manipulation.” The resolution expelled from
church membership Jones, Mouton, and the others involved with the pulpit
committee on the grounds that they “have hurt the Church, decreased its
membership, distracted from its Christian mission, and continue to cause damage
to the Church.” Corey Wilson was elected and installed as the church’s new pastor
a month later, on November 17, 2012.
Conflicting claims to the church’s bank accounts
On December 13, 2012, Whitney Bank, at which the church held two bank
accounts, filed a petition for interpleader, alleging that Mouton, Jones, and a third
person, David E. Daniels, had gone to a branch office on November 2, 2012, and
again on November 13, 2012, and attempted to have the current signatories on the
church’s accounts removed and themselves added. According to the petition,
Mouton, Jones, and Daniels presented a letter signed by Jones representing that she
was the church’s secretary and advising the bank that Mouton had been elected
pastor of the church. The petition further alleged that after these events, Wilson
and another man, Ervin, who was a current signatory on the church’s accounts,
notified the bank that Mouton and Jones were not authorized by the church to have
access to the accounts and were attempting to defraud the church because Mouton
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believed that the church’s funds were part of his inheritance from his deceased
father. The bank’s petition named appellants and appellees as defendants. The
bank was granted a non-suit after depositing the funds in the court’s registry.
The suit between the parties
Appellees answered and cross-claimed against Mouton, Jones, and Daniels
for fraud and negligent misrepresentation related to their attempt to gain control of
the church’s bank accounts. Mouton and Jones counterclaimed for a declaration
that Mouton was the pastor of the church and for damages in the amount of the
interpleaded funds. They later amended their petition to add requests for
declarations that the pulpit committee was properly constituted under the church’s
bylaws and that the appellees violated the church’s bylaws by:
 Interfering with the pulpit committee;
 Holding unauthorized meetings;
 Hiring attorneys to file a defective Certificate of Amendment with the
Secretary of State and to sue for an injunction;1
 Expelling appellants from membership and changing the locks so that
appellants could not access the church; and
 Selecting Wilson as pastor.
1
Jones’s affidavit in support of the response to the combined motion for summary
judgment and plea to the jurisdiction averred that on September 2, 2012, Preston
Cook and attorney Bobbie Young “filed a Certificate of Amendment with the
secretary of state’s office changing the officers of the Church. Such a filing in the
past had only been made with the approval of the Pastor in Charge. Former
Deacon Walter Ervin was named both Treasurer and Secretary.”
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Appellees filed a plea to the jurisdiction in August 2013 and a motion to
dismiss appellants’ claims for lack of standing in October 2013. The trial court
denied both. Appellees petitioned for a writ of mandamus challenging the denial
of the motion to dismiss for lack of standing, which this court denied without
specifying its reasons. See In re Christian Faith Missionary Baptist Church, No.
01-14-00057-CV, 2014 WL 2538646, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June
5, 2014, orig. proceeding).
In October 2014, appellees filed a combined motion for summary judgment
and plea to the jurisdiction. In the plea, appellees argued that the trial court lacked
jurisdiction over appellants’ claims under the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine
because adjudicating the claims would require the trial court to review the church’s
discipline of appellants and to impermissibly involve itself in the pastoral selection
process. After a hearing, the trial court granted the plea and dismissed appellants’
claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Appellees non-suited their claims
and appellants appealed.
Plea to the Jurisdiction
In their first two issues, appellants argue that the trial court improperly
concluded that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine applied and thus erred in
granting the church’s plea to the jurisdiction.
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A. Standard of Review
A plea to the jurisdiction challenges the trial court’s subject-matter
jurisdiction to hear a case. Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 554
(Tex. 2000); Kamel v. Univ. of Tex. Health Sci. Ctr., 333 S.W.3d 676, 681 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. denied). The existence of subject-matter
jurisdiction is a question of law that we review de novo. State Dep’t of Highways
& Pub. Transp. v. Gonzalez, 82 S.W.3d 322, 327 (Tex. 2002); Kamel, 333 S.W.3d
at 681.
When a plea to the jurisdiction “challenges the existence of jurisdictional
facts, we consider relevant evidence submitted by the parties when necessary to
resolve the jurisdictional issues raised, even where those facts may implicate the
merits of the cause of action.” City of Waco v. Kirwan, 298 S.W.3d 618, 622 (Tex.
2009) (internal quotation omitted) (quoting Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v.
Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 227 (Tex. 2004)). The plea to the jurisdiction standard
mirrors that of a traditional motion for summary judgment. Ross v. Linebarger,
Goggan, Blair & Sampson, L.L.P., 333 S.W.3d 736, 744 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 2010, no pet.). When reviewing the evidence, we must take as true all
evidence in favor of the nonmovant and “indulge every reasonable inference and
resolve any doubts in the nonmovant’s favor.” Kirwan, 298 S.W.3d at 622
(quoting Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 228). If the evidence creates a fact question
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regarding jurisdiction, the trial court cannot grant the plea to the jurisdiction, and
the fact issue will be resolved by the fact finder; however, if the relevant evidence
is undisputed or fails to raise a fact question on the jurisdictional issue, the trial
court rules on the plea as a matter of law. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 227–28; Kamel,
333 S.W.3d at 681.
B. Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine
“The Free Exercise clause of the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution precludes civil courts from delving into matters focused on
‘theological controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical government, or the
conformity of the members of a church to the standard of morals required of
them.’” Thiagarajan v. Tadepalli, 430 S.W.3d 589, 594 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied) (quoting Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v.
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 713–14, 96 S. Ct. 2372, 2382 (1976)). “The First
Amendment is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.”
Masterson v. Diocese of Nw. Tex., 422 S.W.3d 594, 601 (Tex. 2013) (citing
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303, 60 S. Ct. 900, 903 (1940)).
“Determining the reach of subject matter jurisdiction in disputes involving
religious organizations requires consideration of competing demands.”
Thiagarajan, 430 S.W.3d at 594. “Courts do not have jurisdiction to decide
questions of an ecclesiastical or inherently religious nature, so as to those questions
8
they must defer to decisions of appropriate ecclesiastical decision makers.”
Masterson, 422 S.W.3d at 605–06. “But Texas courts are bound to exercise
jurisdiction vested in them by the Texas Constitution and cannot delegate their
judicial prerogative where jurisdiction exists.” Id. at 606 (courts must “fulfill their
constitutional obligation to exercise jurisdiction where it exists, yet refrain from
exercising jurisdiction where it does not exist”); see also id. at 596 (Texas courts
have a “constitutional duty to decide disputes within their jurisdiction while still
respecting limitations the First Amendment places on that jurisdiction”).
“Properly exercising jurisdiction requires courts to apply neutral principles
of law to non-ecclesiastical issues involving religious entities in the same manner
as they apply those principles to other entities and issues.” Masterson, 422 S.W.3d
at 606. “Thus, courts are to apply neutral principles of law to issues such as land
titles, trusts, and corporate formation, governance, and dissolution, even when
religious entities are involved.” Id. “[T]he line between required judicial action
and forbidden judicial intrusion ‘will not always be distinct’ because many
disputes ‘require courts to analyze church documents and organizational structures
to some degree.’” Thiagarajan, 430 S.W.3d at 595 (quoting Masterson, 422
S.W.3d at 606). “[C]ourts must look to the substance and effect of a plaintiff’s
complaint to determine its ecclesiastical implication, not its emblemata.” Tran v.
Fiorenza, 934 S.W.2d 740, 743 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no writ)
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(citing Green v. United Pentecostal Church Int’l, 899 S.W.2d 28, 30 (Tex. App.—
Austin 1995, writ denied)); see also Williams v. Gleason, 26 S.W.3d 54, 59 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied) (“Whether this suit is ecclesiastical,
or concerns property rights, torts, or criminal conduct, is determined by first
examining the substance and effect of the [plaintiffs’] petition—without
considering what they use as claims—to determine its ecclesiastical implication.”).
C. Analysis
Appellants contend that their claims arise solely from the church’s failure to
abide by non-ecclesiastical terms of the church’s bylaws and, therefore, the trial
court had jurisdiction to adjudicate the case under neutral principles of law.
According to appellants, the questions they raise—including whether appellees
complied with church bylaws in electing Wilson as pastor and whether appellees
properly expelled appellants from church membership—are non-ecclesiastical
because they are governed by non-ecclesiastical provisions in the church’s
corporate documents. We conclude that the trial court correctly granted the plea to
the jurisdiction because appellants’ claims are inextricably intertwined with
inherently ecclesiastical issues.
We find Westbrook v. Penley, 231 S.W.3d 389 (Tex. 2007), to be
particularly instructive. In that case, Penley sued Westbrook, her former pastor
and a licensed professional counselor, arguing that Westbrook improperly
10
disclosed Penley’s confession of an extramarital affair in connection with the
church’s discipline of Penley. Id. at 391. Penley alleged that the confession was
elicited during counseling and argued that the trial court could apply neutral
principles to resolve her professional-negligence claim because Westbrook’s duty
of confidentiality was secular in nature. Id. at 399. The Texas Supreme Court
reasoned that even though Westbrook’s duty of confidentiality was secular in
nature, the allegedly improper disclosure could not “be isolated from the church-
disciplinary process in which it occurred, nor can Westbrook’s free-exercise
challenge be answered without examining what effect the imposition of damages
would have on the inherently religious function of church discipline.” Id. at 400.
The Court thus concluded that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine applied
because, although Westbrook’s professional duty was secular in nature, it was
inextricably intertwined with inherently ecclesiastical matters. See id.
Contrary to appellants’ argument, we conclude that Masterson did not alter
the principle for which Westbrook stands: courts may apply neutral principles of
law in cases involving religious entities only if doing so does not implicate
inherently ecclesiastical concerns. See Masterson, 422 S.W.3d at 608. In other
words, Masterson did not alter the long-recognized principle that civil courts must
not interfere with the free exercise of religion by adjudicating claims that are
intertwined with inherently ecclesiastical issues. See, e.g., Thiagarajan, 430
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S.W.3d at 594. Accordingly, contrary to appellants’ contention, the mere fact that
a church’s corporate documents—here, its bylaws—prescribe a pastoral selection
process does not make cases involving a pastoral selection dispute categorically
reviewable by a civil court. Instead, whether neutral principles may be applied to a
claim turns on the substance of the issues it raises. Consequently, the fact that the
church’s bylaws in this case contain provisions governing the process for pastoral
selection does not compel the conclusion that a dispute over that process is
reviewable under Masterson.
Here, as in Westbrook, appellants’ claims are inextricably intertwined with
the selection of the church’s new pastor (Wilson) and the church’s expulsion of
members (appellants)—two issues long recognized to be inherently ecclesiastical
and of prime importance to the exercise of religious liberty. Texas courts have
long recognized that courts “should not involve themselves in matters relating to
the hiring, firing, discipline, or administration of clergy.” Lacy v. Bassett, 132
S.W.3d 119, 123 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.) (first citing
McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 558 (5th Cir. 1972); then citing Dean v.
Alford, 994 S.W.2d 392, 395 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1999, no pet.)); see
Thiagarajan, 430 S.W.3d at 594 (Free Exercise clause of the First Amendment
precludes civil courts from delving into matters of ecclesiastical government)
(quoting Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 713–14, 96 S. Ct. at 2382). This is because
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“[t]he relationships between an organized church and its ministers is its lifeblood”
and “[t]he minister is the primary agent by which a church seeks to fulfill its
purpose.” Dean, 994 S.W.2d at 395 (citing Tran, 934 S.W.2d at 743). Thus,
“[c]ourts may not attempt to right wrongs related to the hiring, firing, discipline, or
administration of clergy,” because “[w]hile such wrongs may exist and be severe,
and although the administration of the church may be inadequate to provide a
remedy, the preservation of the free exercise of religion is deemed so important a
principle it overshadows the inequities which may result from its liberal
application.” See id. Accordingly, “[m]atters concerning this relationship must be
recognized as of prime ecclesiastical concern.” Id.
Likewise, discipline of church members, including expulsion, is an
“inherently religious function with which civil courts should not generally
interfere.” Westbrook, 231 S.W.3d at 399; see Thiagarajan, 430 S.W.3d at 594
(Free Exercise clause of the First Amendment precludes civil courts from delving
into matters of ecclesiastical government and church discipline) (quoting
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 713–14, 96 S. Ct. at 2382). “A church has a right to
control its membership without government interference, including interference by
the courts.” Retta v. Mekonen, 338 S.W.3d 72, 76 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, no
pet.) (church’s failure to follow bylaws on a matter of internal governance is a
matter of internal governance and ecclesiastical concerns, and courts may not
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interfere with that decision). Thus, “[c]ourts have no jurisdiction to revise or
question ordinary acts of church discipline and cannot decide who ought to be
members of the church, nor whether the excommunicated have been justly or
unjustly, regularly or irregularly cut off from the body of the church.” Westbrook,
231 S.W.3d at 399 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S.
679, 727 (1871)). We do not read Masterson to alter these bedrock principles.
Appellants rely on Chen v. Tseng, No. 01-02-01005-CV, 2004 WL 35989
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.], Jan. 8, 2004, no pet.) (mem. op.), to argue that
their claims relate only to non-religious issues and therefore may be adjudicated by
the trial court. They characterize the case as a narrow dispute about selection of a
corporate officer and compliance with bylaws. But comparing appellants’ claims
to those in Chen highlights important differences. The issue in dispute in Chen
was whether a church’s election of members to its board of directors had been
properly noticed. Id. at *6. Importantly, however, Chen involved neither the
selection of a church’s pastor nor the expulsion of members, and emphasized that
review was permissible only because it was confined to the limited issue of
selection of directors of the corporation. See id. Indeed, the appellate court noted
that if the trial court had been asked to adjudicate the issue of “who has the right to
minister and to keep the altar,” the trial court would have had “no jurisdiction to
make such a determination”. Id. The Chen court also noted that church
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membership issues were not implicated. See id. In contrast, the substance of
appellants’ claims in this case implicates both pastoral selection and church
discipline in the form of expulsion of members.
Appellants’ reliance on Lacy v. Bassett, 132 S.W.3d 119 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.), is likewise inapposite. In that case, Lacy made
a written request to examine and copy financial records of a church in which he
was a member, but his request was denied. Id at 121. The church was a non-profit
corporation, and thereby subject to the Texas Non-Profit Corporation Act, under
which Lacy had the right to “examine and copy [the corporation’s] books . . . at the
member’s expense.” Id. at 124. The Fourteenth Court held that, because the Act
entitled Lacy to review the records and Lacy’s suit would not require the trial court
“to involve itself with any religious doctrine or principles,” the trial court had
jurisdiction to adjudicate Lacy’s suit for access to the records. Id. at 126. Notably,
Lacy did not involve either church discipline or the selection of a pastor.
Appellants’ claims in this case, in contrast, would require the trial court to trespass
on both.
Appellants also contend that Anderson v. Truelove, 446 S.W.3d 87 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.), supports their argument that the
ecclesiastical abstention doctrine does not apply. But Anderson merely
acknowledged what Masterson expressly stated: “the line between required
15
judicial action and forbidden judicial intrusion ‘will not always be distinct.’”
Thiagarajan, 430 S.W.3d at 595 (quoting Masterson, 422 S.W.3d at 606).
Anderson does not stand for the proposition that neutral principles may be applied
to resolve disputes that are intertwined with inherently ecclesiastical issues.
In sum, although appellants characterize their claims as purely secular
because they rest on provisions of the church’s corporate documents, the trial court
could not adjudicate this case without interfering in inherently ecclesiastical
matters of pastoral selection and church discipline. See Tran, 934 S.W.2d at 743
(“[C]ourts must look to the substance and effect of a plaintiff’s complaint to
determine its ecclesiastical implication, not its emblemata.”). Therefore, we hold
that the trial court correctly concluded that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction
over the case under the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine. See Westbrook, 231
S.W.3d at 400 (where application of neutral principles would impinge upon
inherently ecclesiastical issue of church discipline, ecclesiastical abstention
doctrine applied); Dean, 994 S.W.2d at 395–96 (in suit over pastor’s removal, only
proper action was for trial court to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction based upon
ecclesiastical abstention doctrine). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in
granting the plea to the jurisdiction.
We overrule appellants’ first and second issues.
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Collateral Estoppel
In their third issue, appellants argue that collateral estoppel barred the trial
court from granting appellee’s plea to the jurisdiction because the trial court
previously had twice denied earlier-filed motions that were premised on similar
facts and arguments. In support of this issue, appellants rely on cases applying
collateral estoppel to previously-entered final judgments. But here, any previous
trial court rulings were merely interlocutory, and cannot support the application of
collateral estoppel. See Johnson & Higgins of Tex., Inc. v. Kenneco Energy, Inc.,
962 S.W.2d 507, 519 (Tex. 1998) (application of collateral estoppel requires
showing of prior final judgment on the merits); BP Auto., L.P. v. RML Waxahachie
Dodge, L.L.C., 448 S.W.3d 562, 569 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no
pet.) (judgment must be final in order to have collateral estoppel effect).
Moreover, lack of “[s]ubject matter jurisdiction . . . can be raised at any time.” See
Rusk State Hosp. v. Black, 392 S.W.3d 88, 103 (Tex. 2012). Thus, we hold that
collateral estoppel did not bar the trial court from granting the church’s plea to the
jurisdiction.
We overrule appellants’ third issue.
Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
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Rebeca Huddle
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Higley, Huddle, and Lloyd.
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