State v. Cameron William Varley

COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 02-15-00076-CR
THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE
V.
CAMERON WILLIAM VARLEY APPELLEE
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FROM COUNTY CRIMINAL COURT NO. 7 OF TARRANT COUNTY
TRIAL COURT NO. 1333677
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MEMORANDUM OPINION1
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Appellee Cameron William Varley filed a motion to suppress the State’s
evidence. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted Appellee’s motion.
The State appeals. We reverse and remand.
1
See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
I. Background
By information, the State charged Appellee with driving while intoxicated.
Appellee filed a motion to suppress in which he argued, among other arguments,
that the stop of his car was illegal because it was made without a warrant and
without reasonable suspicion in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution and of section 9 of article I of the
Texas Constitution. U.S. Const. amends. IV, XIV; Tex. Const. art. I, § 9. The
trial court found that there was no reasonable suspicion to make the stop.
Accordingly, the case turns on whether there was reasonable suspicion to make
the initial stop.
II. The Hearing on the Motion to Suppress
The State called Officer Brandon Gilbert of the Arlington Police
Department. He was on duty around 2:11 a.m. on May 23, 2013, when he saw
Appellee traveling southbound on Cooper Street. Officer Gilbert said that from a
distance, he saw Appellee’s white Toyota pickup stopped at an intersection.
Appellee tapped his brakes, and the back passenger brake light did not
illuminate. Officer Gilbert testified that vehicles are required to have at least two
brake lights on the rear of the vehicle, so he concluded that he saw a traffic
offense. Appellee then proceeded through the intersection towards the frontage
road of Interstate 20. Officer Gilbert said he generally waited until a vehicle
stopped a second time to confirm a light violation. He continued to watch
Appellee, but as he watched, he noticed the vehicle weave back and forth from
2
side to side while remaining within its lane. Officer Gilbert acknowledged that
weaving within the lane would not necessarily be enough to pull someone over,
but because he had already observed the brake light violation, he decided to pull
Appellee over. When Appellee braked to pull over and stop, Officer Gilbert said
he confirmed the brake light was out. The video of the stop and arrest was
admitted and played. Officer Gilbert acknowledged that Appellee did not brake at
all during the video, but he explained that the videotape only went back one
minute.
Officer Gilbert said the statute Appellant violated was written to require two
brake lights. He said he did not consider the brake light in the center of the rear
cab window because it was not affixed to the rear of the vehicle. Officer Gilbert
testified he had reasonable suspicion that Appellee had committed an offense.
The prosecutor indicated the State was relying on section 547.323 of the
transportation code. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 547.323 (West 2011).
During its final arguments on the motion to suppress, the State went
straight to the statute, “Well, first of all that statute says [t]hat a vehicle shall be
equipped with two rear lamps for braking purposes.” The State identified the
offense as “failing to have two rear brake lights.” The State then returned to its
position that the totality of the circumstances showed that Appellee had possibly
committed the offense of failing to have two operable brake lights. The State
conceded that the weaving within the lane of traffic did not support the
3
reasonable suspicion for the stop but went, instead, towards whether Officer
Gilbert had probable cause to arrest Appellee.
The trial court ruled as follows:
[A]s to the probable cause [after the stop], I think there’s shaky
grounds, but I would follow the State’s argument. However, I am
making a finding that there was no reasonable suspicion to stop
because—and grant the motion to suppress, because the statute, I
believe, is unclear. It—There was a second stop lamp. And the
statute clearly says that stop lamps shall be mounted on the rear of
the vehicle. But it—You know, what’s the rear? The cab? The rear
is the bed? I don’t know. I think that stoplight is even bigger and
shinier and more—Well, it’s higher up so it’s more noticeable. So
I’m just going to go with that. That he had two stop lamps. And I’m
granting the motion to suppress.
The trial court’s order granting the motion does so without specifying any
reasons. The State did not request and the trial court did not make formal
findings of facts and conclusions of law.
III. The State’s Points
In its first point, the State argues that the trial court mistakenly interpreted
section 547.323 of the transportation code. Id. In its second point, the State
argues that the trial court, by granting Appellee’s motion to suppress, ran afoul of
Terry v. Ohio and its progeny. 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968). In its third
point, the State argues the trial court misapplied the Fourth Amendment
reasonable-suspicion jurisprudence to the facts of this case. The State briefed
its three points collectively. We address them collectively as well.
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IV. Standard of Review
We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence under a
bifurcated standard of review. Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 673 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2007); Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
In reviewing the trial court’s decision, we do not engage in our own factual
review. Romero v. State, 800 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990); Best v.
State, 118 S.W.3d 857, 861 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.). The trial
judge is the sole trier of fact and judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the
weight to be given their testimony. Wiede v. State, 214 S.W.3d 17, 24–25 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2007); State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000),
modified on other grounds by State v. Cullen, 195 S.W.3d 696 (Tex. Crim. App.
2006). Therefore, we give almost total deference to the trial court’s rulings on
(1) questions of historical fact, even if the trial court’s determination of those facts
was not based on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor, and (2) application-
of-law-to-fact questions that turn on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor.
Amador, 221 S.W.3d at 673; Montanez v. State, 195 S.W.3d 101, 108–09 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2006); Johnson v. State, 68 S.W.3d 644, 652–53 (Tex. Crim. App.
2002). But when application-of-law-to-fact questions do not turn on the credibility
and demeanor of the witnesses, we review the trial court’s rulings on those
questions de novo. Amador, 221 S.W.3d at 673; Estrada v. State, 154 S.W.3d
604, 607 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); Johnson, 68 S.W.3d at 652–53.
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When reviewing the trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we must
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. Wiede,
214 S.W.3d at 24; State v. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d 808, 818 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
When the trial court makes explicit fact findings, we determine whether the
evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling,
supports those fact findings. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d at 818–19. We then review the
trial court’s legal ruling de novo unless its explicit fact findings that are supported
by the record are also dispositive of the legal ruling. Id. at 818.
A trial court’s findings on a motion to suppress may be written or oral.
Cullen, 195 S.W.3d at 699. Even where neither party moved for written findings
of fact and conclusions of law and none were filed, if it is apparent from the
record that the trial court intended its findings and conclusions to be expressed
via its oral pronouncements, then the oral findings of fact can be considered as
findings of fact on the record and given due deference. See, e.g., id. (stating that
trial court’s findings and conclusions from the suppression hearing must be
recorded in some way, whether written and filed by the court or stated on the
record at the hearing); Hauer v. State, 466 S.W.3d 886, 890–91 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.); Flores v. State, 177 S.W.3d 8, 13 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. ref’d) (reviewing trial court’s oral findings of
fact on motion to suppress), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1152 (2006). We must
uphold the trial court’s ruling if it is supported by the record and correct under any
theory of law applicable to the case even if the trial court gave the wrong reason
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for its ruling. State v. Stevens, 235 S.W.3d 736, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007);
Armendariz v. State, 123 S.W.3d 401, 404 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003), cert. denied,
541 U.S. 974 (2004).
When a police officer stops a driver without a warrant and without the
driver’s consent, the State has the burden of proving the reasonableness of the
stop at the suppression hearing. State v. Munsey, 424 S.W.3d 767, 771 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 2014, no pet.). An officer conducts a lawful temporary
detention when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe that a person is
violating the law. Derichsweiler v. State, 348 S.W.3d 906, 914 (Tex. Crim. App.),
cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 150 (2011); Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488, 492 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2005); Munsey, 424 S.W.3d at 771. Reasonable suspicion exists if
the officer has specific articulable facts that, when combined with rational
inferences from those facts, would lead the officer to reasonably suspect that a
particular individual has engaged or is (or soon will be) engaging in criminal
activity. Ford, 158 S.W.3d at 492; Munsey, 424 S.W.3d at 771. The State does
not have to establish with absolute certainty that a crime has occurred but must
elicit testimony of sufficient facts to create a reasonable suspicion of a traffic
violation. Munsey, 424 S.W.3d at 771. The reasonableness of the officer’s
suspicion is gleaned only from information known to the officer at the time of the
detention. See Crain v. State, 315 S.W.3d 43, 52–53 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).
The standard is purely objective and does not take into account the officer’s
subjective intent. Ford, 158 S.W.3d at 492.
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V. Discussion
A. Section 547.323 Requires Two Brake Lights with One Mounted
on the Rear of the Vehicle
Section 547.323 provides:
(a) Except as provided by Subsection (b), a motor vehicle, trailer,
semitrailer, or pole trailer shall be equipped with at least two
stoplamps.2
(b) A passenger car manufactured or assembled before the model
year 1960 shall be equipped with at least one stoplamp.
(c) A stoplamp shall be mounted on the rear of the vehicle.
(d) A stoplamp shall emit a red or amber light, or a color between red
and amber, that is:
(1) visible in normal sunlight at a distance of at least 300 feet from
the rear of the vehicle; and
(2) displayed when the vehicle service brake is applied.
(e) If vehicles are traveling in combination, only the stoplamps on the
rearmost vehicle are required to emit a light for the distance
specified in Subsection (d).
(f) A stoplamp may be included as a part of another rear lamp.
Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 547.323.
“‘The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to implement the will of the
Legislature.’” Schwintz v. State, 413 S.W.3d 192, 193 (Tex. App.—Beaumont
2013, pet. ref’d) (quoting Baird v. State, 398 S.W.3d 220, 228 (Tex. Crim. App.
2
The statute refers to brake lights as “stoplamps.” Because “stoplamps” is
antiquated, for purposes of clarity, we generally refer to them elsewhere in the
opinion as “brake lights” unless we are referring to the statute specifically, where
we retain the use of “stoplamps.”
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2013)). When construing language, courts always begin with the literal text,
reading it in context and construing it according to the rules of grammar and
common usage. Id. Courts assume that every word was meant to serve a
discrete purpose that should be given effect. Id. Courts must adhere to the plain
language of a statute that is clear on its face unless implementation would lead to
absurd consequences that the Legislature could not have possibly intended. Id.
The trial court stated, “[T]he statute clearly says that stop lamps shall be
mounted on the rear of the vehicle.” The trial court also considered the brake
light on the rear of cab to count toward the two-brake-light requirement. To the
extent the trial court agreed that section 547.323 requires two brake lights on the
rear of the vehicle and that the rear of Appellee’s cab was sufficient to satisfy the
rear-of-the-vehicle requirement, we disagree. The rear of the cab of a pickup is
nowhere near the rear of the vehicle. Nevertheless, we must uphold the trial
court’s ruling if it is supported by the record and correct under any theory of law
applicable to the case even if the trial court gave the wrong reason for its ruling.
See Stevens, 235 S.W.3d at 740.
Regarding the construction of section 547.323 of the transportation code,
subsection (a) requires two brake lights. Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 547.323(a).
Appellee had two brake lights. Subsection (c) provides, “A stoplamp shall be
mounted on the rear of the vehicle.” Id. § 547.323(c). “A stoplamp,” that is, only
one brake light, has to be mounted on the rear of the vehicle. A, Webster’s Third
New Int’l Dictionary (2002) (“3a: ONE . . . b—used as a function word to suggest
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limitation in number”). Even within section 547.323, the Legislature showed it
knew the distinction between singulars and plurals. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann.
§ 547.323(a)–(f). It would have been a simple matter for the Legislature to have
written, “The stoplamp under section (b) or the stoplamps under section (a) shall
be mounted on the rear of the vehicle.” Regarding taillamps, the Legislature did
precisely that in the section immediately preceding section 547.323. See id.
§ 547.322(c) (West 2011) (“Taillamps shall be mounted on the rear of the vehicle
. . . .”). There is nothing absurd about requiring two working brake lights, one of
which must be on the rear of the vehicle and the other—the backup—somewhere
else. The statute expressly anticipates and authorizes only one brake light for
cars manufactured before 1960. Id. § 547.323(b). Appellee indisputably had at
least one working brake light mounted on the rear of his vehicle and two brake
lights overall. We hold that Appellee did not violate subsections (a) and (c) of
section 547.323.
We are aware of cases that cite section 547.323 for the proposition that
two brake lights must be on the rear of a vehicle. For example, in Morin v. State,
the officer stopped the defendant because “her high-mounted center taillamp was
not working.” No. 07-14-00101-CR, 2015 WL 7231100, at *1 (Tex. App.—
Amarillo Nov. 16, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). The
trial court relied on section 547.3215 of the transportation code, which required
vehicles to comply with the federal standards. Id. at *2 (citing Tex. Transp. Code
Ann. § 547.3215 (West 2011)). However, in a footnote supporting this assertion,
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the court cited section 547.323 for the proposition that “a motor vehicle [must] be
equipped with at least two rear-mounted stoplamps.” Id. at *2 n.4. Thereafter,
within the same footnote, the court cited (1) section 547.3215, which requires
compliance with the federal standards and (2) Schwintz for the proposition that
the federal standards require a high-mounted center taillamp in addition to two
stoplamps. Id. (citing Schwintz, 413 S.W.3d at 192). Because section 547.3215
of the transportation code was dispositive, any discussion of section 547.323 in
Morin was dictum.
In Schwintz, the court wrote, “The Austin Court has treated the center high-
mounted stop lamp as an additional requirement that is separate from and in
addition to the two rear-mounted stop lamps required by section 547.323(a).”
413 S.W.3d at 194. However, section 547.323(a) requires “two stoplamps”
without specifying where they must be placed. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. §
547.323(a). Furthermore, the defendant in Schwintz had two working rear brake
lights; it was his high-mounted brake light that was inoperable. Schwintz, 413
S.W.3d at 193. In Schwintz, the court relied on section 547.3215 of the
transportation code, which adopted the federal equipment safety standards, for
the proposition that a vehicle needed “two working rear-mounted stop lamps and
a center high-mounted stop lamp.” Id. at 194. Whether section 547.323 requires
two operable rear-mounted brake lights is, therefore, dictum in Schwintz.
In Garza v. State, the defendant argued that because his right rear-
mounted brake light and high-mounted brake light on the cab of his truck worked,
11
he complied with section 547.323. See 261 S.W.3d 361, 368 (Tex. App.—Austin
2008, pet. ref’d), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 849 (2009). The court wrote, “Section
547.323 of the transportation code specifies that a car manufactured or
assembled after 1959 must be equipped with at least two functioning stoplamps,
mounted on the rear of the vehicle.” Id. (footnote omitted). This statement,
however, is dictum, because thereafter the court relies on section 547.3215 of
the transportation code, which (as noted earlier) adopted the federal standards
requiring two rear-mounted brake lights and a third high-mounted brake light. Id.
at 369.
In Starrin v. State, the defendant’s left rear-mounted brake light was not
working, but his right rear-mounted brake light and the brake light in the center of
his rear window were working, so he argued his vehicle was in compliance with
section 547.323(a). No. 02-04-00360-CR, 2005 WL 3343875, at *1 (Tex. App.—
Fort Worth 2005, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Citing
section 547.3215 of the transportation code, we held that the trial court properly
denied Starrin’s motion to suppress because he was in violation of both state and
federal law. Id. In Starrin, we relied on section 547.3215, not section 547.323.
Section 543.001 of the transportation code authorizes any peace officer to
arrest without a warrant a person found committing a violation of subtitle C
(Rules of the Road). Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 543.001 (West 2011); see State
v. Gray, 158 S.W.3d 465, 469 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Chapter 547 falls within
subtitle C (Rules of the Road). Tex. Transp. Code Ann. §§ 541.001–.802 (West
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2011 & Supp. 2016). Officer Gilbert thought he observed a violation of
subsections (a) and (c) of section 547.323 of the transportation code. However,
what Officer Gilbert saw was not a violation of subsections (a) and (c). Section
547.323(a) requires two working brake lights. Id. § 547.323(a). Appellee had
two working brake lights. Section 547.323(c) requires one brake light on the rear
of the vehicle. Id. § 547.323(c). Appellee had that as well.
B. Section 547.3215 Would Apply But was Not Preserved
The State next argues that Officer Gilbert had reasonable suspicion
because, although never mentioned at the suppression hearing, all three brake
lights are required under the federal equipment standards that the Texas
Legislature adopted in another statute—section 547.3215 of the transportation
code (repeatedly mentioned in the previously-discussed cases). See id.
§ 547.3215 (West 2011). Section 547.3215(1) requires compliance with “the
current federal standards in 49 C.F.R. Section 571.108.” Id. § 547.3215(1).
Section 571.108 of Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations requires two
brake lights on the rear of the vehicle and one high-mounted brake light (or two
high-mounted brake lights under specified circumstances). 49 C.F.R. § 571.108
(2016).3 The State cites three cases, all of which support the proposition that a
3
We rely on “Table 1-a Required Lamps and Reflective Devices” of section
571.108 of Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations. When comparing the
simplicity of section 547.323 of the Texas Transportation Code with the
complexity of section 571.108 of Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations, we
need not wonder why the State opted to proceed under section 547.323 of the
Texas Transportation Code.
13
violation of section 547.3215 provides reasonable suspicion. See Schwintz, 413
S.W.3d at 193; Garza, 261 S.W.3d at 368–69; Starrin, 2005 WL 3343875, at *1.
We agree that if section 547.3215 had been relied upon by the officer and
argued in the trial court, it would have made Officer Gilbert’s traffic stop
abundantly reasonable. But nothing at the suppression hearing—not Officer
Gilbert’s testimony and not the argument of counsel—presented that theory to
the trial court. In this case, the State effectively relied strictly on subsections (a)
and (c) of section 547.323 of the transportation code. Elsewhere in the State’s
brief, it conceded that its failure to rely on section 547.3215 at trial precludes it
from relying on that provision here on appeal. Any reliance on section 547.3215
was not preserved. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1; State v. Mercado, 972 S.W.2d 75,
78 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (holding that in cases in which the State is the party
appealing, the basic principle of appellate jurisprudence that contentions not
argued at trial are deemed to be waived applies equally to the State and the
defense). Because the State did not rely on section 547.3215 at trial, it may not
rely on it now. See Mercado, 972 S.W.2d at 78.
C. Officer Gilbert’s Construction was Reasonable; Therefore,
There was No Fourth Amendment Violation under Heien v.
North Carolina
The State also relies on Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530 (2014). In
Heien, a police officer stopped a vehicle after seeing that one of the brake lights
did not function. 135 S. Ct. at 534. The North Carolina Supreme Court assumed
that there was no brake light violation because the North Carolina Court of
14
Appeals had held that driving with only one working brake light was not a
violation of North Carolina law and because the State did not seek review of the
court of appeals’s interpretation of the code. Id. at 534–35. The North Carolina
Supreme Court nevertheless held that the officer could have reasonably,
although mistakenly, read the vehicle code to require both brake lights to be in
good working order. Id. at 535. It held that because the officer’s mistaken
understanding of the vehicle code was reasonable, the stop was valid. Id. The
United States Supreme Court affirmed. Id. at 540. The Supreme Court wrote:
Heien is correct that in a number of decisions we have looked
to the reasonableness of an officer’s legal error in the course of
considering the appropriate remedy for a constitutional violation,
instead of whether there was a violation at all. In those cases,
however, we had already found or assumed a Fourth Amendment
violation. An officer’s mistaken view that the conduct at issue did not
give rise to such a violation—no matter how reasonable—could not
change that ultimate conclusion. Any consideration of the
reasonableness of an officer’s mistake was therefore limited to the
separate matter of remedy.
Here, by contrast, the mistake of law relates to the antecedent
question of whether it was reasonable for an officer to suspect that
the defendant’s conduct was illegal. If so, there was no violation of
the Fourth Amendment in the first place.
Id. at 539 (citations omitted). The Supreme Court continued:
Here we have little difficulty concluding that the officer’s error
of law was reasonable. Although the North Carolina statute at issue
refers to “a stop lamp,” suggesting the need for only a single working
brake light, it also provides that “[t]he stop lamp may be incorporated
into a unit with one or more other rear lamps.” The use of “other”
suggests to the everyday reader of English that a “stop lamp” is a
type of “rear lamp.” And another subsection of the same provision
requires that vehicles “have all originally equipped rear lamps or the
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equivalent in good working order,” arguably indicating that if a
vehicle has multiple “stop lamp(s)” all must be functional.
The North Carolina Court of Appeals concluded that the “rear
lamps” discussed in subsection (d) do not include brake lights, but,
given the “other,” it would at least have been reasonable to think
they did. Both the majority and the dissent in the North Carolina
Supreme Court so concluded, and we agree. This “stop lamp”
provision, moreover, had never been previously construed by North
Carolina’s appellate courts. It was thus objectively reasonable for an
officer in [this officer’s] position to think that Heien’s faulty right brake
light was a violation of North Carolina law. And because the mistake
of law was reasonable, there was reasonable suspicion justifying the
stop.
Id. at 540 (citations omitted).
Heien is indistinguishable. Like Heien, we have an officer who was
mistaken in his construction of the statute. If anything, Officer Gilbert was in a
more reasonable position that the officer in Heien. In Heien, the statute had not
previously been construed by the appellate courts. Id. Here, the trial court
acknowledged Officer Gilbert’s construction was reasonable when it stated that
the statute was unclear and that “the rear of the vehicle” could mean the rear of
the cab or the rear of the bed. Additionally, there was some appellate court
authority, although in dicta, for the proposition that section 547.323 required two
rear brake lights. See Schwintz, 413 S.W.3d at 194; Garza, 261 S.W.3d at 368.
For decades, vehicles have had two rear brake lights, and it would be reasonable
to expect the law to require two rear brake lights. Like the Supreme Court, we
have little difficulty concluding that Officer Gilbert’s error of law was reasonable.
See Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 540. Where the officer acts reasonably, there is no
16
violation of the Fourth Amendment in the first instance. See id. at 539; see also
Perez v. State, No. 08-13-00024-CR, 2016 WL 323761, at *8 (Tex. App.—El
Paso Jan. 27, 2016, pet. filed) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has written, “An officer’s mistake
about the law, or about the legal significance of undisputed facts, even if
eminently reasonable, cannot serve to provide probable cause or reasonable
suspicion; it cannot, in other words, validate an otherwise invalid seizure.”
Robinson v. State, 377 S.W.3d 712, 722 & n.26 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (relying
on case law from the Third and Fifth Circuits). We too have written, “[A]n officer’s
honest but mistaken understanding of the traffic law which prompted a stop is not
an exception to the reasonable suspicion requirement.” Fowler v. State, 266
S.W.3d 498, 504 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008, pet. ref’d) (relying on Fifth Circuit
case law); see Goudeau v. State, 209 S.W.3d 713, 716 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (“An officer’s suspicion of an alleged traffic violation,
however, cannot be based on a mistaken understanding of traffic laws.”). Heien,
therefore, represents a departure from established jurisprudence. Because
Officer Gilbert’s mistake of law was reasonable, we must hold, under Heien, that
the trial court erred by granting Appellee’s motion to suppress. See Heien, 135
S. Ct. at 540.
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VI. Conclusion
Accordingly, we sustain the State’s three points, reverse the trial court’s
order granting Appellee’s motion to suppress, and remand the cause to the trial
court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
/s/ Anne Gardner
ANNE GARDNER
JUSTICE
PANEL: GARDNER, MEIER, and SUDDERTH, JJ.
DO NOT PUBLISH
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
DELIVERED: August 31, 2016
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