John Paul Ross v. State

COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 02-11-00163-CR
JOHN PAUL ROSS APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE
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FROM THE 396TH DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY
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MEMORANDUM OPINION1
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I. Introduction
In three issues, Appellant John Paul Ross appeals his robbery conviction.
We affirm.
II. Factual and Procedural Background
Ross entered a CVS pharmacy wearing a hat and sunglasses, approached
photo manager Maria Hernandez at the cash register, told her that he wanted to
1
See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
exchange an item, and handed her the item in a sack.2 Ross then told
Hernandez that he had forgotten his wallet and that he would be right back.
When Ross returned, Hernandez told him that she could not do anything without
a receipt. At that point, Ross told her to come closer to the counter and then
whispered for her to “nice and quietly” put all of the money in the cash drawer
into the sack that he had given her.3 Hernandez told Ross that she did not have
a key to the register and that he had to buy something for her to open it. Ross
said to her, “[Y]ou think I’m playing?” Hernandez replied that she was “not
playing either.”
Hernandez said that she moved away from the cash register and
unsuccessfully tried to get the attention of her manager, Haley Phillips. When
Ross approached Phillips, Hernandez asked a customer to call 9-1-1, but the
customer was unable to do so because she did not have a cell phone. Once
Hernandez got Phillips’s attention, she told Phillips that they were being robbed
and that Phillips needed to call 9-1-1. Phillips, who knew Hernandez not only as
a coworker but also as a long time family friend, said that she could tell from the
look in Hernandez’s eyes that she was scared. Phillips said that after she called
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Hernandez said that the item was some kind of oil but that it was not from
CVS.
3
Hernandez also initially testified that Ross had told her to do so “or else”
but then said that she did not remember him saying that. On cross-examination,
she acknowledged that immediately after the incident, she did not mention to
detectives that Ross had said “or else.”
2
9-1-1, when Ross asked Phillips what she was doing in a stern voice, she
“freak[ed] out” and became hysterical before she heard the approaching police
sirens.
Hernandez testified that Ross approached her again and whispered to her
to finish ringing up her customer, to leave the register open, and to hand him the
money. But Hernandez rang up three or four customers and then closed the
register each time. After one of those occasions, Ross asked Hernandez why
she had closed the register, and Hernandez told him that she was not going to
give him anything. Ross left the store when police vehicle sirens became
audible, but police apprehended him before he drove out of the parking lot. The
State indicted Ross for robbery.
Hernandez stated that she had been angry about having been robbed at
gunpoint the previous week but she was also afraid during the encounter with
Ross and that she felt threatened by both Ross’s words and his actions. Ross
wore his sunglasses and hat the entire time and kept his hands in his pockets,
but Hernandez said that she never saw a weapon and that she could tell that
Ross did not have a weapon in his pockets. However, Hernandez also said that
she was afraid that Ross might grab her, pull her over the counter, or otherwise
injure her somehow. Hernandez testified that she thought that Ross was trying
to commit theft and that she felt threatened and scared; she agreed that she was
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afraid of imminent injury.4 Phillips and Fort Worth Police Officer Stephanie
Tabor, who responded to the 9-1-1 call, both described Hernandez’s post
incident demeanor as shaking and crying.5
A jury found Ross guilty of robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to
thirty years’ confinement. This appeal followed.
III. Fear of Imminent Bodily Injury
In his first issue, Ross claims that there was insufficient evidence to prove
that he either intentionally or knowingly threatened or placed Hernandez in fear
of imminent bodily injury or death.
A. Standard of Review
In our due-process review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a
conviction, we view all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to
determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.
307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979); Isassi v. State, 330 S.W.3d 633, 638
(Tex. Crim. App. 2010).
This standard gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact to
resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable
4
The trial court admitted the CVS surveillance video during Hernandez’s
testimony and allowed the State to publish it to the jury.
5
Fort Worth Police Detective Kyle Sullivan testified that when he
interviewed Hernandez around an hour after the incident, she was still visibly
distraught.
4
inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S. Ct.
at 2789; Isassi, 330 S.W.3d at 638. The trier of fact is the sole judge of the
weight and credibility of the evidence. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.04
(West 1979); Brown v. State, 270 S.W.3d 564, 568 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008), cert.
denied, 129 S. Ct. 2075 (2009). Thus, when performing an evidentiary
sufficiency review, we may not re-evaluate the weight and credibility of the
evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder. Williams v. State,
235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Instead, we Adetermine whether
the necessary inferences are reasonable based upon the combined and
cumulative force of all the evidence when viewed in the light most favorable to
the verdict.@ Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 16–17 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We
must presume that the factfinder resolved any conflicting inferences in favor of
the verdict and defer to that resolution. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326, 99 S. Ct. at
2793; Isassi, 330 S.W.3d at 638.
In determining the sufficiency of the evidence to show an appellant=s intent,
and faced with a record that supports conflicting inferences, we Amust presume—
even if it does not affirmatively appear in the record—that the trier of fact
resolved any such conflict in favor of the prosecution, and must defer to that
resolution.@ Matson v. State, 819 S.W.2d 839, 846 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
B. Robbery
The State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Ross, while in the
course of committing theft of property and with intent to obtain or maintain control
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of the property, intentionally or knowingly threatened or placed Maria Hernandez
in fear of imminent bodily injury or death. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 29.02
(West 2011). This statute, written in the disjunctive, covers both a situation in
which the defendant actually threatens the victim and a situation in which the
defendant implicitly threatens the victim and places the victim in fear. See
Howard v. State, 333 S.W.3d 137, 138–39 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); see also
Olivas v. State, 203 S.W.3d 341, 346 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (recognizing that “to
threaten” and “to place someone in fear” have two distinct meanings). The court
of criminal appeals has further explained that
[t]he plain language of the statute encompasses not just explicit
threats, but whatever implicit threats may lead to the victim being
placed in fear. So long as the defendant’s actions are “of such
nature as in reason and common experience is likely to induce a
person to part with his property against his will,” any actual or
perceived threat of imminent bodily injury will satisfy this element of
[robbery].
Howard, 333 S.W.3d at 138 (internal citations omitted).
As for the culpable mental state, “[a] person acts knowingly, or with
knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his
conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.” Tex. Penal Code Ann.
§ 6.03(b) (West 2011); Howard, 333 S.W.3d at 139 (recognizing that when the
jury could have found the appellant guilty for either culpable mental state, “we
need only address the less-culpable mental state of knowingly”). Therefore,
robbery-by-placing-in-fear requires “that the defendant is aware that his conduct
is reasonably certain to place someone in fear, and that someone actually is
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placed in fear.” Howard, 333 S.W.3d at 140. That is, any actual or perceived
threat of imminent bodily injury will satisfy this element “[s]o long as the
defendant’s actions are ‘of such nature as in reason and common experience is
likely to induce a person to part with his property against his will.’” Id. at 138
(quoting Cranford v. State, 377 S.W.2d 957, 958 (Tex. Crim. App. 1964)).
C. Analysis
Ross argues that the evidence “[a]t most” shows an attempted theft but is
insufficient to show that he intentionally or knowingly threatened Hernandez with
imminent bodily injury or death or that he intentionally or knowingly did an act
that placed Hernandez in fear of bodily injury or death. He complains that the
focus here is not on the victim’s subjective fear but on whether he committed an
act that he intended or knew would cause Phillips or Hernandez to believe that
he was going to hurt or kill them.
The record, as set out above, reflects that Hernandez repeatedly refused
to give Ross the money, that Hernandez said that during the encounter she was
afraid of imminent injury and felt threatened, and that Hernandez repeatedly tried
to have someone call 9-1-1. The trier of fact had the responsibility to weigh this
evidence in light of Hernandez’s other testimony that Ross never produced a
weapon and that she was angry because she had been robbed at gunpoint the
week before. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.04; Brown, 270 S.W.3d at
568. Furthermore, Phillips and Officer Tabor described Hernandez’s shaken and
tearful demeanor immediately after the robbery, and Detective Sullivan stated
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that around an hour later, Hernandez was still visibly distraught. Based on the
record before us, we conclude that the jury’s inference that Hernandez was
placed in fear was reasonable based on the cumulative force of all the evidence.
See Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 16–17; see also Burton v. State, 230 S.W.3d 846,
853 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.) (concluding that appellant’s
informing teller that this is a “holdup” and demanding money reasonably placed
the teller in fear of bodily injury).
Further, with regard to whether there was sufficient evidence that Ross
was aware that his conduct was reasonably certain to place Hernandez in fear,
the record reflects that when Ross interacted with Hernandez, he whispered, was
wearing sunglasses and a hat, and kept his hands in his pockets. While
Hernandez said that she could tell that Ross did not have a weapon in his
pockets, this does not negate that Ross had concealed his face behind
sunglasses inside the store and concealed his hands in his pockets, actions that
the jury could have concluded indicated Ross’s awareness that his actions were
reasonably certain to put Hernandez in fear that he was trying to hide his identity
or a weapon. See Howard, 333 S.W.3d at 138 (recognizing that inquiry’s focus is
on the defendant’s conduct). The jury could have chosen to believe Hernandez
that Ross told her to give him the money and that he was “not playing” and could
have concluded that, based on Ross’s demand and his assurance that he was
serious, Ross knew with reasonable certainly that his actions would place
Hernandez in fear of imminent bodily injury or death. See id.; Hooper, 214
8
S.W.3d at 16–17. Therefore, viewing all of the evidence in the light most
favorable to the verdict, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found
beyond a reasonable doubt that Ross was aware that his conduct was
reasonably certain to place Hernandez in fear and that Hernandez was actually
placed in fear. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S. Ct. at 2789; Howard, 333
S.W.3d at 137–38; Isassi, 330 S.W.3d at 638. We overrule Ross’s first issue.
IV. Closing Argument
In his second and third issues, Ross contends the trial court erred by
allowing the prosecutor to argue during the State’s closing argument that (1) the
only issue was whether Hernandez was “in fear,” arguing that this was a gross
oversimplification of the legal issue and in conflict with the jury charge, and (2)
Ross put Hernandez “in fear,” arguing that this presented an incorrect statement
of law because it failed to include a reference to imminent bodily injury.
The prosecutor began her closing argument by commenting that “[t]he only
issue in this case is whether or not Maria Hernandez was in fear. It’s not about if
he had a weapon. It’s not about if he told her he would kill her.” After Ross
objected and the trial court overruled his objection, the prosecutor explained that
Hernandez “thought he could have grabbed her. She thought he could have
come over the counter. She was afraid he would perform bodily injury on her.”
And during the State’s rebuttal argument, the prosecutor said, “His intentional
acts, his words, his body language, the way he said it, placed her in fear, and he
was trying to get the money. That is a robbery.” Ross objected and complained
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that the full element is “placed her in fear of imminent bodily injury and death, not
merely in fear,” even though the prosecutor had already clarified moments earlier
that the “fear” must be “fear of bodily injury or death.” The trial court overruled
Ross’s objection.
While it is error for the State to present a statement of law that is contrary
to that presented in the jury charge, it is not error for the State to quote or
paraphrase the jury charge. Whiting v. State, 797 S.W.2d 45, 48 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1990). Because the prosecutor clarified both times that the fear to which
she referred was fear of imminent bodily injury, we cannot say that the State
presented a statement of the law that was contrary to the law presented in the
jury charge. See id. Accordingly, we overrule Ross’s second and third issues.
V. Conclusion
Having overruled each of Ross’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
BOB MCCOY
JUSTICE
PANEL: WALKER, MCCOY, and GABRIEL, JJ.
GABRIEL, J., filed a concurring opinion.
DO NOT PUBLISH
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
DELIVERED: August 23, 2012
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COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 02-11-00163-CR
JOHN PAUL ROSS APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE
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FROM THE 396TH DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY
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CONCURRING MEMORANDUM OPINION1
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A robber can be ineffective at robbery and his victim can be uncooperative
to the point of foolish obstinacy but under the appropriate standard of review, a
robbery conviction will be, and properly should be, upheld. In this case,
Appellant’s actions, placed in context with the surrounding circumstances, were
sufficient to place a reasonable person in Hernandez’s circumstances in fear of
imminent bodily injury. A threat need not be explicitly voiced but can be
1
See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
communicated by a person’s actions. McGowan v. State, 664 S.W.2d 355, 357
(Tex. Crim. App. 1984); Donoho v. State, 39 S.W.3d 324, 329 (Tex. App.––Fort
Worth 2001, pet. ref’d) (op. on reh’g). The critical inquiry is whether the accused
acted in such a manner as would, under the circumstances, portend an
immediate threat to a person of reasonable sensibility. See Olivas v. State, 203
S.W.3d 341, 346 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
It has long been held that the party being robbed need not be “scared” to
the extent that he is hysterical. Horn v. State, 89 Tex. Crim. 220, 222, 230 S.W.
693, 694 (Tex. Crim. App. 1921). If under the circumstances and conditions
surrounding the transaction he has a reasonable belief that he may suffer injury
unless he does comply with the robber’s request, the “fear” required by the law is
present. Id. “The fear must arise from the conduct of the accused however,
rather than the mere temperamental timidity of the victim.” Cranford v. State, 377
S.W.2d 957, 959 (Tex. Crim. App. 1964). A robber cannot escape conviction
simply because his victim is dangerously unyielding.
Here, Appellant was clearly focused on placing Hernandez in fear to obtain
property that did not belong to him and Hernandez testified that she was placed
in fear. She may have not acted reasonably given the circumstances, but
because the test is whether the defendant’s actions are “of such nature as in
reason and common experience is likely to induce a person to part with his
property against his will,” because that was a question properly resolved by the
jury, and because evidence in the record support’s the jury’s resolution of that
2
issue, the conviction stands. See Howard v. State, 333 S.W.3d 137, 138 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2011); Wilmeth v. State, 808 S.W.2d 703, 706 (Tex. App.––Tyler
1991, no pet.).
LEE GABRIEL
JUSTICE
DELIVERED: August 23, 2012
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