William Paul Dodd v. State

In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
___________________________
No. 02-19-00126-CR
___________________________
WILLIAM PAUL DODD, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS
On Appeal from the 432nd District Court
Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court No. 1522625D
Before Gabriel, Kerr, and Bassel, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Bassel
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant William Paul Dodd pleaded guilty, without a plea-bargain agreement,
to the offense of robbery. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 29.02. The trial court accepted
Dodd’s plea and ordered the preparation of a presentence-investigation report (PSI).
After reviewing the PSI and hearing evidence during the sentencing hearing, the trial
court found Dodd guilty of robbery and sentenced him to ten years’ confinement. In
his sole issue, Dodd argues that his ten-year sentence is grossly disproportionate.
Dodd did not object to his sentence when the trial court imposed it and did not
raise the complaint in a motion for new trial or other post-trial motion. This type of
claim must be raised at the trial court level to preserve it for appellate review. See
Banister v. State, 551 S.W.3d 768, 769 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2017, no pet.); Pollock v.
State, 405 S.W.3d 396, 405–06 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2013, no pet.); Kim v. State,
283 S.W.3d 473, 475 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, pet. ref’d); cf. Burt v. State, 396
S.W.3d 574, 577 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (“A sentencing issue may be preserved by
objecting at the punishment hearing[] or when the sentence is pronounced.”).
Because Dodd forfeited his complaint by not objecting to his sentence in the trial
court, we overrule his sole issue.1
1
Even if we were to reach the merits of Dodd’s disproportionate-sentence
complaint, his punishment is within the statutory limits for the offense. See Tex.
Penal Code Ann. § 12.33 (providing that a second-degree felony is punishable by two
to twenty years in prison and by a fine of up to $10,000), § 29.02(b) (providing that
robbery is a second-degree felony). Punishment that is imposed within the statutory
limits and based upon the sentencer’s informed normative judgment is generally not
2
Having overruled Dodd’s sole issue, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
/s/ Dabney Bassel
Dabney Bassel
Justice
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
Delivered: December 31, 2019
subject to challenge for excessiveness except in “exceedingly rare” situations. Kim,
283 S.W.3d at 475–76 (quoting Ex parte Chavez, 213 S.W.3d 320, 323–24 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2006)).
3