Ben Arevalo III v. the State of Texas

NUMBER 13-22-00338-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
BEN AREVALO III, Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
On appeal from the 85th District Court
of Brazos County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Silva and Peña
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Peña
Appellant Ben Arevalo III appeals his conviction for aggravated kidnapping, a first-
degree felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 20.04. A jury found Arevalo guilty, and the
trial court sentenced him to thirty-five years’ imprisonment in accordance with the jury’s
assessment of punishment. In one issue, Arevalo argues the trial court erred in denying
a mitigating instruction on voluntary and safe release. See id. § 20.04(d). We affirm as
modified. 1
I. BACKGROUND
A grand jury returned an indictment charging Arevalo with the aggravated
kidnapping of his former girlfriend Victoria Montoya. 2 Arevalo pleaded not guilty, and the
case proceeded to a jury trial, during which the following evidence was adduced.
Montoya and Arevalo were in a romantic relationship that ended after
approximately twenty-five years. Montoya then began dating Anthony Garcia. Arevalo
was upset with the breakup and Montoya’s relationship with Garcia, whom Arevalo had
grown up with. Arevalo threatened to make Montoya’s and Garcia’s lives miserable.
Arevalo showed up at Montoya’s place of employment and home on multiple occasions,
attempting to reconcile. Montoya told Arevalo to stop contacting her, and Arevalo
threatened to kill himself. One morning, Arevalo arrived at Montoya’s home in Brazos
County as she was leaving for work, demanding to talk. When Montoya refused, Arevalo
said, “Don’t make me do something you’re going to regret.” Arevalo attempted to prevent
Montoya from leaving, and he told her that he had a gun. As Montoya got into the driver’s
seat of her car, Arevalo entered the vehicle on the passenger side. Montoya started
driving toward work, hoping Arevalo would exit the car en route. Eventually, Arevalo
demanded to drive. At that point, Montoya stopped at a convenience store, where she
1 This case is before the Court on transfer from the Tenth Court of Appeals pursuant to a docket
equalization order issued by the Supreme Court of Texas. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001.
2 By the time of trial, Montoya changed her name to Victoria Garcia due to her marriage. We will
refer to her as Montoya to avoid confusion with other witnesses who share her current surname.
The indictment also charged Arevalo with unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon. See TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.04. The trial court severed that charge and tried it separately, and it is not at issue
in this appeal.
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ran inside and told the clerk to call 9-1-1 because she was scared. Arevalo entered
seconds later and forced Montoya back to her vehicle. While Arevalo was pushing her
into the vehicle, Montoya noticed that he was pointing a gun to her side. At that moment,
Montoya described being scared and in a panic. The store clerk immediately called 9-1-
1.
As Arevalo was driving, Montoya’s best friend and coworker, Ashley Key, called
Montoya because she had not shown up to work. Arevalo answered the phone, which
disturbed Key as she knew the two had broken up and Montoya was dating Garcia. After
arguing with Arevalo, Key became concerned and called 9-1-1 to report the situation.
Arevalo stopped the vehicle on two occasions—first, to smoke a cigarette, and
then to buy a drink for Montoya. At one of the stops, Arevalo wrapped his gun in a shirt
and placed it in the trunk. At each stop, Montoya remained in the car, stating that she was
“paralyzed with fear.” While alone, Montoya texted Key her location and informed Key
that Arevalo kidnapped her and that he had a gun. Key called 9-1-1 again to share this
information.
At some point during the drive, Arevalo expressed a desire to return to Montoya’s
home so they could talk. Montoya protested because her daughter was at the house, and
she feared Arevalo might harm her or her daughter. Arevalo relented and began driving
toward his own house. Meanwhile, John Pollock, the chief deputy for the Burleson County
Sheriff’s Office, received notice of an active kidnapping. Chief Pollock learned that a ping
from Montoya’s cell phone indicated she was entering Burleson County. Chief Pollock
and several deputies went to the area where they believed Montoya’s vehicle would soon
be. Spotting the vehicle, a sheriff’s deputy accompanying Chief Pollock initiated a traffic
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stop. Arevalo pulled over, and the deputies instructed Arevalo to exit the car. Arevalo
complied, and the deputies placed him under arrest. The deputies searched the vehicle
and discovered a firearm in the trunk.
The jury returned a guilty verdict. At the punishment hearing, Arevalo requested a
jury instruction pursuant to § 20.04(d) of the penal code, contending that the evidence
showed that he voluntarily released the victim in a safe place. See id. The defense, if
proven, would reduce the offense to a second-degree felony. See id. The trial court denied
the requested instruction. Following the punishment hearing, the jury assessed
punishment as stated above. This appeal followed.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review & Applicable Law
When presented with an argument that a trial court committed jury-charge error,
the reviewing court must conduct a two-step inquiry: (1) did an error occur; and (2) if so,
did it cause harm that rises to the level of reversible error? Ngo v. State, 175 S.W.3d 738,
743 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). “The degree of harm necessary for reversal depends on
whether the appellant preserved the error by objection.” Id. If a defendant preserves error,
then he must only show some harm to his rights. Id. If he fails to object, he must
demonstrate egregious harm. Id. at 743–44.
The trial court must provide the jury with “a written charge distinctly setting forth
the law applicable to the case[.]” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 36.14. The law
applicable to the case includes “statutory defenses, affirmative defenses, and
justifications whenever they are raised by the evidence.” Walters v. State, 247 S.W.3d
204, 208–09 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). “[A] defense is supported (or raised) by the evidence
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if there is some evidence, from any source, on each element of the defense that, if
believed by the jury, would support a rational inference that that element is true.” Shaw v.
State, 243 S.W.3d 647, 657–58 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). “[W]e do not apply the usual rule
of appellate deference to trial court rulings when reviewing a trial court’s decision to deny
a requested defensive instruction.” Bufkin v. State, 207 S.W.3d 779, 782 (Tex. Crim. App.
2006). Rather, “we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant’s
requested submission.” Id. “[A] defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on a defensive
issue if it is raised by the evidence, regardless of the strength or credibility of that
evidence.” See Farmer v. State, 411 S.W.3d 901, 906 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citing
Granger v. State, 3 S.W.3d 36, 38 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)). On the other hand, if the
evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant, does not establish the
defense, an instruction is not required. See id.Aggravated kidnapping is a first-degree felony. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 20.04(c).
However, “[a]t the punishment stage of a trial, the defendant may raise the issue as to
whether he voluntarily released the victim in a safe place. If the defendant proves the
issue in the affirmative by a preponderance of the evidence, the offense is a felony of the
second degree.” Id. § 20.04(d). To raise the issue of “voluntary release in a safe place,”
there must be evidence that the defendant actually released the victim, that he released
the victim “voluntarily,” and that he released the victim in a safe place. See Butcher v.
State, 454 S.W.3d 13, 19 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015); Ballard v. State, 193 S.W.3d 916, 919
(Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Brown v. State, 98 S.W.3d 180, 183–88 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003);
West v. State, 406 S.W.3d 748, 766 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. ref’d).
For there to be a “release,” there must be evidence that the defendant “performed some
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overt and affirmative act that brings home to the victim that he/she has been fully released
from captivity.” Ex parte Chandler, 182 S.W.3d 350, 355 n.18 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005)
(quoting Wiley v. State, 820 S.W.2d 401, 411 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1991, no pet.)); see
also Sadat v. State, No. 13-17-00561-CR, 2018 WL 5289547, at *4 (Tex. App.—Corpus
Christi–Edinburg Oct. 25, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). For
the release to be “voluntary,” there must be evidence that the release was not the result
of intervention or action by others, such as rescue by the police or escape by the victim.
See Ballard, 193 S.W.3d at 919; Dominguez v. State, 467 S.W.3d 521, 527–28 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio 2015, pet. ref’d); LaHood v. State, 171 S.W.3d 613, 624–25 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. ref’d).
B. Analysis
Arevalo argues there was sufficient evidence to warrant a voluntary and safe
release instruction because Montoya had opportunities to escape, and Arevalo had
offered for the two to return to Montoya’s home. The State responds that while Arevalo’s
actions may have afforded Montoya an opportunity to escape, there was no evidence that
Arevalo affirmatively released Montoya.
Arevalo presented no evidence that he voluntarily took any affirmative action to
release Montoya. This is fatal to his requested instruction. See Ex parte Chandler, 182
S.W.3d at 355 n.18. Arevalo’s actions in leaving Montoya in an unlocked car possibly
provided her a means to escape, but it did not constitute a release. See Ballard, 193
S.W.3d at 919 (concluding that the defendant’s act of leaving the victim in her own car
while he went inside a store was not a voluntary release because her actions would have
constituted an escape had the victim drove away); see also McQuitty v. State, No. 07-12-
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00079-CR, 2013 WL 765137, at *3 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Feb. 28, 2013, pet. ref’d) (mem.
op., not designated for publication) (concluding that evidence of the defendant stopping
a vehicle in a parking lot with the doors unlocked did not raise the issue of voluntary
release). Further, the fact that Arevalo at one point expressed an intent to drive Montoya
to her home for the sole purpose of continuing their “talk” in seclusion does not raise the
issue of voluntary release, because he did not actually release her at her home. See
West, 406 S.W.3d at 766 (“In order to raise the issue of voluntary release to a safe place,
a defendant must offer some evidence that he actually released the victim.”). Further,
there is no evidence that, if they had gone to Montoya’s home, she would have been free
from Arevalo’s captivity. See Ex parte Chandler, 182 S.W.3d at 355 n.18. The fact
remains that Montoya was not released from captivity until she was rescued by the
intervention of third parties—police officers. See Ballard, 193 S.W.3d at 919.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the requested instruction, we
conclude that the defensive issue was not raised by the evidence. See Farmer, 411
S.W.3d at 906. Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying Arevalo’s request for a
voluntary and safe release instruction. See id. We deny Arevalo’s sole issue.
III. MODIFICATION OF JUDGMENT
The judgment of conviction incorrectly states that Arevalo was convicted under
Texas Penal Code § “24.04 (B).” We modify the judgment to show that Arevalo was
convicted under Texas Penal Code § 20.04. See Bigley v. State, 865 S.W.2d 26, 27–28
(Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (noting that we have the power to modify a judgment to speak the
truth when we are presented with the necessary information to do so).
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IV. CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s judgment as modified.
L. ARON PEÑA
Justice
Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Delivered and filed on the
6th day of April, 2023.
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