Hector Gomez v. Susana Gomez

COURT OF APPEALS
EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
EL PASO, TEXAS
§
HECTOR GOMEZ, No. 08-18-00136-CV
§
Appellant, Appeal from the
v. §
383rd District Court
SUSANA GOMEZ, §
of El Paso County, Texas
Appellee. §
(TC# 2011-CM-3393)
§
OPINION
In this dispute over the division of retirement funds in a divorce, Appellant Hector Gomez
challenges a money judgment entered against him and in favor of his ex-wife, Appellee Susana
Gomez. Their divorce decree had divided two retirement accounts held in Hector’s name, but
while the divorce was pending and in violation of a court order, Hector withdrew and spent all of
the retirement funds. Susana filed suit to enforce the property division, TEX.FAM.CODE ANN.
§§ 9.001-.014, and she also alleged fraud on the community, see id. § 7.009. The trial court entered
judgment based on both grounds alleged by Susana, and Hector challenges each on appeal.
We overrule each of Hector’s three issues relating to Susana’s enforcement action. The
judgment did not impermissibly alter or change the substantive division of community property in
the divorce decree, it was not precluded as a matter of res judicata, and there was no abuse of
discretion in the determination of the amount of damages awarded. Because the judgment is valid
as enforcement of the divorce decree, we need not separately analyze Hector’s challenges to the
judgment based on the allegations of fraud, and accordingly we affirm.
Background
Susana Gomez filed for divorce from her then-husband, Hector. It is undisputed that in the
course of the divorce proceedings, Hector submitted an inventory and appraisement, which was
subsequently amended. Both inventories referenced two retirement accounts held in Hector’s
name and administered by his employer, FedEx. The inventories did not specify the amount of
funds held in the retirement accounts. It is further undisputed that Hector and Susana were ordered
to preserve their assets pending the conclusion of the divorce. Yet without informing the trial court
or Susana, Hector closed one of his FedEx retirement accounts in September 2012, and he closed
the other one in October 2012. In each case, the funds were transferred directly to his personal
account and then spent on living expenses.
In the final divorce decree, the trial court awarded to Susana 50% of the two FedEx
retirement accounts, together with any interest, dividends, gains, or losses on those amounts arising
since the date of their marriage, as would be more particularly defined in a subsequent qualified
domestic relations order. The trial court later issued two QDROs, informing the plans’ trustees
that Susana was entitled to receive 50% of Hector’s accrued benefit under each plan. After the
QDROs were filed with the plans’ trustees, Susana learned that Hector had withdrawn all of the
funds from the retirement accounts.
Susana then filed a petition for enforcement of the trial court’s property division. She
alleged that Hector had withdrawn all funds from the retirement accounts, and as a result delivery
of her 50% interest in the retirement plans was no longer an adequate remedy. She asked the trial
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court to reduce her award to a money judgment. TEX.FAM.CODE ANN. § 9.010(a). The petition
also alleged that Hector’s depletion of the retirement accounts constituted actual or constructive
fraud. See id. § 7.009(b).
During the enforcement hearing, Hector testified that he had withdrawn approximately
$75,000 from his retirement accounts, admitting that he had not informed Susana or any trial judge
of his actions and that he had not transferred any of the retirement funds to Susana. Due to being
unemployed, he spent all of the withdrawn funds on rent, medical expenses, and other living
expenses.
Hector’s 2012 federal tax return, filed as a married individual filing separately, covered a
period while the divorce was pending and reported pension income of $114,127. Hector testified
that he did not prepare the document, he did not think the reported pension income was accurate,
and he asserted that he did not “take out that much.” However, he admitted that he had never
amended the return to correct the amount of pension income reported.
A 2011 quarterly statement for one of the retirement accounts was entered into evidence,
and it showed an account balance of $90,140.38. In sworn answers to interrogatories, Hector
stated that in September 2012 he closed one FedEx retirement account and withdrew $65,839.13,
and in October 2012 he closed the other FedEx retirement account and withdrew $8,986.97. Those
funds were deposited directly into Hector’s bank account.
Susana testified that while married to Hector she reviewed documents relating to the
retirement accounts and discussed them with him. She said she knew that one of the retirement
accounts had a balance of $90,000 and the other had a balance of $60,000. She confirmed that she
never received any of the retirement account funds that the trial court had awarded to her.
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At the conclusion of the enforcement hearing, the trial court declared that it had jurisdiction
over the parties and the dispute, found in favor of Susana on her enforcement and fraud claims,
and awarded to Susana a money judgment in the amount of $57,063.50, pre- and post-judgment
interest, and attorney’s fees. The appellate record does not reflect any findings of fact or
conclusions of law in connection with the judgment. See TEX.R.CIV.P. 296. Hector filed a notice
of appeal.
Analysis
Hector challenges the judgment as an enforcement of the divorce decree’s division of
property on three distinct grounds. First, he contends that because there were no funds remaining
in the retirement accounts when the trial court awarded half of those accounts to Susana, the
judgment improperly altered the substantive division of property as provided in the divorce decree.
Second, he argues that the enforcement action is barred by res judicata. Finally, he submits that
the amount of damages awarded was not supported by legally sufficient evidence.
A trial court that rendered a divorce decree retains power to enforce the decree’s property
division. TEX.FAM.CODE ANN. §§ 9.002, 9.006(a); Everett v. Everett, 421 S.W.3d 918, 920
(Tex.App.—El Paso 2014, no pet.). The ruling on a post-divorce motion for enforcement of a
divorce decree is generally reviewed for abuse of discretion. Everett, 421 S.W.3d at 920. A trial
court abuses its discretion when it acts unreasonably, arbitrarily, or without reference to any
guiding rules or principles, or when it erroneously exercises its power by making a choice outside
the range of choices permitted by law. See Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d
238, 241–42 (Tex. 1985); Everett, 421 S.W.3d at 920.
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I. Limitation on power of court to enforce divorce decree
In the context of enforcing a divorce decree, a trial court may not amend, modify, alter, or
change the property division made or approved in the decree. TEX.FAM.CODE ANN. § 9.007(a).
Hector relies on this limitation on the trial court’s enforcement power to support his contention
that the trial court’s award of money damages impermissibly changed the substantive property
division because the retirement accounts had a zero balance when the trial court entered the final
divorce decree awarding half of those accounts to Susana.
In the absence of findings of fact and conclusions of law, we imply all findings supported
by the record that support the trial court’s judgment. See, e.g., Worford v. Stamper, 801 S.W.2d
108, 109 (Tex. 1990). Based on the evidence presented in the enforcement proceeding, the trial
court would have acted within its discretion to find that by withdrawing and spending all of the
funds in the FedEx retirement accounts, Hector violated the court’s order prohibiting him from
depleting the community’s assets while the divorce was pending. Accordingly, we conclude that
under these circumstances Susana was entitled to seek, and the trial court was authorized to render,
a money judgment as enforcement of the property division in the divorce decree.
The Family Code provides: “If a party fails to comply with a decree of divorce or
annulment and delivery of property awarded in the decree is no longer an adequate remedy, the
court may render a money judgment for the damages caused by that failure to comply.”
TEX.FAM.CODE ANN. § 9.010(a). In her amended petition, Susana sought an award of money
because Hector had failed to comply with the divorce decree because he had previously withdrawn
all of the funds in the retirement accounts, thereby rendering the award of a one-half interest in the
those accounts an inadequate remedy. When issuing the original decree, the trial court was
required to order a division of the estate of the parties in a manner that it deemed just and right,
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having due regard for the rights of each party. Id. § 7.001. In so doing, the court was required to
determine the rights of both spouses in any retirement plans, see id. § 7.003, including the two
FedEx retirement accounts listed on Hector’s inventory. Hector was prohibited by court order
from depleting the retirement accounts while the divorce was pending, and the divorce decree
awarded half of the amounts that had been in those accounts to Susana.
The divorce decree and its allocation of retirement funds were not unilaterally transformed
into a null award by Hector’s prior, surreptitious violation of the court’s order. Likewise, the
court’s enforcement of the divorce decree by reducing Susana’s share of the retirement accounts
to a money award did not violate the rule that a division of property may not be later amended
under the guise of an enforcement action. We overrule Hector’s first issue.
II. Res judicata
Hector invokes the doctrine of res judicata as an alternative argument that Susana’s petition
to enforce the allocation of retirement assets in the divorce amounted to a collateral attack on the
division of property in the original decree. See, e.g., Baxter v. Ruddle, 794 S.W.2d 761, 762 (Tex.
1990) (res judicata applies to a final divorce decree to the same extent it applies to any other final
judgment, even if the divorce decree improperly divided the property). However, as explained
above, we reject Hector’s fundamental premise of characterizing Susana’s enforcement action as
an attempt to alter the original division of property. To the contrary, the trial court enforced the
original property division by reducing Susana’s share of the retirement accounts to a money
judgment. TEX.FAM.CODE ANN. § 9.010. The trial court acted within its discretion because it
could have determined that the discovery of Hector’s withdrawal and expenditure of the retirement
funds in violation of the court’s order rendered the decree as written inadequate to ensure that
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Susana received the property to which she was entitled and which she had been awarded. See id.
The doctrine of res judicata did not apply, and we overrule Hector’s second issue.
III. Sufficiency of evidence to support damages
Finally with respect to the enforcement action, Hector contends that the damages awarded
by the trial court were improper because they were supported by no evidence, or by legally
insufficient evidence. He argues that he withdrew approximately $75,000 from the retirement
accounts, and that the money judgment improperly awarded Susana approximately 76% of that
amount. To the extent Hector argues again in this context that the award of money damages was
legally impermissible for the reasons asserted in his first two issues, we reject those arguments for
the reasons explained above. Hector further contends that the award of $57,063 is neither based
on nor rationally linked to the evidence elicited at trial, and in the absence of additional evidence,
the judgment is based solely on speculation and conjecture.
Appellate courts will sustain a legal sufficiency or “no-evidence” challenge if the record
shows: (1) the complete absence of a vital fact; (2) the court is barred by rules of law or evidence
from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact; (3) the evidence offered to
prove a vital fact is no more than a scintilla; or (4) the evidence establishes conclusively the
opposite of the vital fact. Wheeling v. Wheeling, 546 S.W.3d 216, 223 (Tex.App.—El Paso 2017,
no pet.) (citing City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 810 (Tex. 2005)). As fact finder, the
trial court was permitted to evaluate the credibility of witnesses and to assign the weight to be
given their testimony. Golden Eagle Archery, Inc. v. Jackson, 116 S.W.3d 757, 761 (Tex.
2003). The trial court may believe one witness, disbelieve another, and resolve inconsistencies in
the testimony of any witness. McGalliard v. Kuhlmann, 722 S.W.2d 694, 697 (Tex. 1986).
However, because a ruling on the enforcement of a petition to enforce a property division is
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reviewed for abuse of discretion, merely demonstrating legal sufficiency of the evidence is
inadequate; it must also be shown that the alleged error was harmful. See Wheeling, 546 S.W.3d
at 224 (citing TEX.R.APP.P. 44.1(a)(1)).
Hector’s argument assumes the truth of his own contested testimony about the amount of
retirement assets he withdrew and spent, and it ignores the evidence that tended to support the
judgment. The trial court received a tax return into evidence, and that document showed that
Hector reported $114,127 of pension income in 2012. Susana was awarded half of the retirement
accounts, and the amount awarded to her in the enforcement action was half of what Hector
reported as pension income in the same year that he admitted to withdrawing all funds from the
FedEx retirement accounts. Although Hector disputed the accuracy of his tax return, it was the
trial court’s duty to resolve discrepancies in the evidence.
The evidence supported a rational fact finder’s conclusion that half of the income from
retirement accounts reported by Hector on his 2012 tax return—approximately $57,063—would
have been delivered to Susana pursuant to the trial court’s property division and in accordance
with its qualified domestic relations orders if Hector had not wrongfully withdrawn the entirety of
the retirement accounts while the divorce was still pending. Hector argues that no evidence was
adduced to support an unequal division of assets considering the factors guiding the exercise of
discretion in that context outlined in Murff v. Murff, 615 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. 1981), but the task
before the trial court was enforcement of an existing decree, not a fresh determination of a just-
and-right division of assets. We thus conclude that the ruling was supported by legally sufficient
evidence, and the court did not abuse its discretion when it rendered a money judgment in the
amount of $57,063. We overrule Hector’s third issue.
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Conclusion
Having overruled all of Hector’s challenges to the judgment as an enforcement of the
divorce decree, we need not separately address his challenge to the judgment to the extent it was
also supported by a determination of fraud. See TEX.R.APP.P. 47.1; Long v. Long, 144 S.W.3d 64,
67 (Tex.App.—El Paso 2004, no pet.) (“When findings of fact and conclusions of law are not
properly requested and none are filed, the judgment of the trial court must be affirmed if it can be
upheld on any legal theory that finds support in the evidence.”). His only other remaining issue
was an attorney’s-fee challenge that was contingent upon successfully invalidating the trial court’s
award both as a matter of enforcement and with respect to fraud, which he has failed to do.
The trial court properly exercised its discretion in reducing Susana’s one-half share of
community retirement accounts to a money judgment. See TEX.FAM.CODE ANN. § 9.010.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
March 25, 2020
MICHAEL MASSENGALE, Visiting Justice
Before Alley, C.J., Palafox, and Massengale, JJ.
Massengale, Visiting Justice (Sitting by Assignment)
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