Jay Anthony Nottingham v. State

In The
Court of Appeals
Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
No. 07-20-00067-CR
JAY ANTHONY NOTTINGHAM, APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
On Appeal from the 181st District Court
Randall County, Texas
Trial Court No. 27,150-B, Honorable David L. Gleason, Presiding
March 31, 2020
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before QUINN, C.J., and PIRTLE and DOSS, JJ.
Appellant, Jay Anthony Nottingham, proceeding pro se, appeals an order denying
his motion to recuse or disqualify the trial court judge. Now pending before this Court is
the State’s motion to dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. We grant the motion and
dismiss the appeal.
Appellant was indicted on two counts of robbery in 2016. Those charges were
later dismissed by the trial court, upon motion of the State, in 2017. In 2019, appellant
filed a motion to recuse or disqualify the Honorable John B. Board as the trial court judge
even though no criminal case was pending against appellant. The administrative judge
assigned the Honorable David L. Gleason to preside over the motion to recuse or
disqualify. Judge Gleason denied the motion as moot and this appeal followed.
Generally, we have jurisdiction to consider an appeal by a criminal defendant only
from a final judgment of conviction. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.02 (West
2018); Abbott v. State, 271 S.W.3d 694, 697 n.8 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). We do not have
jurisdiction to review interlocutory orders unless that jurisdiction has been expressly
granted by statute. Ragston v. State, 424 S.W.3d 49, 51-52 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). See
also TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(a)(2) (providing that a criminal defendant has the right to appeal
a judgment of guilt or other appealable order).
An order denying a motion to recuse or disqualify the trial court judge is neither a
final judgment nor an order made immediately appealable by statute. Muhammad v.
State, No. 08-18-00125-CR, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 6206, at *1-2 (Tex. App.—El Paso
Aug. 8, 2018, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Hranicky v. State, No.
01-11-00557-CR, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 5233, at *2-3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
Apr. 30, 2013, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Therefore, we lack
jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal from such an order. Id. We may review the denial
of a motion to recuse or disqualify only on appeal from the final judgment rendered in the
case or by mandamus. See Muhammad, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 6206, at *2; TEX. R. CIV.
P. 18a(j) (expressly limiting appellate review to the appeal from the final judgment or by
mandamus); Arnold v. State, 853 S.W.2d 543, 544 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (holding that
recusals in criminal cases are governed by Rule of Civil Procedure 18a).
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Accordingly, we do not have jurisdiction to review the order denying appellant’s
motion to recuse or disqualify the trial court judge. Appellant has filed a response to the
State’s motion to dismiss but failed to demonstrate grounds for continuing the appeal.
We, therefore, grant the State’s motion and dismiss the appeal for want of
jurisdiction.
Per Curiam
Do not publish.
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