Latoria Mattox v. State

AFFIRMED; Opinion Filed March 31, 2020
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-18-01500-CR
LATORIA MATTOX, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 291st Judicial District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F-1500710-U
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Bridges, Molberg, and Carlyle
Opinion by Justice Carlyle
A jury convicted appellant Latoria Mattox of tampering with a government
record. The trial court assessed punishment at two years’ confinement, probated for
five years.
In two issues on appeal, Ms. Mattox contends the evidence is insufficient to
support her conviction and the trial court’s judgment “erroneously” states the statute
under which she was convicted. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in this
memorandum opinion. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4.
Background
The indictment in this case alleged Ms. Mattox “did unlawfully, . . . with intent
to defraud and harm another, make, present and use a governmental record,
document and thing, namely: H1010, a form used . . . to determine eligibility for
food stamps,” and “made, presented, and used said governmental record with
knowledge of its falsity.”
At trial, Tracy Hays testified she is a regional director for Texas Health and
Human Services (THHS), a government agency that, among other things,
administers “food stamps” through the federal Supplemental Nutrition Assistance
Program (SNAP). Ms. Hays stated clients apply for food stamps by submitting a
completed “H1010” application form, which is “a government record.”
According to Ms. Hays, upon receiving a completed H1010 form, the clerk
for the THHS office servicing the applicant’s zip code schedules an interview
appointment for the applicant. The case is then randomly assigned to a caseworker,
who conducts an interview with the applicant in person or by phone. If the
caseworker determines the applicant meets eligibility requirements regarding
income and resources, the caseworker certifies the application. Then, the caseworker
“enter[s] all the information” into the computer system and “run[s] a test for
eligibility to determine if they were eligible.” This generates a “notice of case action”
letter to the applicant. If the test shows the applicant is eligible, the computer system
also generates an “1172 form.” The caseworker submits the 1172 form to an “EBT
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clerk,” who verifies certain information on the form and issues an “electronic benefit
transfer” card to the person designated as “head of household” on the H1010
application form. The EBT card is a debit card that can be used to purchase food.
Though the H1010 form provides applicants the option to designate an “authorized
representative” to “act for” them and sign the application on their behalf, the “head
of household” must complete the form.
In March 2015, Ms. Mattox was a caseworker in the THHS Dallas office on
Gaston Avenue. Ms. Hays testified THHS records showed that on Friday, March 13,
2015, the Gaston Avenue office received an H1010 application form that described
the “contact person and head of household” as “Jazmine Long” and purportedly bore
Ms. Long’s signature. The application (1) listed R.J.1 as Ms. Long’s daughter;
(2) designated Betty J. Jones as Ms. Long’s “authorized representative”; and
(3) showed the same address for Ms. Long and Ms. Jones. That case was processed
by Ms. Mattox and resulted in an EBT card being mailed to Ms. Long at her address
stated on the application.
Stephanie Reason, a THHS program manager in the Gaston Avenue office,
testified that on Monday, March 16, 2015, an employee informed her of “a
suspicious 1172.” Specifically, on March 13, while Ms. Reason and several other
employees were out of the office attending a meeting, an 1172 form had been
1
Because the person listed on the application as Ms. Long’s daughter is a minor, we use initials when
referring to her in this opinion.
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generated authorizing an EBT card for Ms. Long, but no interview had been
scheduled regarding that application. After investigating, Ms. Reason discovered
Ms. Jones was the mother of both R.J. and Ms. Long. Ms. Reason stated that if the
true relationship had been known, Ms. Long would not have qualified for SNAP
benefits and Ms. Jones’s income would have been considered in the eligibility test.
Steve Hamilton testified he is an investigator for the THHS Office of Inspector
General and was assigned to investigate Ms. Long’s application. He tracked the
activity on the EBT card issued to Ms. Long and discovered it was being used by
Ms. Jones at multiple stores, including a Sam’s Club where Ms. Jones used a
membership belonging to Ms. Mattox’s husband.
In June 2015, Mr. Hamilton interviewed Ms. Jones at her apartment. Mr.
Hamilton testified that during the interview, Ms. Jones (1) acknowledged knowing
Ms. Mattox; (2) stated Ms. Mattox had “counseled her” to put “herself down as the
authorized representative” and “her daughter [R.J.] on the application as Jazmine
Long’s daughter” in order to “increase her benefits”; (3) told him Ms. Mattox “was
going to be handling [the application] for me”; and (4) admitted she “forged” her
daughter’s signature on the application.
The next day, Mr. Hamilton interviewed Ms. Mattox at her workplace. She
acknowledged Ms. Jones was her neighbor but denied knowing the application was
fraudulent.
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Standard of review and applicable law
In a sufficiency review, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable
to the verdict and determine whether a rational factfinder could have found the
offense’s essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443
U.S. 307, 318–19 (1979); Ramsey v. State, 473 S.W.3d 805, 808 (Tex. Crim. App.
2015). The factfinder is the exclusive judge of the credibility and weight of the
evidence and is permitted to draw any reasonable inference from the evidence that
is supported by the record. Ramsey, 473 S.W.3d at 808; see also TEX. CODE CRIM.
PROC. art. 36.13. If the record supports conflicting inferences, we presume the
factfinder resolved the conflicts in favor of the conviction and defer to that
determination. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326. Circumstantial evidence is as probative as
direct evidence and “alone can be sufficient to establish guilt.” Hooper v. State, 214
S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
A person who “makes, presents, or uses a governmental record with
knowledge of its falsity” commits the offense of tampering with a governmental
record. TEX. PENAL CODE § 37.10(a)(5). The offense “is a Class A misdemeanor
unless the actor’s intent is to defraud or harm another, in which event the offense is
a state jail felony.” Id. § 37.10(c)(1). A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge,
with respect to the nature of his conduct or to circumstances surrounding his conduct
when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or that the circumstances exist. Id.
§ 6.03(b).
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The evidence is sufficient to support Ms. Mattox’s conviction
In her first issue, Ms. Mattox challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to
support her conviction. She asserts “the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that [she] presented the Long application with knowledge of its falsity.” She
argues she “was presented with a document” and “merely entered the information
provided to her into the [computer] system.”
Mr. Hamilton testified that during his interview with Ms. Jones, she stated
Ms. Mattox (1) had “counseled her” to put “herself down as the authorized
representative” and “her daughter [R.J.] on the application as Jazmine Long’s
daughter” in order to “increase her benefits” and (2) “was going to be handling [the
application] for me.” The jury, as the exclusive judge of the credibility and weight
of the evidence, was free to believe that testimony, which demonstrated Ms.
Mattox’s knowledge of the application’s falsity. Thus, we conclude the evidence is
sufficient to support Ms. Mattox’s conviction. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326; Ramsey,
473 S.W.3d at 808; Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13.
The judgment’s “Statute for Offense” is not “erroneously stated”
In her second issue, Ms. Mattox asserts “[t]he statute for which [she] was
convicted is erroneously stated in the Judgment.” She contends that although “[t]he
indictment charged Appellant with Tampering with a Government Record in
violation of TEX. PENAL CODE § 37.10” and the trial court’s judgment describes the
“Statute for Offense” as “37.10 Penal Code,” that section “contains at least six
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paragraphs.” She asks this court to “correct the Judgment to reflect the correct statute
and reflect a charge by indictment under TEX. PENAL CODE § 37.10(a)(5).” See
Asberry v. State, 813 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, pet. ref’d) (“Courts
of appeals have the power to reform incorrect judgments.”).
The indictment described the pertinent statute as “PC 37.10(c)(1)” and
described an offense under sections 37.10(a)(5) and 37.10(c)(1). The jury convicted
Ms. Mattox of the charged offense. We cannot agree with Ms. Mattox that the
judgment should be modified to state “§ 37.10(a)(5)” is the statute for the offense,
as that would describe a misdemeanor and not the state jail felony of which she was
convicted. See PENAL § 37.10(c)(1). The portion of the trial court’s judgment stating
that the statute for the offense is “37.10 Penal Code” is not “erroneous” and we
decline to modify it.
We decide Ms. Mattox’s two issues against her and affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
/Cory L. Carlyle/
CORY L. CARLYLE
JUSTICE
Do Not Publish
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b)
181500F.U05
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Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT
LATORIA MATTOX, Appellant On Appeal from the 291st Judicial District
Court, Dallas County, Texas
No. 05-18-01500-CR V. Trial Court Cause No. F-1500710-U.
Opinion delivered by Justice Carlyle.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee Justices Bridges and Molberg participating.
Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
Judgment entered this 31st day of March, 2020.
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