Grady Gene Vaughn v. State

In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
___________________________
No. 02-19-00219-CR
___________________________
GRADY GENE VAUGHN, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS
On Appeal from the 415th District Court
Parker County, Texas
Trial Court No. CR16-0367
Before Bassel, Birdwell, and Womack, JJ.
Per Curiam Memorandum Opinion
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Grady Gene Vaughn appeals from the trial court’s judgment
revoking his community supervision and sentencing him to nine years and six months’
confinement. After reviewing the record in accordance with Anders, we affirm.
A grand jury indicted Vaughn for the offense of failing to register as a sex
offender. See generally Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 62.102. Under the terms of a
plea-bargain agreement, Vaughn pleaded guilty to the offense in October 2016, and
the trial court deferred adjudicating his guilt and placed him on five years’ deferred-
adjudication community supervision. The trial also imposed a nonsuspended $1,000
fine.
In June 2017, the State filed a motion to proceed to adjudication, alleging that
Vaughn had violated nine conditions of his community-supervision conditions. In
March 2018, Vaughn pleaded true to violating the conditions of his community
supervision, and the trial court accepted Vaughn’s pleas of “true,” adjudicated him
guilty of the offense of failing to register as a sex offender, sentenced him to ten years’
imprisonment and ordered him to pay the “previously assessed fines and costs,”
suspended the confinement portion of the sentence, and placed him on ten years’
community supervision.
In January 2019, the State moved to revoke Vaughn’s community supervision,
alleging that he had violated the following conditions of his community supervision:
(d) failed to timely report to a community-supervision officer in November 2018;
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(m) failed to timely make a monthly payment towards his court costs, restitution, fine,
and legal fee reimbursement from April through December 2018; (n) failed to timely
pay his monthly community-supervision fee from July through December 2018;
(o) failed to participate in a community-service work program as ordered; and
(p) failed to abstain from the use of all controlled substances by using Xanax on or
about September 8, 2018. The State later waived alleged violations (m) and (n).
Vaughn pleaded “true” to the remaining violations. At the hearing on the State’s
motion to revoke in June 2019, the trial court accepted Vaughn’s pleas of “true” and
found the violations to be true; revoked Vaughn’s community supervision; and
sentenced him to nine years and six months’ confinement, “allowing for unpaid
assessments, court cost, and credit against the sentence as set forth in the judgment.”1
Vaughn’s court-appointed appellate counsel has filed a motion to withdraw as
counsel and a brief in support of that motion. Counsel’s brief and motion meet the
requirements of Anders v. California by presenting a professional evaluation of the
record demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds for relief. See 386 U.S. 738,
744, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 1400 (1967). In compliance with Kelly v. State, counsel notified
Vaughn of the motion to withdraw, provided him a copy of the brief, informed him
of his right to file a pro se response, informed him of his pro se right to seek
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The trial court issued a judgment nunc pro tunc stating that the judgment
revoking community supervision contained an error when it showed “Fine Previously
Assessed but Unpaid: $N/A” and corrected the error so that the judgment reflected
“Fine Previously Assessed but Unpaid: $1,000.00.”
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discretionary review should this court hold that the appeal is frivolous, and took
concrete measures to facilitate Vaughn’s review of the appellate record. 436 S.W.3d
313, 319 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). Vaughn had the opportunity to file a pro se
response to the Anders brief but has not done so.
As the reviewing court, we must conduct an independent evaluation of the
record to determine whether counsel is correct in determining that the appeal is
frivolous. See Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Mays v.
State, 904 S.W.2d 920, 923 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1995, no pet.). Only then may we
grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 82–83, 109 S. Ct.
346, 351 (1988).
We have carefully reviewed the record and counsel’s brief. We agree with
counsel that this appeal is wholly frivolous and without merit; we find nothing in the
record that arguably might support an appeal. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824,
827–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Accordingly, we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw
and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Per Curiam
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
Delivered: January 30, 2020
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