Gordon Ray Dunn v. State

In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
___________________________
No. 02-19-00334-CR
___________________________
GORDON RAY DUNN, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS
On Appeal from Criminal District Court No. 1
Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court No. 1555835D
Before Gabriel, Kerr, and Birdwell, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Gabriel
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Gordon Ray Dunn attempts to appeal his conviction for felony
driving while intoxicated. Because Dunn pleaded guilty under a plea-bargain
agreement, which the trial court followed, and because the trial court certified Dunn
had no right to appeal, we dismiss.
Under a plea-bargain agreement with the State, Dunn pleaded guilty to felony
driving while intoxicated, true to a deadly-weapon allegation, and true to a habitual-
offender enhancement. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 12.42(d), 49.04(a), 49.09. The
trial court found Dunn guilty of the offense and found the deadly-weapon and
habitual-offender allegations true. Following the terms of the plea agreement, the trial
court sentenced Dunn to twenty-five years’ confinement. Dunn filed a notice of
appeal, and the trial court certified that he had pleaded guilty under a plea-bargain
agreement with no right to appeal. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 44.02; Tex. R.
App. P. 25.2(a)(2). We notified Dunn of the certification and warned that we would
dismiss the appeal unless we received a response showing grounds to continue it. See
Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(d), 44.3. We received no response.
The right to appeal a conviction arising from a plea-bargain agreement is
limited to matters that were raised by written motion filed and ruled upon before trial
or to cases in which the appellant has obtained the trial court’s permission to appeal.
See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 44.02; Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2). The trial court’s
certification in this case does not show that Dunn was granted permission to appeal,
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nor does the record indicate that Dunn intends to challenge a ruling on a written
motion filed and ruled on before he pleaded guilty. Thus, we dismiss Dunn’s appeal
in accordance with the trial court’s certification. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(d), 43.2(f).
/s/ Lee Gabriel
Lee Gabriel
Justice
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
Delivered: January 30, 2020
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