Raymond Grely Thornton v. State

IN THE
TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-18-00068-CR
RAYMOND GRELY THORNTON,
Appellant
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
Appellee
From the 54th District Court
McLennan County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2016-672-C2
MEMORANDUM OPINION
A jury convicted Appellant Raymond Grely Thornton of two counts of sexual
assault of a child and assessed his punishment, enhanced by a prior conviction, at life
imprisonment and a $10,000 fine for each count. This appeal ensued. In his sole issue,
Thornton contends that “[t]his Court should exercise its constitutionally-mandated duty
to examine the factual sufficiency of the evidence and, after doing so, conclude that the
evidence is factually insufficient.”1
The Court of Criminal Appeals has abandoned the factual-sufficiency standard in
criminal cases. See Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 902, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010)
(concluding that there is “no meaningful distinction between the Jackson v. Virginia legal
sufficiency standard and the . . . factual-sufficiency standard, and these two standards
have become indistinguishable” and holding the following: “As the Court with final
appellate jurisdiction in this State, we decide that the Jackson v. Virginia standard is the
only standard that a reviewing court should apply in determining whether the evidence
is sufficient to support each element of a criminal offense that the State is required to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt. All other cases to the contrary, including Clewis, are
overruled.”); see also Martinez v. State, 327 S.W.3d 727, 736 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). As an
intermediate appellate court, we are required to follow binding precedent in cases
decided by the Court of Criminal Appeals. See State v. DeLay, 208 S.W.3d 603, 607 (Tex.
App.—Austin 2006) (“As an intermediate appellate court, we lack authority to overrule
an opinion of the court of criminal appeals.”), aff’d sub nom. State v. Colyandro, 233 S.W.3d
870 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). This Court has also repeatedly considered and rejected the
arguments presented by Thornton. See, e.g., Wilkins v. State, No. 10-16-00233-CR, 2018
1Thornton concedes that the evidence is sufficient under the Jackson v. Virginia standard of review. See 443
U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979).
Thornton v. State Page 2
WL 1097367, at *3 (Tex. App.—Waco Feb. 28, 2018, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated
for publication) (citing Thomas v. State, No. 10-17-00049-CR, 2017 WL 5662290, at *2 (Tex.
App.—Waco Nov. 22, 2017, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Burns
v. State, No. 10-16-00357-CR, 2017 WL 2819116, at *3 (Tex. App.—Waco Jun. 28, 2017, pet.
ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication); and Garcia v. State, No. 10-16-00045-CR,
2017 WL 124163, at *2 (Tex. App.—Waco Jan. 11, 2017, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not
designated for publication)).
We are therefore not persuaded to consider Thornton’s factual-sufficiency
argument in this proceeding. We overrule Thornton’s sole issue and affirm the trial
court’s judgments.
REX D. DAVIS
Justice
Before Chief Justice Gray,
Justice Davis, and
Justice Neill
Affirmed
Opinion delivered and filed August 19, 2020
Do not publish
[CRPM]
Thornton v. State Page 3