Remcey Jeunenne Chaney v. Steven Mark Chaney

In The
Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana
No. 06-20-00053-CV
REMCEY JEUNENNE CHANEY, Appellant
V.
STEVEN MARK CHANEY, Appellees
On Appeal from the 255th District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court No. DF-82-12485
Before Morriss, C.J., Burgess and Stevens, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Morriss
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In 1987, Steven Mark Chaney had been wrongfully convicted, sentenced to life
imprisonment, and started serving the wrongful sentence. Later, after the error had been
established and Steven released, Steven received compensation from the State of Texas under the
Tim Cole Act (Act).1 See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 103.001, 103.052; In re Smith,
333 S.W.3d 582, 583 (Tex. 2011). After hearing of this payment, Steven’s ex-wife, Remcey
Jeunenne Chaney, filed a motion for enforcement of alleged back child support. Because, among
other things, the evidence at trial showed that Steven’s child support obligation to Remcey had
been paid in full, the trial court in Dallas County2 granted directed verdicts against Remcey,
denied Remcey’s motion for enforcement, and ordered that Remcey pay Steven’s attorney fees.
In her pro se appellate brief, Remcey “firmly disagrees with the outcome” of this case but
fails to challenge the merits of the trial court’s decision that Steven’s child support arrearages
were paid in full. Without evidentiary support in the record, Remcey claims that her child had
special needs and asks this Court to “set up a Special Needs Trust” for him.3 It also appears that
she seeks an award of pain and suffering from this Court. Because Remcey has not meaningfully
1
“The Tim Cole Act provides a person who has been wrongfully incarcerated with an administrative remedy to seek
monetary compensation from the State for the period of wrongful imprisonment.” Phillips v. Tucker, 442 S.W.3d
543, 545 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, pet. denied) (citing In re Blair, 408 S.W.3d 843, 847–48 (Tex. 2013)). “The
compensation scheme under the Act is essentially liquidated damages for ‘the wrong done in the State’s name’
based on time served.” Id. (quoting Blair, 408 S.W.3d at 847).
2
Originally appealed to the Fifth Court of Appeals, this case was transferred to this Court by the Texas Supreme
Court pursuant to its docket equalization efforts. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001. We follow the precedent of
the Fifth Court of Appeals in deciding this case. See TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3.
3
Because the record shows that this issue was not timely presented or ruled on by the trial court, it is not preserved.
See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a).
2
or appropriately challenged the trial court’s decision to grant a directed verdict against Remcey,
we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
After Steven and Remcey were divorced in 1983, the trial court had ordered Steven to
pay $80.00 per week in child support for their son, who was born in 1976. In a September 2,
1987, order, the trial court had terminated the child support obligation after the child was placed
with a non-parent. In fact, in a 1989 modification order, Remcey had been ordered to pay child
support to the non-parent. Even so, in 2019, Remcey filed the motion for enforcement of back
child support that led to this appeal.
Because their son had turned eighteen in 1994 and graduated from high school in 1995,
Steven argued that Remcey’s suit for enforcement of the child support obligation was barred by
limitations.4 He also filed a responsible-third-party cause of action against the Texas
Comptroller’s Office and Office of the Attorney General Child Support Division (collectively
AG) and argued that they were responsible for calculating the amount of child support, which
had been paid to Remcey in full. The AG also asserted that Remcey’s claims were time barred
since they were filed “nearly 24 years after” the child support obligation terminated and since the
4
Section 157.005(b) states,
The court retains jurisdiction to confirm the total amount of child support arrearages and render a
cumulative money judgment for past-due child support, as provided by Section 157.263, if a
motion for enforcement requesting a cumulative money judgment is filed not later than the 10th
anniversary after the date:
(1) the child becomes an adult; or
(2) on which the child support obligation terminates under the child support order or
by operation of law.
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 157.005(b).
3
child had reached the age of maturity and graduated high school. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 157.005(b).
Remcey’s claim cited the Act. Under the Act, a wrongfully convicted person is entitled
to compensation in an amount equal to:
(1) $80,000 multiplied by the number of years served in prison,
expressed as a fraction to reflect partial years; and
(2) compensation for child support payments owed by the person on
whose imprisonment the claim is based that became due and interest on
child support arrearages that accrued during the time served in prison but
were not paid.
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 103.052(a). “The amount of compensation under
Subsection (a)(2) to which a person is entitled shall be paid on the person’s behalf in a lump-sum
payment to the state disbursement unit, as defined by Section 101.0302, Family Code, for
distribution to the obligee under the child support order.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 103.052(c).5 In its answer, the AG affirmed that “the comptroller has already calculated and
released funds in this case in accordance with . . . § 103.052, zeroing out the arrears owed to
[Remcey].”
At trial, Remcey admitted that Steven did not have any child support obligation after the
1987 and 1989 orders were entered and that she had received a $14,307.69 lump sum payment
from the AG in satisfaction of Steven’s child support arrearage pursuant to Section 103.052(c).
Even so, Remcey said that the payment “was never acceptable.” As a result of Remcey’s
5
Because back child support under Section 103.052 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code is paid to the
state disbursement unit, the AG also argued that Remcey lacked standing to separately pursue a claim under Section
103.052.
4
admissions, both Steven and the AG orally moved for a directed verdict based on the lack of
evidence of any arrearage and based on limitations. The trial court granted the motions for
directed verdict, denied Remcey’s motion for enforcement of child support, and ordered that she
pay $5,000.00 for Steven’s attorney fees.6
Remcey has not meaningfully challenged the trial court’s directed verdict or the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting Steven’s attorney fees. As a result, we affirm the trial
court’s judgment.
Josh R. Morriss, III
Chief Justice
Date Submitted: January 19, 2021
Date Decided: January 20, 2021
6
Testimony establishing the amount of Steven’s attorney fees was presented at trial. Remcey does not challenge that
evidence.
5