DocketNumber： 03-99-00164-CR
Filed Date： 4/13/2000
Status： Precedential
Modified Date： 4/17/2021
The sole issue on appeal is whether the evidence is legally sufficient to sustain the guilty verdict. In determining the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction, the question is whether, after viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979); Geesa v. State, 820 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Griffin v. State, 614 S.W.2d 155 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).
The indictment alleged and the jury found that appellant "intentionally [or] knowingly harm[ed] . . . James Keahey . . . by operating a motor vehicle and striking another motor vehicle occupied by James Keahey, in retaliation for [or] on account of the service of the said James Keahey as a witness [or] a prospective witness [or] a person who had reported the occurrence of a crime." See Penal Code § 36.06(a)(1). Keahey represented appellant's wife in her divorce from appellant. Keahey testified that in October 1995, following a hearing in the divorce action, appellant tripped Keahey in the courthouse, cursed him, and threatened to beat him up. Keahey reported this incident to a deputy sheriff. In August 1996, Keahey had a second encounter with appellant, this time in a grocery store. Appellant struck Keahey with a shopping cart, pinning him against the store shelves. Once again, appellant cursed and threatened Keahey. As a result of Keahey's report of the second incident, appellant was arrested for retaliation and released on bond.
The incident giving rise to this prosecution took place two months later, in October 1996. Keahey was driving on Ranch Road 620 when he was passed by a van, which then slowed to about five miles-per-hour. Keahey attempted to pass the van, but it repeatedly swerved in front of Keahey to prevent him from passing. Keahey eventually realized that the van belonged to appellant. Both vehicles came to a stop at a stop sign, with Keahey about three car-lengths behind appellant. Suddenly, appellant began to rapidly back up. The van struck Keahey's car with such force as to lift the rear of the van onto the hood of Keahey's vehicle. Appellant then drove forward and stopped, got out of his car, and walked toward Keahey. Keahey, believing that appellant had caused the accident as an excuse to assault him, seized a pistol he had recently purchased and pointed it at appellant. A witness intervened at this point, and appellant got back in his van and drove away. The witness, Richard Stemler, testified for the State and confirmed Keahey's account.
Defense witnesses contradicted each point of the State's case. Appellant's attorney testified that he left the October 1995 hearing with appellant, and that appellant neither tripped Keahey nor threatened him. Lois Bishop testified that she was in the grocery store in August 1996 when she saw a man "screaming things to [appellant] like I will get you, you will pay for that, you SOB." Cynthia Hulsey testified that she was in the van with appellant on Ranch Road 620 in October 1996, that Keahey rammed the rear of appellant's van with his car, and that Keahey then brandished a pistol and threatened to kill appellant.
Appellant's argument on appeal is summarized in this paragraph from his brief.
There is an abundance of evidence that if Appellant engaged in the conduct charged, there were many other reasons for his doing so, reasonable alternative hypotheses which raise a reasonable doubt such that, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, a rational trier of fact could not have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant engaged in the charged conduct, if he did, "in retaliation for or on account of (complainant') service as a witness or a prospective witness or a person who had reported the occurrence of a crime."
The reasonable alternative hypothesis construct is no longer used as a method of appellate review in legal sufficiency cases. See Geesa, 820 S.W.2d at 161. The jury was the exclusive judge of the credibility of the various witnesses and the weight to give their testimony, and was free to accept or reject all or any part of the evidence. See Bonham v. State, 680 S.W.2d 815, 819 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984); Castellano v. State, 810 S.W.2d 800, 807 (Tex. App.--Austin 1991, no pet.); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.04 (West 1979). Viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, a rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant intentionally harmed Keahey by striking his car in retaliation for Keahey reporting the earlier assault in the grocery store.
Although appellant's point of error is stated as a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence, he also urges at one point that the evidence is factually insufficient. A factual sufficiency review asks whether a neutral review of all the evidence, both for and against the finding of guilt, demonstrates that the proof of guilt is so obviously weak or so greatly outweighed by contrary proof as to undermine confidence in the jury's determination. See Johnson v. State, No. 1915-98, slip op. at 18 (Tex. Crim. App. Feb. 9, 2000). A verdict may be set aside only if a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is clearly wrong and unjust. See Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 129 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); Stone v. State, 823 S.W.2d 375, 381 (Tex. App.--Austin 1992, pet. ref'd as untimely filed). Applying this standard of review to the facts before us, we find the evidence to be factually sufficient to sustain the verdict.
The point of error is overruled and the judgment of conviction is affirmed.
Mack Kidd, Justice
Before Chief Justice Aboussie, Justices Kidd and Smith
Affirmed
Filed: April 13, 2000
Do Not Publish
the rear of the van onto the hood of Keahey's vehicle. Appellant then drove forward and stopped, got out of his car, and walked toward Keahey. Keahey, believing that appellant had caused the accident as an excuse to assault him, seized a pistol he had recently purchased and pointed it at appellant. A witness intervened at this point, and appellant got back in his van and drove away. The witness, Richard Stemler, testified for the State and confirmed Keahey's account.
Defense witnesses contradicted each point of the State's case. Appellant's attorney testified that he left the October 1995 hearing with appellant, and that appellant neither tripped Keahey nor threatened him. Lois Bishop testified that she was in the grocery store in August 1996 when she saw a man "screaming things to [appellant] like I will get you
Jackson v. Virginia , 99 S. Ct. 2781 ( 1979 )
Stone v. State , 823 S.W.2d 375 ( 1992 )
Geesa v. State , 820 S.W.2d 154 ( 1991 )
Clewis v. State , 922 S.W.2d 126 ( 1996 )
Griffin v. State , 614 S.W.2d 155 ( 1981 )
Castellano v. State , 810 S.W.2d 800 ( 1991 )