Gabriel Estrada v. State

In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
___________________________
No. 02-19-00212-CR
No. 02-19-00213-CR
___________________________
GABRIEL ESTRADA, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS
On Appeal from Criminal District Court No. 2
Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court No. 1532787W, 1517268D
Before Sudderth, C.J.; Birdwell and Bassel, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Sudderth
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Gabriel Estrada appeals his convictions for aggravated assault of a
public servant and unauthorized use of a vehicle. See Tex. Penal Code Ann.
§§ 22.02(b)(2)(B), 31.07. Appellant had been on deferred adjudication community
supervision for both offenses, but the trial court adjudicated him guilty after finding
that he had violated his community supervision by committing new offenses. The
trial court sentenced appellant to two years’ incarceration for the state-jail felony of
unauthorized use of a vehicle and 20 years’ confinement for the first-degree felony
aggravated assault of a public servant. Although the trial court did not orally
pronounce fines at the adjudication hearing, the trial court’s judgment for
unauthorized vehicle use imposes a fine of $200, and the judgment for aggravated
assault of a public servant imposes a $600 fine.
Upon concluding that “no legally non-frivolous grounds for appeal” exist,
appellant’s court-appointed appellate counsel has filed a motion to withdraw as
counsel and a brief in support of that motion. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738,
744–45, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 1400 (1967). Although not identifying the judgment error we
describe below, counsel’s brief and motion meet the requirements of Anders v.
California, which requires presenting a professional evaluation of the entire record
demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds for relief. Id., 87 S. Ct. at 1400. We
have independently examined the entire record, as is our duty upon the filing of an
Anders brief. See Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Mays v.
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State, 904 S.W.2d 920, 922–23 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1995, no pet.); see also Penson v.
Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 82–83, 109 S. Ct. 346, 351 (1988). Although provided a copy of the
record, appellant declined to file a pro se response. The State agreed with appellant’s
counsel’s assessment of the case and has not filed a brief.
After carefully reviewing the record and counsel’s brief,1 we have determined
that the judgments adjudicating guilt, and incorporated orders to withdraw funds from
appellant’s inmate trust account, should be modified to delete the fines imposed.
Although the trial court’s original deferred-adjudication orders contained fines, the
trial court did not orally assess fines as part of appellant’s sentences after adjudicating
appellant guilty and revoking his deferred adjudication community supervision in both
cases. Therefore, the trial court could not impose fines in the written judgments
adjudicating guilt. See Taylor v. State, 131 S.W.3d 497, 502 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
Accordingly, we modify the trial court’s judgments adjudicating guilt, and the
incorporated orders to withdraw funds from appellant’s inmate trust account, to
delete the fines. See id.; Polk v. State, Nos. 02-19-00152-CR, 02-19-00153-CR, 02-19-
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Based on our stringent review of the record and our conclusion that the
appeals are indeed frivolous but for the clear modifiable errors in the judgments,
abating the appeals for the appointment of new appellate counsel to brief this
arguable issue that is governed by clear authority would result in a waste of resources
for all involved. See Bray v. State, 179 S.W.3d 725, 729–30 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
2005, no pet.) (en banc) (modifying judgment in Anders appeal and affirming judgment
as modified rather than abating appeal for appointment of new counsel).
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00154-CR, 2020 WL 938149, at *1–2 (Tex. App.––Fort Worth Feb. 27, 2020, pet.
ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
Except for these modifications to the judgments and incorporated withdrawal
orders, we agree with counsel that these appeals are wholly frivolous and without
merit. Our independent review of the records reveals nothing further that might
arguably support the appeals. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827–28 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2005); see also Meza v. State, 206 S.W.3d 684, 685 n.6 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). We
grant counsel’s motion to withdraw, modify the trial court’s judgments and
incorporated orders to withdraw funds to delete the fines, and affirm the judgments
as modified. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(b); Bray, 179 S.W.3d at 729.
/s/ Bonnie Sudderth
Bonnie Sudderth
Chief Justice
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
Delivered: March 11, 2021
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