Joe Gilbert Young, Jr. v. Jamie Michelle Lemons Young

i i i i i i
MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-08-00925-CV
Joe Gilbert YOUNG, Jr.,
Appellant
v.
Jamie Michelle Lemons YOUNG,
Appellee
From the 57th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2008-CI-03796
Honorable Barbara Hanson Nellermoe, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Phylis J. Speedlin, Justice
Sitting: Catherine Stone, Chief Justice
Phylis J. Speedlin, Justice
Steven C. Hilbig, Justice
Delivered and Filed: September 2, 2009
AFFIRMED
Joe Gilbert Young, Jr. appeals the trial court’s judgment granting a divorce and dividing the
community estate. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Joe and Jamie were married on March 15, 2002. On February 17, 2004, Joe was incarcerated
and currently remains in prison. Jamie filed for divorce in 2008; Joe subsequently filed a
counterpetition for divorce. After a bench trial at which both Joe and Jamie appeared and testified,
04-08-00925-CV
the trial court granted the divorce and divided what remained of the community property. Joe,
appearing pro se, raises eleven issues on appeal. Many of Joe’s complaints are not briefed,1 and
therefore we need not consider them on appeal. See TEX . R. APP . P. 38.1(i); Strange v. Cont’l Cas.
Co., 126 S.W.3d 676, 677-78 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, pet. denied) (holding that a pro se litigant
is held to the same standards as licensed attorneys and that an appellate issue unsupported by
argument or citation to any legal authority presents nothing for the appellate court to review). We
are also unable to address Joe’s complaint that Jamie failed to deliver certain personal property to
his mother as ordered in the divorce decree because Joe failed to file a motion for enforcement with
the trial court as contemplated by section 9.009 of the Family Code. See TEX . FAM . CODE ANN . §
9.009 (Vernon 2006). Accordingly, these issues are overruled.
The remainder of Joe’s complaints relate to the trial court’s division of the community
property, “mainly the settlement from the buyback of [Joe’s] home by San Antonio Housing
Authority and K.B. Homes.”2 The trial court has broad discretion in dividing the marital estate, and
we presume the trial court properly exercised its discretion. Murff v. Murff, 615 S.W.2d 696, 698
(Tex. 1981). The trial court is required to divide the estate of the parties in a manner that is “just and
right,” having due regard for the rights of each party. TEX . FAM . CODE ANN . § 7.001 (Vernon 2006);
Tenery v. Tenery, 932 S.W.2d 29, 30 (Tex. 1996). The party complaining of the trial court’s
1
… The following issues were not adequately briefed and therefore we decline to address them: “(3) Also
Appellant’s spouse obtained numerous credit cards in Appellant’s name without this authorization while he has been
incarcerated and ran up debt on them that is not his; (4) Fraud on the community; (5) W asting of community assets by
a spouse; (6) Appellant never waived his rights to a jury trial; (7) Actual fraud committed by spouse; (9) Spouse made
defamatory and false charges which were of a privileged nature; and (11) Appellant was not allowed to give complete
testimony by the Trial Court. ”
2
… The other two related issues are: “(8) A judgment was rendered in disregard of the expressed [sic]
provisions of the Divorce Statute; and (10) Biased and partial ruling by Judge Barbara Nellermoe.”
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property division must demonstrate from the evidence in the record that the division was so unjust
that the trial court abused its discretion. Prague v. Prague, 190 S.W.3d 31, 40 (Tex. App.—Dallas
2005, pet. denied). The trial court may order an unequal division of martial property when a
reasonable basis exists for doing so. Id. at 41. We consider every reasonable presumption in favor
of the proper exercise of discretion by the trial court in dividing the community estate. Murff, 615
S.W.2d at 699; Prague, 190 S.W.3d at 41.
At trial, Jamie testified that Joe stopped working in May 2003 and therefore she was left to
pay the couple’s bills using money from her salary alone. She further stated that Joe used illegal
drugs and incurred many debts, which she then took out loans to pay. Jamie later sold the house she
and Joe owned together, with Joe’s permission, for $93,000, which netted proceeds totaling
approximately $28,750. She used that money to pay off the couple’s debt, including credit card bills,
loan payments, and medical bills. Jamie testified that no money remained from selling the house.
Joe was permitted to testify at length, even reading a prepared statement to the court. He stated that
Jamie incurred debts by spending money that she did not have, and therefore he should be entitled
to his half of the proceeds from the sale of the house. At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court
stated that there was not much property to divide up, and “I can’t divide something that doesn’t exist
anymore.” They were each awarded a vehicle and other personal property, and Jamie was ordered
to turn over all items belonging to Joe to Joe’s mother. Further, Jamie was ordered to pay the debt
owed on the vehicle awarded to her, and also any credit card debt in her name and any debts incurred
solely by her after February 17, 2004. Joe was ordered to pay any credit card debt in his name and
any debts incurred solely by him after February 17, 2004.
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04-08-00925-CV
Based on this record, it appears the trial court considered the evidence presented by both
parties and determined that any assets once held by the parties were used to pay community
liabilities. Accordingly, we cannot conclude the trial court abused its discretion in dividing the
community estate. Joe’s issues on appeal are overruled, and the judgment of the trial court is
affirmed.
Phylis J. Speedlin, Justice
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