Ana Deisi Martinez Banos v. State

ACCEPTED
13-14-00307-CR
THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS
CORPUS CHRISTI, TEXAS
10/21/2015 3:03:13 PM
Dorian E. Ramirez
CLERK
CAUSE NO. 13-14-00307-CR
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FILED IN
13th COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRTEENTH SUPREME JUDICIAL DITRICT
CORPUS CHRISTI/EDINBURG, TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI, TEXAS 10/21/2015 3:03:13 PM
DORIAN E. RAMIREZ
Clerk
ANA DEISI MARTINEZ BANOS., APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
APPEAL OF TRIAL COURT CASE NO. CR-1220-13-A
FROM THE 206TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF HIDALGO COUNTY, TEXAS
The Honorable Jaime Tijerina, Presiding
BRIEF OF STATE/APPELLEE
RICARDO RODRIGUEZ, JR.
CRIMINAL DISTRICT ATTORNEY
HIDALGO COUNTY TEXAS
MICHAEL W. MORRIS, ASSISTANT
State Bar No. 24076880
Lead Counsel for Appellee
Office of Criminal District Attorney
Hidalgo County Courthouse
100 N. Closer Blvd.
Edinburg, Texas 78539
Telephone: (956) 318-2300 ext. 781
Telefax: (956) 380-0407
ATTORNEYS FOR THE STATE
Oral argument is not requested
i
IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL
APPELLANT in this case is Anan Deisi Martinez Banos.
APPELLANT is represented on appeal by Hon. O. Rene Flores, 320 W.
Pecan Blvd., McAllen, Texas 78501.
APPELLANT was represented at trial by Hon Florencio Lopez, 110 S. 12th,
Suite L, Edinburg, Texas 78539.
APPELLEE in this case is the State of Texas, by and through her District
Attorney for Hidalgo County, the Hon. Ricardo Rodriguez, Jr., Office of Criminal
District Attorney, Hidalgo County Courthouse, 100 N. Closner Blvd., Edinburg,
Texas 78539.
APPELLEE is represented on appeal by Hon. Michael W. Morris, Assistant
District Attorney for Hidalgo County, Hidalgo County Courthouse, 100 N. Closner
Blvd., Edinburg, Texas 78539.
APPELLEE was represented at trial by Hon. Graciela Reyna, Assistant
District Attorney for Hidalgo County, and Hon. Magdalena Hinojosa, Assistant
District Attorney for Hidalgo County, Hidalgo County Courthouse, 100 N. Closner
Blvd., Edinburg, Texas 78539.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Identification of Counsel and Parties ................................................................... ii
Table of Contents ................................................................................................ iii
Index of Authorities ..............................................................................................v
Notation as to Citation ....................................................................................... vii
Statement of the Case........................................................................................ viii
Issues Presented (Restated) ............................................................................... viii
Note as to Oral Argument ................................................................................. viii
Statement of Facts .................................................................................................1
Summary of the Argument....................................................................................4
Argument...............................................................................................................4
I. There was not a fatal variance between the charge as alleged and
the proof at trial ........................................................................................4
A. Standard of Review ................................................................................4
B. Party Liability does not give rise to a fatal variance ..........................5
II. The evidence is sufficient to overcome the challenge to denial of
motion for directed verdict of acquittal and the claim of
evidentiary insufficiency ..........................................................................8
A. Standard of Review ................................................................................9
B. The evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s verdict .................. 10
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Prayer for Relief ................................................................................................. 13
Certificate of Compliance .................................................................................. 14
Certificate of Delivery ....................................................................................... 15
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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Barron v. State, 773 S.W.2d 44 (Tex. App. —Houston [1st Dist.] 1989)............7
Byrd v. State, 336 S.W.3d 242 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) .......................................4
Chambers v. State, 805 S.W.2d 459 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) ..............................9
Curry v. State, 30 S.W.3d 394 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) .................................... 10
Goff v. State, 931 S.W.2d 537 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995)................................... 5, 10
Gollihar v. State, 46 S.W.3d 243 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) .............................. 4, 5
Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) ......................................9
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) ............................................................9
Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) .............................. 6, 10
Marable v. State, 85 S.W.3d 287 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) ............................. 5, 10
Miranda v. State, 391 S.W.3d 302 (Tex. App. —Austin 2012 ............................7
Powell v. State, 194 S.W.3d 503 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) .............................. 5, 10
Rainey v. State, 2013 WL 692477 (Tex. App. —Austin Feb. 22, 2013)......... 7, 8
Sorto v. State, 173 S.W.3d 469 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) ................................. 5, 10
Villarreal v. State, 286 S.W.3d 321 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) ........................... 10
v
Zavala v. State,
956 S.W.2d 715 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1997, no pet.) ...............................8
Statutes and Rules
TEX. PENAL CODE § 7.01 (2015) ............................................................................ 6, 8
TEX. PENAL CODE § 7.02 (2015) .................................................................... 6, 10, 11
TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.021 (2015) .................................................................. 5, 8, 10
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NOTATION AS TO CITATION
Citation to the record of the case below will be as follows:
1. Citation to the eight volume Reporter’s Record (RR) and the one volume
Supplemental Reporter’ Record (SRR) will be to volume and page, e.g., “2
RR 12” refers to page 12 of volume 2 of the Reporter’s Record.
a. Citation to State’s exhibits will be to volume and exhibit, e.g., “8 RR
SX 1” refers to State’s exhibit one found within volume six of the
Reporters Record.
2. Citation to the single-volume Clerk’s Record (CR) will be to page only, e.g.,
“CR 15” refers to page 15 of the Clerk’s Record.
3. Citation to Appellant’s Brief (AB) will be to page only, e.g., “AB 6” refers
to page 6 of the Appellant’s Brief.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The State adopts Appellant’s Statement of the Case.
ISSUES PRESENTED
I. There was not a fatal variance between the charge as alleged and the
proof at trial.
II. The evidence is sufficient to overcome the challenge to denial of
motion for directed verdict of acquittal and the claim of evidentiary
insufficiency
NOTE AS TO ORAL ARGUMENT
The State of Texas respectfully submits that oral argument in the case at bar
would not serve to enlighten the Court further, because the facts and legal
arguments are adequately presented in the briefs and record. The State respectfully
submits that oral argument in the instant case is not necessary and should therefore
be denied.
The State reserves the right to present oral argument should the Court grant
oral argument.
viii
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Jose Jimenez began sexually abusing his daughter Maritz when she was six
years old. 4 RR 128. The abuse began on the night Appellant was in the hospital
giving birth to Maritz’s brother. 4 RR 128. Jose came into Maritz’s room and got
undressed her and sexually assaulted her, causing pain. 4 RR 128. Jose would
place his “private” in Maritz’s privates and have intercourse with Maritz. 4 RR
130. After Appellant returned, Maritz told her what her father, Jose, had done. 4
RR 129. Appellant told her daughter that it wasn’t true and that if she told anyone
else that it was going to get worse. 4 RR 129. Appellant and Jose had a
discussion about what Maritz had told her, and thereafter they both treated Maritz
has an enemy or liar. 4 RR 129. Maritz was afraid of both her parents because of
the abuse. 4 RR 130.
As time went on, the sexual abuse became more frequent; increasing from
every week to nearly every day. 4 RR 130. Maritz would tell her mother about
the pain the abuse cause and Appellant would tell her she was she was a dirty girl
and did not take her to a doctor. 4 RR 131. When Maritz was eight Appellant
began sending Maritz to have sex with Jose. 4 RR 131-32. Appellant told Maritz
she needed to be her father’s whore. 4 RR 132. This continued after the family
moved to the United States when Maritz was 10. 4 RR 133-36. The family
moved to Weslaco. 4 RR 134. While living in Weslaco, another man, Silvio
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Carvajal, lived with the family. 4 RR 134. Carvajal was Appellant’s boyfriend. 4
RR 135. Appellant would sleep with Carvajal, while Maritz would sleep with Jose
so that he could sexually abuse her. 4 RR 135. Appellant would leave the room to
go sleep with Carvajal after Jose began sexually assaulting Maritz. 4 RR 136.
Jose was ok with his wife’s affair as long as he was allowed to continue abusing
Maritz. 4 RR 145. Appellant would send Maritz to Jose so that she could continue
her affair. 4 RR 145.
Jose and Appellant trained Maritz and her sibling to say nothing about the
abuse going on at home. 4 RR 138. Maritz was 12 when she was pregnant with
her first child; it was Appellant who first told Maritz that she was pregnant. 4 RR
139. Appellant knew that Maritz was pregnant by her father Jose. 4 RR 139.
However, Appellant told Maritz to lie and say that she had gotten pregnant by
having sex with a random guy that she had met. 4 RR 140. Appellant told Maritz
to lie because she did not want Jose to go to jail for sexually abusing his daughter,
and because it would ruin the family. 4 RR 140. When Appellant took Maritz to
the doctors for the pregnancy, Appellant would talk for her. 4 RR 142. After
Maritz’s first child , Crystal, was born Appellant would treat Crystal like her child.
4 RR 143-44. After the birth, Jose became even more possessive of Maritz. 4 RR
144.
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After the birth social workers became involved because Maritz was a minor.
4 RR 147. Before the social workers came for the interview, Appellant coached
Maritz on what to say. 4 RR 147. Maritz was to continue with the lie that the
father of her child was the random guy she hooked up with. 4 RR 147. Maritz and
her siblings were also coached not to discuss Appellant’s boyfriend and to say that
it was only Appellant Jose and the children living in the apartment. 4 RR 147.
Jose continued sexually abusing Maritz after Crystal’s birth. 4 RR 148.
Maritz then became pregnant for a second time when she was 13. 4 RR 148.
Appellant told Maritz to say that the father of the second child was the same as the
first. 4 RR 150.
Crystal was referred to a neurologist by a family physician because of
developmental issues. 4 RR 157-58. Appellant held Crystal out to be her child.
4RR 158. The neurologist conducted DNA testing. 4 RR 158. It was from this
testing that he doctor determined that Crystal was the product of an incestuous
relationship and that the Appellant was not the mother. 4 RR 158. Maritz
attempted to commit suicide on two occasions as a result of the stress related to the
sexual abuse. 4 RR 150.
After the abuse was discovered, Appellant gave Maritz up for placement into
foster care. 4 RR 155. Maritz’s children and her siblings remained in her
mother’s custody. 4 RR 156.
3
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Any variance in pleading in provide was not material as the only possible
variance was between principal and party liability.
The evidence was legally sufficient to show that Appellant aided, encouraged,
directed or solicited Jose Jimenez in the Aggravated Sexual Assault of Maritz
Jimenez, in that the sexual assault by Jose is undisputed and competent evidence
shows that Appellant directed Maritz to accept the abuse by Jose Jimenez and
condoned the abuse in exchange for freedom to conduct an affair of her own.
ARGUMENT
I. There was not a fatal variance between the charge as alleged and the
proof at trial.
In her first ground, Appellant claims that a fatal variance exists between the
conduct as pled in the indictment and the proof offered at trial. AB 15.
Specifically, Appellant alleges that the indictment alleged penetration of the
victim’s sex organ with the Appellant’s sex organ, while the proof at trial showed
that the penetrating sex organ was belonged to the victim’s father who also was
Appellant’s husband. AB at 15-16.
A. Standard of Review
A variance exists if the proof at trial differs from the allegations in the
charging instrument. See Byrd v. State, 336 S.W.3d 242, 246 (Tex. Crim. App.
2011) (citing Gollihar v. State, 46 S.W.3d 243, 246 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001)). A
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variance is fatal only if the variance was material. See Gollihar, 46 S.W.3d 247-
48. A variance is material if it “fails to give the defendant sufficient notice [of the
offense alleged] or would not bar a second prosecution for the same" offense. Id.
B. Party Liability does not give rise to a fatal variance.
Appellant was charged by indictment with the offense of aggravated sexual
assault; in said indictment the State alleged in relevant part that:
Ana Martinez Banos, herein after styled Defendant, on or about the 1st
day of August A.D., 2009, and before the presentment of this
indictment, in Hidalgo County Texas, did then and there intentionally or
knowingly cause the penetration of the sexual organ of Maritz Jimenez,
a child then and there younger than 14 years of age and not the spouse
of the defendant or Jose Jimenez, by defendant’s sexual organ. CR 6.
This indictment properly alleges the offense of Aggravated Sexual Assault, in
that it alleges the penetration of the sexual organ of a child younger than 14 years of
age by another’s sexual organ. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.021 (2015). Further, it is
clear that the indictment contemplates the party liability as it expressly alleges that
the victim was not the spouse of either Jose Jimenez or the Appellant.
It is proper to submit a jury charge under Section 7.02 (a) (2) of the Penal
Code, although said concept is not alleged in the indictment. See, e.g., Powell v.
State, 194 S.W.3d 503, 506 (Tex. Crim. App 2006); Sorto v. State, 173 S.W.3d 469,
476 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); Marable v. State, 85 S.W.3d 287, 287-88 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2002); Goff v. State, 931 S.W.2d 537, 544 n. 5 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995); See
5
also TEX. PENAL CODE § 7.01(c)(2015). Further, the evidence adduced at trial raised
the issue of party liability as the evidence suggested that Maritz’s sexual organ was
penetrated by her father Jose Jimenez and that Jose was aided or abetted in this act by
the Appellant. 4 RR 130, 131-32, 150. Under Malik, a hypothetically correct jury
charge is one that “accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does
not unnecessarily increase the State's burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the
State's theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for
which the defendant was tried." Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1997). The jury charge under Section 7.02 (a) (2) of the Penal Code was
raised by the evidence and was authorized by the indictment.
Appellant’s argument that she cannot be guilty of aggravated sexual assault
because the proof at trial showed that that Maritz’s sexual organ was penetrated by
her father Jose Jimenez rather than by Appellant’s sexual organ would render party
liability inapplicable to sexual assault or aggravated sexual assault. If it was
Appellant’s sexual organ that penetrated the victim’s sexual organ this would always
be under principle rather than party liability. For party liability to have any meaning
in aggravated sexual assault cases, an individual would have to, acting with intent,
solicite, encourage, direct, aid, or attempt to aid another actor to commit the sexual
assault; i.e., to have helped another penetrate the victim’s sexual organ with the other
actor’s sexual organ. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 7.02(a)(2)(2015). It is clear that party
6
liability is applicable to sexual assault or aggravated sexual assault cases as it has
been applied in other cases that have been affirmed on appeal. See Barron v. State,
773 S.W.2d 44, 46 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1989); Miranda v. State, 391
S.W.3d 302, 309 (Tex. App.—Austin 2012).
Further, in an unpublished opinion, the Third Court of Appeals in Austin
faced a similar claim. Rainey v. State, 2013 WL 692477 (Tex. App.--Austin Feb.
22, 2013)(memorandum opinion)1. The State would submit that this opinion is
instructive on the issue. In Rainey, the appellant claimed that a fatal variance was
caused as the indictment alleged that his sexual organ penetrated the victim’s
mouth while the proof at trial was that a co-defendant’s sexual organ penetrated the
victim’s mouth. Rainey, 2013 WL 692477 at *3. Rainey’s claim was that because
the indictment alleged his sexual organ penetrated the victim’s mouth it was a
material variance as the State proved that the victim’s mouth was penetrated by
another assailant’s sexual organ. Id at *4. This is similar to Appellant’s claim in
that she is claiming that the indictment at issue in this appeal alleged that her
sexual organ penetrated Maritz, while the proof at trial was that it was Jose’s
sexual organ that penetrated Maritz. AB 15. The Third Court of Appeals held
that this argument misconstrues the application of the law of parties as its applied
in aggravated sexual assault. Rainey, 2013 WL 692477 at *4. It further held that
1
The appellant in Rainey was a codefendant to the defendant in Miranda v. State, 391 S.W.3d
302, 309 (Tex. App. Austin 2012).
7
when properly applying the law of parties to sexual assault a defendant “would be
guilty as a party to aggravated sexual assault if he encouraged, directed, aided, or
attempted to aid an assailant who, as the principal actor, penetrated K.B.'s mouth
with his sexual organ, while that assailant worked in concert with another who also
committed sexual assault.” Id. When applied to the case at hand, Appellant would
be guilty as a party to aggravated sexual assault if she encouraged, directed, aided,
or attempted to aid an assailant who, as the principal actor, penetrated Maritz’s
sexual organ with his sexual organ, and it was shown that Maritz was then younger
than 14 years old. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 7.01, TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.021. The
only variance here is between whether Appellant was guilty as a principal or as a
party. This variance, if any, is immaterial.
II. The evidence is sufficient to overcome the challenge to denial of
motion for directed verdict of acquittal and the claim of evidentiary
insufficiency.
In her second and third issue2, Appellant alleges that the evidence was
insufficient to prove that she committed the offense as alleged in the indictment.
A. Standard of Review
In determining whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support a
conviction, a reviewing court must consider all of the evidence in the light most
2
As a challenge to denial of a motion for directed verdict of acquittal is, in essence, a challenge
to evidentiary sufficiency, the State of Texas will herein address Appellant’s claims of error in
denial of her directed-verdict motion and Appellant’s claim that the evidence is insufficient to
sustain conviction in a single issue. See, Zavala v. State, 956 S.W.2d 715 (Tex. App.—Corpus
Christi 1997, no pet.).
8
favorable to the verdict and determine whether, based on that evidence and
reasonable inferences therefrom, a rational fact finder could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979); Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2007). This "familiar standard gives full play to the responsibility of
the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence,
and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts." Jackson, 443
U.S. at 319. "Each fact need not point directly and independently to the guilt of the
appellant, as long as the cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances is
sufficient to support the conviction." Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13.
If the record supports conflicting inferences, the reviewing court must
presume that the fact-finder resolved the conflicts in favor of the prosecution and
therefore defer to that determination. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326. Further, direct and
circumstantial evidence are treated equally: "[c]ircumstantial evidence is as
probative as direct evidence in establishing the guilt of an actor, and circumstantial
evidence alone can be sufficient to establish guilt." Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13.
Finally, it is well established that the fact-finder is entitled to judge the
credibility of witnesses and can choose to believe all, some, or none of the
testimony presented by the parties. Chambers v. State, 805 S.W.2d 459, 461 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1991). The sufficiency of the evidence is measured by the elements of
9
the offense as defined by a hypothetically-correct jury charge. Villarreal v. State,
286 S.W.3d 321, 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Curry v. State, 30 S.W.3d 394, 404
(Tex. Crim. App. 2000). "Such a charge is one that accurately sets out the law, is
authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State's burden of
proof or unnecessarily restrict the State's theories of liability, and adequately
describes the particular offense for which the defendant was tried." Villarreal, 286
S.W.3d at 327; see Malik, 953 S.W.2d at 240.
B. The evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s verdict.
Under Texas Penal Code section 22.021, a person commits the offense of
Aggravated Sexual Assault if, they cause the penetration of the sexual organ of a
child younger than 14 by any means. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.021. As she was
charged in the indictment the Stated was limited to the theory that said penetration
was caused by a sexual organ. CR 6. To prove that Appellant was guilty of
Aggravated Sexual Assault, under a party theory, the State was required to show
that he was criminally responsible for the actions of another under the law of
parties. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN § 7.02. As previously stated, it is proper to
submit a jury charge on Section 7.02 (a) (2), although that concept is not alleged in
the indictment. See, e.g., Powell, 194 S.W.3d at 506; Sorto, 173 S.W.3d at 476;
Marable, 85 S.W.3d at 287-88; Goff, 931 S.W.2d at 544 n. 5. Texas Penal Code
section 7.02(a)(2) makes a person criminally responsible for an offense committed
10
by the conduct of another if, acting with the intent to promote or assist the
commission of the offense, she solicits, encourages, directs, aids, or attempts to aid
the other person to commit the offense. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 7.02. Therefore
under a jury charge that applies the law of parties to aggravated sexual assault as
alleged in the indictment, the State was required to prove that Appellant
encouraged, directed, aided, or attempted to aid an assailant who, as the principal
actor, penetrated Maritz’s sexual organ with said principal actor’s sexual organ,
and it was shown that Maritz was then younger than 14 years old.
Appellant alleges only that there was no proof that her sexual organ
penetrated Maritz’s sexual organ. However, under the law of parties ,the State was
not required to show that Appellant’s sexual organ penetrated Maritz’s sexual
organ. Rather the State was required to prove that Appellant, acting with the intent
to promote or assist the commission of the offense; solicited, encouraged, directed,
aided, or attempted to aid another person commit the offense. In other words that
Appellant solicited, encouraged, directed, aided, or attempted to aid Jose in his
sexual assault of Maritz.
The evidence adduced at trial clearly showed that Jose did in fact sexually
assault Maritz. 4 RR 128-139. Further, the evidence shows that Maritz was twice
impregnated as a result of the continuing sexual assault by Jose. 4 RR 139; 148.
Appellant doesn’t even challenge that Maritz was sexual assaulted by Jose. AB 33.
11
Maritz testifies that the sexual abuse began when she was six and continued until
she was 14 when her first child, Crystal, was diagnosed with autism and genetic
screening showed that said child was fathered by Jose. 4 RR 128, 158-59. She
also testified that she was twelve when she was pregnant with her first child, and
thirteen when pregnant with her second. 4 RR 139, 148. This testimony clearly
demonstrates that Maritz was sexually assaulted by Jose.
Maritz further testified that Appellant, her mother, was aware of the sexual
abuse Maritz was suffering at the hands of Jose; in fact, that Appellant was aware
of the abuse from the time Maritz was six years old. 4 RR 129. Maritz also
testified that Appellant would send her to Jose, her father, so that he could have
sexual intercourse with her. 4 RR 131-32, 145. Appellant would then sleep with
her boyfriend. 4 RR 145. Jose and Appellant had an arrangement that allowed
Appellant to sleep with her boyfriend, Carvajal, and Jose to sleep with Maritz. 4
RR 147. Maritz further testified that Appellant directed her to lie to Child
Protective Services when asked who the father of her children was. 4 RR 147.
The evidence is clearly sufficient to prove that Appellant was guilty as a party to
Jose’s aggravated sexual assault of Maritz.
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PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, the State of Texas respectfully requests that the judgment of
the trial court be, in all things, AFFIRMED.
Respectfully submitted,
RICARDO RODRIGUEZ, JR.
CRIMINAL DISTRICT ATTORNEY
HIDALGO COUNTY TEXAS
/s/ Michael W. Morris
________________________________
Michael W. Morris, Assistant
Criminal District Attorney
State Bar No. 24076880
Office of Criminal District Attorney
Hidalgo County Courthouse
100 N. Closner Blvd.
Edinburg, Texas 78539
Telephone: (956) 318-2300 ext. 781
Telefax: (956) 380-0407
ATTORNEYS FOR THE STATE
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Certificate of Compliance
I hereby certify that this document has the following number of words:
A. Initial documents—beginning at cover page and ending at Note as to Oral
Argument: 867 words
B. Brief: 3116 words
C. Total: 3983 words
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Michael W. Morris
________________________________
Michael W. Morris, Assistant
Criminal District Attorney
State Bar No. 24076880
Office of Criminal District Attorney
Hidalgo County Courthouse
100 N. Closner Blvd.
Edinburg, Texas 78539
Telephone: (956) 318-2300 ext. 781
Telefax: (956) 380-0407
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief of
State/Appellee was sent to Appellant’s attorney of record, O. Rene Flores through
the electronic filing service at Floreslaw1@aol.com.
/s/ Michael W. Morris
______________________
Michael W. Morris
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