DocketNumber： 03-95-00362-CR
Filed Date： 2/6/1997
Status： Precedential
Modified Date： 4/17/2021
This appeal is taken from a conviction for attempt to commit capital murder during the course of committing or attempting to commit robbery (1) alleged and proven to have occurred on December 2, 1993. The jury found appellant Dion Delon Alexander guilty, rejecting his "not guilty" plea. The trial court assessed punishment at life imprisonment. Appellant was tried jointly with co-defendant Tyrone Akito Harris. See Harris v. State, No. 03-95-00319-CR, this day decided.
Appellant advances seven points of error. Although not in chronological order, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the conviction, contends that the court erred in overruling both his "motion to suppress evidence" and his motion for severance, and in allowing the prosecutor to interject facts into the case that were not in evidence. In addition, appellant complains that the trial court erred in allowing unsworn testimony and, in connection therewith, complains of the trial court's intervention and comments which he claims deprived him of a fair trial under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
The challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is found in the seventh point of error. We shall commence our discussion with this contention in order to place all of appellant's contentions in proper perspective.
Dalton Langford, the owner of D's Pawn Shop in Killeen, testified that on December 2, 1993, he was at the store with his employee, Lorrie Lefler at about 6:45 p.m., near closing time, he went into his office to do some book work, and Lefler began bringing the bicycles on display outside into the store. After returning one bicycle, Lefler reported to Langford that "three people were outside the building." She returned to her work. Langford went to the store's counter and took out a loaded, but uncocked revolver. At this time, three black males came into the store, one of them holding Lefler by the neck. One of the men yelled, Lefler was shoved to the ground, and "they opened fire." Langford estimated that eight to twelve shots were fired by the men. One shot grazed Langford's head and knocked his glasses off. One shot grazed his ribs and another shot entered Langford's arm and elbow knocking him down. Other shots hit a computer and various parts of the store. The men then ran. Langford never fired a shot. He was able to tell Lefler to call 911 to notify the police. He did not get a good look at the faces of the men and was unable to identify anyone as the men who he concluded were there to commit robbery.
Lorrie Lefler testified that, as she began bringing the bicycles into the store, she saw a man walking across the parking lot. She identified him as Tyrone Harris. Later, she heard male voices from the side of the building. Lefler reported what she had heard and seen to Langford. When she returned to bring a second bicycle inside, Harris grabbed her around the neck, told her to get back into the store and to get down. As they entered the store, she could tell two other men were with Harris. She heard one of the men yell that "he (apparently Langford) has a gun," and the firing commenced. When it ended, the men fled from the store and Lefler called 911. She later selected Harris's photograph out of a photographic spread or lineup. She was not able to identify the other two men.
Officer Robert Hester of the Austin Police Department testified that on December 11, 1993, he stopped a vehicle in Austin because neither the driver nor the front seat passenger was wearing seat belts as required by law. As the vehicle came to a stop, Officer Hester observed that the front seat passenger made movements as if he was placing something under the front seat. Officer David Socha arrived on the scene as a backup. Socha removed the front seat passenger from the car while Hester removed the driver. A third man appeared to be asleep in the back seat. The driver had no identification or driver's license and gave his name as Karl Dickens. It was later shown that Dickens was Larry President. The front seat passenger gave his name as Tony Rome when in fact he was Dion Alexander. The "sleeping man" gave his name as James Taylor, but he was shown to be Tyrone Harris. Officer Hester searched under the front passenger seat where Alexander had been seated and found a 9 millimeter Glock semiautomatic pistol. President and Alexander were arrested, the vehicle impounded, and the pistol retained. Harris was released. Alexander and President were released sometime the next day.
Killeen Police Officer Jack St. John testified that he investigated the scene at D's Pawn Shop the night the offense occurred. State's exhibits 20 and 21 were identified as 9 millimeter shell casings found at the store. After St. John's conversation with one Donyell Frederick, St. John contacted the Austin Police Department and obtained the 9 millimeter Glock pistol found after the traffic stop on December 11, 1993. Russell Johnson, a firearm expert with the Texas Department of Public Safety, test-fired the weapon and was of the opinion that it fired the shell casings found at the pawn shop.
Marvin LaVell Rhynes, a/k/a LaVell Willis, testified that he was in Colorado at the time of the alleged offense, but that in the summer of 1994 he was returned to the Bell County Jail on a drug charge. There, he encountered Dion Alexander whom he had known previously. Alexander told him that he (Alexander), along with Larry President, and a third man whose name Rhymes could not recall, had committed the alleged offense at D's Pawn Shop, that they had gone to the pawn shop to obtain jewelry and money by robbery, that a shoot-out occurred, and that they left when they ran out of bullets. Alexander told Rynes he had wielded a .357 Magnum weapon, and President fired a 9 millimeter weapon. Alexander told Rhynes that a woman was at the store during the incident. Rhynes knew the location of the store from Alexander's conversation because he had traded at D's Pawn Shop in the past. Alexander also informed Rhynes that shortly after the offense, Austin police stopped the car in which he and his companions were riding and had confiscated the 9 millimeter weapon. The other weapon was hidden in an Austin apartment and was not recovered by the police. Rhynes reported his conversation with Alexander to Bell County Officer Tim Steglich and gave a statement concerning the same. Rhynes denied that he had "cut a deal" with any law enforcement authorities.
Nicole Broadway, age 20, testified that she had lived all her life in Killeen; that she had a child by Donyell Fredrick; that she knew Tyrone Harris, Dion Alexander, and Larry President; and that they and Frederick were associates, but she would not say that they were close friends.
Donyell Frederick was a difficult witness for the State. He refused to take a formal oath. He stated that he knew and associated with Harris, Alexander, and President, but that he knew nothing about the alleged offense. He repeatedly claimed the privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. He was granted immunity by the trial court upon the request of the State but still refused to answer questions and was held in contempt by the court. Neither Harris nor Alexander testified or offered any evidence. They rested when the State rested its case at the guilt/innocence stage of the trial.
Appellant Alexander challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction. The standard for reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, any rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt the essential elements of the offense charged. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979); Villalon v. State, 791 S.W.2d 130, 132 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990); Skillern v. State, 890 S.W.2d 849, 879 (Tex. App.--Austin 1994, pet. ref'd). The standard of review is the same in both direct and circumstantial evidence cases. Geesa v. State, 810 S.W.2d 154, 155 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Herndon v. State, 787 S.W.2d 408, 409 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). In our review of the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we must consider all the evidence which the jury was permitted, properly or improperly, to consider. Johnson v. State, 871 S.W.2d 183, 186 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993), cert. denied, U.S. , 114 S. Ct. 1579, 128 L. Ed. 2d 111 (1994); Rodriguez v. State, 819 S.W.2d 871, 887 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). In addition, the evidence must be measured against the charge that was given to the jury. Jones v. State, 815 S.W.2d 667, 668 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Skillern, 890 S.W.2d at 877. In its jury charge, the trial court tracked the allegations of the indictment and also charged on the law of parties. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 7.01 (West 1994).
The jury is the exclusive judge of the facts proved and the weight to be given to the testimony. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.04 (West 1979). The jury is the judge of the credibility of the witnesses, Adelman v. State, 828 S.W.2d 418, 421 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992), and is free to accept or reject any or all of the evidence presented by either party. Saxton v. State, 804 S.W.2d 910, 914 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987); Beardsley v. State, 738 S.W.2d 681, 684 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987). The reconciliation of evidentiary conflicts is solely within the province of the jury. Heiselbetz v. State, 906 S.W.2d 500, 504 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995); Bowden v. State, 628 S.W.2d 782, 784 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982). It is not the reviewing court's duty to disregard, realign, or weigh the evidence. Mareno v. State, 755 S.W.2d 866, 867 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
Appellant Alexander argues that neither Langford nor Lefler could identify him as being at the scene. This is true. Lefler did, however, place Harris at the scene in the company of two other men. Nine days later, appellant, Harris, and President were together in a car that was stopped for a traffic violation in Austin. A 9 millimeter pistol, later shown to have been used in the offense, was found under the seat where Alexander was sitting after he had been seen placing something under the seat. Alexander's argument that he was not connected with any of the guns used in the offense is not correct. Alexander also overlooks Rhynes's testimony describing Alexander's admissions that he committed the offense charged along with President and another man, and that one of the guns used had been seized by the police in Austin. Other evidence showed that the shell casings found had been fired by the 9 millimeter pistol seized. Appellant asks that we not consider the testimony relating the 9 millimeter pistol because it was the fruit of an illegal stop and seizure and that we disregard Frederick's unsworn testimony. As noted earlier, the appellate court, in reviewing evidence sufficiency claims, must consider all of the evidence presented whether properly or improperly admitted. See Fuller v. State, 827 S.W.2d 919, 930-31 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992); Nickerson v. State, 810 S.W.2d 398, 400 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, we conclude that any rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt all the essential elements of the offense charged. We overrule appellant's contention that the evidence was legally insufficient to support the conviction.
Appellant also claims that the evidence is factually insufficient to sustain the conviction. In Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 129 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996), the court concluded that courts of appeals are vested with the authority to review fact questions in criminal cases. The proper standard of review for factual sufficiency of the elements of the offense is the one set forth in Stone v. State, 823 S.W.2d 375, 381 (Tex. App.--Austin 1992, pet. ref'd untimely filed). Clewis, 922 S.W.2d at 129. This standard requires the court of appeals to view the evidence without the prism of "in the light most favorable to the prosecution" and set aside the verdict or judgment only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence to be clearly wrong and manifestly unjust. Id. at 129. Appellant recognizes the standard, calls attention to the same facts as in his challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence, but fails to discuss just how the application of the standard would entitle him to the relief he seeks. See Tex. R. App. P. 74(b). The evidence has been detailed and applying the Stone-Clewis standard we cannot say that the jury's verdict is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and manifestly unjust. Appellant's contention is without merit.
In the third point of error, appellant contends that the "trial court erred in allowing unsworn testimony to be heard at trial." See Tex. R. Crim. Evid. 603. The point of error refers to Donyell Frederick, a witness for the State. Because the background here
underlies both points of error one and two, the facts will be examined in greater detail.
Rule 603 provides:
Before testifying, every witness shall be required to declare that he will testify truthfully by oath or affirmation administered in a form calculated to awaken his conscience and impress his mind with his duty to do so.
Tex. R. Crim. Evid. 603. This rule continues a traditional procedure. 1 Steven Goode, Olin Guy Wellborn III & M. Michael Sharlot, Guide to the Texas Rules of Evidence: Civil and Criminal, § 6.03 at 523 (Texas Practice 1993) (hereinafter Goode). As a rule, unsworn testimony is inadmissible and is not legal evidence on which a judgment can be based. See 24 Tex. Jur. 3d, Criminal Law, § 3264 at 651-52 (1982).
With this background, we turn to the facts of the instant case. Donyell Frederick was more than the ordinary reluctant witness. When called by the State, his request to consult with his attorney was granted. Upon being recalled with the jury in the box and his attorney present, Frederick refused to be sworn by the trial court. He did not claim any religious beliefs against swearing nor did he ask to be sworn in any particular manner. He quickly stated that he had told the prosecutors that he was not going to testify, that he did not have anything to do "with this case," and that his attorney had informed him that he did not have to testify. In response to the trial court's inquiry as to whether he was claiming a privilege, he answered: "No, not really." Thereupon, the trial court informed Frederick that everybody had an obligation to testify unless a privilege was claimed; that Frederick would be required to tell the truth; that if he did not, he could be punished for perjury; and that the State and the defense had a right to call him as a witness.
The interrogation then commenced and the prosecutor elicited from Frederick his name and that he lived in Killeen in the fall of 1993. Thereupon, an objection was made for the first time that Frederick was not under oath. The objection was overruled and the interrogation continued. Frederick acknowledged that he and Nicole Broadway had a young son. When asked if he knew the defendants and Larry President, a second "lack of oath" objection was overruled. Frederick answered: "We was associates. We knew each other. That is it." When inquiry was made if he had told the Killeen police that his associates had admitted their participation in the instant offense, another "no oath" objection was overruled, and the request to remove the jury was denied.
The trial court again addressed Frederick, reminding him that he was subject to perjury, and elicited from him that he knew the difference between telling the truth and not telling the truth. When asked by the court if he would tell the truth, Frederick stated: "I don't know nothing I can tell. You keeping asking me questions. The questions I can answer, I answer. The answers I can't answer, I am not going to answer." The court concluded that Frederick understood the perjury law. The record then reflects:
The Court: Well, let me just advise you, sir, you are required to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth. Do you understand that?
The Witness: Yes, sir.
The Court: Okay. Do you understand what the laws of perjury are in Texas and that if you don't tell the truth that you can be punished for aggravated perjury for not telling the truth?
The Witness: Yes, sir.
The interrogation resumed with the prosecutor asking basically the same question--whether Frederick told Officer St. John that the defendants had admitted their involvement in the instant offense. Frederick responded by claiming the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination. When Frederick denied any involvement in the instant offense, the prosecutor informed him that he could not incriminate himself, but was refusing to incriminate "the defendants." Frederick stated that he did not "know what happened in that place," and took the "Fifth" in response to the same question repeatedly asked. When reminded by the prosecutor that he "was under oath," Frederick expressed the subjective view that he was not under oath, but acknowledged that he was subject to the laws of perjury. The same question was repeated and Frederick took the "Fifth." The prosecutor then offered "immunity" to Frederick with the court's approval. When the same question was repeated, the prosecutor stated that he was laying a predicate for impeachment of the State's own witness. An objection ensued along with a second request to remove the jury. The jury was finally removed. Thereafter, the immunity issue was again raised and the trial court granted the prosecutor's offer of "total immunity," both transactional and use immunity. Frederick was informed that he could no longer rely on the Fifth Amendment. Frederick stated he would not accept immunity and was allowed to confer with his attorney. Thereafter, when the same form of question was asked, Frederick stated: "I am not going to testify. I am not going to say nothing." Frederick was then held in contempt of court.
The trial court overruled a motion to instruct the jury to disregard Frederick's testimony for the lack of an oath. The trial court, with appellant's approval, did instruct the jury that Frederick had been granted immunity, had refused to testify, and had been held in contempt.
Frederick was not under oath when the first two questions were asked and answered revealing only his name and his location in Killeen in the fall of 1993. There was no objection to the questions. Thus, there was a waiver of any error. See Beck v. State, 719 S.W.2d 205, 211-14 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); see also Castillo v. State, 739 S.W.2d 280, 298 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987); Gonzales v. State, 748 S.W.2d 510, 511-12 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, pet. ref'd); Solis v. State, 647 S.W.2d 95, 98 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1983, no pet.). The testimony elicited was hardly incriminating.
After the objection to the lack of an oath, Frederick related only that he and Nicole Broadway had a young son, that he knew the defendants and Larry President, and that they were "associates." This evidence was cumulative of Broadway's testimony that related the same facts without objection. The improper admission of evidence is not reversible error when the same facts are proven by other unobjected-to testimony. Anderson v. State. 717 S.W.2d 622, 626-27 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); Miranda v. State, 813 S.W.2d 724, 739 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1991, pet. ref'd).
The question of whether Frederick had informed the Killeen Police Department or Officer St. John that appellant and his companions had admitted committing the instant offense was never answered. Subsequently, the questioning by the court that resulted in Frederick acknowledging that he was required to tell the truth and knew that he was subject to the laws of perjury constituted an affirmation sufficient to meet the requirements of the law. The obligation to tell the truth may take many forms. Rhea v. State, 705 S.W.2d 165, 170 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 1985, pet ref'd). (2) While the procedure is not to be emulated, we conclude from the point Frederick acknowledged his obligation to tell the truth, he was under "oath" within Rule 603. Thereafter, however, Frederick never answered the question repeatedly asked. In this regard, we observe that Officer St. John testified, without objection, that he received information from Frederick that led to the discovery of a 9 mm. weapon in Austin. On cross-examination, appellant elicited from St. John that Frederick had connected appellant "to the case." See Anderson, 717 S.W.2d at 626-27. Failure to administer a timely oath or affirmation was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt. Tex. R. App. P. 81(b)(2). The third ground of error is overruled.
The first point of error contends that the "trial court intervention and comments to and concerning witnesses prejudiced appellant's right to a fair trial under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution." The stated point is somewhat difficult to follow as the argument is directed to a single witness, Donyell Frederick, and to the actions of the prosecutor as well as the trial court. Generally, appellant complains that the trial court trespassed on the jury's right to assess the credibility of the witnesses. We are referred to fourteen pages of record where appellant contends that Frederick was subjected to admonishments for exercising his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Appellant fails to point out where the trial court "intervened," where an objection was made to such "intervention," or where any ruling was obtained on any objection. See Tex. R. App. P. 52(a). Nothing appears to have been preserved for review. An appellate court is not required to examine the record page by page and speculate on what appellant might have reference to on appeal. Frederick was a reluctant witness and presented some difficulties for the trial court to resolve as reflected by our discussion concerning the third point of error. After Frederick's appearance on the witness stand, the trial court, at appellant's request, instructed the jury to disregard any instructions given by the court to Frederick and any comments made. The court told the jury that legal rulings or comments were not intended to have any influence on the jury who was the trier of facts. After the court's instruction, appellant asked for no further relief.
Appellant relies upon Marlow v. State, 537 S.W.2d 8 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976), to support his contention that the trial court's intervention deprived him of a fair trial. Appellant does not explain how Marlow is controlling or even persuasive in the instant case. Marlow involved a claimed error in the jury charge by assuming facts damaging to the defendant. Id. at 11. Marlow is distinguishable on the law and the facts. It did not involve the Sixth Amendment.
Adding a multifarious flavor to the point of error, appellant also complains of actions of the prosecutor. These matters are simply listed in the brief. To none of these matters was an objection lodged so as to preserve error on appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 52(a). Failure to make a timely and specific objection waives any error. See Russell v. State, 665 S.W.2d 771, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1073 (1984). The first point of error is overruled.
In the second point of error, appellant urges that the "trial court's comments were an impermissible comment on the weight of the evidence which denied appellant his right to a fair trial under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution." Appellant relies upon article 38.05 which provides:
In ruling upon the admissibility of evidence, the judge shall not discuss or comment upon the weight of the same or its bearing in the case, but shall simply decide whether or not it is admissible; nor shall he, at any stage of the proceeding previous to the return of the verdict, make any remark calculated to convey to the jury his opinion of the case.
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.05 (West 1979).
To constitute reversible error in violation of the statute prohibiting the trial judge from making any remark conveying to the jury his opinion of the case, the comment must be such that it is reasonably calculated to prejudice a defendant's rights or to benefit the State. Williams v. State, 834 S.W.2d 502, 505 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 1992, pet. ref'd). To preserve any error for review, there must be a timely and proper objection. Tex. R. App. P. 52(a). Mestiza v. State, 923 S.W.2d 720, 724 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1996, no pet.) (citing Minor v. State, 469 S.W.2d 579, 580 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981)); Lookingbill v. State, 855 S.W.2d 66, 77 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1993, pet. ref'd). The failure to object constitutes a waiver. Williams, 834 S.W.2d at 505.
At the outset, appellant simply calls attention to "comments" mentioned in the first point of error, but most of these involved the prosecutor, not the trial court. There was no showing that any trial court comment was reasonably calculated to prejudice appellant's right or to benefit the State. Moreover, there were no objections. Any error was waived.
Next, appellant directs our attention to a trial court's oral instruction to the jury. When the court took a recess to work on the jury charge at the guilt/innocence stage, it told the jury:
You must remember now that all the instructions that you have received up to this point are still in effect, and you have to keep those in mind if you were to violate any of the instructions at this point, it could still cause a mistrial or a reversal or something like that after a waste of all this time. So be sure you remember and follow all the instructions that you received. Don't talk to anybody or let anybody talk to you or give you any information.
Appellant seizes upon the phrase "a waste of all this time" but fails to point out how this constituted a comment on the weight of evidence when incorporated in the quoted jury instruction. The jury instruction was not reasonably calculated to prejudice appellant's right, or to benefit the State. Moreover, there was no objection to the jury instruction. Any error was waived. The second point of error is overruled.
Appellant's fourth point of error contends that the "trial court erred in allowing the prosecutor to interject facts not in evidence into the trial." Appellant lists four instances in his brief. First, he asserts that the prosecutor testified for the witness. It was elicited from Officer St. John that the photographs identified earlier as having been used in a "line-up" may not have been the correct ones and that photographs with "the proper numbers" were outside the courtroom. The prosecutor then asked and obtained the court's approval for the witness to step outside the courtroom to secure the correct photographs. Second, it is claimed that at another point the prosecutor led the witness. There was no objection to either the testimony or the procedure so as to preserve error. Tex. R. App. P. 52(a).
Next, appellant complains that the prosecutor led the witness and testified for the witness. We are given only record page references. When Nicole Broadway was testifying, two objections that the prosecutor was leading the witness were overruled. In each situation, the prosecutor had not completed the question. Despite the trial court's ruling, the questions were rephrased and answered without objection. Rule 610(c) provides in part that leading questions should not be used on direct examination of a witness except as may be necessary to develop his testimony. Tex. R. Crim. Evid. 610(c). The rule clearly contemplates that some leading is acceptable at the trial court's discretion. Myers v. State, 781 S.W.2d 730, 733 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 1989, pet. ref'd). Rule 610(c) has not changed the former case law that permitting leading questions on direct examination is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court and that no abuse of discretion is shown unless the defendant can show that he was unduly prejudiced by virtue of such questions. Newsome v. State, 829 S.W.2d 260, 270 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1992, no pet.). Appellant has made no such showing.
Lastly, appellant claims that the prosecutor assumed the prerogative of the trial court in admonishing the witness Frederick in front of the jury. Here again, we are merely referred to a record page number. At one point when Frederick invoked the Fifth Amendment, he was informed by the prosecutor that under the law a witness can only do so on the ground that his testimony may tend to personally incriminate him in the commission of a crime. The objection that such admonishment should come from the trial court was overruled. In this instance, as in the others, appellant failed to show how the prosecutor improperly interjected facts not in evidence. The fourth point of error is overruled.
The fifth point of error asserts that the trial court erred in denying appellant's motion to sever his trial from that of the co-defendant Harris. Appellant relies upon article 36.09 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which provides:
Two or more defendants who are jointly or separately indicted or complained against for the same offense or any offense growing out of the same transaction may be, in the discretion of the court, tried jointly or separately as to one or more defendants; provided that in any event either defendant may testify for the other or on behalf of the state; and provided further, that in cases in which, upon timely motion to sever, and evidence introduced thereon, it is made known to the court that there is a previous admissible conviction against one defendant or that a joint trial would be prejudicial to any defendant, the court shall order a severance as to the defendant whose joint trial would prejudice the other defendant or defendants.
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 36.09 (West 1981) (emphasis added).
Severance formerly was always mandatory. Article 36.09 represents a substantial departure from the former law in that the "right" to severance is now "extremely limited." See Latham v. State, 656 S.W.2d 478, 480 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983). The statute has been interpreted as dividing the grounds for severance into mandatory and discretionary ones. Robinson v. State, 449 S.W.2d 239, 241 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969); 42 George E. Dix & Robert O. Dawson, Criminal Practice and Procedure § 33.27 at 360 (Texas Practice 1995). The mandatory ground for severance, that one defendant has "a previous admissible conviction," is applicable only when one defendant has no prior criminal record or at least no prior admissible conviction and the co-defendant has a prior conviction that is admissible. If both defendants have prior admissible convictions, the request for severance must be based on the fact that a joint trial would be prejudicial. This latter ground is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. See Dawson v. State, 477 S.W.2d 277, 279 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972); Robinson, 449 S.W.2d at 241.
Appellant claims error in the denial of his motion to sever because co-defendant Harris had a prior admissible conviction for aggravated robbery and because his defense was totally inconsistent with that of the co-defendant. The record shows that appellant and Harris were separately indicted for the same offense growing out of the same transaction. The State, however, filed a motion for joinder of parties. Appellant followed by filing a motion to sever based only on the mandatory ground for severance. The co-defendant also filed a motion to sever, but that motion is not in this appellate record. See Tex. R. App. P. 50(d). These latter motions were premature as there had not been a joinder of parties. They were obviously filed in anticipation of a favorable ruling on the issue of joinder.
On January 27, 1995, a hearing on the State's motion for joinder was heard by Judge Morris. The motion was taken under advisement. On February 17, 1995, another hearing was conducted on the same motion before a different judge. At that hearing, it was pointed out by the prosecutor that the co-defendant's prior conviction was on appeal and not admissible at trial, and that appellant had been granted probation in his cases and that these convictions were not final and would not be used at trial. The trial court took the matter under advisement and later granted the State's motion to join the parties for trial. After the joinder, we find no hearing and no ruling on appellant's motion to sever. (3)
On March 20, 1995, co-defendant Harris "reurged" his motion to sever, particularly on the basis that a joint trial would be prejudicial to Harris because of appellant's extraneous offenses. This record does not reflect when Harris originally "urged" his severance motion. Under any circumstances, appellant joined Harris in the "reurging." Counsel for Harris orally argued that the traffic stop in Austin and the finding of a weapon used in the instant offense under appellant's seat would be admissible against appellant at a joint trial, and that this would prejudice Harris and deny him a fair trial. Counsel acknowledged that the same evidence would show that he was asleep in the car at the time of the traffic stop. No evidence was offered by Harris or appellant before Harris's motion to sever was overruled. Unsworn assertions of fact by an attorney are not regarded as evidence. See Loveless v. State, 800 S.W.2d at 940, 945 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 1990, pet. ref'd). Article 36.09 provides for severance, and merely obtaining an adverse ruling upon the issue is not sufficient to preserve error for review. Dix, § 33.26 at 359. The failure to present evidence is the most frequent basis for denial of severance. Id.; see also Snow v. State, 721 S.W.2d 943, 945 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, no pet.); Rejski v. State, 715 S.W.2d 832, 834 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1986), overruled on other grounds, Rutledge v. State, 749 S.W.2d 501 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988). Moreover, no error is preserved for review when there is a failure to present evidence on the adopted motion of a co-defendant for severance. Hudson v. State, 794 S.W.2d 883, 885 (Tex. App.--Tyler 1990, no pet.). At the first hearing on the State's motion for joinder, appellant did get the trial court to take judicial notice of Harris's prior conviction, but this was a different and subsequent hearing. And there was, as noted, no hearing on appellant's independent motion to sever.
Appellant urges for the first time on appeal that there was error in denying his severance motion because his defense was totally inconsistent with that of the co-defendant. He bases this claim on the fact that, at trial, Lefler was able to identify Harris as the man who grabbed her around the neck and pushed her to the floor during the instant offense, but that she was unable to identify appellant as one of the other two men. This contention was not a part of appellant's motion for severance and never presented to the trial court. See Tex. R. App. P. 52(a). A trial motion or objection stating one legal basis may not be used to support a different legal theory on appeal. Rezac v. State, 782 S.W.2d 869, 870 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
At trial, neither appellant nor Harris testified and their prior convictions were not introduced before the jury. A trial court does not abuse its discretion when the allegations in the severance motion and the proof, if any, offered in support thereof are not borne out by events at trial. See Morales v. State, 466 S.W.2d 293, 296 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971); Williams v. State, 630 S.W.2d 866, 867 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1982, no pet.). An appellate court will find an abuse of discretion by the trial court in refusing a severance motion only when a defendant has satisfied the "heavy burden" of showing clear prejudice. Metoyer v. State, 860 S.W.2d 673, 679 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 1993, pet. ref'd); Loveless, 800 S.W.2d at 945. We find no abuse of discretion in the overruling of the motion for severance.
In the sixth point of error, appellant contends that the trial "court erred in denying appellant's motion to suppress evidence seized subsequent to a traffic stop." Appellant does not direct our attention to any pretrial motion to suppress. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 28.01(6) (West 1989). We are directed only to a hearing at the trial on the merits outside the presence of the jury apparently to determine the admissibility of evidence seized after the traffic stop. (4)
At the hearing, Austin Police Officer Robert Hester testified that he was on patrol on the night of December 11, 1993, which was nine days after the instant offense. At about 9:57 p.m., Hester observed a four-door Cadillac automobile with neither the driver nor the front seat passenger wearing seat belts. Hester followed the vehicle and turned on the overhead lights of his police vehicle. Officer Hester then saw the front seat passenger make a furtive movement by reaching down with both hands to place something under the car seat. This furtive gesture caused Hester concern for his own safety. The Cadillac stopped and a backup officer, David Socha, arrived. Hester told Socha about the furtive movement. They approached the car cautiously for they were in fear of their safety. The driver told Hester that his name was Karl Dickens (later shown to be Larry President) and that he had no driver's license. Appellant was the front seat passenger. He told Officer Socha that his name was Tony Rome. The men had no identification and the officers were suspicious of the names given. A third man was asleep in the rear seat. Appellant and President were removed from the car and frisked for weapons at the rear of the vehicle. No weapons were found. Appellant claimed to live only a few blocks from the scene, but he could not give the address. He admitted that he knew the other two men as he had been "associated" with them in Bell County. The officers knew from police reports that men from the Fort Hood--Bell County area had been coming into Austin committing robberies and engaging in fighting, shootings, and other offenses. The officers discovered the car was not registered to any occupants. Officer Hester had observed the furtive movement, knew one man was still in the car, and based on his experience and training, had concern for his safety. He made a limited frisk or "quick sweep" under the front seat and found the 9 millimeter pistol. After the finding of the pistol, Hester arrested appellant for unlawfully carrying a firearm and arrested President for the failure to have a driver's license. The third man was identified as co-defendant Harris. Harris gave a false name at the time, but he was released because it was not believed that he had violated any law. Appellant and President were taken to jail and the Cadillac was impounded. At the conclusion of the hearing, appellant objected to the admission of the pistol solely on the ground that no probable cause to search was shown. The objection was overruled. Officers Hester and Socha both testified before the jury and the pistol was admitted into evidence.
The State urges that appellant has no standing to complain of the search, "quick sweep," or frisk that revealed the 9 millimeter weapon. Standing is an individual's right to complain about an allegedly illegal governmental search, and thus to exclude evidence. The purpose of both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and article I, section 9 of the Texas Constitution "is to safeguard an individual's legitimate expectation of privacy from unreasonable governmental intrusions." Richardson v. State, 865 S.W.2d 944, 948 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). An accused has standing to challenge the admission of evidence obtained by a governmental intrusion only if he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the place invaded. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978); Richardson, 865 S.W.2d at 948-49; Fuller v. State, 829 S.W.2d 191, 202 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
The accused, because he has greater access to the relevant evidence, has the burden of proving facts establishing a legitimate expectation of privacy. Calloway v. State, 743 S.W.2d 645, 650 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988); Wilson v. State, 692 S.W.2d 661, 667 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (op. on reh'g). To carry this burden, the accused normally must prove: (1) that by his conduct, he exhibited an actual subjective expectation of privacy, i.e., a genuine intention to preserve something as private, and (2) that the circumstances existed under which society was prepared to recognize his subjective expectation as objectively reasonable. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979); Richardson, 865 S.W.2d at 948-49. The following nonexclusive factors are relevant to the court's determination of whether the accused's subjective expectation was one that society was prepared to recognize as objectively reasonable: (1) whether the accused had a property or possessory interest in the place invaded; (2) whether he was legitimately in the place invaded; (3) whether he had complete dominion or control and the right to exclude others; (4) whether, before the intrusion, he took normal precautions customarily taken by those seeking privacy; (5) whether he put the place to some private use; and (6) whether his claim of privacy is consistent with historical notions of privacy. Calloway, 743 S.W.2d at 651.
Turning to the instant case, we observe that mere occupancy in a vehicle in and of itself, does not establish a legitimate expectation of privacy. Kelley v. State, 807 S.W.2d 810, 815 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, pet. ref'd). Simply because a person is a passenger in a car with the permission of the owner is not determinative of whether he has a legitimate right of privacy. Lewis v. State, 664 S.W.2d 345, 347 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). If a passenger in a vehicle fails to assert a possessory interest in the vehicle or the property seized, he does not have a legitimate expectation in the vehicle. Meeks v. State, 692 S.W.2d 504, 510 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985). Appellant has not asserted any possessory interest in the Cadillac shown to be registered to another and being driven by Larry President. He certainly does not assert any possessory interest in the 9 millimeter weapon, the fruit of the search. Considering all the relevant factors in Calloway, we find that appellant has failed to sustain his burden of proof and conclude that appellant lacks standing to contest the search. United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 91-92 (1980); Kelley, 807 S.W.2d at 815. A reviewing court may properly sustain the trial court's ruling on the objection on the ground that the evidence failed to establish standing as a matter of law even though the issue was not raised in the court below. Wilson, 692 S.W.2d at 671; see also State v. Klima, 934 S.W.2d 109, 111 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). The sixth point of error is overruled.
The judgment is affirmed.
John F. Onion, Jr., Justice
Before Chief Justice Carroll, Justices Kidd and Onion;* Chief Justice Carroll Not Participating
Affirmed
Filed: February 6, 1997
Do Not Publish
* Before John F. Onion, Jr., Presiding Judge (retired), Court of Criminal Appeals, sitting by
assignment. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 74.003(b) (West 1988).
1. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 15.01 & 19.03(a) (West 1994). The current code is cited for
convenience because the code amendments effective September 1, 1994, have no substantive effect
on the instant offense. The applicable law is the law in effect at time of the offense. See Act of
May 8, 1975, 64th Leg. R.S., ch. 203, § 4, 1975 Gen. Laws 476, 478 (Tex. Penal Code Ann.
§ 15.01, since amended); Act of April 16, 1985, 69th Leg., R.S., ch. 44, § 1, 1985 Tex. Gen.
Laws 434 (Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.03(a), since amended).
2. Oaths and affirmations have long been used as a means of inducing witnesses to testify
truthfully. Goode, § 603 at 523. See Tex. Const. art. I, § 5, ; Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art.
1.17 (West 1977). "Oath is not defined by statute or rule nor is its form prescribed." 7A Michael
J. McCormick, Thomas D. Blackwell & Betty Blackwell, Title 2, § 70.02 at 193 (Texas Practice
1995). An oath has been described as "any form of attestation by which a person signified that he
is bound in conscience to perform an act faithfully and truthfully." Vaughn v. State, 177 S.W.2d
59, 60 (Tex. Crim. App. 1944). "Oath" includes affirmation. Tex. Penal Code Ann. §
1.07(a)(32) (West 1994). Webster defines an affirmation as "a solemn declaration made under
the penalties of perjury by a person who conscientiously declines to take an oath." Webster Ninth
New Collegiate Dictionary 61 (1983). Rule 603 was modeled after the Federal Rules of Evidence.
The advisory notes to the Federal Rules of Evidence explain that an "[a]ffirmation is simply a
solemn undertaking to tell the truth; no special verbal formula is required." See Busby v. State,
907 S.W.2d 949, 954 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 1995, pet. ref'd).
3. Appellant directs our attention to a certain page of the statement of facts from the
pretrial hearing on the State's motion for joinder. No ruling on appellant's motion is
reflected there. It would have been premature if there had been such a ruling. Our
examination of the record does not reveal any ruling on appellant's motion to sever.
4. We have not found any trial objection in the record prior to the hearing regarding the
exclusion of evidence obtained after the traffic stop.
icle or the property seized, he does not have a legitimate expectation in the vehicle. Meeks v. State, 692 S.W.2d 504, 510 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985). Appellant has not asserted any possessory interest in the Cadillac shown to be registered to another and being driven by Larry President. He certainly does not assert any possessory interest in the 9 millimeter weapon, the fruit of the search. Considering all the relevant factors in Calloway, we find that appellant has failed to sustain his burden of proof and conclude that appellant lacks standing to contest the search. United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 91-92 (1980); Kelley, 807 S.W.2d at 815. A reviewing court may properly sustain the trial court's ruling on the objection on the ground that the evidence failed to establish standing as a matter of law even though the issue was not raised in the court below. Wilson, 692 S.W.2d at 671; see also State v. Klima, 934 S.W.2d 109, 111 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). The sixth point of error is overruled.
The judgment is affirmed.
John F. Onion, Jr., Justice
Before Chief Justice Carroll, Justices Kidd and Onion;* Chief Justice Carroll Not Participating
Affirmed
Filed: February 6, 1997
Do Not Publish
* Before John F. Onion, Jr., Presiding Judge (retired), Court of Criminal Appeals, sitting by
assignment. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 74.003(b) (West 1988).
1. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 15.01 & 19.03(a) (West 1994). The current code is cited for
convenience because the code amendments effective September 1, 1994, have no substantive effect
on the instant offense. The applicable law is the law in effect at time of the offense. See Act of
May 8, 1975, 64th Leg. R.S., ch. 203, § 4, 1975 Gen. Laws 476, 478 (Tex. Penal Code Ann.
§ 15.01, since amended); Act of April 16, 1985, 69th Leg., R.S., ch. 44, § 1, 1985 Tex. Gen.
Laws 434 (Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.03(a), since amended).
2. Oaths and affirmations have long been used as a means of inducing witnesses to testify
truthfully. Goode, § 603 at 523. See Tex. Const. art. I, § 5, ; Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art.
1.17 (West 1977). "Oath is not defined by statute or rule nor is its form prescribed." 7A Michael
J. McCormick, Thomas D. Blackwell & Betty Blackwell, Title 2, § 70.02 at 193 (Texas Practice
1995). An oath has been described as "any form of attestation by which a person signified that he
is bound in conscience to perform an act faithfully and truthfully." Vaughn v. State, 177 S.W.2d
59, 60 (Tex. Crim. App. 1944). "Oath" includes affirmation. Tex. Penal Code Ann. §
1.07(a)(32) (West 1994). Webster define
Beck v. State , 1986 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 860 ( 1986 )
Smith v. Maryland , 99 S. Ct. 2577 ( 1979 )
Latham v. State , 1983 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 1137 ( 1983 )
Dawson v. State , 1972 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 2268 ( 1972 )
Villalon v. State , 1990 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 97 ( 1990 )
Richardson v. State , 1993 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 167 ( 1993 )
Marlow v. State , 1976 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 951 ( 1976 )
Clewis v. State , 1996 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 11 ( 1996 )
Rodriguez v. State , 1991 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 265 ( 1991 )
Solis v. State , 1983 Tex. App. LEXIS 3960 ( 1983 )
Rezac v. State , 1990 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 6 ( 1990 )
Bisby v. State , 907 S.W.2d 949 ( 1995 )
Castillo v. State , 1987 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 651 ( 1987 )
Jackson v. Virginia , 99 S. Ct. 2781 ( 1979 )
Heiselbetz v. State , 906 S.W.2d 500 ( 1995 )
Rajski v. State , 1986 Tex. App. LEXIS 8266 ( 1986 )
Herndon v. State , 1990 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 64 ( 1990 )
Mestiza v. State , 1996 Tex. App. LEXIS 1461 ( 1996 )
Metoyer v. State , 1993 Tex. App. LEXIS 2250 ( 1993 )