Texas Southern University, Texas Southern University President Leisa Crumpton-Young and General Counsel Hao Le v. Mary Young

Opinion issued April 11, 2023
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
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NO. 01-22-00913-CV
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TEXAS SOUTHERN UNIVERSITY, TEXAS SOUTHERN UNIVERSITY
PRESIDENT LEISA CRUMPTON-YOUNG AND GENERAL COUNSEL
HAO LE, Appellants
V.
MARY YOUNG, Appellee
On Appeal from the 127th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 2022-77744
MEMORANDUM OPINION
We deny rehearing, withdraw our previous opinion and judgment of February
22, 2023, and issue the following opinion in its stead.
Appellants Texas Southern University, Texas Southern University President
Leisa Crumpton-Young, and General Counsel Hao Le (collectively, “TSU”) attempt
to appeal from the trial court’s implicit ruling on an amended plea to the jurisdiction
in an underlying suit brought by appellee Mary Young.
We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Background
On November 30, 2022, Young sought mandamus relief, declaratory relief,
and an application for a temporary restraining order and a temporary and permanent
injunction against TSU regarding Young’s employment as TSU’s Chief of Police.
An ancillary court granted a temporary restraining order in favor of Young on
December 1, 2022. The next day, another ancillary court granted expedited
discovery.
On December 5, 2022, TSU filed a plea to the jurisdiction. On the same day,
TSU also sought reconsideration and a protective order to stay discovery. On
December 6, 2022, TSU requested the trial court to hear its plea to the jurisdiction
and its Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for Protective Order to Stay
Discovery at an emergency hearing previously set for December 8.
On December 7, 2022, another ancillary court granted a TRO in favor of
Young. And, on the evening of December 7, 2022, TSU filed an amended plea to
the jurisdiction.
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During the morning of the December 8 hearing, TSU attempted to argue its
amended plea to the jurisdiction. The trial court reminded TSU that it had already
notified TSU on a telephone conference earlier in the day that it would not be
addressing the plea to the jurisdiction at the hearing since it was not prepared to
rule—especially since TSU filed the amended plea the day before.
On the afternoon of December 8, TSU filed this interlocutory appeal of the
trial court’s “implicit denial of the Defendants’ First Amended Plea to the
Jurisdiction during the December 8, 2022 hearing.”
On January 5, 2023, this Court notified TSU that it appeared we lack
jurisdiction. TSU responded to our notice within its appellate brief.
Analysis
Before considering the substantive issues presented, we must first determine
whether we have jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal. See Pike v. Texas EMC
Mgmt., LLC, 610 S.W.3d 763, 774 (Tex. 2020). Whether we have jurisdiction is a
question of law that we consider de novo. Bonsmara Nat. Beef Co. v. Hart of Tex.
Cattle Feeders, LLC, 603 S.W.3d 385, 390 (Tex. 2020). “[T]he general rule, with a
few mostly statutory exceptions, is that an appeal may be taken only from a final
judgment.” Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001). We
strictly construe statutes authorizing interlocutory appeals because they “‘are a
narrow exception to the general rule’ that ‘appellate courts generally only have
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jurisdiction over final judgments.’” Bonsmara Nat. Beef, 603 S.W.3d at 390 (quoting
CMH Homes v. Perez, 340 S.W.3d 444, 447 (Tex. 2011)). The statute applicable
here provides that a person may appeal from an order that “grants or denies a plea to
the jurisdiction by a governmental unit.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
§ 51.014(a)(8).
It is undisputed that the trial court has not issued a written order granting or
denying TSU’s amended plea to the jurisdiction. Nonetheless, TSU argues that the
trial court could have made an implicit ruling which would give this Court
interlocutory appellate jurisdiction. See, e.g., Thomas v. Long, 207 S.W.3d 334, 337
(Tex. 2006) (holding that trial court’s order ruling on merits of declaratory judgment
claim constituted implicit denial of plea to jurisdiction and was appealable under
section 51.014(a)(8)).
Relying on Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1, TSU contends that the
trial court denied its plea because TSU “stated the grounds for the ruling it sought
with sufficient specificity to have made the trial court aware of what it wanted and
the grounds for it” and “it must have received a ruling, either explicit or implicit, or
a refusal to rule to which it objected.” See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1. TSU thus contends
that it made the trial court aware that it wanted a dismissal of the case based on
sovereign immunity and that “it received an implicit ruling, in the refusal to
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reconsider or stay the discovery it had ordered, and a refusal to rule, to which it
objected.”
TSU’s reliance on Rule 33.1 is misplaced. Rule 33.1 governs the preservation
of appellate complaints. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1. It does not confer interlocutory
jurisdiction on this Court. See Hamlett v. Hamlett, No. 01-04-01097-CV, 2006 WL
241484, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 2, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op.)
(noting that Rule 33.1(a)(2)(A) does not constitute authority that confers jurisdiction
on the Court).
Moreover, the record does not show that any implicit ruling on the plea to the
jurisdiction occurred here. To the contrary, the trial court expressly stated on the
record at the December 8, 2022 hearing that it was not making a ruling on the plea
to the jurisdiction at that time; especially since the amended plea to the jurisdiction
had been filed just 24 hours before the December 8 hearing. Accordingly, because
this record does not show that the trial court made any ruling on the plea to the
jurisdiction, we lack jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal. See TEX. CIV. PRAC.
& REM. CODE § 51.014(a)(8).
TSU alternatively argues that we should construe its appeal as a writ of
mandamus and issue a writ directing the trial court to stay discovery and rule on
TSU’s amended plea to the jurisdiction. After considering TSU’s appeal as a
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petition for writ of mandamus, we conclude that TSU is not entitled to mandamus
relief. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8(a).
Conclusion
We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, and we deny mandamus relief.
PER CURIAM
Panel consists of Chief Justice Adams and Justices Countiss and Rivas-Molloy.
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