Byron Anthony Pleasant v. Ayanna Rae Black

Affirm and Opinion Filed March 17, 2022
In the
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-20-01040-CV
BYRON ANTHONY PLEASANT, Appellant
V.
AYANNA RAE BLACK, Appellee
On Appeal from the 382nd Judicial District Court
Rockwall County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 1-20-0980
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Carlyle, Smith, and Garcia
Opinion by Justice Carlyle
Appellant Byron Anthony Pleasant challenges the trial court’s two-year
protective order prohibiting him from, among other things, committing family
violence against Ayanna Rae Black. Mr. Pleasant contends the trial court erred by
(1) failing to make a statutorily required finding, (2) awarding relief that “did not
conform with” Ms. Black’s pleading, and (3) issuing the challenged order based on
legally and factually insufficient evidence. We affirm in this memorandum opinion.
See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4.
Background
The parties began a dating relationship in approximately 2012 and have at
least one child together.1 In June 2020, Mr. Pleasant filed a “Suit Affecting the
Parent–Child Relationship” in Dallas County.
Ms. Black filed an August 6, 2020 application for a protective order in
Rockwall County, where she resides, alleging Mr. Pleasant “has engaged in conduct
that constitutes family violence.” The application stated it “is brought for the
protection of [Ms. Black]” and requested that Mr. Pleasant be prohibited from,
among other things, “committing family violence as described in section 71.004 of
the Texas Family Code.”
The application’s attachments included a declaration of Ms. Black in which
she stated, among other things, (1) “Byron Pleasant has a long history of being
physically and emotionally abusive to me” and (2) “I believe that Byron is likely to
continue to assault me and that I need as much protection as the Court and the law
will allow.”
At the September 1, 2020 hearing on the protective order application, Ms.
Black testified she began living with Mr. Pleasant during her senior year of high
school. About two months after she moved in, Mr. Pleasant got “upset” with her and
became violent for the first time. He hit the side of her face with “open hand slaps.”
1
Though Ms. Black gave birth to two children during the parties’ dating relationship, the record shows
Mr. Pleasant disputes whether paternity has been established as to the second child.
–2–
After that, he committed similar abuse against her “numerous times,” about “every
other week or so.”
In 2014, Ms. Black became pregnant with their son, which made Mr. Pleasant
“upset” because “he wasn’t ready” for a child. Ms. Black testified Mr. Pleasant
“punched me directly in my stomach, saying that we needed to have a miscarriage.”
Then, Mr. Pleasant moved to Michigan and Ms. Black moved back into her parents’
home. Their son was born in January 2015.
Mr. Pleasant joined the military in November 2014 and, after his initial
training, was stationed in Monterey, California. Ms. Black visited him there four
times. She testified Mr. Pleasant committed violence against her each time, including
“attacking me by punching me in my arms and in my abdomen, in my stomach,”
which left “marks and bruises” on her. Subsequently, Mr. Pleasant was stationed in
Hawaii for four years and Ms. Black visited him there six to twelve times. On almost
every visit, he committed violence against her similar to the Monterey incidents. She
stated that though she was afraid of him, she continued to visit him because she
“loved him” and “thought that he would change” and they could “be a family.”
In August 2019, Mr. Pleasant completed his military commitment. He returned
to Texas and moved in with Ms. Black at her parents’ home for several months.
During that time, he committed physical violence against her “like maybe every
other week.” She testified, “He was calling me names, he would then punch me in
places like, again, arms, in my stomach, slaps towards my face.” She stated she wore
–3–
long sleeves and jackets to cover the bruises on her arms. The trial court admitted
into evidence without objection several photographs that Ms. Black described as
showing bruises on her arms caused by Mr. Pleasant’s violence. Ms. Black stated her
mother took those photographs in October 2019 “because she was worried.”
In early 2020, Ms. Black and Mr. Pleasant moved to a Dallas apartment. Ms.
Black stated that during their time there, Mr. Pleasant committed violence against
her two or three times a week. At one point, he choked her with his hands and she
“blacked out for a second.” In about March 2020, Ms. Black realized she was
pregnant again. Because Mr. Pleasant had “said he would lose his mind” if she
became pregnant again, she was scared and told him she was not pregnant.
The day after Father’s Day 2020, she began having contractions but thought
they were “fake.” When the contractions became more severe, she locked herself in
the apartment’s bathroom, where she delivered a daughter. She stated Mr. Pleasant
“knocked down the door, had seen that I had delivered the baby at home, and he
started yelling.” He broke her phone by throwing it. Then, paramedics arrived and
took her and the baby to the hospital. Since being discharged from the hospital, she
has lived at her parents’ home. The trial court admitted into evidence without
objection a photograph of Ms. Black’s broken phone.
Ms. Black also testified:
Q. . . . Are you—are you in fear, Ayanna, of Byron Pleasant?
A. Yes, I am.
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Q. Do you believe you need a protective order granted to protect you in
the future against Byron Pleasant’s conduct?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. Do you believe that, based on the history and conduct of Byron
Pleasant, that he’s likely to become assaultive or abusive again in the
future?
A. Yes.
....
Q. And, so, you’re going to have to continue to have some interaction
with him on some level and you want a protective order to prevent any
future acts of domestic violence; is that correct?
A. Yes, that’s correct.
On cross-examination, Ms. Black stated she did not call police or seek medical
attention regarding any of the alleged incidents, nor did she tell her family or friends
about the alleged abuse. She also stated that on the day before Father’s Day 2020,
she gave Mr. Pleasant a Father’s Day card in which she had written “thank you so
much for being there for [their son] and I, you are truly a great daddy, and I
appreciate everything you do, Babe. Have a great day—have a great daddy day.”
The trial court admitted a copy of that card into evidence without objection.
Ms. Black’s mother, Francine Black, testified the parties lived with her and
her husband after Mr. Pleasant moved back to Texas in 2019. Francine stated she
“knew that they would argue, verbally,” but she “had no knowledge” of them having
“physical fights” until she saw bruises on Ms. Black’s arm in October 2019. Francine
saw the bruises “by accident” when Ms. Black took off the sweater she usually wore.
Ms. Black’s “entire arm was bruised.” Francine photographed those bruises. She
stated Ms. Black never told her about any instances of violence before or after that
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time. When asked whether she believes Ms. Black needs a protective order against
Mr. Pleasant “to prevent future violence,” Francine stated, “Yes, I do.”
Mr. Pleasant testified that during their dating relationship, he and Ms. Black
had only one “physical altercation,” which consisted of her hitting him in the face
with a closed fist during an argument about a mattress they were purchasing. He
introduced text messages regarding that altercation into evidence without objection.
He testified he has never hit, slapped, choked, or physically assaulted or abused Ms.
Black. He stated (1) he did not cause the bruises in the photographs and does not
know how Ms. Black got those bruises and (2) Ms. Black lied to him about both of
her pregnancies.
During closing, Ms. Black’s counsel argued:
[Ms. Black] offered credible testimony about a history of violence
between her and Mr. Pleasant. We’ve got the picture of the bruises and
pictures of the broken phone and a pattern of behavior that shows that
not only has family violence occurred in the past but is likely to occur
again in the future.
Counsel for Mr. Pleasant responded, “Your Honor, I would—I know you’ll be
surprised—disagree with that statement, but we—what the evidence has shown is
that [Ms. Black] has a history of trouble with the truth.”
At the hearing’s conclusion, the trial court stated, “ Based on the overall
testimony and based on the information that are in the applicant’s Exhibits . . . , the
Court is going to make a finding that family violence has occurred. The request for
protective order is granted . . . .”
–6–
Before an order was signed, Mr. Pleasant obtained new counsel and filed a
September 9, 2020 “Motion to Reconsider Ruling on Application for Protective
Order and Special Exceptions.” He asserted, among other things:
[Ms. Black’s] Application for Protective Order is defective because she
failed to plead that family violence is likely to occur in the future as
required by Tex. Fam. Code § 81.001. [Ms. Black] did not plead for a
finding that family violence is likely to occur in the future, therefore the
Court should not have found that family violence was likely to occur in
the future.
The trial court signed a September 11, 2020 “Final Protective Order” that
stated in part, “The Court finds that family violence has occurred and that family
violence is likely to occur in the future.” At Mr. Pleasant’s request, the trial court
also issued October 7, 2020 findings of fact and conclusions of law, which included:
FINDINGS OF FACT
....
4. Byron Pleasant has committed one or more acts of family violence
against Ayanna Rae Black . . . .
5. Family violence by Byron Pleasant against Ayanna Black is likely to
occur in the future.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
....
3. Family violence by Byron Pleasant has occurred against Ayanna Rae
Black.
4. Family violence is likely to occur in the future.
Mr. Pleasant filed objections to the trial court’s findings and conclusions and
requested “additional or amended” findings of fact and conclusions of law. He also
filed a motion for new trial, contending, among other things, (1) the trial court “failed
to make a finding that family violence was likely to occur in the future as required
–7–
by Tex. Fam. Code § 85.001(a)” and (2) the application for protective order “was
defective because [Ms. Black] failed to plead that family violence was likely to occur
in the future as required by Tex. Fam. Code § 81.001.”
After a hearing, the trial court denied Mr. Pleasant’s motion for new trial. The
trial court did not issue additional or amended findings of fact and conclusions of
law.
Standard of review and applicable law
We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. Sommers v.
Sandcastle Homes, Inc., 521 S.W.3d 749, 754 (Tex. 2017). When construing statutes,
our primary objective is to give effect to the Legislature’s intent. Galbraith Eng’g
Consultants, Inc. v. Pochucha, 290 S.W.3d 863, 867 (Tex. 2009). We presume
legislative intent is reflected in the words of the statute and accord those words their
fair meaning. See Sommers, 521 S.W.3d at 754. We assume that “lawmaker-authors
chose their words carefully, both in what they included and in what they excluded.”
Id.
“Family violence” in a dating relationship includes “an act, other than a
defensive measure to protect oneself,” that “is intended to result in physical harm,
bodily injury, assault, or sexual assault or that is a threat that reasonably places the
victim or applicant in fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury, assault, or
sexual assault.” TEX. FAM. CODE §§ 71.004, 71.0021. Under family code § 81.001,
“[a] court shall render a protective order as provided by Section 85.001(b) if the
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court finds that family violence has occurred and is likely to occur in the future.” Id.
§ 81.001. Section 85.001 states:
(a) At the close of a hearing on an application for a protective order, the
court shall find whether:
(1) family violence has occurred; and
(2) family violence is likely to occur in the future.
(b) If the court finds that family violence has occurred and that family
violence is likely to occur in the future, the court:
(1) shall render a protective order as provided by [the family
code] . . . .
Id. § 85.001.
We review challenges to family violence protective orders for legal and factual
sufficiency. See In re E.A.K., No. 05-16-00724-CV, 2017 WL 2391722, at *3 (Tex.
App.—Dallas June 1, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.). When addressing a legal sufficiency
challenge, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the challenged finding,
crediting favorable evidence if a reasonable factfinder could and disregarding
contrary evidence unless a reasonable factfinder could not. City of Keller v. Wilson,
168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex. 2005). A legal sufficiency challenge to a family violence
protective order may be sustained only when “(1) the record discloses a complete
absence of evidence of a vital fact; (2) the court is barred by rules of law or of
evidence from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact; (3) the
evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere scintilla; or (4) the
evidence establishes conclusively the opposite of the vital fact.” In re Frasure, No.
05-13-01667-CV, 2015 WL 459223, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 4, 2015, no pet.)
–9–
(mem. op.); see also City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 827 (“The final test for legal
sufficiency must always be whether the evidence at trial would enable reasonable
and fair-minded people to reach the verdict under review.”).
“When an appellant challenges the factual sufficiency of the evidence on an
issue, we consider all the evidence supporting and contradicting the finding.”
Fulgham v. Fischer, 349 S.W.3d 153, 157 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, no pet.) (citing
Plas-Tex, Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 772 S.W.2d 442, 445 (Tex. 1989)). “We set aside
the finding for factual insufficiency only if the finding is so contrary to the evidence
as to be clearly wrong and manifestly unjust.” Id. (citing Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d
175, 176 (Tex. 1986) (per curiam)). In a bench trial, the trial court, as factfinder, is
the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses. Id. The factfinder may decide to
believe one witness and disbelieve another. E.g., Bowling v. Dahlheimer, No. 05-16-
01196-CV, 2017 WL 5166998, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 7, 2017, pet. denied)
(mem. op.) (citing City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 819). We will not substitute our
judgment for that of the trial court merely because we might reach a different
conclusion. In re Frasure, 2015 WL 459223, at *5.
Analysis
In his first issue, Mr. Pleasant contends the trial court “failed to properly
construe the requirements of Tex. Fam. Code § 85.001(a) and failed to make a
finding that family violence is likely to occur in the future.” According to Mr.
Pleasant, though the trial court “ruled as to prong one” of § 85.001(a) at the hearing
–10–
and stated “[t]he request for protective order is granted,” the court “made no other
findings” before concluding the trial and thus “did not make the statutorily required
findings at the close of the hearing.” He asserts this omission “violated not only
Section 85.001(a) of the Texas Family Code, but also Section 85.001(b),” which
allows for a protective order only if both findings are made.
The record shows Mr. Pleasant made no objection at the time of the alleged
omission. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a). Even assuming without deciding that this issue
was properly preserved for appellate review, Mr. Pleasant cites no authority, and we
have found none, interpreting section 85.001(a) as requiring trial courts to orally
announce that section’s required findings at the protective order hearing. In fact, at
least two Texas courts of appeals have specifically declined to adopt that
interpretation. In doing so, the Thirteenth District Court of Appeals reasoned:
While §§ 85.001(c) and (d) of the Texas Family Code require the court
to make written findings in certain protective orders, § 85.001(a) does
not specify the manner in which a court is to provide its findings. Title
4 of the Texas Family Code is remedial in nature, and we are to broadly
construe its provisions to “effectuate its humanitarian and preventative
purposes.” The statute in question does not expressly forbid a court
from reducing its findings to writing after a hearing, nor does it require
the findings be expressly made during the hearing or in the protective
order. We note that no manner of rendition is prescribed by the statute
and we decline to hold that § 85.001(a) requires a court to orally render
the required family violence findings at a protective order hearing.
Cox v. Walden, No. 13-20-00283-CV, 2022 WL 120014, at *2 n.3 (Tex. App.—
Corpus Christi–Edinburg Jan. 13, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citations omitted);
–11–
accord In re M.I.W., No. 04-17-00207-CV, 2018 WL 1831678, at *2 (Tex. App.—
San Antonio Apr. 18, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.).
Based on that same reasoning, we too “decline to hold that § 85.001(a)
requires a court to orally render the required family violence findings at a protective
order hearing.” Cox, 2022 WL 120014, at *2 n.3. Here, the trial court (1) stated at
the hearing that “[t]he request for protective order is granted” and (2) included past
and future family violence findings in both its written order and its findings of fact
and conclusions of law.2 We decline to conclude the trial court failed to comply with
section 85.001’s requirements. See id.; In re M.I.W., 2018 WL 1831678, at *2.
In his second issue, Mr. Pleasant asserts the trial court “erred in awarding
relief that did not conform with [Ms. Black’s] application because [Ms. Black] failed
to plead that family violence was likely to occur in the future.” Mr. Pleasant contends
he preserved this complaint for appellate review by asserting it in his September 9,
2020 motion to reconsider and special exceptions. He also contends “the likelihood
of future violence was not tried by consent” because “[Ms. Black] presented no
evidence that family violence was likely to occur in the future” and “[t]he conclusory
questions of [Ms. Black’s] counsel without presentation of evidence were not
calculated to elicit an objection from [Mr. Pleasant’s] trial counsel.”
2
Mr. Pleasant’s request for additional or amended findings of fact and conclusions of law did not
contain any objection or request regarding the timing of the trial court’s future family violence finding or
its non-announcement at trial.
–12–
Even assuming without deciding that Ms. Black’s application was deficient
for not pleading that family violence was likely to occur in the future, trial by consent
can cure a pleading defect. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 67. An unpled issue may be deemed
tried by consent when evidence about the issue is developed under circumstances
indicating both parties understood the issue was in the case and the opposing party
did not make an appropriate objection. E.g., Johnson v. Structured Asset Servs., LLC,
148 S.W.3d 711, 719 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, no pet.). An issue is not tried by
consent merely because evidence regarding it is admitted. Bos v. Smith, 556 S.W.3d
293, 306–07 (Tex. 2018). “We must examine the record not for evidence of the issue,
but rather for evidence of trial of the issue.” Id. at 307. If evidence is relevant to pled
issues as well as unpled issues, there is no trial by consent because the evidence
would not be calculated to draw an objection. Id. Our standard for reviewing a trial
court’s ruling that an unpled issue was tried by consent is abuse of discretion. See,
e.g., In re C.E.C., No. 05-17-01482-CV, 2018 WL 3062454, at *8 (Tex. App.—
Dallas June 1, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.).
Here, the application stated it “is brought for the protection of [Ms. Black]”
and requested that Mr. Pleasant be prohibited from, among other things, “committing
family violence as described in section 71.004 of the Texas Family Code.” Thus, at
the very least, the pleading provided notice that future violence by Mr. Pleasant
against Ms. Black was a concern. At trial, Ms. Black and her mother both testified
–13–
without objection that they believe Ms. Black needs a protective order to protect her
from Mr. Pleasant’s future conduct. Ms. Black also stated:
Q. Do you believe that, based on the history and conduct of Byron
Pleasant, that he’s likely to become assaultive or abusive again in the
future?
A. Yes.
....
Q. And, so, you’re going to have to continue to have some interaction
with him on some level and you want a protective order to prevent any
future acts of domestic violence; is that correct?
A. Yes, that’s correct.
At closing, Ms. Black’s counsel argued in part that the likelihood of future family
violence had been shown, and Mr. Pleasant’s counsel disagreed.
Mr. Pleasant does not explain, and the record does not show, how this
testimony directly addressing the likelihood of future family violence was not
evidence regarding such,3 or how that testimony was relevant to what he contends
was the sole family violence allegation pleaded—that family violence has occurred
in the past—and thus “not calculated to elicit an objection.” On this record we
conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion to the extent it determined that
the likelihood of future family violence was tried by consent. See Johnson, 148
S.W.3d at 719.
3
To the extent Mr. Pleasant’s second issue can be construed to include a legal sufficiency challenge,
our analysis below regarding his third issue addresses his evidentiary sufficiency complaints.
–14–
In his third issue, Mr. Pleasant asserts the trial court “abused its discretion by
issuing a protective order based on legally and factually insufficient evidence.” Mr.
Pleasant contends:
[Ms. Black’s] testimony failed to articulate competent evidence beyond
the bare listing of allegations of “family violence,” and [Mr. Pleasant]
denied all allegations. Without testimony or other evidence about the
circumstances surrounding the alleged incidents of “family violence,”
the evidence is factually and legally insufficient to support the required
finding that family violence occurred and is likely to occur in the future.
Mr. Pleasant argues (1) “none of the testimony given by [Ms. Black] is corroborated
by any other evidence or testimony”; (2) “the evidence [Ms. Black] provided was no
more than a mere scintilla”; (3) Ms. Black “testified that she lies, thereby calling into
question the weight and credibility of her entire testimony”; (4) the evidence as a
whole “establishes conclusively that family violence did not occur”; and (5) “[g]iven
that unsubstantiated stories were the sole basis for [Ms. Black’s] claims of family
violence, it is clear the trial court could not find that family violence is likely to occur
in the future.”
As described above, Ms. Black testified Mr. Pleasant (1) began committing
physical violence against her several months after they moved in together and
continued doing so throughout their dating relationship; (2) caused “marks and
bruises” on her by punching her arms and stomach; (3) punched her in the stomach
when she was pregnant with their son; and (4) at one point in 2020, caused her to
“black out” by choking her with his hands. Ms. Black’s mother testified she became
–15–
aware of the parties’ “physical fights” when she saw bruises on Ms. Black’s arm in
October 2019. Photographs of those bruises were admitted into evidence. Both Ms.
Black and her mother testified they believe Ms. Black needs a protective order to
protect her from Mr. Pleasant’s future conduct. Ms. Black also stated that based on
Mr. Pleasant’s past conduct, she believes he is likely to become assaultive or abusive
again in the future.
Mr. Pleasant cites no authority to support his contention that the evidence of
past family violence here is too “bare” to be credited by a reasonable factfinder.
Under the appropriate standard of review, we reject that contention. See In re
Frasure, 2015 WL 459223, at *4, 6; see also In re Collier, 419 S.W.3d 390, 397
(Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, no pet.) (concluding trial court’s finding of past family
violence was sufficiently supported by Mother’s testimony of alleged incidents
refuted by Father and not corroborated by any other source, even though Mother
allegedly had “tendency to exaggerate”). We conclude more than a scintilla of
evidence supports the trial court’s finding that family violence by Mr. Pleasant has
occurred. Thus, Mr. Pleasant’s legal sufficiency challenge regarding that finding is
without merit. See In re Frasure, 2015 WL 459223, at *4, 6.
As to factual sufficiency regarding the past family violence finding, the trial
court, as factfinder, was free to accept or reject all or part of each witness’s testimony.
See id. at *6. Though there was contradictory evidence at trial, the evidence
supporting the trial court’s finding of past family violence is not so weak or so
–16–
contrary to the overwhelming weight of all the evidence as to be clearly wrong or
unjust. See id. (concluding evidence was factually sufficient to support finding of
past family violence even where there was no other evidence of altercation wife
described and husband contended wife had perjured herself).
A trial court can reasonably conclude future violence is likely to occur based
on testimony showing a pattern of violent behavior. In re F.K.M., No. 05-11-00276-
CV, 2012 WL 939271, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Mar. 19, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.);
see also In re Frasure, 2015 WL 459223, at *6 (“In cases involving family violence
protective orders, evidence that a person has engaged in abusive conduct in the past
permits an inference that the person will continue this behavior in the future.”). Here,
Ms. Black testified Mr. Pleasant committed violence against her on multiple
occasions over nearly eight years. As described above, the trial court could decide
to believe one witness and disbelieve another. On this record, we conclude the
evidence is both legally and factually sufficient to support a finding that family
violence is likely to occur in the future. See In re F.K.M., 2012 WL 939271, at *3;
accord In re E.A.K., 2017 WL 2391722, at *3 (“Based on E.A.K.’s testimony of
multiple instances of past family violence, the trial court could reasonably infer
family violence was likely to occur in the future.”).
We affirm the trial court’s protective order.
__________________
–17–
/Cory L. Carlyle//
CORY L. CARLYLE
JUSTICE
–18–
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT
BYRON ANTHONY PLEASANT, On Appeal from the 382nd Judicial
Appellant District Court, Rockwall County,
Texas
No. 05-20-01040-CV V. Trial Court Cause No. 1-20-0980.
Opinion delivered by Justice Carlyle.
AYANNA RAE BLACK, Appellee Justices Smith and Garcia
participating.
In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial
court is AFFIRMED.
It is ORDERED that appellee AYANNA RAE BLACK recover her costs of
this appeal from appellant BYRON ANTHONY PLEASANT.
Judgment entered this 17th day of March, 2022.
–19–