Crystal Hernandez v. the State of Texas

NUMBER 13-21-00418-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
CRYSTAL HERNANDEZ, Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
On appeal from the 36th District Court
of San Patricio County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Longoria, Hinojosa, and Silva
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Hinojosa
Appellant Crystal Hernandez appeals the trial court’s judgment revoking her
community supervision and adjudicating her guilty of two counts of assault of a public
servant, third-degree felonies. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(b)(1). In one issue,
Hernandez argues that her sentence of concurrent seven-year prison terms constitutes
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
A grand jury returned an indictment charging Hernandez with two counts of
assaulting a public servant. See id. Hernandez pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea
agreement, and the trial court placed her on deferred adjudication community supervision
for five years. The State later filed a motion to adjudicate guilt 1 , alleging Hernandez
violated her community supervision conditions by: (1–3) committing the offenses of
possession of a controlled substance in penalty group 1 in an amount less than one gram,
possession of drug paraphernalia, and public intoxication; (4–6) failing to report her arrest
for the aforementioned offenses; (7) failing to report to her community supervision officer;
(8) failing to complete an outpatient psychiatric treatment program; and (9–10) failing to
pay fees and fines.
At the adjudication hearing, Hernandez pleaded true to each alleged violation. The
trial court admitted two exhibits: (1) “Stipulation and Waiver of Pre-Sentence Report”; and
(2) “Stipulation and Judicial Confession.” Hernandez testified that she agreed that the trial
court should revoke her community supervision and adjudicate her guilty. However, she
requested that the trial court consider sentencing her to “the least amount of time
possible[.]”
1 The State filed two prior motions to adjudicate guilt, which resulted in the trial court amending
Hernandez’s community supervision conditions.
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The trial court found each alleged violation to be true, revoked Hernandez’s
community supervision, adjudicated her guilty on both counts of assault of a public
servant, and sentenced Hernandez to concurrent terms of seven years’ imprisonment.
This appeal followed.
II. CRUEL & UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
In her sole issue, Hernandez argues that her punishment is excessive in light of
the offense and thus unconstitutional. Hernandez maintains that a sentence of three years
is more appropriate because she has no prior felony convictions and she caused only
minor injuries to the police officers she assaulted.
A. Applicable Law
An allegation of excessive or disproportionate punishment is a legal claim
“embodied in the Constitution’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment” and based on a
“narrow principle that does not require strict proportionality between the crime and the
sentence.” State v. Simpson, 488 S.W.3d 318, 322–24 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (citing
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991)); see U.S. CONST. amend. VIII
(“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted.”). A successful challenge to proportionality is exceedingly rare and
requires a finding of “gross disproportionality.” Simpson, 488 S.W.3d at 322–23 (citing
Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 73 (2003)); Trevino v. State, 174 S.W.3d 925, 928 (Tex.
App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2005, pet. ref’d) (providing that a sentence is unlikely to
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be disturbed on appeal if it is assessed within the legislatively determined range).
To preserve for appellate review a complaint that a sentence constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment, a defendant must present to the trial court a timely request,
objection, or motion stating the specific grounds for the ruling desired. See TEX. R. APP.
P. 33.1(a); Smith v. State, 721 S.W.2d 844, 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); Navarro v. State,
588 S.W.3d 689, 690 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2019, no pet.) (holding that to preserve a
disproportionate-sentencing complaint, the defendant must make a timely, specific
objection in the trial court or raise the issue in a motion for new trial); Toledo v. State, 519
S.W.3d 273, 284 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. ref’d) (same).
B. Analysis
Hernandez did not object in the trial court that her sentences were disproportionate
to the offenses charged or in violation of her constitutional rights. See TEX. R. APP. P.
33.1. Furthermore, the trial court’s seven-year sentence falls within the statutory
prescribed punishment range for third-degree felonies. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 12.34(a) (“An individual adjudged guilty of a felony of the third degree shall be punished
by imprisonment in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice for any term of not more
than 10 years or less than 2 years.”). Accordingly, we hold that Hernandez failed to
preserve this complaint for our review. See Smith, 721 S.W.2d at 855; Trevino, 174
S.W.3d at 927–28 (“Because the sentence imposed is within the punishment range and
is not illegal, we conclude that the rights [appellant] asserts for the first time on appeal
are not so fundamental as to have relieved him of the necessity of a timely, specific trial
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objection.”). We overrule Hernandez’s sole issue.
III. CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
LETICIA HINOJOSA
Justice
Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2 (b).
Delivered and filed on the
24th day of March, 2022.
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