Douglas Isiaq v. the State of Texas

In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
___________________________
No. 02-22-00206-CR
___________________________
DOUGLAS ISIAQ, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS
On Appeal from the 16th District Court
Denton County, Texas
Trial Court No. F21-1781-16
Before Birdwell, Bassel, and Womack, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Bassel
MEMORANDUM OPINION
A grand jury indicted Douglas Isiaq for injury to an elderly person, and he
pleaded guilty. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.04(a)(3), (c)(2). A jury found him
guilty, as instructed, and assessed his punishment at eight years’ confinement. See id.§ 22.04(f) (providing that intentionally or knowingly causing bodily injury to an elderly
person is a third-degree felony), § 12.34(a) (providing that confinement range for
third-degree-felony is two to ten years). The trial court sentenced him accordingly.
Isiaq did not object to the sentence.
Isiaq’s court-appointed counsel has filed a motion to withdraw as counsel and a
brief in support of that motion, in which he avers that, in his professional opinion,
“no meritorious ground for appeal exists in this case.” Counsel’s brief and motion
meet the requirements of Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744–45, 87 S. Ct. 1396,
1400 (1967), by presenting a professional evaluation of the appellate record
demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds for relief. See Stafford v. State, 813
S.W.2d 503, 510–11 & n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
In compliance with Kelly v. State, counsel (1) provided Isiaq a copy of the
motion to withdraw and Anders brief; (2) informed Isiaq of his right to review the
appellate record and to file a pro se response; (3) informed him of his pro se right to
seek discretionary review should this court hold the appeal frivolous; and (4) took
concrete measures to facilitate his review of the appellate record. See 436 S.W.3d 313,
319 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). Although this court afforded Isiaq the opportunity to
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file a response on his own behalf, he did not do so. Likewise, the State declined to
file a brief.
After an appellant’s court-appointed counsel files a motion to withdraw on the
ground that an appeal is frivolous and fulfills the requirements of Anders, this court is
obligated to undertake an independent examination of the record to see if there is any
arguable ground that may be raised on his behalf. See Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 511.
Only then may we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75,
82–83, 109 S. Ct. 346, 351 (1988).
We have carefully reviewed counsel’s brief and the appellate record. We agree
with counsel that this appeal is wholly frivolous and without merit; we find nothing in
the appellate record that arguably might support this appeal. See Bledsoe v. State, 178
S.W.3d 824, 827–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); see also Meza v. State, 206 S.W.3d 684, 685
n.6 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Accordingly, we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and
affirm the trial court’s judgment.
/s/ Dabney Bassel
Dabney Bassel
Justice
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
Delivered: April 27, 2023
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