Guojian Wei v. the State of Texas

Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed May 25, 2023.
In The
Fourteenth Court of Appeals
NO. 14-21-00751-CR
GUOJIAN WEI, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 458th District Court
Fort Bend County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 19-DCR-089085
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Guojian Wei appeals his conviction for sexual assault. See Tex.
Penal Code Ann. § 22.011. In four issues, appellant argues (1) the evidence is legally
insufficient to prove that appellant was guilty of sexual assault, (2) the jury’s
conclusion that appellant was the cause of the sexual assault violates the equal-
inference rule, (3) the jury was not free to ignore DNA evidence conclusively
establishing that appellant did not “cause” his finger to “penetrate” the
complainant’s vagina, and (4) the evidence was factually insufficient to prove the
offense of sexual assault. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
On September 23, 2019, appellant was indicted for the offense of sexual
assault by intentionally or knowingly causing the penetration of the complainant’s
sexual organ with appellant’s finger without the complainant’s consent. See id. He
pleaded not guilty and proceeded to trial.
At trial, the evidence showed that appellant worked as a masseuse at 88 Foot
Massage. The complainant testified that prior to the massage session with appellant
on July 8, 2019, at the request of appellant, she changed out of her leggings and put
on shorts provided by 88 Foot Massage. During the massage session, appellant slid
his hand inside the complainant’s shorts and underwear and inserted at least two
fingers into the complainant’s sexual organ. The complainant immediately told
appellant to leave her alone and get away from her, changed clothes quickly, exited
the room, and asked the receptionist to call the police. The complainant was
instructed to go outside, where she called the police. When Officer Joshua
Manriquez of the Rosenberg Police Department responded to 88 Foot Massage, the
complainant reported that she had been sexually assaulted. The complainant
identified appellant at trial as the person who had sexually assaulted her.
The jury also heard testimony from Sergeant Wade Wehring of the Rosenberg
Police Department; Lori Long, a sexual assault nurse that examined the complainant
on the day of the assault; Jacaranda Solis, a forensic scientist with the Texas
Department of Public Safety Crime Laboratory; Jennifer Young, a DNA analyst with
the Texas Department of Public Safety Crime Laboratory in Houston; Lieutenant
Joseph Rogers of the Rosenberg Police Department; and appellant, who denied
assaulting the complainant.
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The jury found appellant guilty of the offense as charged and assessed
appellant’s punishment at seven years’ imprisonment in the Texas Department of
Criminal Justice. This appeal followed.
II. LEGAL SUFFICIENCY
In his first issue, appellant argues the evidence is legally insufficient to
support his conviction. In his third issue, appellant argues the jury was not free to
ignore DNA evidence conclusively establishing that appellant did not “cause” his
finger to “penetrate” the complainant’s vagina. We will address these issues
together.
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Legal sufficiency is measured by the elements of the offense as defined by a
hypothetically correct jury charge. Villarreal v. State, 286 S.W.3d 321, 327 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2009). “Such a charge is one that accurately sets out the law, is
authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of
proof or unnecessarily restrict the State’s theory of liability, and adequately
describes the particular offense for which the defendant was tried.” Id.In a legal sufficiency review, we consider the evidence in the light most
favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational finder of fact could have
found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Chambers v.
State, 580 S.W.3d 149, 156 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019); see Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d
893, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.
307, 319 (1979)). In our analysis, we defer to the trier of fact to fairly resolve
conflicts in testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences
from basic facts to ultimate facts. Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2007) (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318–19). When the record contains
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conflicting inferences, we presume that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts
in favor of the prosecution, and we must defer to that resolution. Padilla v. State,
326 S.W.3d 195, 200 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326).
B. APPLICABLE LAW
A hypothetically correct jury charge would instruct the jury to find appellant
guilty if he (1) intentionally or knowingly (2) caused the penetration of
complainant’s sexual organ (3) with his finger and (4) without the complainant’s
consent. (CR 7). See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.011(a)(1)(A). Additionally,
[a]ny conviction under . . . Section 22.011 . . . is supportable on the
uncorroborated testimony of the victim of the sexual offense if the
victim informed any person, other than the defendant, of the alleged
offense within one year after the date on which the offense is alleged to
have occurred.
See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.07(a).
C. ANALYSIS
Appellant argues that the evidence is legally insufficient to support his
conviction because there was insufficient evidence that he caused his finger to
penetrate the complainant’s sexual organ and because the jury was not free to ignore
evidence that his DNA was not found inside the complainant’s vagina.
Here, the complainant testified that appellant inserted at least two fingers into
her sexual organ without her consent during a massage on July 8, 2019. Additionally,
the complainant informed the police of the offense that same day, as testified to by
the complainant, Officer Manriquez, and Sergeant Wehring. This testimony
constitutes legally sufficient evidence supporting appellant’s conviction. See id.;
Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.011(a)(1)(A); Chambers, 580 S.W.3d at 156; Hooper,
214 S.W.3d at 13; see, e.g., Garcia v. State, 563 S.W.2d 925, 928 (Tex. Crim. App.
1978) (holding that victim’s testimony of penetration by appellant, standing alone,
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was sufficient).
We overrule appellant’s first and third issues.
III. EQUAL-INFERENCE RULE
In his second issue, appellant argues that the jury’s “conclusion” that appellant
was the cause of the sexual assault violates the equal-inference rule because the
evidence presented at trial showed that it was just as likely that he did not cause his
finger to penetrate the complainant’s sexual organ.
In Texas civil law, the equal-inference rule prevents a jury from inferring an
ultimate fact from minimal circumstantial evidence which could give rise to any
number of inferences, none of which is more probable than another. Hancock v.
Variyam, 400 S.W.3d 59, 70–71 (Tex. 2013); see Suarez v. City of Tex. City, 465
S.W.3d 623, 634 (Tex. 2015). Appellant has not cited any criminal case applying the
equal-inference rule, nor have we found one.
Additionally, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that the legal-
sufficiency standard of review is “the only standard that a reviewing court should
apply in determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support each element of a
criminal offense that the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 894. We are bound to follow the precedent of the Texas Court
of Criminal Appeals where, as here, that court has deliberately and unequivocally
interpreted the law in a criminal matter. Mayer v. State, 494 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. ref’d). Furthermore, the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals has held that if evidence gives rise to at least two reasonably equal,
plausible inferences when viewed in a vacuum, then it is the jury that makes the
choice of which inference to accept. Evans v. State, 202 S.W.3d 158, 165 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2006).
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Finally, the equal-inference rule applies when there is only minimal
circumstantial evidence, and here there is direct evidence of appellant’s guilt. “[T]he
distinction between circumstantial evidence and direct evidence is that the latter
applies directly to the ultimate fact to be proved, while circumstantial evidence is
the direct proof of a minor fact which, by logical inference, demonstrates the fact to
be proved.” Crawford v. State, 502 S.W.2d 768, 769 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); see
also Frazier v. State, 576 S.W.2d 617, 619–20 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (“The test is
not whether the evidence is more or less probative, or even conclusive, but whether
it applies directly or inferentially to the main fact to be proved.”). It is well
established that eyewitness testimony constitutes direct evidence rather than
circumstantial evidence. See Helms v. State, 493 S.W.2d 227, 229 (Tex. Crim. App.
1973).
The complainant’s testimony that appellant inserted his fingers in her sexual
organ without her consent is direct evidence of his guilt. See id. Accordingly, we
reject appellant’s argument based on the equal-inference rule and again conclude
that the evidence was legally sufficient. See Isassi v. State, 330 S.W.3d 633, 638
(Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (noting that appellate courts defer to the responsibility of
the trier of fact to fairly resolve conflicts in testimony, weight the evidence, and draw
reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts); see also, e.g., Duke v. State,
365 S.W.3d 722, 730 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2012, pet. ref’d) (rejecting argument
based on equal-inference rule because there was direct evidence of guilt); Salazar v.
State, No. 11-15-00007-CR, 2017 WL 469379, at *4 (Tex. App.—Eastland Feb. 2,
2017, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (same).
We overrule appellant’s second issue.
IV. FACTUAL SUFFICIENCY
In his fourth issue, appellant asks this court to conduct a factual sufficiency
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review of the evidence adduced at trial. However, the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals has expressly rejected this standard of review. Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 894.
As noted, the Court has adopted the legal sufficiency standard as the only standard
applicable in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a criminal
conviction. Id. at 912 (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-20 (1979)). We
therefore reject appellant’s invitation to conduct a factual-sufficiency review and
overrule his fourth issue.
V. CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
/s/ Margaret “Meg” Poissant
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Wise, Jewell, and Poissant.
Do Not Publish — Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).
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