Angel Maldonado v. the State of Texas

AFFIRM; Opinion Filed May 18, 2023
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-22-00728-CR
No. 05-22-00729-CR
No. 05-22-00784-CR
ANGEL MALDONADO, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 4
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause Nos. F19-59968-K, F19-59969-K, and F19-59970-K
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Molberg, Carlyle, and Smith
Opinion by Justice Smith
Appellant Angel Maldonado pleaded guilty to three charges of aggravated
assault with a deadly weapon, and the trial court assessed fifteen years’ confinement
for each charge with the sentences to be served concurrently. In a single issue,
appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for
new trial based on ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm.
Background
Appellant was charged with three counts of aggravated assault with a deadly
weapon after he fired gunshots at an occupied vehicle in a restaurant parking lot. He
entered, and the trial court accepted, an open plea of guilt to each count.
At the plea hearing, Antwone Wright testified that he was driving his vehicle
in a Chik-fil-A parking lot. His wife was seated in the front passenger seat, and his
son was seated in the middle of the backseat. As Wright pulled into a line of
vehicles, another vehicle jumped in front of him. Wright honked and raised his
hands; the driver of the other vehicle lowered his window, fired two shots at Wright’s
vehicle, and drove away. One bullet shattered a rear passenger window and became
lodged in the back of Wright’s headrest. The other bullet went through the vehicle’s
bumper. Wright was able to provide police with the other vehicle’s license plate
number and, subsequently, appellant was arrested.
Appellant also testified at the plea hearing. He acknowledged shooting at the
Wright family. He previously reported that he was “acting in self-defense because
there was a gun pulled on [him]” but, at the hearing, explained that he saw the
vehicle’s window lower and somebody “stick their hand out, like they were trying
to pull out a gun at me.” Appellant further admitted that he had been under the
influence of alcohol and Xanax at the time of the shooting and “really didn’t think
about anything [he] did at the time.”
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Appellant had a pending driving while intoxicated (DWI) case when he
committed the aggravated assault offenses. He attended and successfully completed
DWI and victim impact classes. He also had been honest in his pre-sentence
interview with the probation department and an interview with “a clinical person
regarding drugs and alcohol and mental health.” He asked the trial court to take his
cooperation, as well as the reports generated from those interviews, into
consideration. Appellant testified that he understood the consequences of his actions
and that his conduct had been dangerous and unreasonable. He also apologized to
the Wright family.
At the time of the plea hearing, appellant lived with his parents and brothers
and worked approximately forty-eight hours each week in an auction warehouse. He
denied having a criminal history other than the DWI and aggravated assault offenses.
However, he admitted to drinking alcohol, taking Xanax without a prescription, and
possessing a firearm while released on bond for the DWI offense. He further
admitted to drinking alcohol and using marijuana while released on bond for the
aggravated assault offenses.
Appellant had attempted suicide in the past and believed it would be good for
him to see a mental health provider. He smoked marijuana to help with anxiety, but
understood that he would have to find a legal way to manage his anxiety. He testified
that he needed help.
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After hearing the evidence, the trial court found appellant guilty and sentenced
him to fifteen years’ confinement, to be served concurrently, in each case.
Appellant filed a motion for new trial, alleging trial counsel was not prepared
for the hearing and provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to arrange
for character and expert witness testimony. In an affidavit attached to the motion,
appellant averred that trial counsel passed his case for many months. They did not
discuss legal defenses, character witnesses, or the evidence. Trial counsel told
appellant he was getting probation and not to worry. According to appellant, his
parents, siblings, neighbors, and friends are examples of character witnesses who
would have testified on his behalf, but trial counsel did not investigate or prepare his
case.
During a hearing on the motion for new trial, appellant introduced into
evidence a list of fourteen individuals he asserted would have been called to testify
on his behalf had trial counsel done any investigation or contacted anyone in his
family. The individuals were family members, friends, a co-worker, and a mitigation
expert.
One of those individuals, Lizett Deleon,1 was the sole witness to testify at the
hearing. Deleon testified that appellant’s case had been postponed each month.
1
Deleon did not testify about her relationship to appellant, but trial counsel noted that appellant lived
with Deleon.
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Appellant was not advised that he was going to appear in court prior to the plea
hearing. According to Deleon, if appellant “knew that he was going to see the Judge
that day, we would have been aware and we would have been here.” It is unclear to
whom Deleon is referring, but she further testified that she understood that trial
counsel would notify her and appellant’s family when to come to court for the plea
hearing. She acknowledged, however, seeing pass slips that trial counsel provided
to appellant to inform him of the next court date and what he needed to complete
before then.
According to Deleon, appellant attended his DWI classes and was always on
time; he wanted to show the trial court all the things he was doing to get back on the
right path. Appellant planned to plead guilty, talk to the trial court, and see if he
could get probation.
After hearing the evidence and argument of counsel, the trial court denied the
motion for new trial. This appeal followed.
Standard of Review
We review a trial court’s denial of a motion for new trial alleging ineffective
assistance of trial counsel for an abuse of discretion. Okonkwo v. State, 398 S.W.3d
689, 694 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). We reverse only “if no reasonable view of the
record could support” it. Id.A trial court has wide latitude in deciding whether to deny or grant a motion
for new trial. State v. Boyd, 202 S.W.3d 393, 401 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, pet.
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ref’d). In reviewing the trial court’s decision, we “view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, defer to the court’s credibility
determinations, and presume that all reasonable fact findings in support of the ruling
have been made.” State v. Thomas, 428 S.W.3d 99, 104 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
In a single issue, appellant asserts the trial court abused its discretion in
denying his motion for new trial. Specifically, appellant contends the evidence
demonstrates that trial counsel did not contact or present readily-available mitigation
witnesses at the plea hearing and “[i]t is not reasonable to assume that the fourteen
witnesses could not have altered the outcome.”
A criminal defendant has the right to reasonably effective assistance of
counsel. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 10; see Lopez v. State, 343
S.W.3d 137, 142 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). The right to effective assistance of
counsel requires objectively reasonable, but not errorless, representation. Lopez, 343
S.W.3d at 142 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984), and
Robertson v. State, 187 S.W.3d 475, 483 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)).
To establish ineffective assistance, an appellant must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that: (1) counsel’s performance was deficient; and
(2) the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687;
Lopez, 343 S.W.3d at 142; see Williams v. State, 301 S.W.3d 675, 687 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2009) (“An appellant’s failure to satisfy one prong of the Strickland test
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negates a court’s need to consider the other prong.”). For the first prong, an appellant
must show that “counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness under the prevailing professional norms.” Lopez, 343 S.W.3d at 142.
For the second prong, an appellant must demonstrate “a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; Lopez, 343 S.W.3d at 142. A reasonable
probability is one sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Lopez, 343
S.W.3d at 142. The Strickland test applies to ineffective assistance claims involving
both the guilt-innocence and punishment phases of trial. See Hernandez v. State,
988 S.W.2d 770, 772 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
A defendant asserting ineffective assistance of counsel in the punishment
phase of trial must demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, a reasonable
probability that, absent counsel’s errors, a more lenient punishment would have been
assessed. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695; Miller v. State, 548 S.W.3d 497, 499 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2018). To establish prejudice because of trial counsel’s failure to call
witnesses, a defendant also must show that he would have benefited from the
witnesses’ testimony. See Perez v. State, 310 S.W.3d 890, 894 (Tex. Crim. App.
2010) (defendant could not establish prejudice when uncalled alibi witness’s
testimony would not have benefited defendant; even according to witness’s affidavit,
it was still possible that defendant committed crime); King v. State, 649 S.W.2d 42,
44 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (“failure to call witnesses at the guilt-innocence and
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punishment stages is irrelevant absent a showing that such witnesses were available
and appellant would benefit from their testimony”).
Here, appellant provided a list of witnesses that “would have been called” had
trial counsel properly investigated and prepared his case. There is no evidence,
however, regarding what those witnesses, save perhaps Deleon, would have testified
to at the plea hearing. Accordingly, appellant cannot show that he would have
benefited from the testimony of those witnesses in any meaningful way. See, e.g.,
Ex parte Vetcher, Nos. 05-18-00224-CR–05-18-00226-CR, 2018 WL 4103211, at
*11 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 29, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for
publication) (“Without knowing what type of mitigating evidence, if any, was
available, appellant has not carried his burden to show that such evidence would
have impacted the punishment assessed to such a degree that the failure to obtain
character references constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.”); Lewis v. State,
No. 01-17-00860-CR, 2019 WL 3022972, *6–7 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
July 11, 2019, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (trial court
reasonably could have determined that defendant was not prejudiced by counsel’s
failure to develop mitigating evidence for punishment phase when defendant did not
demonstrate how testimony of potential witnesses would have benefitted him);
Washington v. State, 417 S.W.3d 713, 725 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013
pet. ref’d) (defendant did not establish prejudice related to counsel’s failure to
request appointment of investigator, testimonial expert, or consulting expert when
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there was no evidence of what an investigation would have revealed or what benefit
an expert would have provided).
Deleon’s testimony included some mitigation evidence consistent with
appellant’s plea hearing testimony that he conscientiously attended his DWI classes
and was taking steps to get back on the right track. The trial court, however, was the
sole judge of witness credibility at the motion for new trial hearing, and we presume
that, in denying the motion, the court concluded that the additional mitigation
evidence would not have affected its decision on punishment. See Smith v. State,
286 S.W.3d 333, 344 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (“Only the trial judge in this case could
have known what factors he took into consideration in assessing the original
punishment, and only he would know how the defendant’s testimony, if allowed,
might have affected that assessment.”). On this record, we likewise conclude that
appellant did not demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.
Because appellant did not establish prejudice resulting from trial counsel’s allegedly
deficient performance, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying his
motion for new trial. Accordingly, we overrule appellant’s sole issue.
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The trial court’s judgments are affirmed.
/Craig Smith//
CRAIG SMITH
220728f.u05 JUSTICE
220729f.u05
220784f.u05
Do Not Publish
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b)
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Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT
ANGEL MALDONADO, Appellant On Appeal from the Criminal District Court
No. 4, Dallas County, Texas
No. 05-22-00728-CR V. Trial Court Cause No. F19-59968-K.
Opinion delivered by Justice Smith.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee Justices Molberg and Carlyle participating.
Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
Judgment entered this 18th day of May, 2023.
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Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT
ANGEL MALDONADO, Appellant On Appeal from the Criminal District Court
No. 4, Dallas County, Texas
No. 05-22-00729-CR V. Trial Court Cause No. F19-59970-K.
Opinion delivered by Justice Smith.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee Justices Molberg and Carlyle participating.
Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
Judgment entered this 18th day of May, 2023.
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Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT
ANGEL MALDONADO, Appellant On Appeal from the Criminal District Court
No. 4, Dallas County, Texas
No. 05-22-00784-CR V. Trial Court Cause No. F19-59969-K.
Opinion delivered by Justice Smith.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee Justices Molberg and Carlyle participating.
Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
Judgment entered this 18th day of May, 2023.
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