Terrance Bell v. Sun West Mortgage Company, Inc.

Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed June 13, 2023
In The
Fourteenth Court of Appeals
NO. 14-22-00229-CV
TERRANCE BELL, Appellant
V.
SUN WEST MORTGAGE COMPANY, INC., Appellee
On Appeal from County Court at Law No. 3
Galveston County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. CV-0089427
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Terrance Bell (“Bell”) appeals pro se from a post-answer default
judgment of possession in favor of appellee Sun West Mortgage Company, Inc.
(“Sun West”) in a forcible detainer action. In what we construe as one issue, Bell
argues that Sun West lacked standing to bring a suit for forcible detainer. We
affirm the judgment of the trial court.
I. BACKGROUND
Bell formerly owned a real property in Galveston County, Texas that was
sold in a foreclosure sale in February 2020. Afterwards, he did not leave the
property despite receiving a notice to vacate from Sun West, the post-foreclosure
property owner.
In November 2021, Sun West filed a forcible-detainer petition in the justice
court. Bell filed responsive pleadings pro se in the justice court. He also appeared
at trial. On December 6, 2021, the justice of the peace signed a judgment of
possession in favor of Sun West, ordering Bell evicted from the property.
Bell subsequently appealed to the county court for trial de novo and filed an
answer and other pleadings pro se in the county court. On March 23, 2022,
following a bench trial at which Bell did not appear, the county court signed a
judgment of possession in Sun West’s favor. Bell did not file post-trial motions but
filed a notice of appeal on March 29, 2022.
II. POST-ANSWER DEFAULT JUDGMENT
Courts may reverse a post-answer default if (1) the defendant’s failure to
appear was unintentional and was not the result of conscious indifference, (2) the
defendant has a meritorious defense, and (3) a new trial would not cause delay or
undue prejudice. See Matthis v. Lockwood, 166 S.W.3d 743, 744 (Tex. 2005) (per
curiam). Bell has addressed none of these factors directly and has not addressed the
first or third elements inferentially. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i) (“The brief must
contain a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate
citations to authorities and to the record.”). His appellate brief contains no mention
of the trial or of his failure to appear, no argument addressing post-answer default,
and no citations to the record or to applicable law. See id.2
Although we construe a pro se party’s filings liberally, a party’s pro se status
does not relieve him from rules of procedure. See Wheeler v. Green, 157 S.W.3d
439, 444 (Tex. 2005) (per curiam); Morris v. Am. Home Mort. Servicing, Inc., 360
S.W.3d 32, 36 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.) (noting pro se
appellant in forcible detainer appeal must comply with rules regarding appropriate
citation to authorities and to the record); see also Wade v. Dominion at Woodlands,
No. 14-17-00777-CV, 2018 WL 3354549, at *2 n.4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] July 10, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“We construe pro se filings and briefs
liberally but nonetheless hold pro se litigants to the same standards as licensed
attorneys.”). Construing Bell’s brief liberally, we conclude that he raises only one
jurisdictional issue that may be raised for the first time on appeal, which we
address below. Otherwise, Bell raises nothing for us to review. See Tex. R. App. P.
38.1(i); see also Johnson-Williams v. Idlewilde Apartments, No. 14-19-00977-CV,
2021 WL 98895 at *1, (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 12, 2021, no pet.)
(mem. op.).
III. STANDING
In his sole issue on appeal, Bell argues that Sun West lacked standing to
bring the suit for forcible detainer.
Standing is a constitutional prerequisite to filing suit. Heckman v.
Williamson County, 369 S.W.3d 137, 150 (Tex. 2012). A court does not have
jurisdiction over a claim made by a plaintiff who does not have standing to assert
it. Id. Because standing is a component of subject matter jurisdiction, it cannot be
waived and can be raised for the first time on appeal. West Orange-Cove Consol.
I.S.D. v. Alanis, 107 S.W.3d 558, 583 (Tex. 2003). We review questions of
standing de novo because standing is a component of subject-matter jurisdiction.
Farmers Tex. Cnty. Mutual Ins. v. Beasley, 598 S.W.3d 237, 240 (Tex. 2020).
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When reviewing standing on appeal, we construe the petition in favor of the
plaintiff and, if necessary, review the entire record to determine whether any
evidence supports standing. Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d
440, 446 (Tex. 1993). Standing requires a concrete injury to the plaintiff and a real
controversy between the parties that will be resolved by the court. Heckman, 369
S.W.3d at 154; see also Austin Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. Lovato, 171 S.W.3d 845, 849
(Tex. 2005) (stating issue of standing focuses on whether party has sufficient
relationship with lawsuit so as to have a “justiciable interest” in its outcome).
Generally, to have standing (1) the plaintiff must be personally injured; (2)
the plaintiff’s injury must be fairly traceable to the defendant’s conduct; and (3) the
plaintiff’s injury must be likely to be redressed by the requested relief. See
Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at 154. A standing inquiry requires a careful examination of
the allegations in the petition to determine whether the “particular plaintiff is
entitled to an adjudication of the particular claims asserted.” Id. at 156 (quoting
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984)). “Only the party whose primary legal
right has been breached may seek redress for the injury.” Alarcon v. Velazquez,
552 S.W.3d 354, 359 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, pet. denied).
“Without a breach of a legal right belonging to a specific party, that party has no
standing to litigate.” Id. “A plaintiff does not lack standing simply because he
cannot prevail on the merits of his claim.” DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Inman, 252
S.W.3d 299, 305 (Tex. 2008).
Sun West’s petition reflects that Bell’s formerly-owned Galveston County
property, which was subject to a mortgage on which he defaulted, was purchased at
a foreclosure sale by Fannie Mae a/k/a Federal National Mortgage Association.
Fannie Mae then conveyed the property to Sun West by a special warranty deed, 1 a
1
A warranty of title warrants the title of the grantee. See Chicago Title Ins. v. Cochran
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copy of which is attached to the petition. Sun West alleged in its petition that Bell
thus became a tenant at sufferance, i.e., an occupant in naked possession after his
right to possession has ceased.2 See Goggins v. Leo, 849 S.W.2d 373, 377 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, no pet.). Sun West alleges in its petition that it
sent Bell a notice to vacate the property on November 1, 2021. Attached to the
petition was a copy of two letters, which had been delivered and received by
certified mail and also sent by regular mail addressed separately to Bell “and/or all
occupants” and to “Tenant/Occupant.” Sun West states in its petition that despite
the notice to vacate, Bell failed to vacate and surrender the property to Sun West.
A person who refuses to surrender possession of real property on demand
commits a forcible detainer if the person is a tenant at will or by sufferance. See
Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 24.002(a)(2). Thus, Sun West filed the forcible-detainer
petition on November 15, 2021, seeking to evict Bell and for judgment for
possession of the property.3 These allegations and the attachments to the petition
suffice to show that that Sun West had been personally injured, that this alleged
injury was fairly traceable to Bell as tenant at sufferance, and that the injury—lack
of possession—was likely to be addressed through a suit for forcible detainer. We
Invs., Inc., 602 S.W.3d 895, 902 (Tex. 2020). A special warranty deed limits the circumstances
under which a grantee can recover for a failure of title, allowing it to do so for claims by,
through, and under the grantor, but not otherwise. See id.2
Where a deed of trust establishes a landlord and tenant-at-sufferance relationship
between the purchaser at the foreclosure sale and the previous owners, an independent basis for
possession exists on which the justice or county court can determine the issue of immediate
possession without resolving the issue of title to the property. Black v. Washington Mut. Bank,
318 S.W.3d 414, 418 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. dism’d w.o.j.). This is so even
if the possessor questions the validity of a foreclosure sale and the quality of the buyer’s title.
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Ezell, 410 S.W.3d 919, 921 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2013, no pet.); see
Villalon v. Bank One, 176 S.W.3d 66, 71 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. denied).
3
A forcible-detainer suit is a special proceeding, governed by particular statutes and
rules, to determine the right to immediate possession of real property. See Hong Kong Dev., Inc.
v. Nguyen, 229 S.W.3d 415, 433–34 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.); see also
Tex. Prop. Code Ann. §§ 24.001–.011; Tex. R. Civ. P. 510.
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conclude that Sun West had standing to bring suit and overrule Bell’s issue.
IV. CONCLUSION
Having overruled Bell’s sole issue, we affirm the judgment of the county
court at law.
/s/ Margaret “Meg” Poissant
Justice
Panel consists of Justice Wise, Justice Jewell, and Justice Poissant.
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