Danielle Leigh Edwards v. the State of Texas

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
ON REMAND
NO. 03-20-00138-CR
Danielle Leigh Edwards, Appellant
v.
The State of Texas, Appellee
FROM THE 421ST DISTRICT COURT OF CALDWELL COUNTY
NO. 18-217, THE HONORABLE CHRIS SCHNEIDER, JUDGE PRESIDING
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Danielle Leigh Edwards was convicted of the offense of injury to a child and
sentenced to twelve years’ imprisonment. See Tex. Penal Code §§ 12.33, 22.04. On appeal to
this Court, Edwards asserted that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support her
conviction. We affirmed the trial court’s judgment of conviction. Edwards v. State, No. 03-20-
00138-CR, 2021 WL 2692350 (Tex. App.—Austin July 1, 2021) (mem. op., not designated for
publication) (“Edwards I”). Subsequently, Edwards appealed this Court’s ruling, and the Court
of Criminal Appeals determined that the evidence was insufficient, reversed this Court’s
judgment, and remanded the case to this Court for further proceedings. Edwards v. State,
666 S.W.3d 571 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023) (“Edwards II”). We will modify the trial court’s
judgment of conviction, affirm it as modified in part, reverse in part, and remand for
further proceedings.
BACKGROUND
At the time relevant to this appeal, Edwards was living with her husband and was
raising her approximately one-year-old daughter L.B. After the Department of Family and
Protective Services (“Department”) initiated an investigation involving Edwards, a hair sample
from L.B. was subjected to drug testing, which revealed a positive result for the presence of
cocaine as well as cocaine metabolites that are produced when cocaine is broken down in
the body. As part of the Department’s investigation, Edwards filled out and signed a form
acknowledging that she had tested positive for cocaine and listing six days in the prior ten-day
period in which she had used cocaine. Edwards was later charged with injury to a child for
causing L.B. to suffer serious mental deficiency, impairment, or injury by allowing her to
ingest cocaine.
At trial, the form mentioned above was admitted as an exhibit during a
Department employee’s testimony. In addition, a laboratory manager for the company that
performed the drug testing on L.B.’s hair testified regarding those testing results. More
specifically, the manager explained that the testing showed that L.B. had cocaine and metabolites
of cocaine in her system. Regarding the amount of cocaine, the manager related that the
testing instrument validates up to a maximum of 20,000 picograms of cocaine per milligram,
that the results for cocaine were greater than 20,000 picograms, and that the actual number was
over 37,000 picograms. The police officer who obtained an arrest warrant for Edwards in
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response to these test results described the results as showing a concentration of cocaine “in
extreme amounts.”
Further, Edwards’s husband related that although he and another adult lived in the
home with Edwards and L.B., Edwards was L.B.’s primary caregiver and was nursing L.B. at the
time of her arrest. Moreover, Edwards’s husband denied consuming cocaine or giving L.B.
cocaine. Additionally, the person who became L.B.’s guardian after L.B. was removed from
Edwards’s home testified that a doctor described L.B. as being small for her age, that L.B. was
“clingy” and “fussy,” and that testing performed on L.B. showed that she was not suffering any
developmental delays at the time of the testing.
Finally, Bruce Jefferies testified that he owns a company that performs drug
testing and that he regularly testifies at trials as an expert witness regarding drug testing and
drug testing results. Jefferies discussed the drug testing results in this case, explaining that the
presence of cocaine metabolites demonstrates that the body processed the cocaine. Further,
Jeffries related that the result showing more than 20,000 picograms “shocked” him because of
how high the number was and that the results were “indicative of an addict that’s doing it all the
time which is going to cause . . . withdrawals.” Additionally, Jeffries said that cocaine attacks
the nervous system and that the ingestion of the amount of cocaine in question could cause
seizures, injure the right side of the heart, or result in physical and mental developmental delays.
The jury charge in this case instructed the jury that a person commits the offense
of injury to a child “if she recklessly causes serious mental deficiency, impairment or injury” to a
child. Regarding the allegations in this case, the charge instructed that the jury should only find
Edwards guilty if it determined beyond a reasonable doubt that Edwards “did then and there
recklessly cause serious mental deficiency, impairment or injury to [L.B.], a child 14 years of
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age or younger, by allowing [L.B.] access to cocaine and [L.B.] was able to ingest the cocaine.”
After considering the evidence presented at trial, the jury found Edwards guilty of injury to a
child. Edwards appealed the trial court’s judgment of conviction, arguing that the evidence was
insufficient to support her conviction because there was no evidence of any “mental deficiency,
injury or impairment to L.B.” Edwards I, 2021 WL 2692350, at *2. After noting that the
Penal Code does not define the phrase “serious mental deficiency, impairment, or injury,” we
referenced definitions for the relevant terms found in case law and in dictionaries. Id. After
setting out these definitions, we went through the evidence summarized at trial and concluded
that “the jury could have reasonably inferred that L.B. had ingested an amount of cocaine
sufficient to make her addicted and that she experienced withdrawal symptoms after having been
removed from Edwards’s custody” and, therefore, that the evidence was “sufficient to establish
that L.B. suffered from a serious mental deficiency, impairment, or injury.” Id. at *3.
On appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals agreed that the Penal Code did not
define “serious mental deficiency, impairment, or injury”; did not adopt the definitions for those
words provided in other non-penal contexts; and explained that the jury was “free to apply
any reasonable meanings for the ordinary statutory terms.” See Edwards II, 666 S.W.3d at 575
& n.6. Next, the Court of Criminal Appeals referenced the evidence presented at trial,
characterized the evidence as showing that “ingestion of cocaine could be harmful,” and
emphasized that no witness “testified that L.B. actually suffered from any of the[] theoretical
side effects” of cocaine ingestion. Id. at 576. Accordingly, the Court of Criminal Appeals
determined that “the State presented no evidence that the cocaine L.B. ingested caused her
‘serious mental deficiency, impairment, or injury.’” Id. Similarly, the Court of Criminal
Appeals rejected the idea that the jury could have “inferred the existence of serious mental
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deficiency, impairment, or injury” from common knowledge regarding the nature of drug
addiction and its harmful effects because jurors “would not have a common-sense understanding
of precisely how drug addiction and withdrawals affect a child’s development, cognitive
functioning, or mental health.” Id. For these reasons, the Court of Criminal Appeals determined
that there was insufficient evidence to establish “the element that L.B. suffered serious mental
deficiency, impairment, or injury”; reversed this Court’s judgment; and remanded the case to
allow this Court to address whether Edwards’s “conviction could be reformed to some lesser-
included offense.” Id. at 577.
STANDARD OF REVIEW AND GOVERNING LAW
Lesser-included offenses are defined in article 37.09 of the Texas Code of
Criminal Procedure, which explains that an offense is a lesser-included one in the following four
circumstances:
(1) it is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to
establish the commission of the offense charged;
(2) it differs from the offense charged only in the respect that a less serious injury
or risk of injury to the same person, property, or public interest suffices to
establish its commission;
(3) it differs from the offense charged only in the respect that a less culpable
mental state suffices to establish its commission; or
(4) it consists of an attempt to commit the offense charged or an otherwise
included offense.
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 37.09.
If an appellate court finds “the evidence insufficient to support an appellant’s
conviction for a greater-inclusive offense,” the court must consider the following two questions
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when “deciding whether to reform the judgment to reflect a conviction for a lesser-included
offense”: “1) in the course of convicting the appellant of the greater offense, must the jury have
necessarily found every element necessary to convict the appellant for the lesser-included
offense; and 2) conducting an evidentiary sufficiency analysis as though the appellant had been
convicted of the lesser-included offense at trial, is there sufficient evidence to support a
conviction for that offense?” Thornton v. State, 425 S.W.3d 289, 299-300 (Tex. Crim. App.
2014); see Rabb v. State, 483 S.W.3d 16, 21 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). “If the answer to either of
these questions is no, the court of appeals is not authorized to reform the judgment. But if the
answers to both are yes, the court is authorized—indeed required—to avoid the ‘unjust’ result of
an outright acquittal by reforming the judgment to reflect a conviction for the lesser-included
offense.” Thornton, 425 S.W.3d at 300 (internal footnote omitted).
“Evidence is sufficient to support a criminal conviction if a rational jury could
find each essential element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Stahmann v. State,
602 S.W.3d 573, 577 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319
(1979)). In making this determination, “[w]e view the evidence in the light most favorable to
the verdict and consider all of the admitted evidence, regardless of whether it was properly
admitted.” Id. “The jury is the sole judge of credibility and weight to be attached to the
testimony of the witnesses.” Id. “Juries can draw reasonable inferences from the evidence so
long as each inference is supported by the evidence produced at trial,” id., and are “free to apply
common sense, knowledge, and experience gained in the ordinary affairs of life in drawing
reasonable inferences from the evidence,” Eustis v. State, 191 S.W.3d 879, 884 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. ref’d). “When the record supports conflicting inferences, we
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presume that the jury resolved the conflicts in favor of the verdict and defer to that
determination.” Merritt v. State, 368 S.W.3d 516, 525-26 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
Appellate courts must “determine whether the necessary inferences are reasonable
based upon the combined and cumulative force of all the evidence when viewed in the light
most favorable to the verdict.” Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 16-17 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
Appellate courts also must bear in mind that “direct and circumstantial evidence are treated
equally” and that “[c]ircumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing
the guilt of an actor” and “can be sufficient” on its own “to establish guilt.” Kiffe v. State,
361 S.W.3d 104, 108 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. ref’d). The evidence is legally
insufficient if “the record contains no evidence, or merely a ‘modicum’ of evidence, probative of
an element of the offense” or if “the evidence conclusively establishes a reasonable doubt.” Id.
at 107 (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 320).
Under the terms of the Penal Code, a person commits the offense of injury to a
child if she “intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence, by act . . . causes
to a child . . . (1) serious bodily injury; (2) serious mental deficiency, impairment, or injury; or
(3) bodily injury,” and the term “child” under that provision means “a person 14 years of age
or younger.” Tex. Penal Code § 22.04. In this case, the indictment alleged that Edwards
committed the offense of injury to a child by recklessly causing “serious mental deficiency,
impairment, or injury” to her daughter L.B. by allowing L.B. to access and ingest cocaine when
she was fourteen years old or younger. The jury charge included instructions consistent with
these allegations.
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DISCUSSION
On remand, we must address whether Edwards’s conviction should be reformed
to a conviction for a lesser offense. To address this issue, we must determine if there is an
offense that meets the two Thornton prongs. 425 S.W.3d at 299-300.
In addressing this issue, we have been unable to find an offense that requires
“proof of the same . . . facts” as the charged offense. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 37.09(1);
Tex. Penal Code § 22.04. Next, we consider whether there is an offense that otherwise qualifies
as a lesser offense. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 37.09.
As a logical first step, we consider whether attempt to commit the charged offense
qualifies as a lesser included offense in the present case. Attempt to commit an offense is an
offense “one category lower than the offense attempted,” which in this case would be a third-
degree felony. Tex. Penal Code §§ 15.01(d), 22.04(e). Although the Code of Criminal
Procedure directs that an offense is a lesser-included one if “it consists of an attempt to commit
the charged offense,” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 37.09(4), the Court of Criminal Appeals has
warned that attempt to commit a charged offense may not constitute a lesser-included offense of
the charged offense when the mental state for the charged offense is, like here, a reckless one,
Rabb, 483 S.W.3d at 22; see also id. (noting that “a jury does not ‘necessarily find’ guilt of
attempt when it convicts on the completed offense”). This is so because the statute governing
the offense of attempt explains that a person is guilty of attempting to commit a crime if she
“does an act amounting to more than mere preparation that tends but fails to effect the
commission of the offense intended” “with specific intent to commit an offense.” Tex. Penal
Code § 15.01 (emphasis added); see also Cheney v. State, 755 S.W.2d 123, 126 (Tex. Crim. App.
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1988) (noting that statutes should be construed in manner giving effect to all laws and provisions
bearing on same subject).
In this case, by finding that Edwards committed the offense of injury to a child by
recklessly causing “serious mental deficiency, impairment, or injury” to her daughter L.B., the
jury would not necessarily have found that she acted with specific intent. See Tex. Penal Code
§§ 15.01(a), 22.04; see also id. § 6.03(a), (c) (explaining that person acts with intent “when it is
his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result” but that person acts
recklessly “when he is aware of but consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk
that the circumstances exist or the result will occur”); Graves v. State, 782 S.W.2d 5, 6 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 1989, pet. ref’d) (explaining that words “‘with specific intent to commit an
offense’ mean that the accused must intend to bring about the desired result”). Accordingly, as
charged in this case, attempt to commit injury to a child is not a lesser included offense of injury
to a child. See Tex. Penal Code §§ 15.01(a), 22.04.
Having determined that attempt to commit the offense of injury to a child is not a
lesser-included offense of the charged offense, we now consider whether there are any other
offenses that might qualify. In addition to the provision governing the charged offense of injury
to a child, the Chapter of the Penal Code governing assaultive offenses includes a provision
also related to children that prohibits people from abandoning or endangering children.
See id. § 22.041. That provision contains different subsections for two different offenses:
abandoning a child and endangering a child. See id. § 22.041(b)-(c). Of significance here,
subsection 22.041(c) states that a “person commits an offense if he . . . recklessly . . . by act or
omission, engages in conduct that places a child younger than 15 years in imminent danger of . . .
mental impairment,” and that the offense is a state-jail felony. See id. § 22.041(c), (f). Imminent
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in this context means “ready to take place, near at hand, hanging threateningly over one’s head,
menacingly near.” Hernandez v. State, 531 S.W.3d 359, 363 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2017, no
pet.) (quoting Garcia v. State, 367 S.W.3d 683, 689 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012)); see also id. at 364
(explaining that “the Texas legislature intended to protect vulnerable children when it enacted
Section 22.041”).
When finding Edwards guilty of injury to a child, the jury determined that she
recklessly caused L.B., who was fourteen years of age or younger, serious mental deficiency,
impairment, or injury when Edwards allowed L.B. to access and ingest cocaine. Regarding the
age of the victim, by concluding that L.B. was fourteen years of age or younger, the jury would
also necessarily have found that L.B. was younger than fifteen years old as required under the
endangering statute. See Tex. Penal Code §§ 22.04(c), .041(c). Similarly, by determining for the
charged offense that Edwards recklessly allowed L.B. to access and ingest cocaine, the jury
would also necessarily have found that Edwards recklessly “engage[d] in conduct” as required
for the offense of endangering a child. See id. §§ 22.04(a), .041(c).
Turning to the final elements of the two offenses, the jury determined that
Edwards’s actions caused L.B. serious mental deficiency, impairment, or injury. See id.
§ 22.04(a). The terms deficiency, impairment, and injury are synonyms. See Injury and Defect,
Thesaurus.com, https://www.thesaurus.com (last visited June 21, 2023) (listing deficiency and
injury as synonyms for defect and listing impairment as synonym for injury); see also Wagner v.
State, 539 S.W.3d 298, 318-19 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (Keller, J., dissenting) (noting that list of
words in series may be intended to demonstrate shared commonality in meaning). As set out in
our previous opinion, those terms also have similar definitions. See Edwards I, 2021 WL
2692350, at *2; see also Ex parte Hammons, 628 S.W.3d 335, 337 (Tex. App.—Waco 2021)
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(defining terms from section 22.04), vacated on other grounds by 631 S.W.3d 715 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2021). For example, “deficiency” has been defined as “the quality or state of being
defective or lacking some necessary quality or element.” Deficiency, Merriam-Webster.com,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/deficiency (last visited June 21, 2023). Similarly,
“impairment” is defined as “diminishment or loss of function or ability.” Impairment, Merriam-
Webster.com, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/impairment (last visited June 21,
2023). “Injury” comparably is defined as “hurt, damage, or loss sustained.” Injury, Merriam-
Webster.com, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/injury (last visited June 21, 2023).
When the similar terms are read in the context of a statute in which an
offender causes or inflicts those conditions, the synonymous nature of the terms is enhanced
as all of them refer to mental damage inflicted on a victim by an offender. See Tex. Penal
Code § 22.04; see also Mental Deficiency, Merriam-Webster.com, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/mental%20deficiency (last visited June 21, 2023) (defining “mental
deficiency” as meaning “a deficiency in cognitive functioning”); Mental Injury, Law Insider,
https://www.lawinsider.com/dictionary/mental-injury (last visited June 21, 2023) (defining
“[m]ental injury” as “the observable, identifiable, and substantial impairment of a child’s
mental or psychological ability to function”); Mental Impairment, Collins Dictionary,
https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/mental-impairment (last visited June 21,
2023) (defining “[m]ental impairment” as “a condition in which a part of a persons’ mind is
damaged or is not working properly”). Moreover, given the modifier “serious” found in section
22.04, the statute refers to “a heightened or excessive level of the deficiency, impairment, or
injury.” Hammons, 628 S.W.3d at 337; see also Black’s Law Dictionary 1101 (6th abridged ed.
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2000) (stating that “serious” as it relates to injuries means “dangerous; potentially resulting in
death or other severe consequences”).
The endangering statute does not require that the child victim actually suffer any
mental damage and does not require that any damage be serious in nature. See Tex. Penal
Code § 22.041©. Instead, the statute prohibits conduct that “places” the child “in imminent
danger of . . . mental impairment.” Id. Again, as with the injury-to-a-child statute, the meaning
of “mental impairment” as referring to mental damage is provided by the context of having the
impairment being caused by an offender’s conduct. By concluding that Edwards caused the type
of serious mental damage alleged in the charged offense, the jury would have also necessarily
found that Edwards placed L.B. “in imminent danger of . . . mental impairment.” See Simms v.
State, 629 S.W.3d 218, 223 n.8 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (noting that “proof of causing serious
bodily injury as is necessary to establish aggravated assault also automatically establishes proof
of placing the victim in imminent danger of serious bodily injury for purposes of establishing
deadly conduct”); Ford v. State, 38 S.W.3d 836, 845 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet.
ref’d) (reasoning that “one who causes bodily injury with a deadly weapon necessarily places the
complainant in imminent danger of serious bodily injury”).
Having determined that the jury would have necessarily found all of the elements
of the offense of endangering a child, we conclude that the first Thornton prong is satisfied and
that as charged in this case endangering a child is a lesser-included-offense of injury to a child.
See Gaddy v. State, 433 S.W.3d 128, 131 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2014, pet. ref’d) (determining
that “[t]he offense elements of felony DWI in this case are the same as the offense elements of
misdemeanor DWI, save and except for the offense-enhancement paragraphs” and that,
therefore, “the jury necessarily found Gaddy guilty of misdemeanor DWI in the course of
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convicting him of felony DWI” (internal citations omitted)). Now, we address whether the
second prong—if the evidence is sufficient to support a conviction for the lesser offense—is
satisfied. As set out above, an individual commits the offense of endangering a child if the
person recklessly “engages in conduct that places a child younger than 15 years in imminent
danger of . . . mental impairment.” Tex. Penal Code § 22.041©.
At trial, evidence was presented indicating that Edwards was the primary
caregiver for her one-year-old daughter L.B. and that she was breastfeeding L.B. before L.B. was
removed from her custody. In addition, Edwards filled out a form documenting that she had
tested positive for cocaine around the time that L.B. was removed from her home and that she
had regularly consumed cocaine in the days leading up to the drug testing. In addition, testing
performed on a sample of L.B.’s hair revealed the presence of cocaine and cocaine metabolites
that are produced inside the human body when cocaine is broken down. The testing produced a
result that exceeded the maximum 20,000 picograms per milligram of cocaine that the test was
designed to detect, and the estimated value of the actual concentration of cocaine was almost
double the maximum test value.
When discussing the results of the testing, Jefferies testified that the level of
cocaine present in the sample “shocked” him because it was so high and that the results were
those he would expect for a person who is addicted and using that drug all the time. Similarly,
Jeffries explained that the amount of drugs consumed would cause withdrawals and could cause
appetite suppression, psychological effects, seizures, brain disorders, and mental developmental
delays because cocaine attacks the nervous system. Cf. Hernandez, 531 S.W.3d at 364 (noting
that factfinder may infer that victim suffered pain). However, L.B.’s guardian did testify that
L.B. was not experiencing any developmental delays.
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Although the Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that this evidence and the
reasonable inferences that the jury could make from the evidence were insufficient to establish
that L.B. actually “suffered a serious mental deficiency, impairment, or injury as a result of
ingesting cocaine,” see Edwards II, 666 S.W.3d at 576, we believe that the evidence and the
reasonable inferences the jury could have made from the evidence are sufficient to establish that
L.B. was placed in danger of imminent mental impairment, see Tex. Penal Code § 22.041(c).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to a conviction for the lesser offense, a
reasonable jury could have concluded that Edwards recklessly allowed L.B. to access and ingest
cocaine when she was younger than fifteen years old and that this conduct placed her in
imminent danger of mental impairment. See id.; see also Hernandez, 531 S.W.3d at 366 (noting
that jury could have determined that conditions in home constituted immediate danger to
children’s physical and mental health). Accordingly, the second Thornton prong is satisfied
because the evidence is sufficient to support a conviction for the lesser-included offense of
endangering a child, and reformation of the judgment is required. See Tex. Penal Code
§ 22.041(c); see also Tex. R. App. P. 43.2 (allowing appellate court to modify trial court’s
judgment); Nowlin v. State, 473 S.W.3d 312, 319 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (reforming judgment
under Thornton to lesser included misdemeanor offense because all of elements were met except
aggravating factor).
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, we modify the trial court’s judgment to reflect a conviction for
the state-jail felony offense of endangering a child, affirm the judgment as modified as to the
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finding of guilt, reverse the portion of the judgment imposing sentence, and remand the case to
the trial court for a new punishment hearing on the lesser-included offense.
__________________________________________
Thomas J. Baker, Justice
Before Chief Justice Byrne, Justices Baker and Smith
Modified and, as Modified, Affirmed in Part; Reversed and Remanded in Part on Remand
Filed: June 23, 2023
Do Not Publish
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