Jerry A. Guzzetta v. Brimhall LQ, LLC D/B/A La Quinta Hotel

Fourth Court of Appeals
San Antonio, Texas
OPINION
No. 04-22-00194-CV
Jerry A. GUZZETTA,
Appellant
v.
BRIMHALL LQ, LLC d/b/a La Quinta Hotel,
Appellee
From the 285th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2012-CI-14775
Honorable John D. Gabriel Jr., Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice
Sitting: Irene Rios, Justice
Beth Watkins, Justice
Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice
Delivered and Filed: July 12, 2023
AFFIRMED
In this appeal, appellant Jerry A. Guzzetta complains of the award of contingency
attorney’s fees to his former attorney, Patrick Stolmeier. On appeal, Guzzetta raises three issues:
(1) the trial court erred in awarding fees because Stolmeier failed to establish good cause for his
withdrawal and provide sufficient evidence to support the award of fees; (2) the trial court erred
in granting and refusing to set aside appellee Brimhall LQ, LLC’s (“Brimhall”) motion for
summary judgment; and (3) the trial court erred in refusing to grant a new trial and sever/abate
Stolmeier’s fee claim to allow Guzzetta to pursue a malpractice case against Stolmeier. We affirm.
04-22-00194-CV
BACKGROUND
The Origin of the Dispute
This dispute owes its origins to a personal injury claim arising over a decade ago. Although
Guzzetta’s personal injury action is not at issue in this appeal, the factual origin provides important
context. In July 2011, Guzzetta (a California resident) was hired by American K-9 Detection
Services (“K-9”). On or around September 18, 2011, Guzzetta attended K-9’s training program for
canine handlers in Pipe Creek, Texas. While participating in K-9’s training program, Guzzetta
stayed at a La Quinta Inn owned by Brimhall. 1 According to Guzzetta, he slipped on muddy steps
at the La Quinta Inn and fell onto a landing, resulting in injuries to his neck, right upper extremity,
and left knee. After completing training, Guzzetta was sent to either Iraq or Afghanistan in
December 2011. He continued to work for K-9 until his employment contract ended at the end of
April 2012.
Upon returning to the United States, Guzzetta notified K-9 that he was injured during his
employment. He then filed at least four claims relating to the injury: (1) a worker’s compensation
claim in California; (2) an unemployment claim in Florida; (3) a third-party lawsuit against
Brimhall in Bexar County, Texas; and (4) a claim for benefits under the Defense Base Act
(“DBA”). The third of these is the proceeding below, and the fourth is essential to this appeal.
Guzzetta’s alleged injury potentially entitled him to $1,260,000 in federal worker’s
compensation benefits under the DBA. See 42 U.S.C. § 1651, et seq. Importantly, however, the
DBA bars all recovery if a person entitled to compensation “enters into a settlement with a third
person” for an amount less than his compensation entitlement for an alleged injury without
1
Brimhall formally declined to participate in oral argument and did not file a brief.
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obtaining the employer or its insurer’s prior written consent to the third-party settlement. 33 U.S.C.
§ 933(g). 2
Florida attorney Howard Grossman represented Guzzetta in pursuit of his DBA claim.
Beginning around January 16, 2013, Stolmeier represented Guzzetta in the underlying personal
injury action against Brimhall. Guzzetta engaged Stolmeier on a 40% contingency agreement.
Relevant Procedural History
On September 7, 2012, Guzzetta filed his original petition against Brimhall. After years of
litigation and extensive discovery, Guzzetta (represented by Stolmeier) and Brimhall attended a
June 27, 2016 mediation, which resulted in the consummation of a Mediation Settlement
Agreement (“MSA”). In relevant parts, the MSA (1) required Brimhall to pay Guzzetta $250,000
for dismissal with prejudice of all claims and associated releases and indemnities and (2) set forth
timing related to tendering (but not executing) drafts of the formal release and for payment.
Rather than end litigation, the MSA initiated years of protracted, acrimonious litigation
centered around one fact: Because Guzzetta neither sought nor received K-9 or its insurer’s prior
written consent to the MSA, the MSA potentially barred Guzzetta from a significantly higher
recovery on his DBA claim. According to Guzzetta, Stolmeier failed to advise him that receipt of
settlement funds would result in forfeiture of his DBA claim and failed to communicate with
Grossman prior to execution of the MSA. According to Stolmeier, Grossman approved Guzzetta’s
execution of the MSA. Guzzetta asserts that after he learned that receipt of funds from Brimhall
would forfeit his DBA claim, he refused to sign the release contemplated by the MSA unless and
until K-9 or its insurer provided written consent.
2
“The written-approval requirement . . . ‘protects the employer against his employee’s accepting too little for his
cause of action against a third party.’” Est. of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469 (1992).
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Guzzetta subsequently sought to either unwind the MSA or delay its implementation as
long as possible so that the DBA claim could be favorably resolved. Meanwhile, Stolmeier sought
to recover his contingency fee attributable to the third-party claim and, to that end, intervened in
the underlying proceeding. The parties subsequently filed various pleadings and motions seeking
essentially the same relief: (1) for Guzzetta, time to handle the DBA claim; (2) for Stolmeier, his
contingency fee derived from the third-party settlement; and (3) for Brimhall, the release
contemplated by the MSA.
After intervening, Stolmeier sought to depose Guzzetta and obtained a court order requiring
Guzzetta to appear at a certain date and time. Asserting an unspecified medical emergency,
Guzzetta failed to appear. Having failed to appear for a court-ordered deposition, on April 7, 2017,
the trial court entered a twenty-two-page sanctions order. 3 Guzzetta refers to the sanctions order
as a “death penalty sanctions order” that effectively ended his DBA claim.
On May 30, 2017, Brimhall filed a motion for summary judgment. On traditional grounds,
Brimhall asserted Guzzetta breached the MSA. On no-evidence grounds, Brimhall asserted there
is no evidence of a valid excuse that would invalidate the MSA. Neither summary judgment ground
relied on the sanctions order. Given Guzzetta and Stolmeier’s potentially competing claims to the
settlement payment, Brimhall also sought to interplead 4 the settlement payment into the court’s
registry.
On August 11, 2017, the trial court granted Brimhall’s motion for summary judgment. The
trial court determined the MSA was a binding, enforceable agreement; deemed the release signed
by Guzzetta; and sustained Brimhall’s objections to Guzzetta’s defenses. The trial court also
3
Much later, the sanctions order was set aside in part in an order that, among other things, ordered Guzzetta to appear
for his deposition and pay certain costs.
4
Interpleader protects a person from multiple liability by allowing a disinterested party to tender payment, which
allows interested parties to adjudicate amongst themselves. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 43.
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granted Brimhall’s motion for leave to deposit the settlement proceeds into the court registry and
discharged Brimhall from liability to the extent of the tendered sum.
On September 11, 2017, Stolmeier filed a motion to “join” the order on Brimhall’s motion
for summary judgment. On November 6, 2017, the trial court entered an order granting
Intervenor’s request for the same relief obtained by Brimhall.
After approximately two-and-a-half years of relative tranquility, the parties resumed active
litigation in May 2020. The parties filed numerous motions. Most pertinently, Stolmeier filed for
immediate payment of his contingency fee from the registry deposit, and Guzzetta sought to block
payment from the registry on the basis that it would extinguish his DBA claim. After the parties
set a slate of competing motions for a September 28, 2020 hearing, they entered a “Revised
Confidential Settlement Proposal for Rule 11 Agreement.” To summarize, the Rule 11 agreement
provided:
1. The parties agreed not to oppose Guzzetta’s motion to set aside the
trial court’s August 11, 2017 order granting Brimhall’s motion for
summary judgment; however, the parties agreed to
contemporaneously sign an agreed order vacating the order to set
aside the summary judgment, provided that the agreed order will be
held by Stolmeier for at least thirty days prior to presenting to the
trial court for signature. In other words, Guzzetta would have thirty
days to obtain a waiver under the DBA; if he did not, Stolmeier
could file an agreed order reinstating Brimhall’s summary
judgment.
2. The parties agreed not to oppose Brimhall’s motion to amend
interpleader order.
3. The parties agreed that if Stolmeier waited until resolution of the
DBA issue to seek disbursement of the interpled funds, Guzzetta
would stipulate to the $114,145.93 claim for fees; waive any
argument or claim under federal law for equitable adjustment; and
stipulate that Guzzetta’s recovery from the DBA proceeding and his
share of the interpled funds constitutes a full recovery for his claims.
The parties further agreed to execute full releases prior to
distribution.
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4. Thirty days after entry of the order amending the interpleader,
Stolmeier may seek distribution of interpled funds; however, if he
does so, Guzzetta and Brimhall do not join the request and can
contest it prior to final resolution of the DBA claim.
The Rule 11 agreement was executed by attorneys for Guzzetta and Brimhall, and by
Stolmeier. Pursuant to the Rule 11 agreement, on September 28, 2020, the trial court entered orders
(1) setting aside Brimhall’s summary judgment order and (2) amending the interpleader order.
On May 3, 2021, relying on the Rule 11 agreement, Stolmeier sought entry of the executed
agreed order. On June 28, 2021, the trial court entered the “Agreed Order on Intervenor’s Motion
to Vacate Order Setting Aside Summary Judgment.” Notably, the order was signed “Agreed” by
all parties, as required by the Rule 11 agreement. This order vacated the prior order that set aside
Brimhall’s summary judgment, thereby reinstating Brimhall’s summary judgment.
Stolmeier subsequently filed various papers seeking release of registry funds. After several
hearings, on January 7, 2022, the trial court entered a final judgment entitled “Order Granting
Intervenor’s Motion to Withdraw Funds from the Court Registry.” The order: (1) found
Stolmeier’s request for $100,000 in contingency attorney’s fees to be reasonable; (2) found
$14,145.93 in costs to be reasonable; (3) ordered the Bexar County clerk to issue a check to
Stolmeier for $114,145.93, “plus interest at the legal rate pursuant to the Texas Finance Code”;
and (4) denied all objections to Stolmeier immediately withdrawing funds. On January 24, 2022,
the trial court entered a nunc pro tunc order that calculated interest in the amount of $25,481.98
and substituted the calculated interest for the general award of interest.
On February 7, 2022, Guzzetta filed a motion for new trial and an original counterclaim
for legal malpractice against Stolmeier. Guzzetta argues the final judgment forfeits his right to
recover on his DBA claim, giving rise to a legal injury and newly accrued malpractice claim. He
requested the trial court set aside its judgment and allow his malpractice counterclaims to proceed
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to trial. On March 17, 2022, Guzzetta amended his motion for new trial and moved to sever his
malpractice claims into a new cause. The trial court did not rule on either motion. 5 Guzzetta timely
appealed.
FUNDAMENTAL ERROR
To preserve a complaint for appellate review, a party must present to the trial court a timely
request, objection, or motion that states the specific grounds for the desired ruling, if not apparent
from the context. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A). Guzzetta accurately concedes his first and third
issues were not preserved in the trial court. Nevertheless, Guzzetta asserts he is entitled to raise
the issues on appeal under the fundamental error doctrine.
“Except for fundamental error, appellate courts are not authorized to consider issues not
properly raised by the parties.” Mack Trucks v. Tamez, 206 S.W.3d 572, 577 (Tex. 2006); In the
Interest of B.L.D., 113 S.W.3d 340, 350–52 (Tex. 2003). But the present jurisprudential value of
the fundamental error doctrine is dubious; the “discredited” doctrine survives today only in two,
“rare” instances. Cox v. Johnson, 638 S.W.2d 867, 868 (Tex. 1982).
Under the first instance—not at issue here—we review for fundamental error where “the
record affirmatively and conclusively shows that the court rendering the judgment” lacked subject
matter jurisdiction. Tamez, 206 S.W.3d at 577. This type of fundamental error is relatively
common and wholly uncontroversial.
Under the second instance—at issue here—we review for fundamental error where the
“error directly and adversely affects the interest of the public generally, as that interest is declared
by the statutes or Constitution of our State.” Id. “The meaning of the ‘public interest’ that is
adversely affected must be extremely circumscribed, or the exception would swallow the rule.” In
5
The motion for new trial was overruled by operation of law. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b.
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re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 292 (Tex. 2002) (Hankinson, J., dissenting); see also Newman v. King,
433 S.W.2d 420, 422 (Tex. 1968) (“Error in failing to appoint a guardian ad litem for a minor
plaintiff who is represented by a regular guardian or next friend affects the rights of only the
particular minor and the particular litigants; it does not adversely affect the interest of the public
generally.”). Texas courts have most often found “public interest” fundamental error in quasi-
criminal proceedings, such as juvenile proceedings. See, e.g., In re C.O.S., 988 S.W.2d 760, 765
(Tex. 1999) (emphasizing “a juvenile proceeding is not purely a civil matter. It is quasi-criminal.”).
On this record, we decline to undertake “public interest” fundamental error review for four reasons.
First, Guzzetta asserts the public policy of the State of Texas, as expressed in the Texas
Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct (the “Disciplinary Rules”), demands we review his
unpreserved issues. However, “[t]he Disciplinary Rules are not binding as to substantive law
regarding attorneys, although they inform that law.” Royston, Rayzor, Vickery, & Williams, LLP
v. Lopez, 467 S.W.3d 494, 503 (Tex. 2015). And being neither statutory nor constitutional, the
Disciplinary Rules do not appear to constitute a sound basis to invoke “public interest”
fundamental error review as it is presently articulated. See Tamez, 206 S.W.3d at 577 (public
interest must be “declared by the statutes or Constitution” of Texas).
Second, although Guzzetta asserts the “unique facts of this case demonstrate how closely
judicial integrity is linked to lawyers’ compliance with” the Disciplinary Rules, he fails to identify
what unique facts do so. He also fails to identify, and we cannot ascertain, a limiting principle
distinguishing this case from every other case involving alleged attorney misconduct. Taken to its
natural conclusion, Guzzetta’s argument implies error preservation is categorically inapplicable in
cases involving alleged attorney misconduct. Yet, employing “public interest” fundamental error
review in this way would swallow the rule. See In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 292 (Hankinson, J.,
dissenting).
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Third, the issues at stake in this case appear to “affect[] the rights of only . . . the particular
litigants” and “do[] not adversely affect the interest of the public generally.” Newman, 433 S.W.2d
at 422. The remedy Guzzetta seeks illustrates this: If Guzzetta prevails, moneys paid to Stolmeier
would be returned to the court registry, allowing Guzzetta to potentially recover on his DBA claim.
In essence, this is a case about who gets how much money; the public faces no potential adverse
effects no matter the outcome.
Fourth, assuming without deciding the face of the record reveals Stolmeier egregiously
violated the Disciplinary Rules, 6 we are not convinced the fundamental error doctrine, as it is
presently articulated, is applicable outside the extremely narrow contexts in which it has been
approved by our supreme court. See People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Bandera
Wranglers, No. 04-21-00466-CV, 2023 WL 1810496, at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Feb. 8,
2023, no pet.) (“[M]ajor changes in established law should be made by our Supreme Court.”)
(quoting Calhoun v. Pasadena Indep. Sch. Dist., 496 S.W.2d 131, 132 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 1973, writ ref’d n.r.e.)).
Guzzetta did not preserve his first and third appellate issues, and we decline to review them
for fundamental error. We overrule Guzzetta’s first and third issues.
INVITED ERROR
“A party cannot ask something of the trial court and then complain the trial court erred in
granting the relief sought.” In re of R.H.B., 660 S.W.3d 136, 154 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2022,
no pet.). “The invited error doctrine applies to situations where a party requests the court to make
a specific ruling, then complains of that ruling on appeal.” Galvan v. Garcia, 502 S.W.3d 382, 385
(Tex. App.—San Antonio 2016, no pet.) (quoting In re Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 273
6
The record reflects Guzzetta’s grievance against Stolmeier was dismissed.
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S.W.3d 637, 646 (Tex. 2009)). A party’s consent to the trial court’s entry of judgment waives any
error, except for fundamental error, contained in the judgment, and that party has nothing to
properly present for appellate review. DHI Holdings, LP v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co. as Tr. for
Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Tr. 2006-HE3, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2006-HE3, 650 S.W.3d 522, 527–28 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2021, pet. filed).
Guzzetta asserts the trial court erroneously granted Brimhall’s motion for summary
judgment. However, the order granting Brimhall’s motion for summary judgment was reinstated
by the trial court at Guzzetta’s request as part of the parties’ Rule 11 agreement. On June 28, 2021,
the trial court entered the “Agreed Order on Intervenor’s Motion to Vacate Order Setting Aside
Summary Judgment.” As required by the Rule 11 agreement, Guzzetta agreed to the form and
substance of the order reinstating Brimhall’s motion for summary judgment. By agreeing to the
substance of the order reinstating Brimhall’s motion for summary judgment, Guzzetta invited error
and, therefore, this issue is not presented for our review. See id. (“Concluding that DHI did not
comply with Rule 33.1(a) and invited the trial court to sign the agreed judgment against DHI’s
interest without objecting to the content or the result, DHI has not preserved a complaint for
appellate review.”). We overrule Guzzetta’s second issue.
CONCLUSION
Having overruled each of appellant’s issues, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice
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