Ruben Labrada v. the State of Texas

Affirmed as Modified and Opinion Filed July 13, 2023
S In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-21-00784-CR
RUBEN LABRADA, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 292nd Judicial District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F-1875816-V
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Molberg, Pedersen, III, and Miskel
Opinion by Justice Miskel
Ruben Labrada appeals the trial court’s judgment convicting him of murder.
The jury found him guilty and assessed his punishment at imprisonment for life.
Labrada raises four issues on appeal arguing as follows: (1) the evidence is
insufficient to identify him as the murderer; (2) the trial court erred when it excluded
evidence he sought to admit; (3) he suffered egregious harm when the trial court
instructed the jury as to good conduct time; and (4) the trial court erred when it
included a definition of reasonable doubt in the jury charge. In a cross-issue, the
State argues the judgment should be modified to reflect that Labrada pleaded not
guilty to the offense.
We conclude the evidence was sufficient. Also, we conclude the trial court
did not err when it excluded evidence, and even if there was jury-charge error,
Labrada did not suffer egregious harm. And the trial judge erred when he signed a
judgment with mistakes in it. The trial court’s judgment is affirmed as modified.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Juana “Katalina” Parga and Jose “Ramone” Perales Labrada (Jose)1 were in a
relationship and had a son together. They lived in a five-bedroom house with other
family members, including Jose’s younger brother, Labrada. Jose worked for
Vanguard Plastics, and Labrada worked at the same location for The Die Shop, but
they worked different days and hours. Jose owned three vehicles: (1) a white Isuzu
truck driven by Parga and Jose; (2) a Nissan Maxima driven by Labrada; and (3) a
red Hyundai hatchback.
At some point, Parga also began having a romantic relationship with Labrada.
Other family members were aware, or at least suspected, that Parga was having an
affair with Labrada. However, family members held differing views as to whether
Jose knew or suspected Parga was in a relationship with his brother. The night
before May 5, 1997, Jose’s son from an earlier marriage who shared a room with
1
We will refer to Jose Labrada by his first name to avoid confusing him with the appellant whom we
refer to as Labrada.
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Labrada was awakened by an intoxicated Labrada who was looking into a mirror
and saying to himself, “Should I break him? Should I break him? . . . . No, I can’t do
that, you know he’s . . . my blood.”
On the morning of May 5, 1997, Parga left the house in the white Isuzu truck
at around 9:30 a.m. to go to work. A short time afterward, Jose and his son from a
prior relationship left the house. First, they went to Jose’s place of employment
where Jose learned that Labrada had not reported for work, then they went shopping
for car stereos.
Later that afternoon, Parga’s body was found in the white Isuzu truck parked
at Valley View Park in Dallas, Texas. Parga’s clothes were soaked with blood, and
she appeared to have been stabbed. It also appeared that Parga had struggled with
her assailant because there was blood all over the inside of the truck and Parga had
multiple defensive wounds on her hands. The police collected blood samples and a
knife from the inside of the truck. They also obtained a bloody fingerprint from the
knife handle. In addition, the police found a letter from the Dallas County District
Attorney’s Office addressed to Parga relating to a December 1996 misdemeanor
assault where Jose was the defendant and Parga was the complainant.
When Jose and his son returned to the house, the police were present and
informed them of Parga’s murder. Jose cooperated with the police investigation.
Neither Jose nor his son had any cuts or wounds. Although Labrada would have
ordinarily been at the house at that time, he was not there.
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That evening, Labrada went to his friend Manuel Aguirre’s store, confessed
that he had killed his “morrita,” or girlfriend, and showed Aguirre some bloody
clothes inside the trunk of the Nissan Maxima that Labrada was driving and a cut on
one of Labrada’s arms. Labrada stayed until Aguirre’s store closed then told Aguirre
he was going to the field where they often played soccer. Labrada was not seen
again for several years.2
Later that evening, one of Labrada’s sisters went to Aguirre’s apartment
looking for Labrada. She told Aguirre that Labrada had done “something really
wrong,” but she did not specify what that was. Aguirre told her that Labrada had
gone to the soccer field. Afterward, Aguirre saw media coverage of Parga’s murder
and connected it with Labrada stating he had killed his “morrita.”
A few days later, Jose saw Aguirre and asked if he knew what had happened.
Aguirre told Jose that Labrada had confessed to him. Jose said that he was not going
to do anything with the information because he did not want to upset his mother.
Aguirre decided not to go to the police because he also loved Labrada’s mother and
did not want to upset her by being the person who came forward and implicated
Labrada in Parga’s murder. Also, four days after Parga’s murder, Jose’s son from a
prior relationship found Labrada’s Nissan Maxima abandoned in a parking lot near
the field where Labrada frequently played soccer.
2
There was some testimony that Labrada briefly returned for a holiday or family gathering.
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An autopsy of Parga’s body revealed that she had ten stab wounds and 41
incised wounds. The medical examiner concluded that Parga died as a result of
multiple sharp force injuries and her manner of death was homicide.
During the investigation, Detective Glenda Crum was unable to locate
Labrada and learned that he had fled to Mexico. Because the police were not able
to locate Labrada, the case eventually went “cold” and was suspended on
February 20, 1998.
In 2017, the case was reopened by Detective David Gilmore. During his
investigation, he met with Jose at the Mexican border and obtained a DNA sample,
he learned that Labrada had returned the United States, and he identified a new
witness, Aguirre. Labrada was eventually located and apprehended in Oklahoma.
A forensic fingerprint expert also determined that the latent bloody fingerprint on
the handle of the knife used to kill Parga was from Labrada’s right little finger.
Further, DNA evidence linked both Labrada and Jose to some of the samples
collected at the murder scene in 1997.
Labrada was indicted for murder. During his trial, Labrada’s defensive theory
was that Jose murdered Parga because Jose was enraged Parga was having an affair
with Labrada. A jury found him guilty and assessed his punishment at imprisonment
for life.
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II. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
In issue one, Labrada argues the evidence is insufficient to identify him as the
murderer. He contends the evidence that his brother Jose murdered Parga is so great
that it negates the possibility that he committed the offense such that the jury was
not rationally justified in finding him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The State
responds that Labrada had the motive and opportunity to murder Parga, and he
confessed to Aguirre that he murdered Parga before fleeing and avoiding
apprehension for 21 years.
A. Standard of Review
Under the Due Process Clause, a criminal conviction must be based on legally
sufficient evidence. Harrell v. State, 620 S.W.3d 910, 913 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021).
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court considers all of
the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether the jury
was rationally justified in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318–19 (1979); Harrell, 620 S.W.3d at 913–14. Further, an
appellate court is required to defer to the jury’s credibility and weight determinations
because the jury is the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility and the weight
assigned to their testimony. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 326; Harrell, 620 S.W.3d
at 914. An appellate court will consider all evidence when reviewing the sufficiency
of the evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, properly or improperly admitted,
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or submitted by the prosecution or defense. Jenkins v. State, 493 S.W.3d 583, 599
(Tex. Crim. App. 2016).
B. Applicable Law
A person commits murder if he intentionally or knowingly causes the death
of an individual. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(b)(1). A person acts intentionally,
or with intent, when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct
or cause the result. Id. § 6.03(a). A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, when
he is aware of the nature of his conduct or that the circumstances exist, or that his
conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. Id. § 6.03(b).
Direct evidence of the elements of the offense, including the identity of the
perpetrator and culpable mental state, is not required. Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d
9, 14 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Identity may be proven by direct evidence,
circumstantial evidence, or by reasonable inferences from the evidence. Ingerson v.
State, 559 S.W.3d 501, 509 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). The jury is permitted to make
reasonable inferences from the evidence presented at trial, and circumstantial
evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing the guilt of the actor.
Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 14–15. Circumstantial evidence alone may be sufficient to
establish guilt. Id. at 15.
C. Evidence is Sufficient to Prove Identity
Labrada challenges only the sufficiency of the evidence establishing his
identity as the perpetrator. He does not challenge the other elements of the offense.
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As a result, we focus our analysis on the evidence linking him to the offense. The
record shows that Labrada was having an affair with Parga who was in a relationship
with his older brother, Jose. It also shows that Labrada made statements the night
before Labrada’s murder that suggested his was contemplating “breaking his
brother.” And he confessed to Aguirre on the afternoon of the murder that he killed
his “morrita.” Further, Labrada was linked to the crime through fingerprint and
DNA evidence. In addition, Labrada disappeared for years after the murder.
The crux of Labrada’s argument is that the evidence is insufficient because
there was evidence that also suggested his brother, Jose, committed the offense. This
argument goes to the jury’s assessment of the weight and credibility of the evidence
rather than the sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial. However, we are
required to defer to the jury’s credibility and weight determinations because the jury
is the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility, and the weight to be given to their
testimony. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 326; Harrell, 620 S.W.3d at 914.
After reviewing the evidence, we conclude that a rational jury could have
found that Labrada committed the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly,
we conclude the evidence is sufficient to support Labrada’s conviction for murder.
Issue one is decided against Labrada.
III. EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE
In issue two, Labrada argues the trial court erred when excluded evidence he
sought to admit. He contends the trial court should have admitted evidence that his
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brother had beaten Parga unconscious a short time before the murder, including the
document the police found in the truck at the time of Parga’s murder to that effect.
Although Labrada focuses his argument on Texas Rule of Evidence 403, the
substance of his argument is that he was unable to present his defense—it was his
brother who murdered Parga. The State responds that Labrada failed to preserve this
issue for appellate review. In the alternative, the Sate argues the trial court did not
abuse its discretion because Labrada already had other compelling and undisputed
evidence before the jury establishing Jose as a possible, alternative perpetrator due
to the pending assault charge. Further, the State contends that even if the trial court
erred, Labrada cannot show that error was harmful error.
A. Applicable Law
The erroneous exclusion of evidence generally constitutes non-constitutional
error and is reviewed under Rule 44.2(b) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Walters v. State, 247 S.W.3d 204, 219 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). However, an
exception exists when erroneously excluded evidence offered by a criminal
defendant forms such a vital portion of the case that its exclusion effectively
precludes the defendant from presenting a defense. Id. When a trial court sustains
the State’s objection to the admission of a defendant’s evidence, a federal due
process violation may arise only if: (1) a state evidentiary rule categorically and
arbitrarily prohibits the defendant from offering otherwise relevant, reliable
evidence vital to his defense; or (2) the trial court’s clearly erroneous ruling results
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in the exclusion of admissible evidence that forms the vital core of a defendant’s
theory of defense and effectively prevents him from presenting that defense. Easley
v. State, 424 S.W.3d 535, 540 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014); Walters, 247 S.W.3d at 219.
When this transpires, the standard for constitutional errors under Rule 44.2(a),
applies. Walters, 247 S.W.3d at 219. In contrast, when the excluded evidence does
not prevent a defendant from presenting a defense, but only incrementally furthers a
defensive theory, any corresponding error is non-constitutional and the harm
standard articulated in Rule 44.2(b) applies. See id. at 222.
B. Labrada was Able to Present His Defense
Assuming without deciding the trial court erred, we review whether that
alleged error constituted harmful error. During the trial, the trial court held a hearing
outside the presence of the jury because Labrada had been precluded from “go[ing]
into the underlying facts of the misdemeanor assault case” against Jose. At that time,
Defendant’s Exhibit No. 5, the arrest report for that assault which was found in the
white Isuzu truck with Parga’s body, was admitted for record purposes. At the
conclusion of the hearing, the trial court excluded any evidence of the underlying
facts of Jose’s alleged assault of Parga on the basis that it was not relevant and its
probative value was substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect.
Labrada’s defensive theory was that Jose murdered Parga because Jose was
enraged Parga was having an affair with Labrada. He maintains that this shows Jose
had a motive to kill Parga and that he did not. Although the trial court excluded a
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copy of the arrest report and testimony relating to the specific details of the alleged
assault, the record shows that Labrada was able to elicit general testimony about
Jose’s arrest for assaulting Parga. In particular, Detective Gilmore testified that he
was aware of an assault involving family violence, that the police department had
filed charges against Jose for that assault, and that there was an envelope removed
from underneath the seat of the truck with a letter to Parga in reference to an assault
by Jose. In addition, Detective Crum testified that, in the truck, police found
correspondence to Parga about an upcoming court date for a case pending against
Jose where she was the victim and a witness, and that Parga was murdered a month
and a half before that trial date. Accordingly, we conclude that any error in
excluding the evidence was non-constitutional in nature. See Ray v. State, 178
S.W.3d 833, 836 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (concluding court of appeals did not err in
declining to apply constitutional harm analysis when exclusion of evidence did not
prevent appellant from presenting her defense). Because any error was non-
constitutional, we apply the harm standard under Rule 44.2(b). Walters, 247 S.W.3d
at 219.
Under Rule 44.2(b), we must disregard any error that does not affect
Labrada’s substantial rights. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b). We cannot overturn a
criminal conviction for non-constitutional error if, after examining the record as a
whole, we have fair assurance that the error did not influence the jury, or only
influenced the jury slightly. Barshaw v. State, 342 S.W.3d 91, 93–94 (Tex. Crim.
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App. 2011). We have already discussed that the record shows Labrada was not
precluded from presenting evidence that a document about the alleged assault of
Parga by Jose was found in the truck. Further, during closing argument, defense
counsel argued that the detectives did not follow up on that document. And he
argued that it was a reasonable inference from the evidence that Jose caught Parga
having an affair with Labrada, then went to the park with Parga to discuss things and
killed her. After reviewing the record as a whole, we conclude that the trial court’s
exclusion of evidence relating to the specific details of Jose’s alleged assault of Parga
did not affect Labrada’s substantial rights.
Issue two is decided against Labrada.
IV. JURY CHARGE ERROR
In issues three and four, Labrada argues as follows: (1) he suffered egregious
harm when the trial court instructed the jury as to good time conduct in the
punishment charge; and (2) the trial court erred when it included a definition of
reasonable doubt in the guilt-phase jury charge.
A. Standard of Review
All alleged jury-charge error must be considered on appellate review
regardless of whether it was preserved in the trial court. Kirsch v. State, 357 S.W.3d
645, 649 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). When presented with an argument that a trial
court committed jury charge error, the reviewing court must conduct a two-step
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inquiry: (1) Did an error occur?; and (2) If so, did it cause harm that rises to the level
of reversible error? Ngo v. State, 175 S.W.3d 738, 743 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
The degree of harm necessary for reversal depends on whether the defendant
preserved the error by objection. Id. If a defendant preserved error, then he only has
to show “some harm” to his rights. Id. If he failed to object, he must demonstrate
“egregious harm.” Id.B. Instruction on Good Time Conduct
In issue three, Labrada argues he suffered egregious harm when the trial court
instructed the jury as to good conduct time in the punishment charge. He argues the
punishment charge did not comply with article 37.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure because the legislature removed the language relating to good conduct
time from the statute by amendment in 2019. As a result, Labrada contends that the
charge’s statements with respect to good conduct time are a clear error of the law
and always constitute egregious harm. The State concedes that the language relating
to good conduct time was incorrectly included in the punishment charge but
maintains that Labrada did not suffer egregious harm as a result of its inclusion.
1. Applicable Law
Errors that result in egregious harm are those that affect the very basis of the
case, deprive the defendant of a valuable right, vitally affect the defensive theory, or
make a case for conviction clearly and significantly more persuasive. Taylor v.
State, 332 S.W.3d 483, 490 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). Egregious harm is a high and
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difficult standard to meet, and such a determination must be borne out by the trial
record. Reeves v. State, 420 S.W.3d 812, 816 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). An egregious
harm determination must be based on a finding of actual rather than theoretical harm.
Arrington v. State, 451 S.W.3d 834, 840 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015).
The egregious harm inquiry is fact specific and must be performed on a case-
by-case basis. Gelinas v. State, 398 S.W.3d 703, 710 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). In
making an egregious harm determination, an appellate court considers: (1) the entire
jury charge; (2) the state of the evidence, including the contested issues and weight
of probative evidence; (3) the argument of counsel; and (4) any other relevant
information revealed by the trial record as a whole. See Villarreal v. State, 453
S.W.3d 429, 433 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015); Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171
(Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (op. on reh’g).
2. Labrada Did Not Suffer Egregious Harm
The trial court’s charge in the punishment phase of the trial stated, in part:
Under the law applicable to this case, the defendant may earn time off
the period of incarceration imposed through the award of good conduct
time. Prison authorities may award good conduct time to a prisoner
who exhibits good behavior, diligence in carrying out prison work
assignments, and attempts at rehabilitation. If a prisoner engages in
misconduct, prison authorities may also take away all or part of any
good conduct time earned by the prisoner.
It is also possible that the length of time for which the defendant will
be imprisoned might be reduced by the award of parole. Under the law
applicable to this case, the defendant will not become eligible for parole
until the actual time earned equals one-half of the sentence imposed or
30 years, whichever is less. Eligibility for parole does not guarantee
that parole will be granted.
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It cannot be accurately predicted how the parole law might be applied
to this defendant if he is sentenced to a term of imprisonment, because
the application of these laws will depend on decisions made by prison
and parole authorities.
You may consider the existence of the parole law. You are not to
consider the manner in which the parole law may be applied to this
particular defendant.
The parties agree that the trial court’s instruction in the punishment charge as to good
conduct time was error. And this Court has previously determined that a charge that
contains language the legislature removed by amendment from article 37.07 in 2019
constitutes error. Taylor v. State, No. 05-20-00017-CR, 2022 WL 17335689, at *12
(Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 30, 2022, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for
publication). However, we also reviewed that error for egregious harm. Id.Accordingly, because Labrada did not object to this error, he is entitled to a reversal
only if he suffered egregious harm as a result of the error. As a result, we examine
the record for egregious harm.
First, we consider the entire charge to the jury in the punishment phase of the
trial. Although the charge contained language about good conduct time that was no
longer required under article 37.07, it also instructed the jurors that they were “not
to consider the manner in which the parole law may be applied to this particular
defendant.” The charge correctly instructed the jury on the matters to be considered
in deliberations, the burden of proof, and the requirement of unanimity. Further,
absent evidence that the jury was actually confused by the charge, we assume the
jury followed the trial court’s instruction that it was “not to consider the manner in
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which the parole law may be applied to this particular defendant.” See Williams v.
State, 937 S.W.2d 479, 490 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). There is no evidence of jury
confusion. The jury did not send any notes or questions expressing confusion about
good conduct time, parole, or their application. The charge correctly instructed the
jury regarding the range of punishment. However, the jury assessed Labrada’s
punishment at the maximum sentence—imprisonment for life. We conclude the first
factor does not weigh in favor of or against finding egregious harm.
Second, we consider the state of the evidence. Under this factor, we determine
whether the evidence made it more or less likely that the charge error caused
appellant actual harm. Taylor, 2022 WL 17335689, at *13. We must determine the
likelihood that the jury would in fact have reached a non-unanimous verdict on the
facts of this particular case. Id. The evidence at the punishment phase focused on
Labrada’s sexual abuse of his niece who did not report the abuse until later because
her grandmother, who was also Labrada’s mother, was very protective of him, and
the effect of the murder on Parga’s son who was two years old at the time of her
murder. No evidence was offered regarding possible parole or good conduct time.
We conclude the state of the evidence made it less likely that the jury charge caused
appellant actual harm. Consequently, this factor weighs against finding egregious
harm.
Third, we consider whether any arguments made by the State, Labrada, or the
trial court exacerbated or ameliorated the error in the charge. Id. There was no
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mention of good conduct time by the State, Labrada, or the trial court except in the
charge language quoted earlier in this opinion. And that language instructed the jury
not to consider the manner in which parole may be applied. The State did mention
parole during the punishment-phase closing argument, stating as follows:
So now what is this case worth? This case is worth life in prison, and I
will tell you why, and why I’m not talking about life without parol[e].
As the [trial] [j]udge explained in the Jury Charge, he’s still eligible for
parole, but we can’t go through and we’re not going to go through that,
but I want you to remember this is not a life without parol[e] case.
The record shows the State’s comments were done in the context of clarifying why
the case was not a “life without parole” case. We conclude this factor weighs against
finding egregious harm.
Finally, we consider any other relevant information, such as whether the jury
sent requests for clarification during deliberations. Id. The record reveals no jury
notes during the punishment phase or any other indication that the jury sought any
clarification regarding good conduct time or parole. We conclude the final factor
weighs against finding egregious harm.
After considering and weighing all of the relevant factors, we conclude that
the erroneous instructions regarding good conduct time did not cause actual harm to
appellant. Nor did the erroneous jury instructions affect the very basis of the case,
deprive Labrada of a valuable right, or vitally affect a defensive theory.
Issue three is decided against Labrada.
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C. Reasonable-Doubt Jury Instruction
In issue four, Labrada argues the trial court erred when it improperly defined
“reasonable doubt” in violation of Paulson v. State, 28 S.W.3d 570 (Tex. Crim. App.
2000), in the jury charge. Labrada asks this Court to overrule its prior precedent
holding that the instruction used in this case is not a definition of reasonable doubt.
He also maintains that a reversal for this type of error should not be subject to a harm
analysis. The State responds that this Court has previously held the complained-of
instruction in the guilt-phase jury charge does not improperly define reasonable
doubt.
1. Applicable Law
In Paulson, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals overruled the portion of
Geesa v. State, 820 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) that required trial courts to
instruct juries on the definition of reasonable doubt. Paulson, 28 S.W.3d at 573.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals stated that the better practice is to give no
definition of reasonable doubt at all to the jury. Id.However, when a jury charge merely refers to “reasonable doubt” by stating,
“It is not required that the prosecution prove guilt beyond all possible doubt; it is
required that the prosecution’s proof excludes all ‘reasonable doubt’ concerning the
defendant’s guilt,” it does not violate Paulson because it does not define reasonable
doubt. Mays v. State, 318 S.W.3d 368, 389 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Woods v. State,
152 S.W.3d 105, 115 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); see also, Keller v. State, 604 S.W.3d
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214, 230–31 (Tex. App—Dallas 2020, pet. ref’d); Bates v. State, 164 S.W.3d 928,
931 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.); O’Canas v. State, 140 S.W.3d 695, 701–02
(Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, pet. ref’d). This instruction simply states the legally
correct proposition that the prosecution’s burden is to establish proof beyond a
reasonable doubt and not all possible doubt. O’Canas v. State, 140 S.W.3d at 702.
2. Jury Charge Did Not Define Reasonable Doubt
The charge in this case merely referred to “reasonable doubt,” stating “It is
not required that the prosecution proves guilt beyond all possible doubt; it is required
that the prosecution’s proof excludes all reasonable doubt concerning the
Defendant’s guilt.” Labrada concedes that he did not object to this statement in the
jury charge. And, Labrada acknowledges, we have on numerous occasions
considered this instruction and held that it does not violate Paulson because it does
not define reasonable doubt. See, e.g., Bates, 164 S.W.3d at 931; O’Canas, 140
S.W.3d at 701–02; Washington v. State, No. 05-14-00604-CR, 2015 WL 4178345,
at *7 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 10, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for
publication) (noting this Court has rejected this argument on so many occasions that
there are far too many cases to list). Further, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
has held that the trial court does not abuse its discretion by giving this same
instruction. Mays, 318 S.W.3d at 389; Woods, 152 S.W.3d at 115. As an
intermediate court of appeals, we are bound by the precedent of the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals and have no authority to disregard or overrule it. See TEX. CONST.
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art. 5, § 5 (“The Court of Criminal Appeals shall have final appellate jurisdiction . . .
and its determinations shall be final. . . .”); State ex rel. Wilson v. Briggs, 351 S.W.2d
892, 894 (Tex. Crim. App. 1961) (“The Court of Criminal Appeals is the court of
last resort in this state in criminal matters. This being so, no other court of this state
has authority to overrule or circumvent its decisions, or disobey its mandates.”);
Reyes v. State, No. 05-19-00952-CR, 2021 WL 1884769, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas
May 11, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
We again reject this argument and decline to re-evaluate the holdings of the
Texas Court of Criminals Appeals or the holdings of this Court with respect to this
issue. We conclude the trial court’s instruction did not define reasonable doubt, and
the trial court did not err by including it in the jury charge.
Issue four is decided against Labrada.
V. MODIFICATION OF THE JUDGMENT
In a cross issue, the State argues the trial court’s judgment erroneously shows
that Labrada pleaded “guilty” to the offense. The record supports the State’s
contention.
An appellate court has the authority to modify an incorrect judgment to make
the record speak the truth when it has the necessary information to do so. See TEX.
R. APP. P. 43.2(b); Bigley v. State, 865 S.W.2d 26, 27–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993);
Asberry v. State, 813 S.W.2d 526, 529–30 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, pet. ref’d) (en
banc). We conclude the trial court’s final judgment should be modified as follows:
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“Plea to Offense: GUILTY” is modified to read “Plea to Offense:
NOT GUILTY.”
The State’s cross point is decided in its favor.
VI. CONCLUSION
The evidence was sufficient. Also, the trial court did not err when it excluded
evidence Labrada sought to admit, and even if the there was jury-charge error,
Labrada did not suffer egregious harm. And the trial judge erred when he signed a
judgment with mistakes in it.
The trial court’s judgment is affirmed as modified.
The trial court is directed to prepare a corrected judgment that reflects the
modifications made in this Court’s opinion and judgment in this case. See Shumate
v State, 649 S.W.3d 240 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2021, no pet.).
/Emily Miskel/
EMILY MISKEL
JUSTICE
Do Not Publish
TEX. R. APP. P. 47
210784F.U05
–21–
S
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT
RUBEN LABRADA, Appellant On Appeal from the 292nd Judicial
District Court, Dallas County, Texas
No. 05-21-00784-CR V. Trial Court Cause No. F-1875816-V.
Opinion delivered by Justice Miskel.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee Justices Molberg and Pedersen, III
participating.
Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is
MODIFIED as follows:
“Plea to Offense: GUILTY” is modified to read “Plea to Offense:
NOT GUILTY.”
As REFORMED, the judgment is AFFIRMED.
The trial court is DIRECTED to prepare a corrected judgment that reflects
the modifications made in this Court’s opinion and judgment in this case.
Judgment entered July 13, 2023
–22–