Texas Disposal System, Inc. v. City of Round Rock, Texas and Laurie Hadley, in Her Official Capacity of City Manager of Round Rock, Texas

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
NO. 03-22-00450-CV
Texas Disposal System, Inc., Appellant
v.
City of Round Rock, Texas and Laurie Hadley, in Her Official Capacity of
City Manager of Round Rock, Texas, Appellees
FROM THE 395TH DISTRICT COURT OF WILLIAMSON COUNTY
NO. 22-0482-C395, THE HONORABLE RYAN D. LARSON, JUDGE PRESIDING
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In two issues, Texas Disposal System, Inc. (Texas Disposal) contends that the
trial court abused its discretion by denying its application for a temporary injunction. For the
following reasons, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
Pursuant to non-exclusive franchise agreements with the City of Round Rock (the
City), Texas Disposal provided garbage and recycling collection for commercial businesses
(non-residential services) in the City. Other companies, including FF CTR Holdings, Inc. d/b/a
Central Texas Refuse (CTR), also had non-exclusive franchise agreements to provide
non-residential services. The most recent agreement between the City and Texas Disposal
expired on September 30, 2022, but among the agreement’s terms, the City was authorized at “its
sole discretion” to terminate the agreement “at any time beginning December 1, 2021, upon
thirty (30) days’ written notice” to Texas Disposal.
The published agenda for the city council’s retreat that was held on July 22, 2021,
noticed under “Resolutions/Action Items” that the city council would be “consider[ing]
discussion and possible action regarding the collection and disposal of commercial refuse.”
During the retreat, the city council considered several alternatives before voting that the “City
Manager is authorized to negotiate a sole source contract with [CTR].” At that time, CTR was
the sole provider of residential garbage and recycling collection (residential services) and the
largest provider of non-residential services in the City.
The city council’s published agenda for its meeting on November 4, 2021,
provided notice that the city council would be considering resolutions (i) authorizing the mayor
to execute an “Amended and Restated Refuse Collection Contract with [CTR]” (Refuse
Collection Contract) that would “allow CTR to be the single vendor for all solid waste collection
services in the City” and (ii) authorizing the city manager to provide written notice to Texas
Disposal and other companies that their existing franchise agreements for non-residential
services would terminate on April 30, 2022. During a “packet briefing” 1 held before the
November meeting and again during the November meeting, representatives from Texas
Disposal and other companies spoke against the resolutions, but the city council ultimately voted
in favor of the resolutions.
Shortly after the November meeting, the City and CTR entered into the
Refuse Collection Contract, which covered residential and non-residential services, and on
March 23, 2022, the City provided written notice to Texas Disposal that the City had approved
the Refuse Collection Contract that authorized CTR to be the “single provider” of non-residential
1 According to the evidence, before regularly scheduled council meetings, the city
council holds a “packet briefing,” which is an open public meeting where the city council
discusses items on the upcoming agenda.
2
services in the City as of May 1 and that the City intended to terminate its franchise agreement
with Texas Disposal as of April 30. 2
On April 18, Texas Disposal filed suit against the City and its manager in her
official capacity 3 seeking declaratory relief under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act
(UDJA), see Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §§ 37.001–.011, and mandamus or injunctive relief
under the Texas Open Meetings Act (TOMA), see Tex. Gov’t Code §§ 551.001–.146. Texas
Disposal alleged, among its claims, that the City’s “adoption of a sole-source exclusive
franchise” for non-residential services was void “because it conflicts irreconcilably with the City
Charter, which expressly provides that ‘[n]o exclusive franchise [of a public utility] shall ever be
granted,’” see City of Round Rock, Charter § 11.02, 4 and that the City violated the TOMA at its
July 2021 retreat. 5 CTR intervened in the suit, 6 and following a hearing, the trial court denied
Texas Disposal’s request for a temporary restraining order on April 29.
2 In the letter, the City also proposed a franchise agreement between the City and Texas
Disposal for the collection and disposal of solid waste for temporary services, but the parties did
not enter into that agreement.
3 We generally refer to the City and its manager collectively as the City.
4 Section 11.02 of the City Charter, titled “Franchise; power of City Council,” states:
The City Council shall have power to grant, amend, renew or extend by ordinance
all franchises of all public utilities of every character including any person,
business or corporation providing cable television or community antenna
television service, operating within the City, and for such purposes is granted full
power. No public utility franchise shall be transferable except to persons, firms or
corporations taking all or substantially all of the holder’s business in the City and
except with the approval of the City Council expressed by ordinance. No
franchise shall be granted for an indeterminate term. No exclusive franchise shall
ever be granted.
5 Texas Disposal’s other claims included that the city council’s adoption of a
“sole-source exclusive franchise” was void because it violated the contract clauses of the United
3
On May 25, Texas Disposal filed an amended petition that included an ultra vires
claim against the city manager in her official capacity, alleging that she “acted without legal
authority” in carrying out “acts to effectuate an exclusive franchise for CTR.” Texas Disposal
sought a declaration that she cannot take future actions to enforce “the alleged exclusive
franchise or to enforce the wrongful cancellation of Texas Disposal’s non-exclusive franchise,”
and injunctive relief “barring any such future actions.” Texas Disposal sought a temporary
injunction “prohibiting” the City and the city manager “from taking any steps to enforce a sole-
source exclusive franchise and contract for the collection of commercial waste and recyclable
materials within the City”; from taking any steps to enforce the “sole-source contract’s
requirement for exclusive use” of a particular recycling facility; and “from enforcing any
revocation of the non-exclusive franchise to collect and haul non-residential waste within the
City held by Texas Disposal before the commencement of the present controversy.”
The day after Texas Disposal filed its amended petition, the trial court held a
hearing on Texas Disposal’s request for a temporary injunction. At the beginning of the hearing,
counsel for Texas Disposal represented to the trial court that its request for a temporary
injunction was limited to its claims that “the City has acted in violation of its own charter” and
that “the City has acted in violation of the [TOMA].” The witnesses at the hearing were Texas
Disposal’s director of sales, its principal owner, and its municipal sales manager; the City’s
director of utilities and environmental services and its assistant city manager; and CTR’s director
of public-sector services and community relations.
States and Texas constitutions, see U.S. Const. art. I §10; Texas Const. art. I § 16, and that the
requirement in the “sole-source contract” to utilize a particular recycling facility violated the
commerce clause of the United States Constitution, see U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
6 CTR has filed a responsive brief in this Court.
4
The evidence showed that CTR had spent over $7,000,000, beginning in
November 2021, to transition and be ready by May 1 to service the non-residential customers
who were being serviced by other providers and, by the time of the hearing, it was providing
98% of the non-residential services in the City. CTR’s director testified about CTR’s efforts
to comply with the Refuse Collection Contract, including contacting Texas Disposal in
November 2021 to discuss and plan for the transition. There was conflicting evidence about the
number of non-residential customers that Texas Disposal was servicing at the time of the
hearing. Texas Disposal’s principal owner testified that it was servicing about “half” of the
“roughly” 200 non-residential customers that it had been servicing in November 2021, but
CTR’s director testified that CTR was servicing all but 22 to 24 of Texas Disposal’s former
customers. The exhibits included relevant published agenda items from city-council meetings,
copies of the City’s agreements with CTR and Texas Disposal, the City’s March 2022
termination notice to Texas Disposal, and CTR’s timeline detailing its actions during the
transition from November 2021 to a few days before the hearing. The parties also filed
supplemental briefing after the hearing.
By order dated July 6, 2022, the trial court denied Texas Disposal’s application
for a temporary injunction, expressly finding that Texas Disposal had not carried its burden to
prove the three required elements for a temporary injunction and that “the terms of the relief
sought go beyond the scope of what is legally permissible.” This interlocutory appeal followed.
See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014(a)(4).
5
ANALYSIS
Texas Disposal raises two issues. Its first issue contends that the trial court
abused its discretion when it denied Texas Disposal’s application for a temporary injunction
because the evidence established that the City violated its charter by granting “exclusive rights”
to CTR that constituted an “exclusive utility franchise” and that Texas Disposal would suffer
irreparable harm without its requested injunctive relief. In its second issue, Texas Disposal
argues that it was entitled to injunctive relief based on the City’s alleged TOMA violation that its
agenda notice for the April 2021 retreat was not “sufficiently specific” to provide notice that the
city council might authorize the negotiation of an “exclusive franchise.”
Trial Court’s Jurisdiction over Texas Disposal’s claims
Because the City raises jurisdictional arguments in their brief, we begin by
addressing those arguments. See Good Shepherd Med. Ctr., Inc. v. State, 306 S.W.3d 825, 837
(Tex. App.—Austin 2010, no pet.) (stating that appellate court has duty to consider question of
subject-matter jurisdiction because trial court’s power to decide merits, as well as appellate
court’s, “rests upon it”). Although asserted in the alternative, the City seeks dismissal of Texas
Disposal’s claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and vacating of the trial court’s
order denying Texas Disposal’s application for temporary injunction. See McFadden v. Olesky,
517 S.W.3d 287, 300 (Tex. App.—Austin 2017, pet. denied) (vacating trial court’s final
judgment following trial and dismissing claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction).
Whether a court has subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law, which we
review de novo. Texas Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004).
We focus on the plaintiff’s petition to determine whether the facts that were pleaded
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affirmatively demonstrate that subject-matter jurisdiction exists, and we construe the pleadings
liberally in favor of the plaintiff. Id. If the challenge is to the existence of jurisdictional facts,
we consider the pleadings and the evidence that is related to the jurisdictional inquiry. Id. at 227
(citing Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 555 (Tex. 2000)). When evidence is
submitted that implicates the merits of the case, our standard of review generally mirrors the
summary-judgment standard under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a(c). Id. at 228; see also
Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c). The burden is on the governmental unit to present evidence to support
that the trial court does not have jurisdiction. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 228. If the governmental
unit meets this burden, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to show that a disputed issue of
material fact exists regarding the jurisdictional issue. Id. We take as true all evidence that is
favorable to the nonmovant and indulge every reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in the
nonmovant’s favor. Id.
The City’s jurisdictional challenges to Texas Disposal’s UDJA and ultra vires
claims are based on Texas Disposal’s pleadings, and its challenge to Texas Disposal’s TOMA
claim is based on evidence. We address each pleaded claim in turn.
UDJA and Ultra Vires Claims
The City contends that Texas Disposal’s UDJA claims against the City and its
ultra vires claims against the city manager are not viable because construction of a city charter is
not a proper use of the UDJA. See Suarez v. Silvas, 613 S.W.3d 549, 556 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio 2020, no pet.) (distinguishing home-rule city’s charter from ordinances, holding that
charter is home-rule city’s constitution and not statute or ordinance for purposes of UDJA, and
dismissing UDJA claims against city seeking to have charter provisions construed); see also Tex.
7
Loc. Gov’t Code § 5.004 (defining home-rule municipality). The UDJA provides that one
“whose rights, status, or other legal relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance,
contract, or franchise may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under
the instrument, statute, ordinance, contract, or franchise and obtain a declaration of rights, status,
or other legal relations thereunder.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 37.004(a).
Although Texas Disposal asserts in its pleadings that the City acted in violation of
the City Charter, it also challenges the City’s amendments to its code of ordinances governing
the collection of non-residential refuse 7 and seeks a declaration “holding invalid resolutions and
ordinances adopted in violation of the [City] Charter.” See Tex. Const. art. XI, § 5 (authorizing
cities having specified populations to adopt and amend charters by majority vote of qualified
voters). The UDJA provides, “In any proceeding that involves the validity of a municipal
ordinance or franchise, the municipality must be made a party.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code
§ 37.006(b); see, e.g., Turner v. Robinson, 534 S.W.3d 115, 127 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2017, pet. denied) (“[UDJA] clearly and unambiguously waives the sovereign immunity of
municipalities in any declaratory-judgment action involving the validity of a municipal
ordinance.”). Thus, Texas Disposal pleaded facts that affirmatively demonstrate that the trial
court has jurisdiction over its UDJA claims against the City. See Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226.
7 Texas Disposal’s live pleadings included the following allegation:
The Agenda Item Summary for that resolution recited that the amendment of the
Code of Ordinances was pursuant to the amended contract between the City and
the preferred vendor, which “allows CTR to be the single vendor for all solid
waste collection services in the City.” The amendments to the ordinance included
deleting references to collection entities chosen by the customer, and adding
provisions regarding “the city’s contractor,” making it clear that the City had
chosen a single preferred vendor to have the exclusive, sole-source franchise and
contract for the collection of all waste in the City including nonresidential waste.
8
Further, a trial court has jurisdiction to consider ultra vires claims that are asserted
against a governmental actor in her official capacity for the violation of statutory or
constitutional provisions. See Hall v. McRaven, 508 S.W.3d 232, 238 (Tex. 2017) (discussing
ultra vires claims against governmental official); City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366,
369–70 (Tex. 2009) (same). Here Texas Disposal alleges in its ultra vires claim that the city
manager in her official capacity acted without legal authority because her actions to effectuate
and enforce the Refuse Collection Contract violated the City Charter. Based on our review of
Texas Disposal’s pleadings, we similarly conclude that Texas Disposal pleaded facts that
affirmatively demonstrate that the trial court has jurisdiction over its ultra vires claim against the
city manager. See Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226; see also Suarez, 613 S.W.3d at 556–57
(concluding that trial court had jurisdiction to consider ultra vires claims asserting that
government officials were acting without legal authority).
TOMA Claim
“An interested person . . . may bring an action by mandamus or injunction to stop,
prevent, or reverse a violation or threatened violation of [TOMA] by members of a governmental
body,” and a governmental entity’s immunity is waived for such claims. See Tex. Gov’t Code
§ 551.142(a). “An action taken by a governmental body in violation of [TOMA] is voidable,”
id. § 551.141, and generally “determining whether an action was taken in violation of the
[TOMA] is a question to be decided at a trial on the merits,” Hays County v. Hays County Water
Planning P’ship, 69 S.W.3d 253, 259 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, no pet.).
The City does not dispute that Texas Disposal is an “interested party” whose
pleadings allege a TOMA violation based on an insufficiently specific agenda for the April 2021
9
retreat. See Tex. Gov’t Code §§ 551.041 (“A governmental body shall give written notice of the
date, hour, place, and subject of each meeting held by the governmental body.”), .142(a)
(authorizing interested person to bring action to stop violation). The City argues that the trial
court does not have jurisdiction over Texas Disposal’s TOMA claim because it is moot. “The
mootness doctrine dictates that courts avoid rendering advisory opinions by only deciding cases
that present a ‘live’ controversy at the time of the decision.” Texas Health Care Info. Council
v. Seton Health Plan, Inc., 94 S.W.3d 841, 846 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, pet. denied) (citing
Camarena v. Texas Emp. Comm’n, 754 S.W.2d 149, 151 (Tex. 1988)). A case is moot if: (1) “it
appears that one seeks to obtain a judgment on some controversy, when in reality none exists”;
or (2) “when one seeks a judgment on some matter which, when rendered for any reason, cannot
have any practical legal effect on a then-existing controversy.” Id. at 846–47; see Williams
v. Lara, 52 S.W.3d 171, 184 (Tex. 2001) (noting that “a controversy must exist between the
parties at every stage of the legal proceeding” for plaintiff to have standing and that, if
controversy ceases to exist, case becomes moot).
The City argues that Texas Disposal’s TOMA claim is moot because Texas
Disposal does not contend that a TOMA violation occurred at the city council’s November
meeting when the city council approved the agreement with CTR and that this approval mooted
any contract “negotiation” by the city manager that was authorized during the April retreat. In
the context of this interlocutory appeal, however, we cannot conclude that the City has
conclusively established that there is no remaining controversy between the parties over Texas
Disposal’s TOMA claim or that a judgment on that claim would have no practical legal effect on
the parties’ controversy. See Seton Health Plan, 94 S.W.3d at 846–47; see also Miranda,
133 S.W.3d at 228 (placing burden on governmental unit to conclusively prove that trial court
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lacked jurisdiction); City of Austin v. Savetownlake.org, No. 03-07-00410-CV, 2008 Tex. App.
LEXIS 6471, at *13–15, 2008 WL 3877683, at *5 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 22, 2008, no pet.)
(mem. op.) (observing that courts have broadly interpreted standing under TOMA, contrasting
plaintiff’s right to relief under TOMA and trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction to award it,
and concluding that trial court did not err in denying plea to jurisdiction where plaintiff alleged
TOMA violation and city argued that no violation of TOMA occurred). Thus, we conclude that
the City has not established that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over Texas Disposal’s TOMA
claim on the ground of mootness.
Having determined that the trial court has jurisdiction, we turn to Texas
Disposal’s issues.
Denial of Temporary Injunctive Relief
Standard of Review and Applicable Law
“A temporary injunction is an extraordinary remedy and does not issue as a matter
of right.” Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 204 (Tex. 2002). “In a hearing on an
application for a temporary injunction the only question before the court is the right of the
applicant to a preservation of the status quo of the subject matter of the suit pending a final trial
of the case on its merits.” Transport Co. of Tex. v. Robertson Transp., Inc., 261 S.W.2d 549, 552
(Tex. 1953); see Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at 204 (“A temporary injunction’s purpose is to preserve
the status quo of the litigation’s subject matter pending a trial on the merits.”). The “status quo”
is defined as “the last, actual, peaceable, non-contested status [that] preceded the pending
controversy.” In re Newton, 146 S.W.3d 648, 651 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding).
11
To obtain a temporary injunction, an applicant must plead and prove three
elements: (1) “a cause of action against the defendant”; (2) “a probable right to the relief
sought”; and (3) “a probable, imminent, and irreparable injury in the interim.” Butnaru,
84 S.W.3d at 204. “An injury is irreparable if the injured party cannot be adequately
compensated in damages or if the damages cannot be measured by any certain pecuniary
standard.” Id.; see Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. Thompson, 24 S.W.3d 570, 576 (Tex. App.—
Austin 2000, no pet.) (discussing irreparable harm as element of probable-injury requirement).
A trial court has broad discretion in deciding whether to grant or deny a
temporary injunction, and its ruling is subject to reversal only for a clear abuse of that discretion.
See Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at 204; Walling v. Metcalfe, 863 S.W.2d 56, 58 (Tex. 1993). We view
the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s order, indulging every reasonable
inference in its favor, and “determine whether the order was so arbitrary as to exceed the bounds
of reasonable discretion.” Thompson, 24 S.W.3d at 576; see Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at 204 (stating
that appellate court may not substitute its judgment for that of trial court “unless the trial court’s
action was so arbitrary that it exceeded the bounds of reasonable discretion”). A trial court does
not abuse its discretion if some evidence reasonably supports its decision. See Thompson,
24 S.W.3d at 576.
Probable, Imminent, and Irreparable Injury
Here the trial court found that Texas Disposal failed to establish the three required
elements to be entitled to a temporary injunction. See Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at 204 (requiring
applicant to plead and prove three elements). We limit our review of Texas Disposal’s issues to
the third element because it is dispositive. See id.; Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.
12
Texas Disposal’s first amended petition sought a temporary injunction
“prohibiting” the City and its Manager “from taking any steps to enforce” the Refuse Collection
Contract or the termination of Texas Disposal’s agreement with the City. On appeal, Texas
Disposal states that its requested injunctive relief did not seek to terminate CTR’s contracts with
customers or force any CTR customers to terminate their contracts with CTR but requested that
“the pre-lawsuit open market conditions for commercial waste in the City prevail until trial on
the merits.” Texas Disposal states that it “seeks an injunction against only the exclusive nature”
of the Refuse Collection Contract, not to bar its entirety.
As support for its requested temporary injunctive relief, Texas Disposal argues
that the evidence showed that it had lost approximately half of its customers and “sustained
damage to its goodwill and investment in infrastructure that cannot be measured in dollar terms,”
that it was in danger of suffering further similar damages in the absence of injunctive relief, and
that it had no adequate remedy at law because it would most likely be unable to recover
monetary damages from the City due to governmental immunity. See City of Houston
v. Houston Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 549 S.W.3d 566, 576 (Tex. 2018) (stating that generally
cities “have immunity from suits for damages unless the immunity has been waived” and that
ultra vires claims “are only entitled to prospective relief”).
By the time of the temporary-injunction hearing, however, the agreement between
the City and Texas Disposal was no longer in effect. The evidence showed that prior to Texas
Disposal filing suit, the City provided the required thirty-day written notice to Texas Disposal
that their agreement would be terminated effective April 30, 2022, and Texas Disposal does not
dispute that the City’s notice complied with the procedure set out in the agreement between
them. See Philadelphia Indem. Ins. v. White, 490 S.W.3d 468, 471 (Tex. 2016) (“Absent
13
compelling reasons, courts must respect and enforce the terms of a contract the parties have
freely and voluntarily entered.”). Texas Disposal has not cited, and we have not found, authority
that would support requiring the City to reinstate an agreement that the City had the “sole
discretion” to terminate or obligating the City to allow Texas Disposal to provide non-residential
services within the City going forward. For this reason, we conclude that there is some evidence
to support the trial court’s finding that Texas Disposal failed to establish probable, imminent, and
irreparable injury in the interim that its requested injunctive relief would have prevented. 8 See
Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at 204; see also Seton Health Plan, 94 S.W.3d at 853 (stating that purpose
of injunctive relief is to halt wrongful acts that are threatened or ongoing).
As to Texas Disposal’s second issue arguing that it is entitled to temporary
injunctive relief based on its TOMA claim, whether Texas Disposal established its right to a
temporary injunction pending the trial on the merits is a different inquiry from whether it
ultimately will be entitled to injunctive relief pursuant to its TOMA claim. See Tex. Gov’t Code
§ 551.142 (addressing mandamus and injunctive relief that is available for TOMA violation).
Pleading a TOMA claim did not relieve Texas Disposal of its burden to plead and prove the three
elements for a temporary injunction. See Salazar v. Gallardo, 57 S.W.3d 629, 632–33 (Tex.
App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2001, no pet.) (requiring applicant to establish three elements
for temporary injunction in context of TOMA claim); see also Transport Co., 261 S.W.2d at 552
(stating that only question before trial court in determining whether to grant application for
temporary injunction is right of applicant to preservation of status quo pending final trial of case
8 Among its findings in its order denying Texas Disposal’s application for a temporary
injunction, the trial court found that “the terms of the relief sought go beyond the scope of what
is legally permissible.” The trial court reasonably could have found that it had no authority to
reinstate the already terminated agreement between Texas Disposal and the City.
14
on merits). Thus, we conclude that Texas Disposal’s request for injunctive relief pursuant to its
TOMA claim did not support its requested temporary injunctive relief. See, e.g., City of
Brownsville v. Brownsville GMS, Ltd., No. 13-19-00311-CV, 2021 Tex. App. LEXIS 3507, at
*20–22 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg May 6, 2021, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (observing
that trial court had no authority under TOMA to force city to remain in contract with applicant or
enjoin city from entering contract with another entity in future because “TOMA only allows for
the voiding of actions which were approved in violation of TOMA”).
Delay in Seeking Equitable Relief
We also observe that the trial court reasonably could have considered Texas
Disposal’s delay in seeking equitable relief and balanced the equities and resulting hardships in
favor of denying Texas Disposal’s requested temporary injunction. See Thompson, 24 S.W.3d at
578 (stating that trial court may balance equities and resulting hardships from issuance or
denial of temporary injunction); Landry’s Seafood Inn & Oyster Bar-Kemach, Inc. v. Wiggins,
919 S.W.2d 924, 927 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, no writ) (explaining that equitable
principles apply to request for injunctive relief and that movant “must have acted promptly to
enforce its rights”); see also Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 65.001 (stating that generally
“principles governing courts of equity govern injunction proceedings”); In re Gamble,
71 S.W.3d 313, 317 (Tex. 2002) (orig. proceeding) (“A request for injunctive relief invokes a
court’s equity jurisdiction.”); NMTC Corp. v. Conarroe, 99 S.W.3d 865, 868 (Tex. App.—
Beaumont 2003, no pet.) (concluding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in balancing
equities between parties and denying temporary injunctive relief).
15
The evidence showed that Texas Disposal was aware in November 2021 that the
city council had authorized the Refuse Collection Contract and the termination of Texas
Disposal’s agreement, 9 but Texas Disposal delayed filing suit and seeking temporary injunctive
relief until shortly before May 1, when the Refuse Collection Contract was effective. During this
time period, CTR incurred costs to comply with its contract with the City that exceeded over
$7,000,000, and by the time of the temporary-injunction hearing, it was providing 98% of the
non-residential services in the City.
The trial court also could have credited the testimony of CTR’s director that if the
trial court were to grant Texas Disposal’s requested temporary injunctive relief, there would be
“absolute chaos” 10 and concerns about the health-and-safety aspect of consistent garbage
collection. See Amend v. Watson, 333 S.W.3d 625, 630 n.4 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.)
(stating that in exercising its discretion, “trial court was required ‘to take into account other
considerations evident on the face of the pleadings and in the evidence adduced at the temporary-
injunction hearing—for example, the issue of comparative injury or a balancing of the “equities”
and hardships, including a consideration of the important factor of the public interest’” (citing
Methodist Hosps. of Dallas v. Texas Indus. Accident Bd., 798 S.W.2d 651, 660 (Tex. App.—
Austin 1990, writ dism’d w.o.j.))); Thompson, 24 S.W.3d at 579 (stating that appellate court
views evidence in light most favorable to trial court’s order and concluding that trial court did
9 Texas Disposal’s principal owner testified that he attended the November city council
meeting, and CTR’s director testified about CTR’s attempts to contact Texas Disposal and
its communications with others about the Refuse Collection Contract shortly after the
November meeting.
10 CTR’s director testified that if the city council’s decisions “are rolled back to a status
quo” prior to the city council’s November 2021 meeting, “it would be absolute chaos,”
with some customers wanting to stay with CTR and some wanting to go back to their prior
service provider.
16
not abuse discretion in granting temporary injunctive relief based in part on health risks involved
if hospital were closed and balancing equities in favor of doctors and patients).
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in denying Texas Disposal’s application for a temporary injunction, and accordingly, we
overrule its issues and affirm the trial court’s order denying Texas Disposal’s application for
temporary injunction.
__________________________________________
Rosa Lopez Theofanis, Justice
Before Chief Justice Byrne, Justices Triana and Theofanis
Affirmed
Filed: May 31, 2023
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