Christopher Lee Vail v. the State of Texas

In the
Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana
No. 06-22-00139-CR
CHRISTOPHER LEE VAIL, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 8th District Court
Hopkins County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2028169
Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Rambin
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pursuant to a plea agreement with the State, Christopher Lee Vail pled guilty to one count
of indecency with a child by contact and one count of indecency with a child by exposure.1 The
trial court deferred a finding of guilt on both counts and placed Vail on deferred adjudication
community supervision for ten years on each count. On July 20, 2021, the State moved to
adjudicate Vail guilty of both offenses. After a hearing on the matter, the trial court granted the
State’s motion, adjudicated Vail guilty of both counts, and sentenced him to twenty years’ and
ten years’ imprisonment, respectively.2 Vail appeals, arguing (1) that there was insufficient
evidence to support the trial court’s finding that Vail violated the terms and conditions of his
community supervision and (2) that the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court’s
assessment of court-appointed attorney fees. For the reasons below, we affirm the trial court’s
judgment of conviction and modify the assessed attorney fees in this case.
I. Background
On April 29, 2022, the State filed its second amended motion to proceed with an
adjudication of guilt, alleging that Vail violated the terms and conditions of his community
supervision in the following ways:3
1
Vail appeals his conviction of indecency with a child by exposure in our cause number 06-22-00138-CR. Vail has
filed a single brief raising an issue common to both appeals, that is, that the evidence was insufficient to support the
trial court’s finding that he violated the terms and conditions of his community supervision. This opinion addresses
that point of error as it relates to both convictions.
2
The trial court ordered Vail’s sentences to run consecutively.
3
While contending that he had complied with the terms of deferred adjudication community supervision, Vail agreed
that the alleged violations were applicable to both offenses.
2
1. that he failed to report in person not less than once per month as directed by his
community supervision officer (CSO) for the months of June, August, October, November, and
December 2021 and February and March 2022;
2. that he failed to obtain approval from his CSO before changing his residence or
leaving the county;
3. that he failed to pay a sex-offender fee of $5.00 for the months of June, July,
August, September, October, and December 2021 and January, February, March, and April
2022;
4. that he failed to register as a sex offender with local law enforcement in the
county in which he resided. The relevant community supervision condition stated, “If [Vail]
spends 48 consecutive hours or more on three (3) occasions during any given month [he] shall
provide local law enforcement information required under Article 62.02[](b) of the [Texas Code
of Criminal Procedure] the address of residence and statement of intent to stay”;
5. that he failed to comply with all updated procedures, including giving law
enforcement seven days’ notice that he would be leaving the county in which he resided;
6. that he failed to participate and complete sex-offender counseling and pay
associated costs; and
7. that he failed to participate and comply with all rules and requirements of
intensive supervision.
The trial court held a hearing on the State’s motion. Vail entered pleas of “not true” to the
State’s allegations against him.
In support of its motions, the State called Vail’s CSO, Kris Crews, who supervised sex
offenders and individuals who had been placed on intensive supervision. Crews testified that
Vail’s first meeting with him occurred on or around May 14, 2021.4 During their initial meeting,
Crews went over the terms and conditions of Vail’s community supervision. He also explained
4
There is some confusion in the record as to whether the first meeting occurred on May 13 or May 14. It appears
that Crews met with Vail on May 13, at which time he was in county jail. Vail was released from jail the following
day and met with Crews in Vail’s office. This minor discrepancy does not alter the outcome here.
3
that, within seven days from the date of their meeting, Vail was required to register as a sex
offender with the local sex-offender-registry agency. According to Crews, Vail failed to register
within the required time.
Initially, Vail told Crews that he intended to live with his father in Allen, Texas, which is
in Collin County. Vail’s father, though, would not agree to that arrangement. Instead, Vail’s
father provided him with a motel for two nights, and then Vail “w[ould] be on his own after
that.” When Vail made an unsuccessful attempt to register with the Allen Police Department,
“he was informed that that was within a child safety zone.” Around June 10, Vail contacted
Crews via telephone,5 informing him that he was living in a parking lot of the Collin Creek Mall
in Plano, Collin County, Texas. That same day, Crews informed Vail “that he had until 5:00 on
June 14 to find a place to register and live.” On June 14, Vail reported to Crews, telling him that
he was still living in the parking lot at Collin Creek Mall. However, on June 15, Vail contacted
Crews, informing him that he was at the Hopkins County AAA Storage and that the sheriff’s
department refused to “pick him up because they had no room.”
On June 23, Crews received information that Vail was in an assisted-living facility in
Wylie, Texas, but Crews was unable to confirm that information. Wylie is predominately in
Collin County, but parts are in Dallas County and Rockwall County. That same day, Vail told
Crews that “he was currently in the hospital at Trinity Mother Frances in Sulphur Springs
[Hopkins County] and . . . they were maybe keeping him for a while due to a pending bone scan
and . . . they moved him to a facility in Winnsboro to rehab.” During that telephone call, Crews
5
Unless otherwise stated, Vail’s contact with Crews was via telephone.
4
reminded Vail to report to the local police department to let them know that he was in the area.
Vail told Crews that he did not have his own phone and that his car was impounded. As far as
Crews knew, Vail never informed the local police department that he was in Winnsboro.
Two days later, Crews spoke with Vail, who told him that he was going to be transferred
to the Winnsboro Hospital on June 27 or 28 to receive intravenous antibiotics for an infection in
his leg. Winnsboro is partially in Wood County and Franklin County and is very near to
Hopkins County. Vail said he would be in the hospital for about six weeks. Crews alerted the
Winnsboro Police Department that Vail was in town. Crews also reminded Vail that he was
required to contact the local police department to let them know that he was in their community.
On July 6, Vail informed Crews that he would stop by the community supervision office the next
day. But Vail also told Crews that he did not have a vehicle because he needed $500.00 to get
his car out of the impound. According to Vail, he was planning on traveling to Frisco the next
day for a meeting at the social security office. He also planned to live in the Winnsboro area
once he began receiving social security benefits. Again, Crews reminded Vail that he was
required to register with local law enforcement seven days in advance of moving to Winnsboro.
On July 7, Vail met with Crews at his office in Sulphur Springs. Crews reported that he
was still homeless, that he was supposed to be admitted to the Winnsboro Hospital, and that he
would be in the hospital until July 28. During their meeting, Crews referred Vail to Lisa Phillips,
a licensed sex-offender-treatment provider, so that he could begin counseling. Vail informed
5
Crews that he was not guilty of the charged offenses and that he “just said that he pled guilty so
he could be with his ill father.”
On July 15, Vail phoned Crews to report that he recently had been released from the
hospital. At that time, Vail intended to stay in his sister’s driveway until he could find a
permanent place to live. The record does not establish the location of his sister’s residence. On
July 19, Vail reported that he was currently in the Parkland Hospital in Dallas where he was
being treated for a foot infection. On July 26, Vail told Crews that he would be staying at the
Parkland Hospital for an extended period of time. An officer with the Dallas Police Department
(DPD) contacted Crews to inform him that Vail had attempted to register with him, but that he
told Vail that they did not make hospital visits. On July 30, Vail informed Crews that he was
still in Parkland Hospital but that, once he was released from the hospital, he intended to live in
Garland. On August 19, Vail reported to Crews that he would be returning to Parkland Hospital
the next day to receive wound care. Crews testified, “He said in the meantime he’ll be staying at
a bus station.”
On August 30, Vail began receiving monthly social security benefits of around $2,500.00
per month. As a condition of his community supervision, Vail was required to pay a sex
offender supervisory fee of $5.00 per month, but from June 2021 to April 2022, he did not make
a payment. However, after receiving his social security benefits, Vail made a lump sum payment
that brought him current on his sex-offender supervisory fees.
6
On September 1, Vail left Crews a message telling him that he was still in Parkland
Hospital. A couple of days later, Crews sent Vail a text message, again giving Vail the contact
information for Phillips so that he could set up counseling services with her. On September 28,
Vail contacted Crews to tell him that “he was [still] having difficulty with the infection on his
left foot.” He also told Crews “that he and his girlfriend [were] looking for a place to live in
Garland.”
On September 24, Vail contacted Crews to inform him that he was out of the hospital and
staying at the InTown Suites. Vail told Crews that he planned on registering as a sex offender
with the DPD. Crews said, “With the pending motion to proceed [to adjudication of guilt], I
wouldn’t accept a transfer [for probation purposes] to Dallas County.” Regardless, Vail never
registered or attempted to register with the DPD. In short, between September 24 and 28, Vail
stayed in the parking lot of the Sulphur Springs Walmart, the Motel 6 in Greenville (Hunt
County), the Wingate by Wyndham in Richardson, the InTown Suites, and the Plano Inn &
Suites. In total, Vail stayed in at least four different counties over a five-day period.
Vail had an appointment for an office visit with Crews on September 30, but he did not
attend the appointment because “he overslept and he was feeling sick.” Vail was also scheduled
to meet with a counselor for a “preinterview,” but he called Crews on October 1 and asked if he
could cancel it because, according to Vail, he was on his way to the emergency room because he
had a fever. On October 6, Vail telephoned Crews, informing him that he was in Baylor Hospital
and that he had registered as a sex offender in Plano. On October 25, Vail called Crews to tell
7
him “that he was living out of his vehicle [in the] Walmart parking lot [in] Collin County.”
Later, Vail called Crews from the Richardson Police Department, telling Crews that he had
checked into a long-term stay hotel in Richardson but that he did not know the name of the hotel.
Later, Vail decided that the Richardson hotel was too expensive and that he was going to have to
find another place to live.
On October 26, Crews received a telephone call from either the Collin County Police
Department or the Plano Police Department, informing him that the department “was filing a
failure to comply charge on [Vail] for not informing them of his release from the hospital and
where he had been staying upon his release.” On December 13, Vail was again in Parkland
Hospital, “[h]oping to get out on December 17.” Vail told Crews that he intended to live in
Mesquite, Texas, when he was discharged. On December 17, Crews sent another text message
to Vail, reminding him that he was supposed to meet with Phillips and that he needed to contact
her to make an appointment.
On January 3, 2022, Vail called Crews and told him that he was living in Dallas. Crews
asked Vail if he had registered as a sex offender with the DPD, and Vail stated that he had not.
On January 3, Vail contacted Crews to tell him that he was moving to a different address in
Dallas. Crews informed Vail that he could not live at the new address because it was too close in
proximity to a children’s daycare. When Crews was asked whether Vail was registered as a sex
offender at the time of the adjudication hearing, Crews stated, “No. He’s listed on the [Texas
Department of Public Safety] register as an absconder.”
8
Vail continued to move from place to place. On April 19, Crews contacted Vail to
remind him that he was ordered by the trial court to appear in court on April 20 at 1:30. Crews
asked Vail if he would be in court the next day, to which Vail responded that he would make an
appearance “if he ha[d] enough gas.” Vail did not make an appearance in court. The next day,
Vail contacted Crews to tell him that he had not been discharged from the hospital but that he
would be discharged that day. On April 25, Vail called Crews to ask him for the name of the
licensed sex-offender-treatment provider. Once again, Crews told Vail, by phone and email, that
her name was Phillips. That same day, Phillips reported to Crews that Vail did, in fact, call her
but that “[Vail] said he couldn’t hear her.” Phillips placed a subsequent phone call to Vail and
left a message for him. Vail did not return Phillips’s call.
According to Vail, during June and July, he was in a variety of hospitals and
rehabilitation centers in different cities. During that time, Vail missed a June court date due to
illness, so it was rescheduled to July 26. Vail did not appear for the July 26 court date. On
August 12, Vail informed Crews via telephone that he was supposed to be released from
Parkland Hospital in Dallas. Upon his release, Vail intended to move into an apartment in
Dallas. On August 19, however, Vail informed Crews that he was, in fact, out of the hospital,
but that he was homeless and living in a train station in Richardson. Vail also told Crews that he
would be checking back into Parkland Hospital the following day. On September 13, Vail told
Crews that he was planning on living in the InTown Suites in Dallas and that he would be
registering with the DPD. To Crews’s knowledge, that never happened. On September 23, Vail
9
reported that he was going to have to leave Dallas because, “due to his charge[,] . . . he would
not be welcome to stay there any longer, and he reported that he would possibly be moving to
Tyler, Smith County.”
In addition, Crews summarized that Vail failed to report once a month in person for the
months of June, August, October, November, and December 2021, as well as February and
March 2022. According to Crews, the great majority of the time, Vail would tell him where he
was located after he was already there.6
After hearing testimony, the trial court found that Vail had violated the terms and
conditions of his community supervision, granted the State’s motion, adjudicated Vail guilty of
both counts, and sentenced him to twenty years’ imprisonment for his conviction of indecency
with a child by contact and ten years’ imprisonment for his conviction of indecency with a child
by exposure. This appeal followed.
II. Sufficient Evidence Supported the Trial Court’s Adjudication of Vail’s Guilt
In his first point of error, Vail contends that “the State failed to present sufficient
evidence that Vail violated the terms and conditions of his community supervision where the
record shows that Vail was prevented from complying due to circumstances beyond his control.”
We disagree.
The determination to proceed with an adjudication of guilt after a defendant is placed on
deferred adjudication community supervision “is reviewable in the same manner as a revocation
In addition to Crews’s testimony, the victim’s mother testified that her daughter had suffered trauma as a result of
6
Vail’s actions, including, emotional problems, harming herself, suicide attempts, and panic attacks. As a result, she
was required to seek in-patient psychological treatment.
10
hearing.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42A.108(b). “At a revocation hearing, the State
must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a condition of community supervision has
been violated.”7 Perry v. State, 367 S.W.3d 690, 693 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2012, no pet.); see
Cardona v. State, 665 S.W.2d 492, 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984).
In a hearing on a motion to revoke community supervision, “the trial court is the sole trier
of facts” and the judge of the “credibility of witnesses and weight to be given [their] testimony.”
Taylor v. State, 604 S.W.2d 175, 179 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980). When the State meets
its burden of proof and no procedural obstacle is raised, the decision whether to revoke
community supervision is within the discretion of the trial court. Flournoy v. State, 589 S.W.2d
705, 708 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1979). As a result, our review of the trial court’s order
revoking community supervision is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its
discretion. Clerkley v. State, 515 S.W.3d 331, 332 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2015, no pet.) (citing
Cardona, 665 S.W.2d at 493). If there is some evidence to support the finding of even a single
violation, the revocation order must be upheld. See Cochran v. State, 78 S.W.3d 20, 28 (Tex.
App.—Tyler 2002, no pet.) (citing Moore v. State, 605 S.W.2d 924, 926 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel
Op.] 1980)).
In support of his position that the trial court improperly revoked his community
supervision because the alleged violations were beyond his control, Vail directs us to Leonard v.
State, 385 S.W.3d 570 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). In that case, one of the conditions of Leonard’s
7
The preponderance-of-the-evidence standard is met when the greater weight of the credible evidence before the trial
court supports a reasonable belief that a condition of community supervision has been violated. Rickels v. State, 202
S.W.3d 759, 764 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
11
community supervision was that he submit to a polygraph examination and show no deception
during the examination. Id. at 572. The State moved to adjudicate Leonard’s guilt, alleging that
he violated the conditions of his community supervision by showing “significant criteria
indicative of deception” during a polygraph examination and by failing to successfully complete
sex-offender treatment. Id. at 572–73. During the hearing on the State’s motion to adjudicate,
the trial court overruled Leonard’s objection that the results of the polygraph examination were
unreliable and, therefore, inadmissible. Id. at 573. A psychotherapist then testified that Leonard
had been discharged from a program for sex offenders because he failed multiple polygraph
examinations, which indicated that he was engaged in “secret keeping.” Id. On that basis, the
trial court revoked Leonard’s community supervision and adjudicated him guilty. Id. at 572.
Finding no abuse of discretion, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s ruling. Id.
However, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the appellate court’s decision.
In doing so, the court reiterated that the results of a polygraph examination were “inadmissible
over proper objection because the tests are unreliable.” Id. at 577. “If the polygraph results were
inadmissible, then the record would not contain a basis for [the treatment provider’s] decision to
discharge [Leonard], and the trial court abused its discretion by adjudicating [Leonard]’s guilt.”
Id. To the extent Leonard stands for the proposition that a defendant’s community supervision
cannot be revoked based on circumstances beyond his control, for the reasons below, we do not
find Vail’s reliance on Leonard to be compelling.
12
Here, the evidence shows that Vail failed to report to Crews in person over a period of
several months, which included June, August, October, November, and December 2021 and
February and March 2022. Although Vail would notify Crews as to where he was living after he
moved from one county to another—which he did on at least four different occasions—he did so
without first getting permission from Crews. Further, even though Crews informed Vail that he
was required to inform local law enforcement when he was in the area, Vail failed to comply
with those instructions most of the time. In addition, Crews informed Vail on multiple occasions
that he was required to meet with Phillips, but he failed to do so, even once. As a result, he
failed to participate in sex-offender counseling.
Vail blames his poor physical condition and his lack of transportation for his failures to
comply with the terms of his community supervision. Clearly, Vail experienced many physical
difficulties during his term of community supervision, but contrary to Vail’s assertion, many of
his failures were not solely beyond his control. For instance, Vail failed to obtain Crews’s
permission before moving from one county to another. He claims that his poor health prevented
him from doing so. Yet, as he was apparently capable of making telephone calls after he moved,
Vail could have just as easily telephoned Crews to seek his permission before he moved.
Moreover, the evidence showed that Vail was moving from city to city on almost a weekly basis.
Consequently, Vail had the ability to procure some type of transportation to get from place to
place. Had he wanted to meet with Crews in person, as he was required to do, Vail was capable
13
of doing so. The same reasoning applies to Vail’s failure to meet with Phillips and to participate
in counseling.
We, therefore, find that there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s
determination that Vail violated the terms and conditions of his community supervision.
Accordingly, we must uphold its revocation orders and its resulting judgment adjudicating guilt.
See Cochran, 78 S.W.3d at 28 (citing Moore, 605 S.W.2d at 926).
We overrule Vail’s point of error.
III. The Trial Court’s Assessment of Attorney Fees Must be Modified
The record shows that, on February 3, 2021, the trial court appointed an attorney to
represent Vail and that the attorney represented Vail up to and during the deferred adjudication
community supervision proceeding. On May 13, 2021, Vail’s appointed counsel filed a claim
for legal services in the amount of $400.00. The trial court subsequently assessed $400.00 in
attorney fees against Vail in its order of deferred adjudication. We cannot find, and Vail does
not claim, that he objected to the trial court’s assessment of those fees.
On August 18, 2021, the trial court appointed a different attorney to represent Vail. That
particular attorney represented Vail up to and during the revocation and adjudication hearing.
On September 29, 2022, that attorney filed a claim for legal services in the amount of $500.00.
Pursuant to his request, the trial court approved payment of $500.00 in attorney fees in its order
for attorney’s claim for services. The clerk’s bill of costs shows that Vail was responsible for
14
$900.00 ($400.00 plus $500) in attorney fees. The judgment adjudicating guilt shows that the
trial court assessed $918.97 for “[r]eimbursement [f]ees.”8
Under Article 26.05(g) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, a trial court has the
authority to order the reimbursement of a court-appointed attorney’s fees only if “the judge
determines that a defendant has financial resources that enable the defendant to offset in part or
in whole the costs of the legal services provided . . . including any expenses and costs.” TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.05(g) (Supp.). “[T]he defendant’s financial resources and ability
to pay are explicit critical elements in the trial court’s determination of the propriety of ordering
reimbursement of costs and fees” of legal services provided. Armstrong v. State, 340 S.W.3d
759, 765–66 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (alteration in original) (quoting Mayer v. State, 309 S.W.3d
552, 556 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010)). If the record lacks any indication that the defendant’s
financial status or ability to pay changed at any point in the case or that the trial court made a
subsequent finding that he was no longer indigent, he is considered indigent throughout the
proceedings. See Cates, 402 S.W.3d at 251–52; see also Mayer v. State, 309 S.W.3d 552 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2010); Martin v. State, 405 S.W.3d 944, 946–47 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2013, no
pet.).
8
Because the clerk’s bill of costs assessed only $900.00 in attorney fees, we will presume that the remaining $18.97
in the judgment adjudicating guilt was due to some other type of reimbursement fee. Moreover, the attorneys’
claims for legal services amounted in total to $900.00, not $918.97. In addition, the trial court issued orders
confirming $400.00 and $500.00 in attorney fees. At any rate, it is irrelevant whether attorney fees were assessed at
$900.00 or $918.97. As we discuss below, this is so because the trial court determined at the beginning of the case
that Vail was indigent and, without a determination to the contrary, he is presumed to have remained indigent
throughout the entire proceeding. Consequently, the trial court erred when it assessed attorney fees against Vail.
See Cates v. State, 402 S.W.3d 250, 252 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).
15
Vail points out that he remained indigent throughout the case and that there was no
evidence that the trial court ever determined otherwise. According to Vail, the trial court’s
$900.00 assessment of attorney fees must be deleted from the judgment adjudicating guilt.
In Riles v. State, 452 S.W.3d 333 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015), the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals made clear that (1) procedural default applies to issues regarding attorney fees assessed
against an indigent defendant receiving community supervision in an order of deferred
adjudication, and (2) procedural default is premised on the defendant’s “knowledge of, and
failure to challenge, an issue.” Id. at 337. Riles pled guilty to possession of a controlled
substance with intent to deliver, adjudication was deferred, and she received community
supervision. Id. at 334. Riles signed plea papers containing an admonishment that part of her
mandatory supervision costs included a court-appointed attorney fee. Finally, the order of
deferred adjudication, which she also signed, provided that she was ordered to pay “all court
costs including Court Appointed Attorney Fee.” Id. The next day, her trial counsel submitted
his attorney fee voucher for $1,000.00, and it was listed in the district clerk’s bill of costs. Id. at
334–35. A year and a half later, her community supervision was revoked, she was sentenced to
seven years in prison, and she was ordered to pay all court costs, including the fees of her court-
appointed attorney. Id. She appealed the judgment of adjudication arguing that there was no
evidence that she had the ability to pay the attorney fees. Id. at 335.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that, since Riles had knowledge of the
attorney fees, she was required to challenge the sufficiency of evidence supporting the payment
16
of them in a direct appeal from the original order of deferred adjudication. Id. at 337. Since she
failed to appeal the original order of deferred adjudication, she had procedurally defaulted her
complaint. Id. (citing Manuel, 994 S.W.2d at 661–62). The court then clarified that procedural
default is premised on “an appellant’s knowledge of, and failure to challenge, an issue.” Id.
Riles’s several acknowledgments that she would be required to pay attorney fees showed that she
had the requisite knowledge to challenge the fee award on direct appeal, even if she did not
immediately know the exact amount of the fees. Id.
The record in this case shows that the trial court entered its order of deferred adjudication
community supervision on May 13, 2021. The order indicated that Vail was assessed $400.00 in
court-appointed attorney fees. Attached to the trial court’s order was a document containing a
list of conditions, one of which required Vail to pay $400.00 in attorney fees. Vail signed that
document acknowledging that he was aware of the attorney fee assessment, and he
“ACKNOWLEDGE[D] THE RECEIPT OF A COPY OF TH[O]SE CONDITIONS OF
COMMUNITY SUPERVISION.” Vail has not challenged the veracity of that document.
Therefore, there is evidence that Vail had the requisite knowledge to challenge, on direct appeal,
the attorney fees assessment against him in the deferred adjudication order. Since he failed to
appeal that order, he procedurally defaulted his complaint related to the $400.00 attorney fee
assessment.
That said, the record shows that Vail was indigent at the time of the adjudication hearing
and that there was no determination by the trial court that he was able to pay court-appointed
17
attorney fees at that time. Accordingly, we find that the trial court erred when it assessed
$500.00 in attorney fees incurred during the adjudication proceeding. Consequently, we must
modify the trial court’s judgment adjudicating guilt and the clerk’s certified bill of costs (1) by
changing the assessment under the heading “Reimbursement Fees” to $418.97, and (2) we must
modify the certified bill of costs by changing the line item for “(RF) ATTORNEY CLAIMS”
from $900.00 to $400.00.
IV. Conclusion
We modify the trial court’s judgment adjudicating guilt by changing the assessment
under the heading “Reimbursement Fees” to $418.97, and we modify the clerk’s certified bill of
costs by changing the line item for “(RF) ATTORNEY CLAIMS” from $900.00 to $400.00. We
affirm the trial court’s judgment, as modified.
Jeff Rambin
Justice
Date Submitted: April 25, 2023
Date Decided: June 1, 2023
Do Not Publish
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