Caleb Patrick Daniels v. the State of Texas

Fourth Court of Appeals
San Antonio, Texas
MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-21-00471-CR
Caleb Patrick DANIELS,
Appellant
v.
The STATE of Texas,
Appellee
From the 81st Judicial District Court, Frio County, Texas
Trial Court No. 18-10-00155-CRF
Honorable Russell Wilson, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Beth Watkins, Justice
Sitting: Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice
Beth Watkins, Justice
Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice
Delivered and Filed: August 2, 2023
AFFIRMED
Appellant Caleb Patrick Daniels challenges his murder conviction. We affirm the
judgment.
BACKGROUND
On July 14, 2018, Caleb and his father, Dennis Eldon Daniels, met in Frio County for a
previously planned afternoon of target practice. During that outing, Caleb shot and killed Dennis.
Caleb contended he acted in self-defense. After considering the evidence, the jury found Caleb
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guilty of murder and assessed punishment of fifty years’ incarceration. The trial court signed a
judgment consistent with the jury’s verdict. Caleb now appeals.
ANALYSIS
Caleb argues the trial court abused its discretion by: (1) admitting three of the State’s trial
exhibits; (2) denying his objection to hypotheticals the State presented during its voir dire of the
jury panel; and (3) denying his motion to suppress statements he made during an interview with
law enforcement.
Admission of State’s Exhibits
Standard of Review
In his first three issues, Caleb challenges the trial court’s admission of State’s Exhibits 38,
32, and 37A–R. We review the trial court’s admission of evidence for abuse of discretion.
Inthalangsy v. State, 634 S.W.3d 749, 754 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). A trial court does not abuse its
discretion if its decision is within the zone of reasonable disagreement. Id.State’s Exhibit 38
In his first issue, Caleb challenges the admission of State’s Exhibit 38, which consisted of
an e-mail and attachments to the e-mail that Caleb sent to one of his friends before the shooting.
The e-mail included the usernames and passwords for Caleb’s social media accounts, as well as a
message he wanted to be posted to his Facebook page in the event of his death. That message
stated, “[I]f you’re reading this, I am gone” and noted that the people reading it would likely be
“shocked or surprised.” It then explained that he believed his July 14, 2018 meeting with Dennis
“could be the last thing I ever do” but was necessary “to end an ever-reaching cause of pain and
fear for so many people.” The message opined that “the Daniels family was, is, and will never be
even close to okay,” requested “space” for Caleb’s mother, and stated that Caleb would “finally
be at peace after living a life of running from unspeakable trauma.”
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The attachments contained similar, but shorter, messages that Caleb wanted his friend to
disseminate through Snapchat and Instagram. The messages in the attachments did not mention
Caleb’s family or his July 14, 2018 meeting with Dennis. However, like the draft Facebook
message in the e-mail, the messages in the attachments: stated that if they had been posted to
Caleb’s accounts, then he had died; recognized his death would shock the reader; and expressed
that he was “at peace.” The attachments did not contain any information that was substantively
different from the message in the e-mail.
It is undisputed that the State timely disclosed the e-mail to Caleb. It is similarly undisputed
that the State itself did not receive the attachments until September 8, 2021, approximately three
weeks before trial. The State then disclosed the attachments to Caleb on September 20, 2021, seven
days before trial began.
Caleb argues the attachments were not timely disclosed to him and their admission
therefore violated both the due process requirements of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)
and Texas’s statutory disclosure requirements under article 39.14 of the Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.14. He also argues that both the e-mail and
the attachments contained inadmissible hearsay.
A. Brady
Under Brady, “the State has a constitutional duty to disclose to a defendant material,
exculpatory evidence.” Pena v. State, 353 S.W.3d 797, 810 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); see also
Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. “[A] Brady claim requires that the defendant show by a preponderance of
the evidence that evidence was withheld, that it was favorable to the defense, and that the evidence
was material.” Keeter v. State, 175 S.W.3d 756, 760 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). “When favorable
evidence is not concealed but disclosed untimely, a defendant bears the burden to show that the
delay resulted in prejudice”—i.e., that “the result of the proceeding would have been different had
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the evidence been disclosed earlier.” Kulow v. State, 524 S.W.3d 383, 388 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2017, pet. ref’d).
Caleb has never argued that the attachments were favorable to his defense; to the contrary,
at trial he described the attachments as evidence that fell under Texas Rule of Evidence 404(b).
See Keeter, 175 S.W.3d at 760; see also TEX. R. EVID. 404(b). Nor has he argued that the result of
his trial would have been different if the State had disclosed the attachments earlier. See Kulow,
524 S.W.3d at 388. On this record, Caleb has not established a Brady violation. See Keeter, 175
S.W.3d at 760.
B. Article 39.14
Article 39.14 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides, in part:
[A]s soon as practicable after receiving a timely request from the defendant the
state shall produce and permit the inspection and the electronic duplication,
copying, and photographing, by or on behalf of the defendant, of any offense
reports, any designated documents, papers, written or recorded statements of the
defendant or a witness, including witness statements of law enforcement officers
but not including the work product of counsel for the state in the case and their
investigators and their notes or report, or any designated books, accounts, letters,
photographs, or objects or other tangible things not otherwise privileged that
constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the action and that
are in the possession, custody, or control of the state or any person under contract
with the state.
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 39.14(a). The State’s statutory obligation to disclose evidence under
article 39.14 “is much broader” than the constitutional obligations imposed by Brady. See, e.g.,
Watkins v. State, 619 S.W.3d 265, 277 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021); Ex parte Martinez, 560 S.W.3d
681, 702 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2018, pet. ref’d).
We will assume, without deciding, that the disclosure of the attachments one week before
trial violated article 39.14. Statutory violations are non-constitutional error subject to a harm
analysis. See Gray v. State, 159 S.W.3d 95, 97–98 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Consequently, Caleb
is not entitled to a reversal of the judgment unless the admission of the attachments affected his
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substantial rights. See Sopko v. State, 637 S.W.3d 252, 256–57 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2021, no
pet.). “A substantial right is affected when the error had a substantial and injurious effect or
influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” King v. State, 953 S.W.2d 266, 271 (Tex. Crim. App.
1997).
As explained above, the timely disclosed e-mail and the challenged attachments contained
essentially the same information. We therefore cannot say the trial court’s admission of the
attachments had a substantial or injurious effect on the jury’s verdict. Id. at 271.
C. Hearsay
Caleb also argues that the e-mail and the attachments contained inadmissible hearsay. It is
undisputed, however, that he authored both the e-mail and the attachments. When a party’s own
statements are offered against him, those “statements are not hearsay and they are admissible on
the logic that a party is estopped from challenging the fundamental reliability or trustworthiness
of his own statements.” Trevino v. State, 991 S.W.2d 849, 853 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); see also
TEX. R. EVID. 801(e)(2)(A). Because the e-mail and attachments were Caleb’s own statements, the
trial court did not abuse its discretion by overruling his hearsay objection to those exhibits. See
Trevino, 991 S.W.2d at 853.
We overrule Caleb’s first issue.
State’s Exhibit 32
In his second issue, Caleb challenges the admission of State’s Exhibit 32, which was one
of nineteen postmortem photographs of Dennis’s body that were admitted at trial.
Texas Rule of Evidence 403 permits a trial court to “exclude relevant evidence if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice[.]” TEX. R. EVID.
403. In the trial court, Caleb argued State’s Exhibit 32 should be excluded because “the cumulative
nature of [the] photos is extremely and unfairly prejudicial.” On appeal, he argues State’s Exhibit
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32 was unfairly prejudicial because it was “gruesome,” “graphic,” and “inflammatory.” Because
both Caleb’s trial objection and his appellate complaint assert that the probative value of State’s
Exhibit 32 was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, we will assume for the purposes of
this opinion that Caleb preserved this issue for our review. See id.; see also Keeter, 175 S.W.3d at
760 (“We have said that we should avoid splitting hairs when determining whether a claim has
been procedurally defaulted.”).
“The admissibility of a photograph is within the sound discretion of the trial judge.” Gallo
v. State, 239 S.W.3d 757, 762 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). If verbal testimony about the matter
depicted in the photograph is admissible, the photograph itself will generally also be admissible.
Id. “A court may consider many factors in determining whether the probative value of photographs
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. These factors include: the number
of exhibits offered, their gruesomeness, their detail, their size, whether they are in color or black
and white, whether they are close-up, and whether the body depicted is clothed or naked.” Young
v. State, 283 S.W.3d 854, 874 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).
“Photographs of a complainant’s injuries are admissible under Rule 403 if they ‘show only
the injuries that the victim received and are no more gruesome than would be expected.’” Moralez
v. State, 450 S.W.3d 553, 569 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. ref’d) (quoting
Shuffield v. State, 189 S.W.3d 782, 787–88 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)). Of the nineteen admitted
photographs of Dennis’s body, seven were taken at the scene of the shooting and twelve were
taken in connection with the autopsy. State’s Exhibit 32 is an autopsy photograph. It is in color
and shows Dennis’s body in profile from the waist up, shirtless and lying on a body bag. There is
what appears to be a closed incision in the neck and upper chest, a wound in the upper left arm,
and peeling skin on the left shoulder and midsection. The medical examiner who performed the
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autopsy testified without objection that such peeling is common “when someone is kind of out in
the heat for a little while after they died.” See Gallo, 239 S.W.3d at 762.
The trial court admitted the photographs, including State’s Exhibit 32, during the medical
examiner’s testimony about the path the bullets took through Dennis’s body. The trial court could
have reasonably concluded that State’s Exhibit 32 “added to the probative value of the State’s case
by assisting the jury in understanding the testimony presented regarding the injuries sustained by
the complainant.” Moralez, 450 S.W.3d at 569. The trial court also could have reasonably
concluded the exhibit was “not overly gruesome” and “did not pose the potential of impressing the
jury in some irrational way.” Shuffield, 189 S.W.3d at 788.
Moreover, while the State presented nineteen postmortem photographs, Caleb objected to
only one. The trial court could have reasonably concluded that the admission of nineteen
photographs instead of eighteen would not “consume an inordinate amount of time or merely
repeat evidence already admitted.” Gigliobianco v. State, 210 S.W.3d 637, 642 (Tex. Crim. App.
2006); Ladd v. State, 3 S.W.3d 547, 569 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). For that reason, we cannot say
the trial court abused its discretion by overruling Caleb’s claim that State’s Exhibit 32 was
cumulative.
Because the trial court’s admission of State’s Exhibit 32 is within the zone of reasonable
disagreement, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting that exhibit. See Shuffield,
189 S.W.3d at 788. We overrule Caleb’s second issue.
State’s Exhibits 37A–R
In his third issue, Caleb challenges the trial court’s admission of State’s Exhibits 37A–R.
These exhibits were eighteen handwritten letters that Caleb authored before the shooting and
mailed to a friend with instructions to distribute them in the event of his death. The friend who
received the letters testified that she returned them to Caleb after the shooting, and the evidence
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shows that Caleb himself turned the letters over to police. The first letter, State’s Exhibit 37A,
mentioned that Dennis had “sent [Caleb] a gift card to buy a gun,” explained that Caleb had “a
really bad feeling about” an upcoming meeting with Dennis, and expressed Caleb’s belief that
Dennis’s “idea of hashing things out involve[d] [Caleb’s] death.” The letter further stated, “I’ll
either walk away from this situation, or I won’t. If I pass that day, know that I’ll finally be at peace.
And if I live, I’ll finally be free to live my own life. I won’t have to move every year in fear that
I’ll be found and killed.” The letter concluded by instructing its recipient, “If you don’t hear from
me by [July] 21st, assume the worst.” State’s Exhibits 37B–R were shorter letters that did not
express fear of Dennis or refer to any planned meeting. However, like State’s Exhibit 37A, each
letter informed the reader that Caleb had died.
It is undisputed that Caleb wrote the letters, and he concedes that “[a]n admission by a
party opponent is not hearsay.” However, he argues the letters constituted inadmissible hearsay
because they did not contain any explicit “admissions.” As explained above, Texas Rule of
Evidence 801 provides that a party’s own statements are not hearsay when those statements are
offered against him. TEX. R. EVID. 801(e)(2)(A); Trevino, 991 S.W.2d at 853. The relevant portion
of Rule 801’s definition of hearsay looks only to whether the evidence is a statement “offered
against an opposing party [that] was made by the party in an individual or representative
capacity[.]” TEX. R. EVID. 801(e)(2)(A). The definition does not require that the statement
constitute a confession-style “admission” by the party. See id. Because the letters were Caleb’s
own statements, they were not hearsay. See id.Caleb also argues the letters were inadmissible because they “were not relevant to the crime
charged, and contained no details related to any elements of the crime itself.” While “[r]elevant
evidence is generally admissible, irrelevant evidence is not.” Gonzalez v. State, 544 S.W.3d 363,
370 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018); see also TEX. R. EVID. 402. “Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any
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tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the
fact is of consequence in determining the action.” TEX. R. EVID. 401.
State’s Exhibit 37A tended to show that Caleb: (1) had access to a firearm; (2) had a
strained relationship with Dennis; and (3) believed the planned meeting with Dennis might end in
Caleb’s death. While State’s Exhibits 37B–R were less detailed than State’s Exhibit 37A, those
exhibits also tended to show that Caleb believed he might not survive the meeting with Dennis.
The trial court could have reasonably concluded those facts were of consequence to both the State’s
claim that Caleb murdered Dennis and Caleb’s own claim that he acted in self-defense. See id.;
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(b) (required elements of murder); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.32
(required elements of deadly force self-defense claim). Accordingly, we cannot say the trial court
abused its discretion by concluding that State’s Exhibits 37A–R were relevant. TEX. R. EVID. 401.
Finally, Caleb argues that the probative value of State’s Exhibits 37A–R was outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice. See TEX. R. EVID. 403. 1 “The term ‘probative value’ refers to
the inherent probative force of an item of evidence—that is, how strongly it serves to make more
or less probable the existence of a fact of consequence to the litigation—coupled with the
proponent’s need for that item of evidence.” Casey v. State, 215 S.W.3d 870, 879 (Tex. Crim. App.
2007). “‘Unfair prejudice’ refers to a tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis,
commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one.” Id. Exhibits 37A–R showed that before the
shooting, Caleb wrote eighteen letters expressing fear of Dennis, anticipating his own death, or
both. The trial court could have reasonably determined that the preparation and distribution of the
1
The State contends Caleb did not preserve his Rule 403 objection because his “objection at trial was that [the letters]
were hearsay and irrelevant.” We disagree. Caleb filed a written pre-trial motion to exclude the letters that were
eventually designated as State’s Exhibits 37A–R. That motion argued the letters were “unfairly prejudicial, confusing
and misleading, and therefore inadmissible under Rule 403[.]” When the State offered the letters at trial, Caleb
renewed his pre-trial objection, and the trial court overruled that objection. This complaint is therefore preserved for
our review. TEX. R. EVID. 103(a); TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a).
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letters was probative of Caleb’s state of mind during the relevant time. See TEX. PENAL CODE
§ 19.02(b) (murder charge requires the State to show defendant acted intentionally or knowingly).
It also could have reasonably concluded that the jury’s potential emotional reaction to the letters
was outweighed by the State’s need to rebut Caleb’s claim that he reasonably believed his use of
deadly force was immediately necessary to protect himself from Dennis. See TEX. PENAL CODE
§ 9.32; see also Braughton v. State, 569 S.W.3d 592, 608–09 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018).
We overrule Caleb’s third issue.
Voir Dire Hypotheticals
In his fourth issue, Caleb argues the trial court abused its discretion by denying his
objection to hypotheticals the State presented during voir dire. While questioning the venire panel,
the State explained that the statutory range of punishment for the charged offense was “between 5
years and 99 years and up to a $10,000 fine.” The State then described two hypothetical
situations—one that involved a shooting during a home invasion, and another involving the mercy
killing of an elderly spouse—and identified both situations as “murder in the eyes of Texas.” The
State told the venire:
So now, when I ask you can you consider the full range of punishment, that means
there are different scenarios. There are differing cases that come with this and
different punishments that should be allowed for each of these types of cases.
So now going back to that who here can consider the full range of punishment at
this point without knowing any of the facts of the case, can everybody here consider
the full range of punishment? Can anybody here not do that?
Relying on Cardenas v. State, 325 S.W.3d 179 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010), Caleb objected that the
State’s use of the two hypotheticals created an improper commitment question. 2 The trial court
2
“[A] party may ask the potential juror if he could consider the minimum of five years’ imprisonment in a murder
case, but he may not ask if the juror could consider five years in prison in a case in which the State alleged that the
defendant tortured, garroted, poisoned, and pickled the victim.” Cardenas, 325 S.W.3d at 184 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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overruled Caleb’s objection, and the State again asked the panel, “[C]an everybody consider that
full range of punishment that we’re talking about once they hear all of the facts?”
Under these circumstances, we need not determine whether the State’s use of hypotheticals
led to an improper commitment question. This is because even if the State’s question was
improper, the record does not show that Caleb was harmed by it. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2; Sanchez
v. State, 165 S.W.3d 707, 713–14 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
“Under Rule 44.2(b), reviewing courts should assess the potential harm of the State’s
improper commitment questioning by focusing upon whether a biased juror—one who had
explicitly or implicitly promised to prejudge some aspect of the case because of the State’s
improper questioning—actually sat on the jury.” Sanchez, 165 S.W.3d at 713. “There is no single,
specific rule by which reviewing courts should assess” whether an appellant was harmed by an
improper commitment question. Id. at 714. However, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has
promulgated a list of factors that courts may consider in determining whether a jury panel was
“poisoned” by such a question. See id. at 713–14. Those factors include:
1) whether the questions were unambiguously improper and attempted to commit
one or more veniremen to a specific verdict or course of action;
2) how many, if any, veniremen agreed to commit themselves to a specific verdict
or course of action if the State produced certain evidence;
3) whether the veniremen who agreed to commit themselves actually served on
the jury;
4) whether the defendant used peremptory challenges to eliminate any or all of
those veniremen who had committed themselves;
5) whether the defendant exhausted all of his peremptory challenges upon those
veniremen and requested additional peremptory challenges to compensate for
their use on improperly committed veniremen;
6) whether the defendant timely asserted that a named objectionable venireman
actually served on the jury because he had to waste strikes on the improperly
committed jurors; and
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7) whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury’s verdict or course of
action in reaching a verdict or sentence was substantially affected by the State’s
improper commitment questioning during voir dire.
Id.Here, on initial questioning by Caleb’s attorney and before the State presented the
challenged hypotheticals, several members of the venire appeared to indicate they could not
consider a five-year sentence on a murder charge. “A juror who states that he cannot consider the
minimum punishment for a particular statutory offense is subject to a challenge for cause.”
Cardenas, 325 S.W.3d at 185. However, when the State later posed its two hypotheticals and then
individually asked the venire members whether they could consider the entire range of punishment,
no venire members indicated an inability to do so. See Sanchez, 165 S.W.3d at 714. Additionally,
several of the venire members, including some who initially indicated a reluctance to consider the
minimum sentence, confirmed during individual questioning that they could consider the entire
range of punishment.
Caleb did not challenge any venire members on the ground that they could not consider the
entire range of punishment. See id. Caleb also did not request any additional peremptory challenges
or argue that he had used all his peremptory strikes on objectionable venire members. See id.Additionally, Caleb affirmatively stated that he did not object to the jury that was eventually
seated. See id.; see also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 35.16(a) (with exceptions not applicable
here, challenges for cause can be waived). Finally, because the State’s hypotheticals did not bear
any resemblance to the facts of this case, the likelihood that the jury’s verdict was affected by
those hypotheticals appears to be low. See Sanchez, 165 S.W.3d at 714; see also Montoya v. State,
Nos. 03-15-00125-CR & 03-15-00126-CR, 2016 WL 4527599, at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug.
23, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Ng v. State, No. 04-12-00392-CR,
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2013 WL 4009665, at *4 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 7, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op., not
designated for publication). For these reasons, the record does not support a conclusion that Caleb
was “tried by a juror that had prejudged him or some aspect of his case because the State had
improperly committed one or more veniremen to a verdict or course of action before hearing any
evidence[.]” Sanchez, 165 S.W.3d at 714.
We overrule Caleb’s fourth issue.
Motion to Suppress
In his fifth issue, Caleb argues the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence
of statements he made during a July 25, 2018 interview with law enforcement because: (1) he did
not make the statements voluntarily; and (2) the interview was a custodial interrogation and he did
not receive the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) and Texas Code of
Criminal Procedure article 38.22.
Standard of Review
We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress for abuse of discretion. Wexler v.
State, 625 S.W.3d 162, 167 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022); Alvarado v. State, 912 S.W.2d 199, 211 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1995). In reviewing claims that a statement was inadmissible because it was
involuntary and/or the unwarned product of custodial interrogation, we apply a bifurcated standard
of review. Wexler, 625 S.W.3d at 167; Cameron v. State, 630 S.W.3d 579, 591 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio 2021, no pet.). We give almost total deference to the trial court’s assessment of historical
facts, but we apply de novo review to the court’s ultimate legal conclusions. Wexler, 625 S.W.3d
at 167; Cameron, 630 S.W.3d at 591.
When the record contains “indisputable visual evidence contained in a videotape,” we may
review that evidence de novo “even if the trial court did not refer to this evidence in its findings.”
Cameron, 630 S.W.3d at 591 (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, in reviewing this
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issue, we will consider both a video of the July 25, 2018 interview and testimony from the
interviewing officers.
Voluntariness
A. The Trial Court’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
A defendant’s statement may be used as evidence against him if the record shows it “was
freely and voluntarily made without compulsion or persuasion[.]” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.
art. 38.21. When a defendant seeks to suppress his statement on the ground that it was involuntary,
the trial court must hold a hearing on that issue outside the presence of the jury. TEX. CODE CRIM.
PROC. ANN. art. 38.22, § 6; Alvarado, 912 S.W.2d at 211. During the proceedings below, the trial
court held the hearing required by section 6 of article 38.22 and subsequently admitted Caleb’s
statements into evidence. However, it did not enter written findings of fact and conclusions of law
regarding the voluntariness of Caleb’s statements. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.22, § 6. We
therefore abated the appeal and remanded this issue to the trial court for entry of the required
findings and conclusions. See id.; Vasquez v. State, 411 S.W.3d 918, 920 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).
On May 22, 2023, pursuant to an order from this court, the trial court signed written
findings of fact and conclusions of law in which it found that Caleb “was not under arrest at any
time during or at the end of the interrogation, he was allowed to take breaks, he was told that he
could leave at any time, and while he could not go anywhere he wanted to within DPS
headquarters, this was true of any visitor.” The trial court also found Caleb “did not appear
intoxicated, hallucinating, suffering from any medical problems, and no evidence was presented
that he was mentally incompetent”; he answered the questions presented to him on July 25, 2018
“in a competent manner”; and he “was neither threatened, coerced, or beaten during the interview.”
The trial court then applied case law to these findings and concluded “there [were] no incidents of
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police overreaching” and that Caleb’s “statements made to the Texas Rangers on July 25, 2018,
were not involuntarily made under either article 38.22(6), 38.22(3), or the Due Process Clause.”
B. Applicable Law
In reviewing the trial court’s conclusion that Caleb’s statements were voluntary, we must
examine the totality of the circumstances surrounding the making of the statements. Lopez v. State,
610 S.W.3d 487, 489 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020). We consider claims of involuntariness under both
the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution and articles 38.21 and 38.22 of the Texas
Code of Criminal Procedure. Id. at 494. To establish that a statement was involuntary for federal
due process purposes, “a defendant must show (1) that police engaged in activity that was
objectively coercive, (2) that the statement is causally related to the coercive government
misconduct, and (3) that the coercion overbore the defendant’s will.” Id.
Claims of involuntariness under the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure “can be, but need
not be, predicated on police overreaching.” Id. at 495. Under Texas law, a confession may be
involuntary if, for example, it is “given under the duress of hallucinations, illness, medications, or
even a private threat[.]” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
C. Application
Caleb has not argued, and we see nothing in the record indicating, that the statements he
made in the July 25, 2018 interview were involuntary because of non-police factors such as
hallucination, illness, medication, or outside threats. See id. Accordingly, we consider only
whether Caleb’s statements were rendered involuntary by police overreach. Id. at 495–96.
The video of the July 25, 2018 interview and the interviewing officers’ testimony showed
the following:
• Caleb was interviewed by law enforcement in connection with the shooting prior to July
25, 2018 and was released from that prior interview without hindrance.
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• The July 25, 2018 interview was scheduled to accommodate Caleb’s pre-existing vacation
plans.
• Caleb drove himself to the interview.
• The interview took place in a non-public, secure part of a Texas Department of Public
Safety facility in San Antonio. Because Caleb needed to be buzzed in and out of that part
of the building, he checked in at the front desk and entered with a visitor’s pass. 3
• The interview lasted approximately three hours. For some of that time, Caleb was alone in
the interview room with the door open.
• The interview was conducted by two officers.
• Caleb knew the interviewing officers knew he had shot Dennis.
• The officers told Caleb they would be asking “hard” questions about his family history
and the day of the shooting.
• The officers did not handcuff or otherwise physically restrain Caleb at any point.
• The officers told Caleb multiple times that he was not under arrest and would not be
arrested that day.
• The officers told Caleb he could go outside, get a drink of water, or use the restroom if he
wanted to do so.
• When Caleb asked to use the restroom, one of the officers escorted him to the restroom
but did not stay with him or monitor him; the video showed the escorting officer returned
to the interview room alone while he waited for Caleb.
• The officers told Caleb they were “here to help [him]” and said they could not help him
unless he was honest with them. They also told him that if he was not honest, he would
“always have that weighing on [his] conscience.”
• Caleb initially told the officers he shot Dennis because Dennis began shooting at him. The
officers told Caleb his version of events did not make sense and they believed he was lying
about his claimed fear of Dennis. Caleb subsequently made statements that seemed to
conflict with his claim of self-defense. Specifically, Caleb admitted: (1) he, not Dennis,
shot first; and (2) after he shot Dennis, he picked up the gun Dennis had been using and
fired it in the direction of where Caleb had been standing before the shooting.
3
In his brief, Caleb suggests the interviewing officer’s testimony on this point showed he “was not free to leave during
the interview.” We disagree. The interviewing officer testified only that Caleb could not move freely through the
secure part of the building. Because the trial court’s finding that “while [Caleb] could not go anywhere he wanted to
within DPS headquarters, this was true of any visitor” is consistent with this testimony, we must defer to it. See Wexler,
625 S.W.3d at 167.
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• The officers did not raise their voices or make any physically threatening motions.
• Caleb became emotional during parts of the interview, but he did not appear to be
overwhelmed or confused. When he did not understand a question, he requested
clarification, which the officers provided.
• The officers told Caleb they would inform the district attorney that he had cooperated with
their questioning. The officers did not make any promises of leniency, and they told Caleb
that the decision of whether to charge him with a crime was not theirs to make.
• Caleb did not ask to leave at any time during the interview.
• At the conclusion of the interview, Caleb agreed to ride with the interviewing officers to
his home in San Marcos to collect the letters that were eventually designated as State’s
Exhibits 37A–R. He also consented to turn those letters over to the officers and signed a
written consent form allowing the officers to search his phone.
• In San Marcos, the officers stayed in the car and did not accompany Caleb into his home.
The officers then drove Caleb back to the DPS facility in San Antonio.
• Caleb was not handcuffed during the ride to or from San Marcos.
• When the officers and Caleb returned to San Antonio, Caleb left the DPS facility in his
own vehicle.
These circumstances do not support a conclusion that Caleb’s July 25, 2018 statements were
involuntary. See Cameron, 630 S.W.3d at 592–95. Caleb has not argued—and the record does not
show—that the officers made any false promises or engaged in any trickery or threats. See id. at
594. Nor does the record show that the officers attempted to physically intimidate Caleb. While
the officers urged Caleb to be “honest” with them and told him it would “weigh[] on his
conscience” if he was not, we have previously held that “largely vague and general” appeals to an
individual’s “moral sense of right and wrong” did not render a statement involuntary. Id. Although
the video showed the interview was tense and Caleb became emotional, we see nothing to support
a conclusion that the officers’ behavior “‘was such as to overbear the will of [Caleb] and bring
about a confession not freely determined.’” Id. (quoting Green v. State, 934 S.W.2d 92, 99–100
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(Tex. Crim. App. 1996)). On this record, we cannot say the trial court erred by concluding Caleb’s
statements were voluntary.
Custodial Interrogation
Caleb also argues his statements were inadmissible because he was subjected to custodial
interrogation and the interviewing officers did not advise him of his rights under Miranda and
article 38.22. In its May 22, 2023 written findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial court
concluded Caleb “was not in custody” during the July 25, 2018 interview. Because the protections
of Miranda and article 38.22 apply only to statements made during a custodial interrogation, we
begin by examining the trial court’s finding that Caleb was not in custody. See Gardner v. State,
306 S.W.3d 274, 294 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Fiedler v. State, 991 S.W.2d 70, 79 (Tex. App.—
San Antonio 1998, no pet.).
A. Applicable Law
In determining whether a defendant’s statements were the product of custodial
interrogation, the ultimate question is “whether there is a ‘formal arrest or restraint on freedom of
movement’ of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” Gardner, 306 S.W.3d at 293–94
(quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983)). “At trial, the defendant bears the
initial burden of proving that a statement was the product of custodial interrogation.” Herrera v.
State, 241 S.W.3d 520, 526 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]he
State has no burden at all unless ‘the record as a whole clearly establishe[s]’ that the defendant’s
statement was the product of custodial interrogation by an agent for law enforcement.” Wilkerson
v. State, 173 S.W.3d 521, 532 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (quoting Paez v. State, 681 S.W.2d 34, 36
(Tex. Crim. App. 1984)).
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B. Application
The circumstances we considered in our review of the voluntariness of Caleb’s statements
are also relevant here. While he was questioned in a secure, non-public part of a DPS facility,
“[s]tationhouse questioning does not, in and of itself, constitute custody.” Dowthitt v. State, 931
S.W.2d 244, 255 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). Additionally, although Caleb was the only suspect in
Dennis’s death, an interrogation is not rendered custodial merely because the individual being
questioned is the focus of a police investigation. Gardner, 306 S.W.3d at 293. Furthermore, the
officers told him multiple times that he was not under arrest; they did not exert any physical control
over him; he did not ask to leave; and he arrived at and left the DPS facility in his own vehicle.
See Meek v. State, 790 S.W.2d 618, 621–23 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990); Cameron, 630 S.W.3d at
593. These facts did not establish that the interview restrained Caleb’s freedom to the extent that
he was in custody. See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977).
The record also showed, however, that Caleb made statements that were inconsistent with
his claim of self-defense. Early in the interview, he told the officers he shot Dennis after Dennis
began shooting at him. Upon further questioning, however, he admitted this was not true. These
inconsistent statements are significant to our analysis because the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
has held that “a crucial admission could turn a noncustodial encounter into a custodial one[.]” See
Dowthitt, 931 S.W.2d at 256–57; see also State v. Ortiz, 382 S.W.3d 367, 373 (Tex. Crim. App.
2012).
In Dowthitt, the “crucial admission” was the defendant’s statement that he had been present
during a murder. Dowthitt, 931 S.W.2d at 256–57. Under those circumstances, that statement
established probable cause to arrest the defendant, and the Dowthitt court noted that “a reasonable
person would have realized the incriminating nature of the admission.” Id. at 257. The court further
noted that the defendant made the crucial admission approximately twelve hours into the
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interrogation and that the interviewing officers exercised physical control over the defendant by,
for example, “accompanying [him] at restroom breaks” and “ignoring [his] requests to see his
wife[.]” Id. The Dowthitt court held that these facts, when considered together, established that
“‘custody’ began” at the moment of the admission. Id. at 256–57.
In Ortiz, the defendant admitted during roadside questioning following a traffic stop that
he was on probation “‘for drugs.’” Ortiz, 382 S.W.3d at 370. With the defendant’s consent, the
police searched the defendant and his vehicle. Id. They also handcuffed and patted down the
defendant’s wife, found “‘something’” under her skirt, and “announced, in the [defendant’s]
presence,” that they had “found ‘something[.]’” Id. at 370, 375. When the police subsequently
handcuffed the defendant and questioned him, he admitted he was transporting cocaine. Id. at 370.
At the time of his admission, there were “at least two police cars and three officers” on the scene.
Id. at 374. Under these circumstances, the trial court, the court of appeals, and the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals all concluded the defendant was “in custody” at the time of his admission. Id. at
371–73.
The facts of this case are distinguishable from both Dowthitt and Ortiz. Here, the fact that
Caleb shot Dennis was never in dispute; the only question was whether he acted in self-defense.
Cf. Jordan v. State, 593 S.W.3d 340, 343 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020) (accused “cannot both invoke
self-defense and flatly deny the charged conduct”). The police therefore had—and Caleb knew
they had—“reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to warrant a reasonable person to believe
[Caleb] ha[d] committed . . . an offense” before Caleb entered the interview room on July 25,
2018. Cf. id.; see also Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 87 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (defining
probable cause to arrest). While a reasonable person may “have realized the incriminating nature
of” statements that appeared to contradict Caleb’s self-defense claim, those statements did not
establish probable cause for his arrest that was previously lacking. Cf. Ortiz, 382 S.W.3d at 373;
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Dowthitt, 931 S.W.2d at 257. Moreover, we see no other circumstances of the interrogation that
showed the officers restrained Caleb’s freedom to the degree associated with a formal arrest. Cf.
Ortiz, 382 S.W.3d at 375; Dowthitt, 931 S.W.2d at 255.
After considering the totality of the circumstances, we cannot say Caleb was “physically
deprived of [his] freedom of action in any significant way [or] placed in a situation that would lead
[him] to believe that [his] freedom of movement had been significantly restricted.” Cameron, 630
S.W.3d at 593. Accordingly, we must conclude the trial court did not err by finding Caleb was not
in custody on July 25, 2018. 4 See id.; see also Wilkerson, 173 S.W.3d at 532.
For these reasons, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence of
Caleb’s July 25, 2018 statements. We overrule Caleb’s fifth issue.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Beth Watkins, Justice
DO NOT PUBLISH
4
In its May 22, 2023 findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial court found Caleb “was properly admonished
about his rights” before the July 25, 2018 interview. We see no evidence of such admonishment in the video of the
interview. However, because we have held the evidence supports the trial court’s finding that Caleb was not in custody
at the relevant time, we may not reverse the judgment on this basis. See, e.g., Estrada v. State, 313 S.W.3d 274, 294–
95 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (citing Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495).
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