Odell WD Neal v. State

In The
Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana
No. 06-18-00097-CR
ODELL WD NEAL, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 1
Hunt County, Texas
Trial Court No. CR1800114
Before Morriss, C.J., Moseley and Burgess, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Burgess
MEMORANDUM OPINION
After a jury found Odell WD Neal guilty of possession of marihuana in an amount of two
ounces or less, the trial court sentenced him to seventy-five days’ confinement in jail. Neal
appeals, maintaining that (1) the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress, (2) the
evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s guilty verdict, 1 and (3) the trial court erred when it
denied Neal’s requested jury charge made pursuant to Article 38.23 of the Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure. Because we find that the trial court did not err when it denied Neal’s motion to
suppress, there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s guilty verdict, and there was no error
in the trial court’s denial of Neal’s requested jury charge instruction, we affirm the trial court’s
judgment of conviction.
I. Background
On November 3, 2017, Texas Department of Public Safety Trooper Cody Sagnibene was
on routine patrol traveling in the northbound lane when he observed a white vehicle with a
defective head lamp traveling southbound. Sagnibene turned his patrol car around in order to
conduct a traffic stop on the white vehicle. When he approached the driver’s side of the vehicle,
he immediately smelled the strong odor of marihuana emanating from the passenger’s side of the
vehicle. Sagnibene instructed the driver, Neal, to exit the vehicle. At that point, Neal admitted
that he had recently been smoking marihuana.
1
Neal contends in his brief that the evidence is factually insufficient. Texas courts of appeals no longer review criminal
verdicts for factual insufficiency. See Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.).
However, because Neal argues that the evidence is insufficient under the standard set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443
U.S. 307, 314 (1979), we interpret his point of error to be a legal sufficiency challenge.
2
Sagnibene proceeded to conduct a search of the vehicle, which yielded a glass pipe, eye
drops, what he believed to be marihuana residue on the floorboard of the vehicle, several lighters,
and multiple hollowed-out cigarillos. He also discovered a clear, white, plastic bottle, which
contained “a yellow liquid substance and [was] marked with a reader on the bottom that [he]
recognized through [his] experience and training to be synthetic or fake urine.” 2 According to
Sagnibene, synthetic urine can be used to falsify the results of a urine test for the detection of
drugs. After placing Neal under arrest for falsification of drug test results, Neal began to deny the
substance was synthetic urine. Upon arrival at the jail, however, Neal admitted that he was in
possession of marihuana, which he was keeping in his underwear. Neal then retrieved a clear,
plastic baggy containing a green, leafy, plant-like substance that Sagnibene believed to be
marihuana. It was later determined that the baggy contained .04 ounces of marihuana.
II. Discussion
A. The Trial Court’s Denial of Neal’s Motion to Suppress Was Not Error
During the hearing on his motion to suppress, Neal argued that there was a lack of probable
cause to arrest him for the offense of falsification of drug test results. 3 He maintained,
“[S]pecifically, with regard to that, there should be no evidence that the Defendant possessed that
with an intent to use that device to falsify any drug tests. Mere possession of the device alone is
not a criminal act.” In support of the State’s position that Neal’s motion to suppress should be
2
Sagnibene also testified that the bottle was covered with a black label containing the numbers 90, 92, 94, 96, 98, and
100. According to Sagnibene, he believed the numbers indicated temperature readings. Sagnibene added, “As most
people are aware of, the body’s regular temperature is 98.6.”
3
Pursuant to his written motion to suppress, Neal argued that the State’s actions violated his constitutional rights
because Sagnibene did “not hav[e] reasonable suspicion of a traffic offense to stop and detain [him] in this case.”
3
denied, Sagnibene testified to the events leading up to Neal’s arrest. After hearing his testimony,
the trial court denied Neal’s motion, and a jury trial commenced. On appeal, Neal contends the
trial court’s denial of his suppression motion was error because the evidence showed that
Sagnibene “did not have probable cause to arrest [him] for possession of a drug falsification device,
as mere possession of such a device is not a criminal offense, and anything after said unlawful
arrest should be suppressed.”
“We review the trial court’s decision to deny [a] motion to suppress evidence by applying
a bifurcated standard of review.” Young v. State, 420 S.W.3d 139, 141 (Tex. App.—Texarkana
2012, no pet.) (citing Graves v. State, 307 S.W.3d 483, 489 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2010, pet.
ref’d); Rogers v. State, 291 S.W.3d 148, 151 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2009, pet. ref’d)). “Because
the trial court is the exclusive trier of fact and judge of witness credibility at a suppression hearing,
we afford almost total deference to its determination of facts supported by the record.” Id. (citing
State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 856–57 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d
323, 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)).
“We also afford such deference to a trial court’s ruling on application of law to fact questions, also
known as mixed questions of law and fact, if the resolution of those questions turns on an
evaluation of credibility and demeanor.” Id. (citing Villarreal v. State, 935 S.W.2d 134, 138 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1996)).
We apply a de novo review to the trial court’s application of the law and its determination
of questions not turning on credibility. Carmouche, 10 S.W.3d at 332; Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at
89; Graves v. State, 307 S.W.3d 483, 489 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2010, pet. ref’d). “In
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determining whether a trial court’s decision is supported by the record, we generally consider only
evidence adduced at the suppression hearing, because the ruling was based on that evidence, rather
than evidence introduced later at trial.” Young, 420 S.W.3d at 141 (citing Rachal v. State, 917
S.W.2d 799, 809 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996)).
“A peace officer may arrest an offender without a warrant for any offense committed in his
presence or within his view.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 14.01(b) (West 2015). Probable
cause to arrest exists where the facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge and of
which he has reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a
reasonable person to believe that a particular person has committed or is committing an offense.
Amores v. State, 816 S.W.2d 407, 413 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). Here, Sagnibene determined there
was probable cause to place Neal under arrest without a warrant for the offense of falsification of
drug test results. A person commits the offense of falsification of drug test results when he
“knowingly or intentionally uses or possesses with intent to use any substance or device designed
to falsify drug test results[,]” or when he “knowingly or intentionally delivers, possesses with
intent to deliver, or manufactures with intent to deliver a substance or device designed to falsify
drug test results.” TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.133(b) (West 2017).
During the hearing on Neal’s motion to suppress, Sagnibene testified that he smelled
marihuana when he first approached Neal’s vehicle. Moreover, Neal admitted to Sagnibene that
he had, in fact, been smoking marihuana prior to being stopped by Sagnibene. During the search
of Neal’s vehicle, Sagnibene observed a bottle of what he believed to be synthetic urine. The
container Sagnibene discovered held a yellow substance and was marked with an assortment of
5
temperatures, which, according to Sagnibene, indicated to him that Neal intended to use the device
and its contents to falsify a drug test. Sagnibene explained,
Well, through my experience, I’ve seen this container before. I’ve seen the hand
warmer rubber banded around it. You can go online. You can buy things exactly
like this. The temperature label on the side of it, the color, in combination with the
totality of everything in the vehicle, the marijuana residue, the pipe in the trunk,
and the ground-out cigarillos.
He concluded, “That’s what the device is designed for.” Sagnibene also stated that he was aware
that Neal was on parole and that he “assumed that when [Neal was] on parole that he may have to
take a drug test.”
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that, under Article 14.01(b), when a police
officer personally observes behavior that is not overtly criminal but, when coupled with the
officer’s prior knowledge so that the otherwise innocuous conduct reflects that an offense is then
occurring, the behavior may amount to probable cause. Adkins v. State, 764 S.W.2d 782, 785;
Lunde v. State, 736 S.W.2d 665, 667 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988). “Since all evidence is viewed in the
light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, we are obligated to uphold the denial of a motion to
suppress if it was supported by the record and was correct under any theory of law applicable to
the case.” Young, 420 S.W.3d at 141 (citing Carmouche, 10 S.W.3d at 328; State v. Ballard, 987
S.W.2d 889, 891 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)). When we examine the totality of the evidence, we find
that Sagnibene had reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to warrant a reasonable belief
that Neal was knowingly or intentionally possessing the container and its contents with the intent
to use them for the purpose of falsifying drug test results. See Amores, 816 S.W.2d at 413.
6
We, therefore, conclude that the trial court did not err when it denied Neal’s motion to
suppress. Neal’s first point of error is overruled.
B. Sufficient Evidence Supported the Jury’s Guilty Verdict
Next, Neal contends that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that he was
guilty of the offense of possession of marihuana in the amount of two ounces or less. In evaluating
legal sufficiency in this case, we must review all the evidence in the light most favorable to the
verdict to determine whether any rational fact-finder could have found, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that Neal was guilty of the offense of possession of marihuana in an amount of less than two
ounces. See Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 912 (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Hartsfield v. State, 305
S.W.3d 859, 863 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2010, pet. ref’d) (citing Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d
772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)). Our rigorous legal sufficiency review focuses on the quality
of the evidence presented. Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 917–18 (Cochran, J., concurring).
We examine legal sufficiency under the direction of the Brooks opinion, while giving
deference to the responsibility of the fact-finder “to fairly resolve conflicts in testimony, to weigh
the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Hooper v.
State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318–19). Legal
sufficiency of the evidence is measured by the elements of the offense as defined by a
hypothetically correct jury charge. Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
The hypothetically correct jury charge “sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not
unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the State’s theories of
liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which the defendant was tried.” Id.
7
In this case, Neal was charged by information, which set forth, in part, that, “on or about
[the] 3rd day of November, 2017, and before the filing of this information, in Hunt County, Texas,
ODELL WD NEAL, hereinafter called Defendant, did then and there intentionally or knowingly
possess a usable amount of marijuana in the amount of two ounces or less.” On appeal, Neal
maintains that the State failed to present sufficient evidence that he was in possession of a usable
amount of marihuana. “Usable quantity” has been defined as “an amount sufficient to be applied
to the use commonly made thereof.” Pelham v. State, 298 S.W.2d 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1957).
A usable quantity may be proven by circumstantial evidence or inferences drawn from evidence
of the amount of marihuana a person possessed. Lejeune v. State, 538 S.W.2d 775, 777 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1976).
At trial, Sagnibene was asked how he knew the substance in the plastic baggy was
marihuana. He responded, “Marijuana has a very distinctive look, smell, color, and texture to it.
I’ve come across marijuana several times, as I’m sure many people here have come across
marijuana. It’s very common nowadays. This smelled like marijuana. This looked like marijuana.
This felt like marijuana.” Following Neal’s arrest, the marihuana was weighed and it, along with
the plastic baggy, weighed 0.04 ounces. That measurement also included the stems and seeds,
which, according to Sagnibene, were generally not used for smoking.
In addition, Sagnibene testified that, through his training and experience, he believed the
amount of marihuana found in Neal’s possession was a usable amount. The State also presented
evidence that Neal was in possession of drug paraphernalia, including a glass pipe and hollowed
out cigarillos, either of which the jury could have reasonably believed Neal intended to use for the
8
purpose of smoking marihuana. 4 Moreover, the jurors were allowed to examine a photograph of
the marihuana in the baggy, thereby giving them the opportunity to determine for themselves
whether they believed it was a usable amount.
We therefore find the State presented sufficient evidence on which a rational jury could
find that Neal was in possession of a usable amount of marihuana. Neal’s second point of error is
overruled.
C. Instructions to the Jury
Lastly, Neal maintains that the trial court erred when it “sua sponte objected to” the
inclusion of an Article 38.23 instruction in its charge to the jury. Article 38.23(a) of the Texas
Code of Criminal Procedure states,
No evidence obtained by an officer or other person in violation of any provisions
of the Constitution or laws of the State of Texas, or of the Constitution or laws of
the United States of America, shall be admitted in evidence against the accused on
the trial of any criminal case.
In any case where the legal evidence raises an issue hereunder, the jury shall be
instructed that if it believes, or has a reasonable doubt, that the evidence was
obtained in violation of the provisions of this Article, then and in such event, the
jury shall disregard any such evidence so obtained.
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.23(a) (West 2018).
Here, Neal requested an Article 38.23(a) jury instruction based on the same assertions
contained in his motion to suppress evidence, that is, that there was no probable cause to arrest
Neal for the offense of falsification of drug-test results and thus, any evidence resulting from that
4
Sagnibene stated, “And then that’s a bag of cigarillos, which is a popular method to smoke marijuana. They’ll ground
out the hollow -- they’ll hollow out the inside and smoke marijuana out of it.”
9
arrest was retrieved in violation of his constitutional rights. After the trial court noted Neal’s
request, it asked counsel for Neal if he would like to read the instruction into the record. Counsel
responded, “I would like the charge to reflect the suppression issue to the jury, and I do not have
that. I would request to use the County Attorney’s books in order to find that and get it in.” 5 The
State responded that it had no objection to Neal’s requested instruction. The trial court then stated,
Well, the Court does have an objection. The law is clear under Gerron
versus State that an arrest that would have been valid for any other reason, other
than a single incident he was arrested for, does not get a 38.23 charge. So I am
bound by law that I cannot give a 38.23 charge.
See Gerron v. State, 119 S.W.3d 371, 376–77 (Tex. App.—Waco 2003, no pet.).
Pursuant to Article 38.23(a), “[n]o evidence obtained by an officer . . . in violation of any
provisions of the constitution or laws . . . shall be admitted in evidence against the accused” at
trial. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.23(a). However, an Article 38.23(a) instruction is
“mandatory only when there is a factual dispute regarding the legality of the [complained-of
action.]” 6 Will. v. State, 356 S.W.3d 508, 525 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2011, pet. ref’d) (citing
Pickens v. State, 165 S.W.3d 675, 680 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005)). To be entitled to a jury instruction
5
Later during the proceedings, counsel for Neal read into the record his proposed instruction, which stated in relevant
part as follows:
Probable cause to arrest exists when an officer has knowledge of such facts as would lead a
reasonable person to believe that a particular individual is committing, has committed, or is about
to commit a criminal act. The officer must be able to articulate the facts and circumstances forming
the basis for probable cause. Now, therefore, before you consider the testimony of Trooper
Sagnibene concerning events that took place after the arrest of the Defendant, you must first find
beyond a reasonable doubt that the trooper had such probable cause to arrest the Defendant. And if
you do not so find beyond a reasonable doubt, you will disregard any such testimony and evidence
pertaining to the events occurring after said arrest.
6
“[A] factual issue exists when there is evidence that controverts those facts relied upon by the officer to establish
probable cause for the arrest.” Rodriguez v. State, 239 S.W.3d 277, 280 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2007, pet. ref’d) (citing
Garza v. State, 126 S.W.3d 79, 85–86 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)).
10
under Article 38.23(a), the following factors must be shown to exist: “(1) The evidence heard by
the jury must raise an issue of fact; (2) The evidence on that fact must be affirmatively contested:
and (3) That contested factual issue must be material to the lawfulness of the challenged conduct
in obtaining the evidence.” Madden v. State, 242 S.W.3d 504, 510 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). The
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has explained,
If there is no disputed factual issue, the legality of the conduct is determined by the
trial judge alone, as a question of law. And if other facts, not in dispute, are
sufficient to support the lawfulness of the challenged conduct, then the disputed
fact issue is not submitted to the jury because it is not material to the ultimate
admissibility of the evidence. The disputed fact must be an essential one in
deciding the lawfulness of the challenged conduct.
Id. at 510–11 (citations omitted). In other words, “The jury decides facts; the judge decides the
application of the law to those facts.” Id. at 511.
While Neal may dispute the trial court’s legal conclusion as it related to the existence of
probable cause to arrest him for falsification of drug test results, he did not offer any controverting
evidence to factually dispute the State’s version of events leading up to and surrounding his arrest
for that offense. As the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals stated in Madden, “There must be a
genuine dispute about a material fact. If there is no disputed factual issue, the legality of the
conduct is determined by the trial judge alone, as a question of law.” Id. at 510. In this case, no
38.23(a) jury instruction was required because there were no facts in dispute, and the legality of
the complained-of conduct was appropriately determined by the trial court.
Moreover, when there is evidence that an officer observed a defendant commit multiple
violations but the defendant disputes only one of those violations, the defendant is not entitled to
an Article 38.23(a) jury instruction. See Gerron, 119 S.W.3d at 376–77 (holding defendant not
11
entitled to Article 38.23(a) jury instruction because the State’s evidence raised several alternative
reasons supporting the legality of stop and only one of the reasons involved a disputed fact). In
this case, there was uncontroverted testimony from Sagnibene that Neal was driving with a
defective headlight and was also in possession of drug paraphernalia. Thus, despite Neal’s singular
complaint regarding the lack of probable cause to arrest him for the offense of falsification of drug
test results, Sagnibene had the authority to stop Neal, detain him, and arrest him based entirely on
the offense of driving with a defective headlight. 7 See Spence v. State, 325 S.W.3d 646, 653–54
(Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (holding defendant not entitled to Article 38.23(a) jury instruction
regarding issue of whether he was illegally parked blocking a driveway because the traffic stop
was legal based on lack of front license plate on bumper).
For these reasons, Neal was not entitled to the Article 38.23(a) instruction he requested,
and the trial court did not err by refusing to submit it to the jury. We overrule his third point of
error.
7
An officer may lawfully stop and detain an individual who commits a traffic offense. State v. Cardenas, 36 S.W.3d
243, 246 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. ref’d). Here, Sagnibene not only had the right to stop and detain
Neal for driving with a defective headlight, but he also could have arrested him for that offense. See TEX. TRANSP.
CODE ANN. §§ 543.001, 547.302 (West 2011).
12
III. Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Ralph K. Burgess
Justice
Date Submitted: November 1, 2018
Date Decided: December 7, 2018
Do Not Publish
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