In the Interest of A v. and J.M.R., Children v. the State of Texas

Opinion filed December 14, 2023
In The
Eleventh Court of Appeals
__________
No. 11-23-00144-CV
__________
IN THE INTEREST OF A.V. AND J.M.R., CHILDREN
On Appeal from the 318th District Court
Midland County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. AD33600
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This is an accelerated appeal from an order in which the trial court terminated
the parental rights of the mother, Appellant, to her two children, A.V. 1 and J.M.R.2
Appellant presents three issues on appeal in which she challenges the legal and
1
We use pseudonyms to protect the identities of the children. TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b)(2).
2
The trial court also terminated the parental rights of A.V.’s acknowledged father and J.M.R.’s
unknown father. A.V.’s biological father’s parental rights were not terminated. No appeal has been filed
on behalf of the fathers.
factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s findings, and the trial
court’s admission of hearsay statements. We affirm the trial court’s order.
I. Termination Findings and Standards
The termination of one’s parental rights must be supported by clear and
convincing evidence. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b) (West Supp. 2023). To
terminate one’s parental rights, it must be shown by clear and convincing evidence
that the parent has committed one of the acts listed in Section 161.001(b)(1)(A)–
(U) 3 and that termination is in the best interest of the child. Id. Clear and convincing
evidence is “the measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier
of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be
established.” FAM. § 101.007 (West 2019).
In this case, after a bench trial, the trial court found that Appellant committed
the act listed in Section 161.001(b)(1)(C): that Appellant voluntarily left the children
alone or in the possession of another without providing adequate support of the
children and remained away for a period of at least six months. See FAM.
§ 161.001(b)(1)(C). The trial court also found, pursuant to Section 161.001(b)(2),
that termination of Appellant’s parental rights would be in the best interest of the
children. See id. § 161.001(b)(2).
In reviewing a legal sufficiency challenge, we must decide whether a
reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding
3
We note that the legislature recently amended Section 161.001 to include additional requirements
for trial courts to consider in termination suits filed by the Department of Family and Protective Services
(the Department) and a new ground for termination that relates to convictions for the solicitation of a minor;
however, these amendments only apply to suits filed on or after September 1, 2023. Act of May 26, 2023,
88th Leg., R.S., ch. 728, §§ 1, 3, 2023 2023 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1770, 2177 (codified at FAM.
§ 161.001(b)(1)(V)); Act of May 29, 2023, 88th Leg., R.S., ch. 675, §§ 1, 8, 2023 Tex. Sess. Law. Serv.
1646–47 (codified at FAM. § 161.001(f), (g)). The original petition to terminate the parent-child
relationship in this case was filed on August 11, 2022. We therefore apply the law in effect on the date the
suit was filed.
2
was true. In re J.W., 645 S.W.3d 726, 741 (Tex. 2022); In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d
336, 344 (Tex. 2009). “Bearing in mind the required appellate deference to the
factfinder, we look at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding,
assume the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding if a reasonable
factfinder could do so, and disregard all evidence that a reasonable factfinder could
have disbelieved or found to have been incredible.” J.W., 645 S.W.3d at 741
(internal quotation marks omitted). “However, we may not disregard undisputed
facts that do not support the finding,” and the factfinder is the sole arbiter of the
witnesses’ credibility and demeanor. Id. (quoting In re J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d 304,
312 (Tex. 2021)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In assessing whether the evidence is factually sufficient, we weigh disputed
evidence contrary to the finding against all the evidence favoring the finding. In re
A.C., 560 S.W.3d 624, 631 (Tex. 2018). Giving due deference to the finding, we
determine whether, based on the entire record, a factfinder could have reasonably
formed a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the allegations against the
parent. J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 345; In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25–26 (Tex. 2002); In
re L.C.C., 667 S.W.3d 510, 512 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2023, pet. denied).
With respect to the best interest of a child determination, no unique set of
factors need be proved. L.C.C., 667 S.W.3d at 513; In re C.J.O., 325 S.W.3d 261,
266 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2010, pet. denied). Further, the best interest
determination does not restrict proof to any specific factor or factors. In re D.M., 58
S.W.3d 801, 814 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, no pet.). However, courts may use
the non-exhaustive Holley factors to shape their analysis. Holley v. Adams, 544
S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976). These include, but are not limited to: (1) the
desires of the child; (2) the emotional and physical needs of the child now and in the
future; (3) the emotional and physical danger to the child now and in the future;
3
(4) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody; (5) the programs
available to assist these individuals to promote the best interest of the child; (6) the
plans for the child by these individuals or by the agency seeking custody; (7) the
stability of the home or proposed placement; (8) the acts or omissions of the parent
that may indicate the existing parent-child relationship is not a proper one; and
(9) any excuse for the acts or omissions of the parent. Id.To support a best interest finding, the Department is not required to prove
each Holley factor; in some circumstances, evidence of the presence of only one
factor will suffice. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27; In re D.M., 452 S.W.3d 462, 473 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio 2014, no pet.). Additionally, the same evidence that proves one
or more statutory grounds for termination may also constitute sufficient, probative
evidence illustrating that termination is in the children’s best interest. C.H., 89
S.W.3d at 28; C.J.O., 325 S.W.3d at 266.
The absence of evidence of some Holley considerations does not preclude the
factfinder from reasonably inferring or forming a strong conviction or belief that
termination is in the children’s best interest, particularly if the evidence indicates
that the parental relationship and the parent’s conduct has endangered the safety and
well-being of the children. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27. This is so because the best interest
analysis evaluates the best interest of the children, not the parent. In re E.C.R., 638
S.W.3d 755, 767 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2021, pet. denied) (citing In re B.C.S., 479
S.W.3d 918, 927 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2015, no pet.)).
In this regard, the factfinder may measure a parent’s future conduct by his or
her past conduct and determine whether termination is in the children’s best interest.
In re E.D., 419 S.W.3d 615, 620 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, pet. denied); In re
D.S., 333 S.W.3d 379, 384 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, no pet.). The factfinder may
infer that a parent’s past conduct that endangered the safety and well-being of the
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children may recur in the future if the children are returned to the possession of the
parent. In re J.D., 436 S.W.3d 105, 118 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no
pet.); May v. May, 829 S.W.2d 373, 377 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 1992,
writ denied). Further, the factfinder may infer from a parent’s past inability to meet
the children’s physical and emotional needs an inability or unwillingness by the
parent to meet the children’s physical and emotional needs in the future. J.D., 436
S.W.3d at 118; see also In re A.S., No. 11-16-00293-CV, 2017 WL 1275614, at *3
(Tex. App.—Eastland Mar. 31, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.).
II. Evidence Presented at Trial
In August of 2021, the Department investigated Appellant for neglectful
supervision of A.V. and J.M.R., who were with Appellant’s mother at the time.
When the caseworker arrived to investigate, Appellant was “nowhere to be found.”
On August 5, 2021, Appellant spoke to the caseworker and the Department
supervisor, but “wasn’t coherent” because she was under the influence of alcohol,
heroin, and methamphetamine. Due to Appellant’s intoxicated state, the Department
placed A.V. and J.M.R. with Appellant’s cousin, Irma Marquez, and her husband,
Jose Abelardo Marquez, Petitioners in the trial court below.
When Petitioners took possession of the children, one-year-old J.M.R. was
not current on her vaccinations, had not been to her wellness checkups, and could
not crawl, stand, speak, or eat solid food. Six-year-old A.V. was “scared of
everything,” shy, and was “far behind in her learning abilities.” According to Irma,
A.V. needed “a lot of counseling” because Appellant “did so much harm to her.” By
the time of the final termination hearing, A.V. was a straight-A student, and J.M.R.
was learning English and Spanish. The children call Petitioners “Mom” and “Dad.”
Appellant executed an affidavit relinquishing her parental rights to A.V. and
J.M.R on November 16, 2021. On August 11, 2022, after being A.V.’s and J.M.R.’s
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caregivers for over a year, Petitioners filed suit to adopt the children, and to terminate
Appellant’s parental rights. At the hearing, Appellant initially disputed signing the
affidavit of voluntary relinquishment. She later said she did not remember signing
it. Ultimately, Appellant acknowledged it was her signature, but argued that the
affidavit of relinquishment was not the document she signed at the notary’s office.
Gordon Lee Daman, Jr. testified that he notarized the affidavit of
relinquishment that Appellant signed on November 16, 2021. The trial court
determined that Appellant was not a credible witness, and that she indeed signed the
affidavit admitted at the termination hearing.
Petitioners also elicited testimony showing that the Department had been
involved with Appellant and her children since her arrest on October 11, 2017 for
leaving her then-infant son, P.V.J., 4 alone in her car. Appellant was placed on
deferred adjudication community supervision for abandoning a child with the intent
to return, a third-degree felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.041 (West Supp.
2023). Appellant’s community supervision was later revoked in July of 2022
because of her drug use and failure to report to her probation officer.
The Department intervened again in July of 2020 after P.V.J. and four-year-
old A.V. were injured in a motor vehicle accident. While Appellant and her ex-
boyfriend, P.V., 5 were “highly intoxicated and under the influence,” P.V. crashed
their car with A.V. and P.V.J. inside.
Appellant testified and admitted to using methamphetamine while pregnant
with J.M.R. and that she continued to use drugs after J.M.R. was born. Appellant
explained that throughout 2019, 2020, and 2021, she left her children with family
4
P.V.J. was the subject-child of a separate termination suit and is not involved in this appeal.
5
A.V.’s acknowledged father’s rights were terminated, and Appellant revealed the identity of
A.V.’s biological father prior to trial. His rights were not terminated, and he is not a party to this appeal.
6
members for six-month periods while she struggled with her drug addiction.
Appellant also used drugs while caring for her children, and after A.V. and J.M.R.
were placed with Petitioners.
In addition to Appellant’s drug use, A.V. witnessed acts of domestic violence
between Appellant and P.V. In July of 2020, while Appellant was pregnant with
J.M.R., P.V. held Appellant, A.V., and P.V.J. hostage in a room. Appellant, who was
under the influence of methamphetamine and marihuana at the time, stabbed P.V. as
she attempted to escape. A.V. and P.V.J. were temporarily placed with Appellant’s
aunt and needed counseling after the automobile accident and P.V.’s unlawful
restraint. See PENAL § 20.02. A.V. and P.V.J. were later returned to Appellant upon
her completion of family-based services through the Department.
The trial court took judicial notice of Appellant’s multiple cases involving her
children, including the present case. Prior to the trial court making its ruling in this
case, Appellant testified and stipulated that she (1) left A.V. and J.M.R. in Petitioners’
possession without providing adequate support and (2) remained away from the
children for at least six months. See FAM. § 161.001(b)(1)(C). Appellant asked the
trial court to terminate her parental rights only on that basis, rather than making
express findings of endangerment under Sections 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E). In
accordance with the agreement between Appellant, her trial counsel, the trial court,
and the parties, the trial court terminated Appellant’s rights under subsection (C) and
found that termination was in the children’s best interest.
III. Analysis
A. Abandonment
In her first issue, Appellant challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the
evidence to prove that she abandoned A.V. and J.M.R. under subsection (C). See
FAM. § 161.001(b)(1)(C). Appellant does not dispute that she remained away from
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her children for at least six months. Rather, she argues that she did not voluntarily
leave her children with Petitioners because she was “forced” to do so by the
Department. Appellant further asserts that she provided adequate support for her
children.
A finding of abandonment under subsection (C) requires a showing that a
parent has “voluntarily left the child . . . in the possession of another without
providing adequate support of the child and remained away for a period of at least
six months.” FAM. § 161.001(b)(1)(C). A parent has “remained away” if the parent
did not visit the child for six consecutive months from the date the parent voluntarily
left the child with another. In re J.G.S., 574 S.W.3d 101, 115 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 2019, pet. denied); Jordan v. Dossey, 325 S.W.3d 700, 727 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. denied).
The element of “voluntariness” goes to whether the parent voluntarily left the
child with another person. See FAM. § 161.001(b)(1)(C); see J.G.S., 574 S.W.3d at
115–16 (citing In re J.K.H., No. 06-09-00035-CV, 2009 WL 2948575, at *1, *3
(Tex. App.—Texarkana Sept. 16, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.)). Compliance with a
court order that grants one parent the right to designate the child’s residence does
not ordinarily constitute voluntarily leaving the child with another by the other
parent. See J.G.S., 574 S.W.3d at 116; see also J.K.H., 2009 WL 2948575, at *3;
cf. In re H.S., No. 05-16-00950-CV, 2016 WL 7163864, at *5 & n.3 (Tex. App.—
Dallas Dec. 6, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (concluding that the evidence was legally
and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that the father voluntarily
left the child in the grandmother’s possession where evidence showed that the father
indicated his agreement with the court order).
Predicate ground (C) does not necessarily require that the parent personally
support the child; rather, the parent only needs to “make arrangements for the
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adequate support” of the child. See Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 21 (Tex. 1985);
Jordan, 325 S.W.3d at 727–28 (affirming termination under predicate ground (C)
where the mother did not ensure that the child was adequately supported and there
was no evidence of an understanding that the mother would not be sending support);
In re J.E.R., No. 04-19-00566-CV, 2020 WL 690642, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
Feb. 12, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.); In re C.J.A., No. 13-16-00635-CV, 2017 WL
2200301, at *2 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Mar. 16, 2017, no pet.) (mem.
op.) (holding that there must be evidence of an agreement for one parent to support
the child on the other’s behalf to demonstrate that a parent “made arrangements” for
adequate support for the child); see also In re A.R., No. 02-18-00311-CV, 2019 WL
1186963, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 14, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.)
(affirming termination under predicate ground (C) where “there [was] no evidence
that when Father left the children with Mother, she was able to support them or
expected to do so without his assistance.”).
Here, the evidence supporting the trial court’s termination finding under
subsection (C) consisted of Appellant’s stipulation, which the trial court accepted
without objection and which was supported by the testimony of other witnesses.
Appellant neither renounces her stipulation nor challenges the voluntariness of her
statements. Instead, she claims only that the evidence is insufficient to support the
specific findings that she requested the trial court should make—termination based
on a finding under subsection (C) only.
We conclude that Appellant’s testimonial declaration constitutes a judicial
admission. A judicial admission is an assertion of fact that acts as a formal waiver
of proof. Mendoza v. Fid. & Guar. Ins. Underwriters, Inc., 606 S.W.2d 692, 694
(Tex. 1980). As long as it is clear and unequivocal, and stands unretracted, it has
conclusive effect and bars the admitting party from later disputing it. Holy Cross
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Church of God in Christ v. Wolf, 44 S.W.3d 562, 568 (Tex. 2001); Lee v. Lee, 43
S.W.3d 636, 641 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, no pet.). This rule is based on the
public policy that it would be absurd and manifestly unjust to permit a party to
recover after she has sworn herself out of court by a clear and unequivocal statement.
In re A.E.A., 406 S.W.3d 404, 410 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2013, no pet.); Lee, 43
S.W.3d at 641.
Courts treat testimony as a judicial admission if: (1) the testimony relied upon
was made during the course of a judicial proceeding; (2) the testimony is contrary to
an essential fact embraced in the theory of recovery or defense asserted by the person
giving it; (3) the testimony is deliberate, clear, and unequivocal, and not merely a
mistake or slip of the tongue; (4) giving the testimony conclusive effect would be
consistent with the public policy that it would be unjust to allow a party to recover
after she has sworn herself out of court; and (5) the testimony is not also destructive
of the opposing party’s theory of recovery. Mendoza, 606 S.W.2d at 694; Khan v.
GBAK Props., Inc., 371 S.W.3d 347, 357 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no
pet.); Lee, 43 S.W.3d at 641–42.
Appellant, under oath during a judicial proceeding “stipulate[ed] and
admit[ed] that [she] voluntarily left the children in the possession of another,”
specifically, Petitioners, for at least six consecutive months without providing
adequate support. Petitioners’ first allegation in their petition to terminate tracked
the language of Section 161.001(b)(1)(C), as did Appellant’s testimonial admission.
The trial court further clarified: “[Y]ou’re stipulating to the first ground so that I can
terminate your parent/child relationship existing between you and [A.V.] and you
and [J.M.R.]?” Appellant replied that she was “agreeing to the first ground.”
This clear, unequivocal, unretracted judicial admission precludes Appellant
from now asserting on appeal that there is insufficient evidence to terminate her
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parental rights under subsection (C). See In re V.K.H.H., 647 S.W.3d 476, 479 (Tex.
App.—Texarkana 2022, no pet.). We cannot entertain Appellant’s argument that
her sworn testimony is insufficient, especially when she did so to avoid unfavorable
findings under subsections (D) and (E). It would be “absurd and manifestly unjust”
to consider reversing the trial court’s “agreed” termination finding after Appellant
“has sworn [herself] out of court by a clear and unequivocal statement.” See A.E.A.,
406 S.W.3d at 410. Therefore, we conclude that the evidence is legally and factually
sufficient to support the trial court’s termination finding under subsection (C).
Nonetheless, even without Appellant’s judicial admission, the trial court could
have reasonably concluded that Appellant voluntarily left her children with
Petitioners. Appellant claimed that she was forced to place her children with
Petitioners on August 5, 2021, and that she only acquiesced because she “was
drunk,” does “not really remember,” and “didn’t understand what was going on.”
A person’s actions while voluntarily intoxicated are, with few exceptions,
considered knowing and voluntary under Texas law. See, e.g., PENAL § 8.04 (West
2021), § 49.11 (West 2016); J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d at 308 (finding endangerment after
the father crashed a vehicle while driving intoxicated, killing his son, and injuring
another child). But we need not decide whether Appellant’s inability to care for her
children due to her intentional intoxication constitutes voluntary abandonment.
While it is undisputed that on August 5, 2021, the Department determined that
Appellant would be prohibited from having possession of and access to the children,
Appellant made no effort to initiate the return of her children until over a year later.
Appellant acknowledged that she was not legally prohibited from contacting
A.V. and J.M.R. prior to August of 2022. To the contrary—substantial evidence
supports the trial court’s finding that Appellant signed an affidavit of relinquishment
of her parental rights on November 16, 2021. We will thus not disturb the trial
11
court’s determination that Appellant voluntarily left A.V. and J.M.R. with
Petitioners. See, e.g., H.S., 2016 WL 7163864, at *5 (finding that the father
voluntarily left the child with the grandmother because his conduct in the
conservatorship proceedings indicated his agreement that the grandmother would
care for the child).
The trial court could have also formed a firm belief or conviction that
Appellant did not provide her children with adequate support. In June of 2022,
Appellant offered Irma money, food stamps, and insurance cards for the children. A
month later, she expressed a willingness to buy A.V.’s school supplies. Petitioners
declined Appellant’s offers, and Appellant never provided anything for the children.
Appellant’s infrequent bids or random offers to contribute a form of support for the
children are not tantamount to adequate support. See In re D.D.V., No. 04-21-00159-
CV, 2021 WL 3887710, at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Sept. 1, 2021, no pet.)
(mem. op.) (“occasional gifts are insufficient to fulfill a parent’s obligation of
support”) (quoting In re B.T., 954 S.W.2d 44, 49 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997,
pet. denied)).
Moreover, Appellant failed to ensure that Petitioners could adequately support
A.V. and J.M.R. prior to voluntarily abandoning them, and she made no
arrangements for their support. Appellant claimed that she never believed it was in
A.V.’s and J.M.R.’s best interest to be placed with Petitioners. When asked whether
she was certain that the children “were being taken care of,” Appellant responded:
“No.” Therefore, according to Appellant, she believed that her children were not
being adequately supported. Yet, and despite this, Appellant made no arrangements
for the children’s support and allowed them to remain with Petitioners. See In re
J.R., 319 S.W.3d 773, 776–77 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2010, no pet.); In re K.M.B., 91
S.W.3d 18, 26 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2002, no pet.); see also A.R., 2019 WL
121186963, at *4; In re A.T.C., No. 07-08-00258-CV, 2008 WL 5204747, at *3 (Tex.
App.—Amarillo Dec. 12, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op). Because the record
overwhelmingly supports the trial court’s termination finding under subsection (C),
we overrule Appellant’s first issue.
B. Best Interest of the Children
In her second issue, Appellant challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of
the evidence to support the trial court’s finding that termination of her parental rights
would be in the best interest of A.V. and J.M.R.
After Appellant stipulated to the termination of her parental rights pursuant to
subsection (C), her attorney asked: “[A]nd you understand the judge will find that
it’s in the children’s best interest. Correct?” Appellant replied: “Yes, I understand.”
Neither she nor her attorney expressly admitted that termination was in A.V.’s and
J.M.R.’s best interest. While this weighs heavily in favor of the trial court’s findings,
it is not dispositive. See In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d at 632–33; In re J.H. III, 538 S.W.3d
121, 125 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2017, no pet.) (“the paramount concern is the best
interest of the child, and the niceties of the procedural rules of pleading will not be
used to defeat that interest”) (quoting Green v. Green, 850 S.W.2d 809, 811 (Tex.
App.—El Paso 1993, no pet.)). After considering the evidence as set forth above
and the Holley factors, we conclude that the trial court’s best-interest finding is
supported by clear and convincing evidence.
We note that an affidavit of voluntary relinquishment waiving one’s parental
rights itself “can be ample evidence to support a best-interest determination.” In re
K.S.L., 538 S.W.3d 107, 111 (Tex. 2017). “A parent’s willingness to voluntarily
give up her child, and to swear affirmatively that this is in her child’s best interest,
is sufficient, absent unusual or extenuating circumstances, to produce a firm belief
or conviction that the child’s best interest is served by termination.” Id. at 112. Here,
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the trial court found that Appellant, with knowledge of the consequences, signed the
affidavit voluntarily, and sufficient evidence corroborates that finding.
Nevertheless, evidence apart from the affidavit of relinquishment justifies the
trial court’s best-interest finding. Appellant engaged in a pattern of misconduct—
she endangered the children, neglected their physical, emotional, and medical needs,
and exposed them to her ongoing drug use and unstable or unpredictable living
conditions. Nothing in the record, including Appellant’s testimony, shows that she
ever maintained a safe and stable environment for her children.
A.V., who was six years old when she began living with Petitioners, endured
years of Appellant’s drug abuse and the acts of domestic violence between Appellant
and P.V. A.V. sustained a fractured collarbone when P.V. crashed their car while he
and Appellant were using drugs. She was behind in school, fearful all the time, and
needed counseling. When asked about Petitioners adopting her, A.V. expressed
excitement, and “believe[d] that this adoption [would] be in her best interest.”
The record shows that the children are in a safe and stable home with
Petitioners, who have tended to their needs and will continue to do so. Both A.V.
and J.M.R. have flourished and improved physically, mentally, and emotionally
since living with Petitioners. Petitioners have provided ample emotional and
monetary support for A.V. and J.M.R. and have sought to adopt the children after
one and one-half years of caring for them.
Appellant, by contrast, has not demonstrated an ability or a willingness to put
the children’s needs before her own, nor has she shown that she can provide a safe,
stable home and environment for the children. In fact, Appellant’s immediate plan
for the children if she was awarded possession did not even involve them living with
her—Appellant testified that she envisioned (1) her children staying with her aunt,
(2) having “regular visits,” and (3) the children “eventually transition[ing] home.”
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A.V. and J.M.R. were cared for by either Appellant’s aunt or mother throughout 2019
and 2020, and the future would apparently be no different were they returned to
Appellant.
Based on the desires of the children (one of whom is too young to express a
preference), the emotional and physical needs of the children now and in the future,
the emotional and physical danger to the children now and in the future, Appellant’s
lack of parental abilities, Petitioners’ plans for the children, Appellant’s history of
domestic violence and drug abuse, her inability to provide a safe and stable
environment for the children, and the lack of justification for her misconduct, we
hold that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s
finding that termination of Appellant’s parental rights is in the best interest of A.V.
and J.M.R. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72.
Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s second issue.
C. Evidentiary Ruling: Hearsay
Appellant contends in her third issue that the trial court erroneously admitted
statements made by A.V., which Appellant contends are hearsay, “without showing
each of the prerequisites of the Texas Family Code.” Beyond this conclusory
statement, Appellant points to nothing in the record to clarify this issue or to support
her argument. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(g)–(i).
Although briefs are to be “liberally, but reasonably, construed so that the right
to appellate review is not lost by waiver,” an issue is only sufficient if it directs the
reviewing court’s attention to the error about which the complaint is made.
Horton v. Stovall, 591 S.W.3d 567, 569 (Tex. 2019) (per curiam) (citing TEX. R.
APP. P. 38.9); see also TEX. R. APP. P. 38(i) (requiring “appropriate citations to
authorities and to the record”). “[W]e do not and cannot assume the responsibility
of doing the parties’ briefing for them.” De Los Reyes v. Maris, No. 02-21-00022-
15
CV, 2021 WL 5227179, at *9 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Nov. 10, 2021, no pet.)
(mem. op.) (citing Bolling v. Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist., 315 S.W.3d 893,
895 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.)). Simply put, we are not advocates for any
of the parties, even when a party is pro se. Id.Because Appellant has not directed us to any of the trial court’s evidentiary
rulings of which she now complains, she presents nothing for our review. See TEX.
R. APP. P. 33.1. Accordingly, Appellant’s third issue is overruled.
IV. This Court’s Ruling
We affirm the order of the trial court.
W. STACY TROTTER
JUSTICE
December 14, 2023
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.
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