Archie Lee Harris Jr. v. the State of Texas

In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
________________
NO. 09-22-00112-CR
________________
ARCHIE LEE HARRIS JR., Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
________________________________________________________________________
On Appeal from the 252nd District Court
Jefferson County, Texas
Trial Cause No. 21-37749
________________________________________________________________________
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Archie Harris was convicted of burglary of a habitation, a second-
degree felony, and was sentenced to seven years in the Institutional Division of the
Texas Department of Criminal Justice. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 30.02(a)(1).
Appellant contends that he was not guilty of burglarizing a “habitation.” See Tex.
Penal Code Ann. §§ 12.35(a), 30.02(c)(1). We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
1
Evidence at Trial
Helen Cormier’s 1 Testimony
Helen testified that she and her husband moved into their house in
Beaumont, Texas during the summer of 2017, and the home had three bedrooms
and a garage and garage apartment. The garage and garage apartment were
attached to the house by a covered walkway. According to Helen, they were in the
process of remodeling their house.
During the renovations in December 2020, they moved to a temporary
residence because the demolition and remodeling process left the house without a
bathroom. Although the garage apartment had running water and electricity, and
was therefore “habitable,” and although the Cormiers could have lived in the
garage apartment during the renovations, they chose not to do so. Instead, they
used the garage apartment to store some of their property, including dishes, tools,
collectibles, and the like. They used the open double carport area to store a riding
lawnmower and sports equipment.
Helen testified that on April 27, 2021, she was driving past the property
when she noticed that the previously locked door to the garage apartment was
open. She then discovered the padlock on the door had been removed and the door
1
We use pseudonyms to refer to the alleged victims. See Tex. Const. art. I,
§ 30 (granting crime victims “the right to be treated with fairness and with respect
for the victim’s dignity and privacy throughout the criminal justice process[]”).
2
had been forced open, “[e]verything from inside the garage apartment that [they]
had stored with the exception of a few items that were on the floor[]” was missing,
and she called the police. According to Helen, the missing items included items
such as an air compressor, tools, and ice chests. The Cormiers immediately
installed a motion-activated video camera, and that camera recorded additional
thefts on April 29, May 6, and May 7. Helen testified that in June her husband
drove by the property and noticed that their lawnmower that had been parked
underneath the carport had been stolen. Neither Cormier nor her husband gave the
person depicted in the video or any other person permission to remove any of the
items from their property, and she had never met or seen Appellant. According to
Helen, only a few of the stolen items were recovered, including the lawnmower.
Testimony of Brandy Dyson
Evidence technician Brandy Dyson testified and described her training and
her usual day-to-day job duties, which include taking photographs, lifting
fingerprints, and collecting evidence. She outlined the procedures for lifting and
identifying latent fingerprints, noting that the computer generates a list of possible
suspects, but that she personally performs the final identification. Her colleague
then verifies Dyson’s opinion of the fingerprint match. Dyson and her colleague
matched the sole usable fingerprint taken from the crime scene to Appellant’s
fingerprint.
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Testimony of John Courts
Courts, an eighteen-year officer with the Beaumont Police Department also
testified. Courts summarized his training and experience as a law enforcement
professional. At the time of trial, he was assigned to the burglary unit. He
confirmed Cormier’s testimony about the burglary location, and noted that there
were several burglaries at that same property over a short span of time. Courts also
confirmed Dyson’s testimony about matching a fingerprint found at the crime
scene to Appellant. After obtaining the fingerprint evidence and the photographic
evidence from the Cormier’s security camera which showed a suspect who
matched the physical description of Archie Lee Harris, the police arrested Archie
Lee Harris for the burglaries. Courts interviewed Harris about the burglaries on the
day of the arrest, and during that interview, according to Courts, Harris admitted he
is the person on the video taken by the Cormier’s camera, and Harris admitted he
entered the structure in the garage apartment and that he had taken items from the
Cormiers. After the interview, Courts escorted Harris to Harris’s home, where
some of the stolen goods were found. The Cormier’s riding mower was recovered
from Harris’s house, along with some glassware and a few other items.
Additional Evidence
In addition to Harris’s fingerprint, the record contains multiple photographs
taken at the crime scene and photographs of items found at Harris’s home. There
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were additional exhibits with still images downloaded from the Cormier’s security
camera. The security camera still images or photographs show a person taking
items from the Cormier property and leaving the premises with the items. A video
recording of Appellant’s interview by law enforcement was also admitted into
evidence.
Issues
In three appellate issues Appellant challenges his conviction. First, he argues
there was insufficient evidence that the structure he burglarized was a habitation.
Second, he contends the trial court erred by admitting evidence of Appellant’s
extraneous offenses. And third he argues the trial court erred by omitting a jury
instruction on the lesser included offense of burglary of a building.
Standard of Review
When reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we review all the
evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any
rational factfinder could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a
reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Hooper v. State,
214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). The jury as the factfinder is the sole
judge of the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony.
Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. We give deference to the factfinder’s responsibility to
fairly resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw
5
reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13.
If the record contains conflicting inferences, we must presume that the jury
resolved such facts in favor of the verdict and defer to that resolution. Brooks v.
State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 899 n.13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Clayton v. State, 235
S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We review the trial court’s admission of
evidence for an abuse of discretion. See Martinez v. State, 327 S.W.3d 727, 736
(Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Layton v. State, 280 S.W.3d 235, 240 (Tex. Crim. App.
2009). A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision lies outside the zone of
reasonable disagreement. See Martinez, 327 S.W.3d at 736; Layton, 280 S.W.3d at
240. In addition, we uphold a ruling on the admission of evidence if it was correct
on any theory of law supported by the record and applicable to the case, in light of
what was before the trial court at the time the ruling was made. See State v.
Stevens, 235 S.W.3d 736, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Willover v. State, 70
S.W.3d 841, 845 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 856 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2000); Weatherred v. State, 15 S.W.3d 540, 542 (Tex. Crim. App.
2000). We review a trial court’s refusal to submit a lesser-included instruction for
an abuse of discretion. Chavez v. State, 666 S.W.3d 772, 776 (Tex. Crim. App.
2023).
6
Analysis
Under Texas law, a person commits burglary of a habitation if he enters a
“habitation” without the effective consent of the owner with the intent to commit a
felony, a theft, or an assault, or if he attempts to commit these offenses. See Tex.
Penal Code Ann. § 30.02(a)(1), (3). Harris admits he entered the Cormier’s
property without consent with the intent to commit a theft, but he disputes the
“habitation” element of his offense.
For purposes of a burglary, the term “habitation” is defined by the Penal
Code as follows:
(1) “Habitation” means a structure or vehicle that is adapted for the
overnight accommodation of persons, and includes:
(A) each separately secured or occupied portion of the structure or
vehicle; and
(B) each structure appurtenant to or connected with the structure or
vehicle.
Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 30.01(1).
In determining whether a structure is a habitation, “[t]he jury may look to a
host of considerations such as the contents of the structure, including bedding,
electricity, plumbing, or furniture; the jury may also look to and consider the type
of structure and its typical use as a means for overnight accommodation.” Salazar
v. State, 284 S.W.3d 874, 877 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (citing Blankenship v. State,
780 S.W.2d 198, 209-10 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989). The jury’s determination that a
structure is a habitation will be overturned on appeal only if the appellant can show
7
that no reasonable trier of fact could have found the place to have been a habitation
considering the criteria provided. Blankenship, 780 S.W.2d at 209-10.
We reject Appellant’s argument that the garage apartment was a building,
rather than a “habitation.” Helen Cormier testified that the garage apartment had
electricity and running water; she indicated that it was “habitable,” and that the
family could have lived in the apartment while they were remodeling their house.
This evidence established it was an apartment and could be used for “overnight
accommodation.” See Salazar, 284 S.W.3d at 877.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that the apartment was not a
habitation because it “was in the process of a complete demolition and remodel.”
First, Appellant’s argument misstates the evidence before the jury. According to
the evidence in the record, it was the house, not the apartment, that was being
remodeled. The apartment was capable of overnight accommodation. That said,
even if the apartment were undergoing renovation, the mere fact of renovations
being made would not preclude a house from being considered a habitation. See
Jones, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 10279, at **14-16. Second, the garage apartment
and area within the garage was “appurtenant to or connected with” the house. See
Andrus, 495 S.W.3d at 305. A structure connected to the house like this garage
apartment is considered part of the house. See Salas v. State, 548 S.W.2d 52, 53
(Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (observing that “habitation” includes garages). The
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evidence showed that the garage apartment and structure in question was
physically connected to the main house at the roof line and by a covered walkway.
When viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, the jury could have
concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the structure and garage apartment
Harris unlawfully entered and from which he stole the Cormier’s property was a
“habitation” as defined by statute. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 30.01(1)(B). We
conclude based on the record that there was legally sufficient evidence presented to
the jury that established the garage apartment Appellant burglarized was a
“habitation” as defined in the applicable penal code because it was both “adapted
for the overnight accommodation of persons,” and “appurtenant to or connected
with” the Cormier’s house, which was also a “habitation” despite the renovations
that were ongoing. See Jones v. State, No. 01-09-00267-CR, 2010 Tex. App.
LEXIS 10279, at **14-16 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 30, 2010, no pet.)
(mem. op., not designated for publication) (rejecting the argument that an
unoccupied house undergoing renovations was not a habitation); Andrus v. State,
495 S.W.3d 300, 305 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2016, no pet.) (concluding that the
Legislature’s definition of “habitation” includes a garage and breezeway that are
“appurtenant” to a house even if the garage is detached and explaining that the
definition of “appurtenant” is “‘[a]nnexed to a more important thing.’”) (citation
omitted).
9
We overrule Appellant’s first issue.
In his second issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred by allowing
the State to introduce evidence of the multiple burglaries he committed at the
Cormier’s residence over the course of a few weeks. Appellant contends that
evidence of these other serial burglaries was “inadmissible propensity evidence”
and its risk of unfair prejudice outweighed its probative value. See Tex. R. Evid.
403, 404(b). Appellant’s brief includes only recitations of general legal principles.
It does not explain how those principles apply to the instant case to support his
position on appeal. Appellant therefore has failed to comply with Rule 38.1(i). See
Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i); Gonzalez v. State, 616 S.W.3d 585, 594 (Tex. Crim. App.
2020) (negating the need to consider matters that have not been adequately
briefed). That said, we disagree with the merits of the generic argument Appellant
makes in his brief.
Appellant was indicted in this case for the April 27, 2021 burglary of the
Cormier’s property. Evidence of the “extraneous offenses” which Appellant claims
should not have been admitted includes evidence that Appellant went back to the
Cormier’s property and burglarized the same property over the course of multiple
weeks.
“Extraneous-acts evidence is admissible if it is relevant to a fact of
consequence in the case, and the probative value of the evidence is not
10
substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice.” Fox v. State, 283 S.W.3d 85, 91
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. ref’d); see also Tex. R. Evid. 401,
403, 404(b). “[A] trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of extraneous offenses is
reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard.” De La Paz v. State, 279 S.W.3d
336, 343 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). Under this standard, we do not reverse a trial
court’s decision unless it lies outside the zone of reasonable disagreement. Dabney
v. State, 492 S.W.3d 309, 318 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). “Furthermore, if the trial
court’s evidentiary ruling is correct on any theory of law applicable to that ruling,
it will not be disturbed even if the trial judge gave the wrong reason for his right
ruling.” De La Paz, 279 S.W.3d at 344. “‘If the trial court’s decision on the
admission of evidence is supported by the record, there is no abuse of discretion,
and the trial court will not be reversed.’” Bradshaw v. State, 466 S.W.3d 875, 878
(Tex. App.—Texarkana 2015, pet. ref’d). “In determining whether the trial court
abused its discretion, ‘[w]e may not substitute our own decision for that of the trial
court.’” Id.In a pretrial motion, defense counsel objected to the admission of evidence
concerning what he described as “extraneous offenses,” but the trial court
overruled his objection and found the evidence was admissible under the permitted
uses outlined in Rule 404(b). During trial, defense counsel again objected under
404(b), and he also argued the evidence was inadmissible under Rule 403. The trial
11
court overruled the objections but granted the defense attorney’s request for a
limiting instruction. The Court gave the following limiting instruction to the jury:
Ladies and gentlemen, what you’re going to hear is evidence
regarding other possible crimes that the defendant may have
committed. Those, if you are to use them in your deliberations, have
to also be proven to you beyond a reasonable doubt. If they are not,
then you are not to use them. There will be a more formal instruction,
also, in the Court’s charge that explains that to you, as well.
In the jury charge, the judge also instructed the jury:
Evidence of Wrongful Acts Possibly Committed by Defendant
During the trial, you heard evidence that the defendant may
have committed wrongful acts not charged in the indictment. The state
offered the evidence to show the identity, plan, intent and absence of
mistake of the defendant. You are not to consider that evidence at all
unless you find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant did, in
fact, commit the wrongful act(s). Those of you who believe the
defendant did the wrongful act may consider it.
Even if you do find that the defendant committed a wrongful
act, you may consider this evidence only for the limited purpose I
have described. You may not consider this evidence to prove that the
defendant is a bad person and for this reason was likely to commit the
charged offense. In other words, you should consider this evidence
only for the specific, limited purpose I have described. To consider
this evidence for any other purpose would be improper.
Harris does not complain on appeal about the limiting instructions that were given
to the jury. We presume the jury followed the limiting instructions of the trial
court. Gamboa v. State, 296 S.W.3d 574, 580 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Thrift v.
State, 176 S.W.3d 221, 224 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
12
Rule 404(b) of the Texas Rules of Evidence provides that “[e]vidence of a
crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order
to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the
character.” Tex. R. Evid. 404(b)(1). Rule 404(b)(2), however, provides for certain
permitted uses of extraneous-offense evidence. See Tex. R. Evid. 404(b)(2).
Specifically, the rule provides that the evidence is admissible for such matters as
“proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,
absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” Id. This list is not exclusive but is
illustrative. Martin v. State, 173 S.W.3d 463, 466 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
“[E]xtraneous-offense evidence may be admissible when a defendant raises a
defensive issue that negates one of the elements of the offense.” Id. “Thus, a party
may introduce evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts if such evidence logically
serves to make more or less probable an elemental fact, an evidentiary fact that
inferentially leads to an elemental fact, or defensive evidence that undermines an
elemental fact.” Id. The prosecutor argued that the extraneous-offense evidence
was admissible because it established Appellant “had opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, shows his identity and it shows . . . it is not an accident [or] a
mistake that he went to this property.” Appellant’s defense at trial was twofold: (1)
the structure was not a habitation, and (2) he thought the property had been
abandoned and he had mistakenly taken the Cormier’s belongings. The extraneous
13
offenses were nearly identical to the offense at issue in this case. Essentially,
Appellant stole various items from the same property on different days over
several weeks.
The trial court reasonably could have concluded that the extraneous offenses
and the instant offense were sufficiently alike to render the extraneous-offense
evidence admissible under Rule 404(b)(2). The extraneous offenses served to
negate Appellant’s defense that it was merely an accident or misunderstanding and
the offenses help establish elements of the charged offense. The trial court also
could have reasonably concluded that the extraneous-offense evidence was
admissible because it provided context to the charged offense to explain the
circumstances surrounding the offense and why the homeowners put up a camera
and then why investigators focused on Appellant as a suspect. We conclude the
trial court’s decision to admit the extraneous-offense evidence over Appellant’s
Rule 404(b) objection was within the zone of reasonable disagreement and not an
abuse of discretion. See De La Paz, 279 S.W.3d at 343 (“‘Rule 404(b) is a rule of
inclusion rather than exclusion’”).
As for the Rule 403 objection that Harris made at trial, we also conclude the
trial court did not err in overruling this objection. When conducting a Rule 403
balancing test, a trial court
[M]ust balance (1) the inherent probative force of the proffered item
of evidence along with (2) the proponent’s need for that evidence
14
against (3) any tendency of the evidence to suggest decision on an
improper basis, (4) any tendency of the evidence to confuse or distract
the jury from the main issues, (5) any tendency of the evidence to be
given undue weight by a jury that has not been equipped to evaluate
the probative force of the evidence, and (6) the likelihood that
presentation of the evidence will consume an inordinate amount of
time or merely repeat evidence already admitted.
Gigliobianco v. State, 210 S.W.3d 637, 641-42 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). In any
given case, “these factors may well blend together in practice.” Id. at 642. The trial
court is presumed to have engaged in the required balancing test under Rule 403
once a party objects on the ground of Rule 403 and the trial court rules on the
objection unless the record indicates otherwise. See Williams v. State, 958 S.W.2d
186, 195-96 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). The party opposing admission of the
evidence bears the burden to demonstrate that the danger of unfair prejudice
substantially outweighs the probative value. See Kappel v. State, 402 S.W.3d 490,
494 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.). Appellant fails to analyze
any of the Rule 403 factors in his brief, but he summarily alleges the trial court
erred. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i).
Even assuming Harris preserved this argument on appeal, we conclude based
on the record before us that the trial court, after balancing the Rule 403 factors,
could have reasonably concluded that the probative value of the extraneous-offense
evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice and
the other factors in the rule. Applying the first balancing factor, the trial court
15
could have concluded the evidence held probative value and relevance because the
evidence demonstrated Appellant’s intent to commit burglary of a habitation, and it
showed his identity and plan to commit the offense. The evidence was also
consistent with other evidence. The State also introduced evidence of Appellant’s
admission that he entered the Cormier’s property and took items that did not
belong to him, that Appellant brought law enforcement back to his home where he
led them to items taken from the Cormier’s property, and there was photographic
evidence that Appellant returned to the Cormier’s property after the initial
burglary.
With respect to the remaining factors, the evidence would not have unduly
prejudiced or irrationally affected the jury nor did it tend to suggest decision on an
improper basis. The extraneous-offense evidence would not affect the jury any
differently than the evidence of the charged offense because the offenses were so
similar. And the time at trial regarding the challenged evidence was small in
relation to the entire trial, and the same witnesses that testified to the extraneous
offenses testified to establish the elements of the charged offense. The subsequent
extraneous offense evidence helped establish Appellant’s identity in the underlying
case. As we noted above, the trial court gave a limiting instruction, and we
presume the jury followed the trial court’s instruction. See Renteria v. State, 206
S.W.3d 689, 707 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). After balancing the Rule 403 factors, the
16
trial court could have reasonably concluded that the probative value of the
extraneous-offense evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice. See id. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in admitting the challenged evidence. We overrule Appellant’s second issue.
In his final appellate issue, Appellant contends that the trial court erred in
refusing to include an instruction on the lesser-included offense of burglary of a
building in the jury charge. We employ a two-part analysis to determine whether a
trial court abused its discretion in denying a requested charge on a lesser-included
offense. Chavez, 666 S.W.3d at 776; Ritcherson v. State, 568 S.W.3d 667, 670
(Tex. Crim. App. 2018); Bullock v. State, 509 S.W.3d 921, 924 (Tex. Crim. App.
2016); see also Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.09 (defining the requirements
for a lesser-included offense).
First, we compare the statutory elements as alleged in the indictment with
the statutory elements of the requested lesser-included offense to determine
whether the lesser-included offense is included within the proof necessary to
establish the charged offense. Ritcherson, 568 S.W.3d at 670-71; Bullock, 509
S.W.3d at 924-25. This is a question of law and does not depend on the evidence to
be produced at trial. Rice v. State, 333 S.W.3d 140, 144 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).
An offense is a lesser-included offense (sometimes referred to as an LIO) if the
greater-inclusive offense either alleged all the elements of the LIO or alleged
17
elements plus facts (including descriptive averments) from which all the elements
of the LIO may be deduced. Id. (citing Ex parte Watson, 306 S.W.3d 259, 273
(Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Hall v. State, 225 S.W.3d 524, 535 (Tex. Crim. App.
2007)). “If proof of the lesser offense is included within the proof of the greater
offense, the first step has been satisfied.” Chavez, 666 S.W.3d at 776.
Second, we review the entire record to determine if there exists “more than a
scintilla” of affirmative evidence, regardless of whether controverted or credible,
from which a rational jury could find the defendant guilty of only the lesser
offense. Roy v. State, 509 S.W.3d 315, 317 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017); Cavazos v.
State, 382 S.W.3d 377, 385 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (“While it is true that the
evidence may be weak or contradicted, the evidence must still be directly germane
to the lesser-included offense and must rise to a level that a rational jury could find
that if Appellant is guilty, he is guilty only of the lesser-included offense.”). This
requirement is met if there is affirmative evidence of a factual dispute that raises
the lesser offense and rebuts or negates other evidence establishing the greater
offense. Chavez, 666 S.W.3d at 776 (citing Roy, 509 S.W.3d at 319).
In this case, the indictment charged that Appellant “did then and there with
intent to commit theft, enter a habitation . . . without the effective consent of [the
owner.]” The same predicate offense of burglary underlies both burglary of a
building and burglary of a habitation. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 30.02(a).
18
Accordingly, burglary of a building can be a lesser-included offense of burglary of
a habitation. See Andrus, 495 S.W.3d at 308 (noting that “the Court of Criminal
Appeals has recognized that burglary of a building on proper evidence may
sometimes constitute a lesser-included offense of burglarizing a habitation”).
Appellant has not directed this Court to evidence in the record from which
the jury could have concluded that if Appellant were guilty, he was guilty only of
burglary of a building and not burglary of a habitation. While he argues that the
evidence at trial demonstrated that the structure was vacant and unlivable, as
discussed above, according to Helen Cormier, the garage apartment was habitable.
The mere fact that the garage apartment or the house may have been unoccupied
does not constitute more than a scintilla of evidence to show that the apartment
was not suitable for overnight accommodation. See Jones, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS
10279, at **14-16; see also Roy, 509 S.W.3d at 317; Cavazos, 382 S.W.3d at 385.
The evidence at trial sufficiently established that the garage apartment fell within
the statutory definition of a “habitation,” and it was not simply a “building.”
Accordingly, we conclude that Appellant has not shown he was entitled to
the lesser-included instruction. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in
refusing Appellant’s request for a jury instruction on burglary of a building. See
Chavez, 666 S.W.3d at 776; Andrus, 495 S.W.3d at 308; Crutchfield v. State, No.
12-09-00440-CR, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 5883, at **13-14 (Tex. App.—Tyler
19
July 29, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). We overrule
Appellant’s third issue.
Having overruled all issues on appeal, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
LEANNE JOHNSON
Justice
Submitted on June 2, 2023
Opinion Delivered December 6, 2023
Do Not Publish
Before Golemon, C.J., Johnson and Wright, JJ.
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