Estate of Jesse Odis Matlock, III v. the State of Texas

NO. 12-24-00091-CV
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT
TYLER, TEXAS
ESTATE OF § APPEAL FROM THE
JESSE ODIS MATLOCK, III, § COUNTY COURT AT LAW
APPELLANT § HOUSTON COUNTY, TEXAS
OPINION
Dustin Matlock appeals the trial court’s judgment declaring heirship concerning his
deceased father’s estate. He raises two issues on appeal. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Jesse Odis Matlock, III died on August 30, 2022, in Houston County, Texas. The trial
court determined that Jesse Odis Matlock, III, died without leaving a lawful will because the
document purporting to be a will failed to satisfy the legal requirements.
Dustin filed an “Application to Declare Heirship” (the Matlock Application) on November
18, 2022. The Matlock Application alleged that the decedent was survived by his wife Lisa
Matlock, and five children, Jesse Matlock, IV, Jennifer Chimeil, Dillon A. Matlock, Dustin
Matlock, and Dalton Matlock. 1 The Matlock Application also alleged that decedent had another
daughter, Brandy Matlock, who predeceased him and was survived by her children, Taylor Pate
and Cole Pate.
Jesse IV, Jennifer, and Brandy were conceived during the decedent’s first marriage. Dillon,
Dustin, and Dalton were conceived during his second marriage with his surviving wife Lisa. The
Matlock application also identified Lacey Theus and Ashley Veach as persons who “[m]ay claim
to be a child of Decedent” with zero share in the estate.
On March 13, 2023, Lacey, Ashley, and Jesse IV, filed an “Opposition to Dustin Matlock’s
Application to Determine Heirship.” That same day, Lacey filed a competing “Application to
Determine Heirship” (the Theus Application), alleging that in addition to the six children he
conceived in his two marriages, the decedent conceived two other children out of wedlock, namely
Lacey and Ashley. It is undisputed that Lacey and Ashley have the same mother.
In April 2023, Lacey, Ashley, and Jesse IV, all voluntarily submitted to genetic testing. 2
It is undisputed that Jesse IV is the decedent’s son. The May 2023 “LabCorp” Laboratory
Corporation of America genetic testing report concluded as follows:
This study was undertaken to evaluate if LACEY THEUS and ASHLEY VEACH are half siblings
of JESSE MATLOCK IV as opposed to unrelated. The account has indicated that LACEY THEUS
and ASHLEY VEACH have the same mother and that JESSE MATLOCK IV has a different
mother. Given the above information, all relevant relationships were tested using Caucasian
frequencies.
In the most likely relationship, both LACEY THEUS and ASHLEY VEACH are half siblings of
JESSE MATLOCK IV. This relationship is as least 49 times more likely than any other tested
relationship and has a probability of 97.98% when comparing all tested relationships (prior
probability = 0.2). This study supports the allegation that LACEY THEUS and ASHLEY VEACH
are half siblings of JESSE MATLOCK IV.
The attorney ad litem for the unknown heirs filed a report which agreed with the Theus
Application.
On January 9, 2024, the trial court held a hearing on the applications. The trial court
admitted the genetic testing report into evidence over Dustin’s objection that there was no showing
1
Because several parties share the same surname, we will refer to all parties by their first names for the sake
of brevity and clarity.
The parties apparently conducted an earlier genetic test while Jesse Odis Matlock, III, was alive using his
2
DNA, but that report was not admitted into evidence in this proceeding.
2
that the test and techniques were scientifically reliable or that the technique was properly applied,
and that the report is hearsay.
Jesse IV testified that the decedent hosted a family gathering in 2018 at which all seven
surviving children attended, along with Brandy’s two surviving children, and that the decedent
treated them as his children. He further explained that they all knew Lacey and Ashley were
decedent’s children.
Lacey testified that the decedent sent Dustin and Lisa to her home with samples of his DNA
in 2017 so that she and Ashley could confirm his paternity. She explained that she knew the
decedent was her father for her entire life and that he treated her as such. She testified that he
provided for her financially for her entire life and that she had a father-daughter relationship with
him. She further stated that although no court ever ordered that he pay child support, he provided
both Lacey and Ashley with financial support through their mother for their entire lives. Lacey
testified that she attended the gathering in 2018, each of decedent’s surviving children attended,
and that they all acknowledged each other as siblings.
Ashley also testified and confirmed that she provided a DNA sample in 2017 at decedent’s
request to prove to Dustin and Lisa that he was the father of Lacey and Ashley. She confirmed
that the decedent sent her money, gifted her a ring, and paid for her cellphone among other things.
She also explained that she attended the family gathering in 2018 and that the decedent
“acknowledged everybody as his kids.”
Cynthia Moretti, a friend of decedent’s for nearly forty years who had no interest in the
estate, testified at the hearing that decedent had eight children, including Lacey and Ashley, with
three different women. Moretti testified that the decedent gave her money many times with
instructions to give it to Lacey and Ashley, he asked about them over the years, and she had a
meeting with the decedent (after learning he had cancer), during which he stated that he would
provide for Lacey and Ashley. She further testified that the entire Matlock family knew that Lacey
and Ashley were decedent’s children and that they took an earlier genetic test.
After the hearing, the trial court signed a judgment declaring heirship in which it
determined that the decedent had a surviving spouse Lisa, eight children including Lacey and
Ashley, Brandy predeceased him, and Brandy had two surviving children. Among other things,
the judgment also identified each heir’s relationship to the decedent and their shares of decedent’s
property. Dustin appealed the judgment to this Court.
3
JURISDICTION
As an initial matter, Lacey asserts that we lack jurisdiction of this appeal because there is
no final order. As support, she relies on Texas Estates Code Section 32.001, which reads in
pertinent part as follows:
(c) A final order issued by a probate court is appealable to the court of appeals.
(d) The administration of the estate of a decedent, from the filing of the application for probate and
administration, or for administration, until the decree of final distribution and the discharge of the
last personal representative, shall be considered as one proceeding for purposes of jurisdiction. The
entire proceeding is a proceeding in rem.
TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 32.001 (West 2020).
We disagree with Lacey’s contention that there is no final order. Generally, this Court has
jurisdiction only over (1) final judgments and (2) interlocutory orders from which an appeal is
expressly authorized by statute. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 51.012 (West 2015),
51.014(a) (West Supp. 2024); Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001); see
also TEX. R. CIV. P. 301 (providing that only one final judgment may be rendered in a cause).
Appellate jurisdiction generally exists only in cases in which a final judgment has been rendered
that disposes of all issues and parties in the case. See Jack B. Anglin Co., Inc. v. Tipps, 842
S.W.2d 266, 268 (Tex. 1992).
“Probate proceedings are an exception to the ‘one final judgment’ rule; in such cases,
‘multiple judgments final for purposes of appeal can be rendered on certain discrete issues.’” De
Ayala v. Mackie, 193 S.W.3d 575, 578 (Tex. 2006) (quoting Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 192). An
appeal from a probate court order may be taken if it “dispose[s] of all parties or issues in a particular
phase of the proceedings,” or if “there is an express statute, such as the one for the complete
heirship judgment, declaring the phase of the probate proceedings to be final and appealable.” Id.
at 578-79 (quoting Crowson v. Wakeham, 897 S.W.2d 779, 783 (Tex. 1995)). Specifically, here
an express statute governs the appealability of the heirship judgment, which provides as follows:
(a) The judgment in a proceeding to declare heirship is a final judgment.
(b) At the request of an interested person, the judgment in a proceeding to declare heirship may be
appealed or reviewed within the same time limits and in the same manner as other judgments in
probate matters.
4
TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 202.202 (West 2020). In summary, a judgment in a proceeding to
determine heirship is a final judgment that can be appealed by an interested person. See Crowson,
897 S.W.2d at 783; see also Dussetschleger v. Smith, 577 S.W.2d 771, 772 (Tex. App.—Tyler
1979, no writ).
Dustin filed an application to determine heirship. Lacey also filed a competing application.
The trial court determined the heirship of all the parties after an evidentiary hearing. The trial
court ultimately signed a “Judgment Declaring Heirship” that satisfies all the requirements for
such a judgment. Dustin, as an interested person due to his status as one of the decedent’s sons,
appealed from the judgment declaring heirship. Accordingly, we have jurisdiction over this appeal.
See TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 202.202; Nobles v. Bill Hill Oil & Gas Prod., No. 12-22-00119-CV,
2022 WL 3755422, at *1 (Tex. App.—Tyler Aug. 30, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (applying same
statute and concluding we had jurisdiction over appeal concerning denial of application for
declaration of heirship).
Lacey’s contention that we lack jurisdiction is overruled.
ADMISSIBILITY OF DNA REPORT
In his second issue, Dustin contends that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting
the LabCorp genetic testing report into evidence.
Standard of Review
We review evidentiary rulings under the abuse of discretion standard of review. In re
J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 575 (Tex. 2005) (citing State v. Bristol Hotel Asset Co., 65 S.W.3d 638,
647 (Tex. 2001)); see also In re Wallace, No. 03-10-00555-CV, 2013 WL 4817740, at *6 (Tex.
App.—Austin Aug. 28, 2013, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (applying abuse of discretion standard of
review in heirship proceeding concerning the admissibility of genetic testing report). The test for
abuse of discretion is whether the trial court’s ruling is arbitrary, unreasonable, or without
reference to any guiding rules or legal principles. K–Mart Corp. v. Honeycutt, 24 S.W.3d 357,
360 (Tex. 2000) (citing Bocquet v. Herring, 972 S.W.2d 19, 21 (Tex.1998)). “Moreover, we will
not reverse a trial court for an erroneous evidentiary ruling unless the error probably caused the
rendition of an improper judgment.” Owens–Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Malone, 972 S.W.2d
35, 43 (Tex. 1998) (citing TEX. R. APP. P. 44 .1; Gee v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 765 S.W.2d
394, 396 (Tex. 1989)).
5
Applicable Law
The Texas Estates Code provides a detailed procedure for genetic testing to assist the court
in determining the proper heirs of an intestate decedent. See generally TEX. EST. CODE ANN. §§
204.001-.251. The trial court may order genetic testing for one or more specified individuals on
its own motion and must do so upon the request of a party to the proceeding. Id. § 204.051 (West
2020). Unless otherwise assessed under Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 131, the cost of the genetic
testing must be advanced: (1) by a party to the proceeding who requests the testing; (2) as agreed
by the parties and approved by the court; or (3) as the court orders. Id. § 204.052 (West 2020).
If genetic material of the individual to be tested is not available, the court may order the
testing of the individual’s family members (e.g., parent, sibling, child, or other relative) if the
court: (1) makes a finding of good cause; and (2) determines that the need for genetic testing
outweighs the legitimate interest of the individual to be tested. Id. § 204.054 (West 2020).
Additionally, if good cause is shown, the court may order the genetic testing of a deceased
individual and order the disinterment of the deceased individual’s remains to facilitate the testing.
Id. § 204.055 (West 2020).
Assuming the report of the genetic testing complies with Texas Family Code Section
160.504, the report is admissible “as evidence of the truth of the facts asserted in the report.” Id.
§ 204.101 (West 2020). Specifically, Section 160.504 provides:
(a) A report of the results of genetic testing must be in a record and signed under penalty of perjury
by a designee of the testing laboratory. A report made under the requirements of this subchapter is
self-authenticating.
(b) Documentation from the testing laboratory is sufficient to establish a reliable chain of custody
that allows the results of genetic testing to be admissible without testimony if the documentation
includes:
(1) the name and photograph of each individual whose specimens have been taken;
(2) the name of each individual who collected the specimens;
(3) the places in which the specimens were collected and the date of each collection;
(4) the name of each individual who received the specimens in the testing laboratory; and
(5) the dates the specimens were received.
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.504 (West 2022).
6
The rules in Texas Family Code Section 160.505 regarding the interpretation of genetic
tests and how to rebut the results of the tests apply in the determination of heirship context. Id. §§
204.102(1) (West 2020), 204.152 (West 2020). Under Texas Family Code Section 160.505, a
rebuttable presumption that a man is a child’s father arises if the results of genetic testing indicate
(1) a 99% probability of the man’s paternity and (2) a combined paternity index of at least 100 to
1. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.505(a) (West 2022). The presumption can be rebutted only by
other genetic testing that excludes the person as a genetic parent or identifies another person as
possibly being the child’s parent. See TEX. EST. CODE §§ 204.102(2), 204.152 (West 2020); TEX.
FAM. CODE § 160.505(b).
If a party contests the results of the genetic testing and requests additional testing, the court
must order additional genetic testing. TEX. EST. CODE § 204.053(a). However, if the party is
contesting a positive finding of an individual as an heir of the decedent, the court may order the
additional testing only if the contesting party pays in advance for the additional testing. Id. §
204.053(b) (West 2020). If a person refuses to submit to genetic testing as ordered by the court,
the court may enforce the order by contempt. Id.§ 204.051. A party who contests the results may
call genetic testing experts to testify in person or by other means (e.g., telephone, videoconference,
or deposition) but must bear the cost of the expert testifying unless the court orders otherwise. Id.
§ 204.103 (West 2020).
If the genetic tests do not identify or exclude a tested individual as an ancestor, meaning
that the test is inconclusive, then the court: (1) may not dismiss the proceeding to declare heirship;
and (2) must admit the results of the genetic testing in the proceeding. Id. § 204.153 (West 2020).
Discussion
At trial, Dustin objected to the report’s admissibility on numerous occasions on grounds
that Lacey made no showing that the test and techniques were scientifically reliable, the technique
was properly applied, and the report is hearsay. These objections are inapposite.
First, the statute expressly states that a genetic testing report is admissible as evidence of
the truth of the facts asserted in the report provided that it satisfies the requirements of Texas
Family Code Section 160.504. See TEX. EST. CODE ANN. 204.101. Section 160.504 likewise states
that the report is “self-authenticating,” and the results are admissible “without testimony” if the
report satisfies the statutory requirements. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.504. In other words, the
statute provides that so long as the statutory prerequisites are shown, the report is self-
7
authenticating, is not hearsay, is admissible for the truth of the matter asserted, and no testimony,
expert or otherwise, is required to establish its admissibility. The statute has five requirements
that the report must satisfy, all of which are clearly met here.
Specifically, in this case, the reports of the results of DNA genetic testing provided to the
trial court as evidence were in a record, signed under penalty of perjury by a designee of the testing
laboratory that makes the reports self-authenticating. It established a reliable chain of custody
allowing the trial court to admit it without testimony because it included the name and photograph
of individuals whose specimens were taken: Lacey, Ashley, and Jesse IV, who provided their
government-issued photo ID’s, photographs, and fingerprints at the time the samples were
collected. The report also includes the names of uninvolved third parties who collected the
specimens, the date of each collection, the name of the individual who received the specimen in
the testing laboratory and the dates received by LabCorp., Laboratory Corporation of America.
Therefore, the DNA genetic test results are self-authenticating and reliable non-hearsay supporting
that Lacey and Ashley are half-siblings of Jesse IV. See id. § 160.504 (b)(1)-(5).
Dustin also contends that the trial court “retroactively gave effect to a genetic test it had
not ordered.” Dustin claims that this was somehow improper. We disagree. The trial court made
an affirmative finding to order testing at the January 9 hearing as a formality even though the
testing had already been completed and paid for by the testing parties. In any event, the procedures
and rules governing genetic testing in heirship proceedings apply regardless of whether the
individual voluntarily submits to testing or is tested by order of the trial court. See TEX. EST. CODE
ANN. § 160.501 (West 2022). Similarly, “the admissibility of the report is not affected by whether
the testing was performed: (1) voluntarily or under an order of the court[,] . . . or (2) before or after
the date of commencement of the proceeding.” Id. § 160.621 (West 2022). Here, Lacey, Ashley,
and Jesse IV voluntarily underwent testing prior to the heirship proceeding and the report’s
admissibility is unaffected thereby. See id. §§ 160.501, 160.621.
Finally, we note that the genetic testing report was filed with the trial court on May 17,
2023. The heirship hearing took place on January 9, 2024. Dustin had ample notice that the parties
voluntarily underwent genetic testing and knew of the report’s existence and results well before
the hearing. Dustin had every opportunity to contest the results of the testing in accordance with
the statutory procedures but failed to do so other than lodge objections when they were offered
concerning the report’s reliability and hearsay. See In re Wallace, 2013 WL 4817740, at *7–8
8
(holding under predecessor statute that contestant had opportunity to present testimony from
persons performing genetic testing or other expert testimony to contradict the report, but failed to
do so, and accordingly, report provided sufficient proof of heirship).
Accordingly, Dustin’s second issue is overruled.
LEGAL AND FACTUAL SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
In his first issue, Dustin contends that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to
support the trial court’s finding that Lacey and Ashley are heirs.
Standard of Review
Generally, a judgment declaring heirship is reviewed for legal and factual sufficiency. See
In re Estate of Torrance, 991 S.W.2d 98, 100–01 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1999, no pet.); see also In
re Estate of Collier, No. 09-10-00263-CV, 2011 WL 2420989, at *2-3 (Tex. App.—Beaumont
2011, no pet.) (mem. op.). If the judgment includes a determination of a person’s right to inherit
as or through a biological child of the decedent and the decedent is not the presumed father, that
determination is reviewed using the legal and factual sufficiency analysis appropriate for matters
requiring clear and convincing evidence. See TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 201.052(d); In re Estate of
Wallace, 2013 WL 4817740, at *5; cf. In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2002) (termination
of parental rights).
“Clear and convincing evidence is ‘that measure or degree of proof which will produce in
the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to
be established.’” State v. K .E.W., 315 S.W.3d 16, 20 (Tex. 2010) (citing State v. Addington, 588
S.W.2d 569, 570 (Tex. 1979) (per curiam)); see also In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 264–66
(discussing legal and factual sufficiency review when clear and convincing standard of proof); In
re Wallace, 2013 WL 4817740, at *5 (applying clear and convincing legal and factual sufficiency
analysis in heirship proceedings).
When reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence in this circumstance, the appellate
court should look at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s finding “to
determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its
finding was true.” In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266. To give appropriate deference to the
factfinder’s conclusions, we must assume that the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of its
finding if a reasonable factfinder could do so. Id. We disregard all evidence that a reasonable
9
factfinder could have disbelieved or found to have been not credible, but we do not disregard
undisputed facts. Id. Evidence that does no more than raise surmise or suspicion is not sufficient
unless that evidence can produce a firm belief or conviction that the allegation is true. In re
K.M.L., 443 S.W.3d 101, 113 (Tex. 2014). If, after conducting a legal sufficiency review, we
determine that no reasonable factfinder could have formed a firm belief or conviction that the
matter that must be proven was true, then the evidence is legally insufficient, and we must reverse.
Id. (citing In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266).
In a factual sufficiency review, we must give due consideration to evidence that the
factfinder could reasonably have found to be clear and convincing. In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at
266. We must determine whether the evidence is such that a factfinder could reasonably form a
firm belief or conviction about the truth of the petitioner’s allegations. Id. We must also consider
whether disputed evidence is such that a reasonable factfinder could not have resolved the disputed
evidence in favor of its finding. Id. If, considering the entire record, the disputed evidence that a
reasonable factfinder could not have credited in favor of the finding is so significant that a
factfinder could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction, then the evidence is
factually insufficient. Id.
The clear and convincing evidence standard does not mean the evidence must negate all
reasonable doubt or that the evidence must be uncontroverted. In re R.D.S., 902 S.W.2d 714, 716
(Tex. App.—Amarillo 1995, no writ). The reviewing court must recall that the trier of fact has the
authority to weigh the evidence, draw reasonable inferences therefrom, and choose between
conflicting inferences. Id. The factfinder also enjoys the right to resolve credibility issues and
conflicts within the evidence and may freely choose to believe all, part, or none of the testimony
espoused by any witness. Id. Where conflicting evidence is present, the factfinder’s determination
on such matters is generally regarded as conclusive. In re B.R., 950 S.W.2d 113, 121 (Tex. App.—
El Paso 1997, no writ). The appellate court cannot weigh witness credibility issues that depend
on demeanor and appearance. In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005). Even when
credibility issues are reflected in the written transcript, the appellate court must defer to the
factfinder’s determinations, if those determinations are not themselves unreasonable. Id.Dustin’s issues also raise matters of statutory construction, which we review de novo. See
Tex. Mun. Power Agency v. Public Util. Comm’n, 253 S.W.3d 184, 192 (Tex.2007). Of primary
concern in construing a statute is the express statutory language. See Galbraith Eng’g
10
Consultants, Inc. v. Pochucha, 290 S.W.3d 863, 867 (Tex.2009). We apply the plain meaning of
the text unless a different meaning is supplied by legislative definition or is apparent from the
context or the plain meaning leads to absurd results. City of Rockwall v. Hughes, 246 S.W.3d
621, 625–26 (Tex .2008)). We consider the entire act, not isolated portions. 20801, Inc. v. Parker,
249 S.W.3d 392, 396 (Tex.2008).
Applicable Law
Generally, when a person dies intestate, an ownership interest in the decedent’s property
vests in the decedent’s heirs immediately upon death. See TEX. EST. CODE ANN. §§ 101.001(a)(3),
(b) (West 2020), 202.002(1) (West 2020); Woodward v. Jaster, 933 S.W.2d 777, 780 (Tex. App.—
Austin 1996, no writ). To establish who the heirs are and the property they are entitled to, a person
must apply for a judicial determination of heirship. See TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 202.001 (West
2020). A person claiming to be a creditor or the owner of all or part of the decedent’s estate has
standing to apply for the determination. Id. § 202.004(2) (West 2020).
In relevant part, the heirship proceeding requires as follows:
(b) Except as provided by Subsection (c), in a proceeding to declare heirship, testimony regarding
a decedent’s heirs and family history must be taken:
(1) from two disinterested and credible witnesses in open court
....
(c) If it is shown to the court’s satisfaction in a proceeding to declare heirship that, after a diligent
search was made, only one disinterested and credible witness can be found who can make the
required proof in the proceeding, the testimony of that witness must be taken:
(1) in open court . . . .
Id. § 202.151 (West Supp. 2024). Once a judgment declaring heirship has been obtained, third
parties can rely on it and are protected in their dealings with the estate’s personal representative or
the decedent’s heirs. See id. §§ 202.204 (West 2020), 202.205 (West 2020).
Discussion
Dustin contends that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial
court’s finding that Lacey and Ashley are heirs because only one disinterested witness (Moretti)
testified at the hearing, which violates Texas Estates Code Section 202.151. Lacey responds that
she satisfied the statutory requirement for two disinterested and credible witnesses through
Moretti’s and Jesse IV’s in-court testimony. Her argument continues that Jesse IV, although an
11
heir, will have a smaller share in the estate if she and Ashley are heirs, thus he is a disinterested
and credible witness.
We hold that we need not resolve this question. No party disputes that Moretti was a
disinterested and credible witness. The trial court did not expressly find that it was satisfied that
after a diligent search, only one disinterested and credible witness could be found to make the
required proof. However, in this case, none of the parties requested the trial court to make findings
of fact and conclusions of law. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 296 (requiring request for findings and
conclusions to be filed within twenty days after judgment is signed). Where no party requested
such findings, appellate courts imply that the trial court made all fact findings necessary to support
its judgment. See Sixth RMA Partners, L.P. v. Sibley, 111 S.W.3d 46, 52 (Tex. 2003); Black v.
Dallas Cnty. Child Welfare Unit, 835 S.W.2d 626, 631 n. 10 (Tex. 1992). We affirm the judgment
“if it can be upheld on any legal theory that finds support in the evidence.” Worford v. Stamper,
801 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Tex. 1990); see Point Lookout W., Inc. v. Whorton, 742 S.W.2d 277, 278
(Tex. 1987).
Therefore, we hold that even if Jesse IV was not a disinterested and credible witness, the
trial court impliedly found that Moretti was the only available disinterested and credible witness
to make the required showing, which is permitted to provide sufficient proof under the express
language in the statute. TEX. EST. CODE ANN. §§ 202.151(c); see also In re Wallace, 2013 WL
4817740, at *5 (applying implied finding rule to heirship determination and concluding that heir
established paternity inheritance rights by clear and convincing evidence); In re Estate of Collier,
2011 WL 2420989, at *3 (same).
In any event, we have held that the DNA report was admissible evidence, which provides
sufficient proof that Lacey and Ashley are heirs of the decedent. The report’s result does not
automatically establish the rebuttable presumption of paternity. This is because the results fall
short of the 99% probability of the man’s paternity and a combined paternity index of at least 100
to 1. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.505(a). Here, the report concluded that Lacey and Ashley
were likely to be Jesse IV’s half-siblings because “this relationship is as least 49 times more likely
than any other tested relationship and has a probability of 97.98% when comparing all tested
relationships (prior probability = 0.2).” Even though the testing result falls short of creating the
rebuttable presumption, it is still competent evidence of paternity. See TEX. EST. CODE ANN. §
204.153. Furthermore, we conclude that the trial court impliedly found that the decedent’s genetic
12
material was not available, good cause authorized the collection and usage of Jesse IV’s DNA as
an undisputed son of the decedent to be used in place of the decedent’s genetic material, and the
need for testing outweighed any interest of the individuals to be tested. See id. § 204.054.
This evidence, coupled with Moretti’s testimony and the other evidence provided through
the testimony of Lacey, Ashley, and Jesse IV, is clear and convincing evidence to support the
heirship determination. Dustin provided no evidence to the contrary, even though he knew of the
report’s existence. In summary, we hold that a reasonable factfinder could have formed a firm
belief or conviction that the matter that must be proven was true, namely that Lacey and Ashley
are heirs of Jesse Odis Matlock, III. See In re K.M.L., 443 S.W.3d at 113. Similarly, after
considering the entire record, we hold that the disputed evidence that a reasonable factfinder could
have credited in favor of the finding is not so significant that a factfinder could not reasonably
have formed a firm belief or conviction that they are heirs of the decedent. See In re J.F.C., 96
S.W.3d at 266.
Dustin’s first issue is overruled.
DISPOSITION
Having overruled Dustin’s two issues, the trial court’s judgment declaring heirship is
affirmed.
JAMES T. WORTHEN
Chief Justice
Opinion delivered November 20, 2024.
Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.
(PUBLISH)
13
COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT OF TEXAS
JUDGMENT
NOVEMBER 20, 2024
NO. 12-24-00091-CV
ESTATE OF JESSE ODIS MATLOCK, III,
Appellant
Appeal from the County Court at Law
of Houston County, Texas (Tr.Ct.No. 10227)
THIS CAUSE came to be heard on the appellate record and briefs filed
herein, and the same being considered, it is the opinion of this court that there was no error in the
judgment.
It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that the judgment
of the court below be in all things affirmed, and that all costs of this appeal are hereby adjudged
against the appellant, Dustin Matlock, for which execution may issue, and that this decision be
certified to the court below for observance.
James T. Worthen, Chief Justice.
Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.