DocketNumber： PD-0876-13
Filed Date： 4/9/2014
Status： Precedential
Modified Date： 9/16/2015
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
OF TEXAS
NO. PD-0876-13
DANA HANNA, Appellant
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS
ON STATE’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
FROM THE SEVENTH COURT OF APPEALS
LUBBOCK COUNTY
Keller, P.J., filed a dissenting opinion in which Keasler, J., joined.
While appellant was driving while intoxicated, his car struck a utility pole. The pole was broken in half, with power lines spread on the ground. I believe that those facts, by themselves, are sufficient circumstantial evidence of causation (that the defendant’s crime of driving while intoxicated caused the damage to the utility pole). As we stated in Kuciemba v. State, “Being intoxicated at the scene of a traffic accident in which the actor was a driver is some circumstantial evidence that the actor’s intoxication caused the accident, and the inference of causation is even stronger when the accident is a one-car collision with an inanimate object.” This statement, made in connection with the sufficiency of the evidence to support a DWI conviction, in which the applicable standard of proof at trial was “beyond a reasonable doubt,” should apply with even greater force to the restitution inquiry, which involves the lesser standard of proof of “preponderance of the evidence.” And although appellant claimed that his car struck the utility pole because he ran over a water puddle, the trial judge did not have to credit that self-serving explanation.
Further, the force with which appellant hit the utility pole—causing it to break in half—is evidence that appellant failed to timely apply his brakes. The trial judge could rationally infer that such a failure was due to appellant’s intoxication.
I agree with the Court’s analysis of Article 42.037, but I disagree with the way the Court has applied it in this case. I therefore respectfully dissent.
Filed: April 9, 2014
Publish