Jessica Boyett v. State

ACCEPTED
06-15-00023-CR
SIXTH COURT OF APPEALS
TEXARKANA, TEXAS
12/4/2015 1:53:04 PM
DEBBIE AUTREY
CLERK
ORAL ARGUMENT WAIVED
FILED IN
6th COURT OF APPEALS
CAUSE NO. 06-15-00023-CR TEXARKANA, TEXAS
12/4/2015 1:53:04 PM
IN THE DEBBIE AUTREY
Clerk
COURT OF APPEALS
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT TEXARKANA
____________________________________________________________
JESSICA BOYETT, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
____________________________________________________________
ON APPEAL FROM THE 6TH DISTRICT COURT;
LAMAR COUNTY, TEXAS; TRIAL COURT NO. 25505;
HONORABLE WILL BIARD, JUDGE
____________________________________________________________
APPELLEE’S (STATE’S) BRIEF
____________________________________________________________
Gary D. Young
Lamar County and District Attorney
Lamar County Courthouse
119 North Main
Paris, Texas 75460
(903) 737-2470
(903) 737-2455 (fax)
ATTORNEYS FOR THE STATE OF TEXAS
IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL
Pursuant to Tex. R. App. P. 38.2(a)(1)(A), the list of parties and
counsel is not required to supplement or correct the appellant’s list.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE NO:
IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
TABLE OF CONTENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
STATEMENT OF THE CASE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . ix
ISSUE PRESENTED IN REPLY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
STATEMENT OF FACTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES
ISSUE PRESENTED IN REPLY NO. 1: THE TRIAL
COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING THE
APPELLANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS BECAUSE
THE TRAFFIC STOP WAS SUFFICIENTLY SUPPORTED
BY REASONABLE SUSPICION, AND WAS
JUSTIFIED. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
-ii-
PAGE NO.:
ISSUE PRESENTED IN REPLY NO. 2: THE TRIAL
COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING THE
APPELLANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS BECAUSE
JESSICA BOYETT’S ARREST WAS SUPPORTED BY
PROBABLE CAUSE; THE APPELLANT’S CONFESSION
WAS VOLUNTARY; AND THE TRIAL COURT DID
NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN ADMITTING THE
RECORDED STATEMENT/CONFESSION. . . . . . . . 20
ISSUE PRESENTED IN REPLY NO. 3: THE EVIDENCE
WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUBSTANTIATE THE
APPELLANT’S, JESSICA BOYETT’S, GUILT OF
CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY UNDER ARTICLE 1.15 OF
THE TEXAS CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE. . 33
PRAYER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
-iii-
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CASES: PAGE:
Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91; 85 S. Ct. 223; 13 L. Ed. 2d
142 (1964) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Bizzarri v. State, 492 S.W.2d 944, 946 (Tex. Crim. App.
1973) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Blanks v. State, 968 S.W.2d 414, 420, 421 (Tex. App.--Texarkana
1998, pet. ref’d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22, 23,24,30
Butler v. State, 990 S.W.2d 298, 302 (Tex. App.--Texarkana
1999, no pet.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Canada v. State, 446 S.W.2d 601, 603-04 (Tex. App.--
Texarkana 2014, no pet.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 327 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Carroll v. State, 56 S.W.3d 644, 647, 650 (Tex. App.--Waco 2001,
pet. ref’d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13,31
Colvin v. State, 467 S.W.3d 647 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 2015,
pet. ref’d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Delao v. State, 235 S.W.3d 235, 238 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) . . . 20
Dinnery v. State, 592 S.W.2d 343, 353 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel
Op.] 1979) (op. on reh’g) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Ehrhart v. State, 9 S.W.3d 929, 930 (Tex. App.--Beaumont
2000, no pet.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
-iv-
CASES: PAGE:
Flowers v. State, 438 S.W.3d 86, 107 (Tex. App.--Texarkana
2014, pet. ref’d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Garcia v. State, 827 S.W.2d 937, 942 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). . . 25
Gonzalez v. State, 195 S.W.3d 114, 126 (Tex. Crim. App.
2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Graves v. State, 307 S.W.3d 483, 489 (Tex. App.--Texarkana
2010, pet. ref’d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Green v. State, 934 S.W.2d 92, 98 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) . . . . . 20
Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89, 90 (Tex. Crim. App.
1997). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14,24,25,28
Hernandez v. State, 983 S.W.2d 867, 871 (Tex. App.--Austin
1998, pet. ref’d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Herrera v. State, 241 S.W.3d 520, 525, 526 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Martinez v. State, 348 S.W.3d 919, 922-23 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2011) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Martinez v. State, 29 S.W.3d 609, 612 (Tex. App.--Houston
[1st Dist.] 2000, pet. ref’d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17,18
Miller v. State, 418 S.W.3d 692, 696-97 (Tex. App.--Houston
[14th Dist.] 2013, pet. ref’d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 442-457, 467-79; 86 S. Ct.
1602; 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Potts v. State, 571 S.W.2d 180, 182 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel
Op.] 1978) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
-v-
CASES: PAGE:
Renfro v. State, 958 S.W.2d 880, 884 (Tex. App.--Texarkana
1997, pet. ref’d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30-31
Rhodes v. State, 84 S.W.3d 10, 14 (Tex. App.--Texarkana
2002, no pet.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25,27
Rogers v. State, 291 S.W.3d 148, 151 (Tex. App.--Texarkana
2009, pet. ref’d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-14
Romero v. State, 800 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Tex. Crim. App.
1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15,20
Sossamon v. State, 816 S.W.2d 340, 345 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
State, 958 S.W.2d 880, 884 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 1997, pet. ref’d).
State v. Ballard, 987 S.W.2d 889, 891 (Tex. Crim. App.
1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
State v. Bassano, 827 S.W.2d 557, 560 (Tex. App.--Corpus
Christi 1992, pet. ref’d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11,13
State v. Kerwick, 393 S.W.3d 270, 275 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). . 18,19
State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 856-57 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). . . 14
State v. Saenz, 411 S.W.3d 488, 490 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). . . . 21
Stone v. State, 147 S.W.3d 657, 659 (Tex. App.--Amarillo 2004,
pet. ref’d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 113-14; 116 S. Ct. 457; 133
L. Ed. 2d 383 (1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
-vi-
CASES: PAGE:
Tyler v. State, 161 S.W.3d 745, 749 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth
2005, no pet.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16,17,18
Tucker v. State, 183 S.W.3d 501, 507 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth
2005, no pet.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-13
Vanderburg v. State, 365 S.W.3d 712, 713-14 (Tex. App.--
Texarkana 2012, no pet.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Villarreal v. State, 935 S.W.2d 134, 138 (Tex. Crim. App.
1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Wiede v. State, 214 S.W.3d 17, 25 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). . . . . . 32
STATUTES: PAGE:
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. ART. 1.15 (West 2005) . . . . 33
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ART. 1.15 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ART. 14.01(b) (West 2014) . . . . . . 24,27,28
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ART. 38.21 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21,28
TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(e) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
TEX. R. APP. P. 38.2(a)(1). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
TEX. R. APP. P. 38.2(a)(1) (A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. §545.060 (West 2011) . . . . . . . . 12,16,18
TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. §545.060 (a)(1)-(2)
(West 2011) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a conspiracy case, and is a companion case to cause number
06-15-00024-CR styled Rodney Boyett v. The State of Texas.
Law enforcement officers in Lamar County were notified that Jessica
Boyett had just purchased pseudoephedrine at CVS located at 507
Clarksville in downtown Paris. See RR, pgs. 9, 13. Law enforcement
officers had also located a vehicle, a white pickup, that was registered to
Rodney Boyett. See RR, pg. 14. After surveillance and an investigation, a
traffic stop was initiated and a probable cause search of the vehicle (white
pickup) revealed pseudoephedrine tablets and other chemicals. Jessica
Boyett was arrested along with her husband (Rodney Boyett) and charged
with possession of chemicals. See RR, pgs. 33-34.
Jessica Boyett filed a motion to suppress which, after a hearing, was
denied by the trial court. See RR, pg. 170. Jessica Boyett then accepted a
plea bargain agreement that assessed a $500.00 fine and sentenced her to
five years confinement in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice
Institutional Division; however, that was probated for a period of three
years. See RR, pg. 179. Jessica Boyett timely filed his notice of appeal. See
CR, pg. 188. The certification included that “the right to appeal the judge’s
ruling on the motion to suppress.” See CR, pg. 183.
-viii-
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
The State of Texas will waive oral argument. See Tex. R. App. P.
38.1(e), 38.2(a)(1).
-ix-
ISSUES PRESENTED IN REPLY
ISSUE PRESENTED IN REPLY NO. 1: THE TRIAL COURT DID
NOT ERR IN DENYING THE APPELLANT’S MOTION TO
SUPPRESS BECAUSE THE TRAFFIC STOP WAS SUFFICIENTLY
SUPPORTED BY REASONABLE SUSPICION, AND WAS
JUSTIFIED.
ISSUE PRESENTED IN REPLY NO. 2: THE TRIAL COURT DID
NOT ERR IN DENYING THE APPELLANT’S MOTION TO
SUPPRESS BECAUSE JESSICA BOYETT’S ARREST WAS
SUPPORTED BY PROBABLE CAUSE; THE APPELLANT’S
CONFESSION WAS VOLUNTARY; AND THE TRIAL COURT DID
NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN ADMITING THE RECORDED
STATEMENT/CONFESSION.
ISSUE PRESENTED IN REPLY NO. 3: THE EVIDENCE WAS
SUFFICIENT TO SUBSTANTIATE THE APPELLANT’S, JESSICA
BOYETT’S, GUILT OF CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY UNDER
ARTICLE 1.15 OF THE TEXAS CODE OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE.
-x-
CAUSE NO. 06-15-00023-CR
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT TEXARKANA
____________________________________________________________
JESSICA BOYETT, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
____________________________________________________________
ON APPEAL FROM THE 6TH DISTRICT COURT;
LAMAR COUNTY, TEXAS; TRIAL COURT NO. 25505;
HONORABLE WILL BIARD, JUDGE
____________________________________________________________
APPELLEE’S (STATE’S) BRIEF
____________________________________________________________
TO HONORABLE SIXTH COURT OF APPEALS:
COMES NOW, the State of Texas, by and through its Lamar County
and District Attorney’s Office, files this its Appellee’s Brief under Rule 38.2
of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Unless otherwise indicated, the appellant will be referred to as
“Jessica Boyett” and the appellee will be referred to as “the State.”
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Factual Background.
In the fall of 2013, Lieutenant Anson Amis (Amis) with the sheriff’s
department had a program that monitored the purchase of pseudoephedrine.
See RR, pg. 9. Through that system, he was allowed to “flag” (RR, pgs. 9,
13) people or certain individuals that he thought might have suspicious
buying patterns of pseudoephedrine. See RR, pgs. 9, 13. Amis contacted
Leigh Foreman (Foreman) with the Paris Police Department and stated that
Jessica Boyett had just purchased pseudoephedrine at CVS located at 507
Clarksville in downtown Paris. See RR, pgs. 9, 13.
On September 24, 2013, Foreman then became involved in an
investigation of Rodney and Jessica Boyett. See RR, pg. 9. Rodney and
Jessica Boyett were married (RR, pg. 9), and they lived in Rattan,
Oklahoma. See RR, pg. 14.
According to Amis, Jessica and Rodney Boyett had the same address
on their drivers license, and were buying pills in the Paris area at different
pharmacies in a close timeframe together. See RR, pg. 12. Foreman
believed that they were being deceptive in their buying of pseudoephedrine,
and that they were purchasing pills for the use of making methamphetamine.
-2-
See RR, pg. 12.
Amis called Foreman and asked if he could go to the CVS Pharmacy
out by Wal-Mart, which was at 3710 Lamar Avenue. See RR, pgs. 13, 17.
Foreman did. See RR, pg. 14. The purpose in going to a different pharmacy
was to see if Rodney Boyett was going to buy. See RR, pg. 14. “We usually
call them a pill run.” See RR, pg. 15.
Amis had located a vehicle, a white pickup, that was registered to
Rodney Boyett. See RR, pg. 14. The vehicle was in the parking lot, and had
Oklahoma tags. See RR, pg. 16.
In unmarked vehicles, Foreman, Amis and Detective Tommy Moore
began surveillance at 3710 Lamar Avenue. See RR, pg. 16. The pickup left,
and the officers began following the vehicle. See RR, pg. 17. The vehicle
went to Home Depot, where it stayed for “a short while.” See RR, pg. 17.
Foreman observed that both Rodney and Jessica Boyett entered the store,
then left the store and got back into the vehicle. See RR, pgs. 18-19. They
went back towards Wal-Mart. See RR, pg. 19.
The officers continued their surveillance and followed them as they
traveled back to Wal-Mart. See RR, pg. 19. They were in Wal-Mart, again
for a short time, before “exiting Wal-Mart, getting in their vehicle and
-3-
leaving.” See RR, pg. 19. See also RR, pg. 21.
The officers followed them to see if they would make any other stops
before leaving to go back towards Oklahoma. See RR, pg. 21. “They did
not.” See RR, pg. 21.
Observation of a Traffic violation.
In the 1100 block of the northeast Loop, Foreman observed a traffic
violation; they failed to maintain a single lane. See RR, pg. 21. There was
really heavy traffic on the Loop, so Foreman waited for them to exit on
North Main (i.e. Highway 271), heading northbound. At that time, he
initiated a traffic stop. See RR, pg. 22.
As Foreman approached on the driver’s side, Rodney Boyett was in
the driver’s seat. See RR, pg. 23. Foreman identified himself, explained to
Rodney Boyett why he had been stopped, and asked for identification. See
RR, pg. 25. Foreman asked Rodney Boyett to exit the vehicle, so he could
speak with him about his activity for the day. See RR, pg. 25. Foreman and
Rodney Boyett went to the rear of the vehicle. See RR, pg. 29.
According to Rodney Boyett, he had been to the CVS, Wal-Mart and
Home Depot. See RR, pg. 25. Rodney Boyett said that they had purchased
pseudoephedrine at Wal-Mart. See RR, pg. 26. Rodney Boyett also said
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that he had liquid heat in the vehicle. See RR, pgs. 26, 29. Finally, Rodney
Boyett told Foreman that “they were good people.” See RR, pg. 28. See
also RR, pg. 29.
Detective Moore began speaking with Jessica Boyett. See RR, pg. 29.
They were at the front of the vehicle on the passenger side. See RR, pg. 29.
Later, Foreman asked her if they had any ingredients to make
methamphetamine, and she said they did not. See RR, pg. 30.
Foreman went to the white pickup, and he searched the vehicle (RR,
pgs. 30, 32) for ingredients used to manufacture methamphetamine. See RR,
pgs. 30. Foreman believed that he had probable cause to believe that there
was evidence of a crime in the vehicle. See RR, pg. 32. Rodney and Jessica
Boyett were detained at that time. See RR, pg. 36. See also RR, pg. 64
(“they were still in detention.”).
Probable Cause Search and Arrest.
During the search, Foreman found boxes of ephedrine and
pseudoephedrine tablets. See RR, pgs. 33, 65. Also, Foreman found two
bottles of liquid heat, rubber tubing and there bottles of hydrogen peroxide.
See RR, pgs. 33, 64. Foreman took possession of those items and placed
Rodney and Jessica Boyett under arrest for possession of certain chemicals.
-5-
See RR, pgs. 33-34, 37.
An “actual” police vehicle arrived, and they were placed in the back
of that unit because suspects were not transported in unmarked vehicles. See
RR, pg. 34. They were transported to the Paris Police Department and
placed in the booking room. See RR, pgs. 37, 65.
Interviews of Jessica Boyett.
Jessica Boyett was booked-in first. See RR, pg. 37. Foreman asked
Jessica Boyett if she wanted to speak with him, and she did. See RR, pg. 39.
In the CID office (RR, pg. 38), Foreman and Detective Moore interviewed
Jessica Boyett first. See RR, pg. 36. Foreman read her Miranda rights and
warning during her two interviews that night. See RR, pgs. 38-40.
During the first interview, Jessica Boyett was deceptive about the
intended use. See RR, pg. 40. “She lied.” See RR, pg. 40. She did not ask
to have a lawyer. See RR, pg. 45.
Prior to the second interview, Jessica Boyett indicated that she wanted
to speak with us again, and that she wanted to tell the truth. See RR, pg. 43.
Foreman escorted her back to the CID interview room and gave her the
Miranda warning, once again. See RR, pg. 44.
During the second interview, Jessica Boyett did indicate that the
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liquid heat was used to manufacture methamphetamine. See RR, pg. 44.
Jessica Boyett said that she had used methamphetamine the previous day by
shooting it up with a syringe, and that she (and Rodney) had both used
methamphetamine the previous day, after he had gotten off work. See RR,
pg. 44.
Also, Jessica Boyett talked about Rodney Boyett cooking
methamphetamine. See RR, pg. 45. It was cooked on a shed on their
property. See RR, pgs. 45, 50. During the interviews, Jessica Boyett said
that “she didn’t know how to cook, but she had been present while it was
cooked, but that she [did] not know how to cook it.” See RR, pg. 49. See
also State’s Exhibit 2.
Interview of Rodney Boyett.
Foreman and Detective Moore decided to interview Rodney Boyett on
the following day. See RR, pg. 50. Foreman began his interview with
Rodney Boyett at approximately 8:30 a.m. that morning. S e e R R , p g . 5 1 .
He was “Mirandized.” See RR, pg. 51.
During the interview, Rodney Boyett talked about his
methamphetamine use, since he was 14 years of age. See RR, pg. 51. He
used it by injection, and he showed a needle mark on his left arm where he
-7-
had used methamphetamine. See RR, pg. 51.
Eventually, Rodney Boyett said that they had a shed where he cooked
it. See RR, pg. 52. He went in to specific detail about how his particular
process of cooking methamphetamine, a “Red P.” See RR, pg. 52 (“red
phosphorous”). See also State’s Exhibit 1.
Procedural Background.
On November 14, 2013, a grand jury in Lamar County returned an
original indictment against Jessica Boyett in cause number 25505.1 See CR
(25505), pg. 5. By two (2) counts in this indictment, the State charged
Jessica Boyett with the felony offenses of (1) conspiracy to manufacture a
controlled substance, namely, methamphetamine of more than one gram but
less than four grams and (2) possession or transportation of chemicals with
intent to manufacture a controlled substance. See CR, pg. 5.
Pre-Trial Suppression Hearing on February 3, 2015.
Subsequently, Jessica Boyett filed her motion to suppress on or about
April 22, 2014. See CR, pgs. 73-75. During a hearing on February 3rd, the
trial court called cause number 25505 (and 25506),2 after impaneling a jury
1
Similarly, the grand jury returned an original indictment against Rodney Boyett in
cause number 25506.
2
The corresponding appellate cause number is 06-15-00024-CR.
-8-
the previous day. See RR, pg. 6. The trial court approved the agreement
between counsel as to a motion in limine. See RR, pgs. 6-7. The trial court
then proceeded with Jessica Boyett’s motion to suppress. See RR, pg. 7.
The State stipulated that the search of the vehicle was without a
warrant, and called its first witness (Foreman). See RR, pg. 8. During
Foreman’s testimony, the proceedings were interrupted, and the trial court
invoked “the Rule” with the exception of the expert-witnesses. See RR, pgs.
10-11. Upon the conclusion of Foreman’s testimony, the State rested for
purposes of the motion to suppress. See RR, pg. 71.
The defense presented several witnesses, which included the
testimony of Rodney Boyett (RR, pgs. 71-98) and Jessica Boyett. See RR,
pgs. 98-114. Upon the conclusion of the testimony from the defense
witnesses, the trial court ruled, “[b]ased on the totality of the evidence that
the Court has heard and considered, the Court is going to deny the Motion to
Suppress.” See RR, pg. 170.
On February 3, 2015, the trial court signed its order denying the
motion to suppress. See CR, pg. 170.
Subsequent Proceedings.
Subsequently, the State abandoned count 2 in the original indictment,
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and the trial court accepted a plea bargain agreement. See RR, pg. 178. The
trial court then found Jessica Boyett guilty and sentenced her to five (5)
years in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice Institutional Division but
placed her on community supervision for a period of three (3) years. See
RR, pgs. 178-179. The trial court assessed a $500.00 fine. See RR, pg. 179.
In addition, the trial court approved the portion of the plea bargain
agreement that allowed Jessica Boyett to appeal any pre-trial motions,
including the motion to suppress. See RR, pg. 179. On February 3, 2015,
the trial court signed its judgment of conviction by court--waiver of jury
trial. See CR, pgs. 189-190.
On February 4, 2015, Jessica Boyett timely filed her notice of appeal.
See CR, pg. 188. The trial court’s certification specifically included that
“Defendant shall have the right to appeal the judge’s ruling on the motion to
suppress and all pretrial motions.” See CR, pg. 183.
Procedural Background: Appeal.
On or about February 10, 2015, Jessica Boyett, as the appellant, filed
her notice of appeal in this Court. On March 2nd, appellate counsel filed a
notice of appearance for Jessica Boyett. See CR, pgs. 191-192.
By electronic filing or about March 31st, the District Clerk of Lamar
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County filed the Clerk’s Record. The official court reporter filed the
Reporter’s Record on or about July 7th along with the exhibits on or about
July 13, 2015.
The appellant (Jessica Boyett) filed a motion to extend time to file her
brief, which this Court granted on or about July 27, 2015. The appellant
filed a second motion to extend time to file her brief, which this Court again
granted on or about September 9, 2015. The appellant then filed her brief on
October 5, 2015.
On or about November 4th, the State filed a motion to extend time to
file its brief, which this Court granted until December 4, 2015. The State
filed, or will be, filing its brief on or before December 4th.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
As a passenger in the vehicle, Jessica Boyett had standing to challenge
the search of the vehicle registered to her husband (Rodney Boyett) because
of community property laws. See State v. Bassano, 827 S.W.2d 557, 560
(Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1992, pet. ref’d).
In summary, the trial court did not err in denying the appellant’s,
Jessica Boyett’s, motion to suppress for the same reasons as in the State’s
Brief in cause number 06-15-00024-CR (now set for submission on the
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briefs on December 3, 2015). Those reasons are the following:
(1) The traffic stop was sufficiently supported by reasonable
suspicion on the basis of (a) section 545.060 of the Texas Transportation
Code and (b) the officers’ investigation of the pharmacy logs of purchases of
pseudoephedrine in Lamar County.
(2) The appellant’s arrest without a warrant was sufficiently
supported by probable cause; and after Jessica Boyett’s lawful arrest, her
recorded statement/confession was voluntary.
(3) Finally, the evidence was sufficient to substantiate the
appellant’s guilt of criminal conspiracy under article 1.15 of the Texas Code
of Criminal Procedure. Thus, the final judgment of conviction should be
affirmed.
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES
ISSUE PRESENTED IN REPLY NO. 1: THE TRIAL COURT DID
NOT ERR IN DENYING THE APPELLANT’S MOTION TO
SUPPRESS BECAUSE THE TRAFFIC STOP WAS SUFFICIENTLY
SUPPORTED BY REASONABLE SUSPICION, AND WAS
JUSTIFIED.
A. The Appellant’s (Jessica Boyett’s) Issue of Standing.
A passenger generally has no standing to contest the search of a
vehicle. See, e.g., Tucker v. State, 183 S.W.3d 501, 507 (Tex. App.--Fort
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Worth 2005, no pet.); Stone v. State, 147 S.W.3d 657, 659 (Tex. App.--
Amarillo 2004, pet. ref’d); Carroll v. State, 56 S.W.3d 644, 650 (Tex. App.--
Waco 2001, pet. ref’d). In her brief, Jessica Boyett did not address the issue
of standing, but neither party raised the issue of standing in the trial court
below. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a).
After the traffic stop, Foreman approached the vehicle on the driver’s
side and Rodney Boyett was in the driver’s seat. See RR, pg. 23. When
Detective Moore began speaking with Jessica Boyett, they were at the front
of the vehicle on the passenger side. See RR, pg. 29. So, Jessica Boyett was
a passenger in the vehicle at the time of the stop. Also, Rodney Boyett and
Jessica Boyett were married at the time of the stop. See RR, pg. 9.
As a passenger in the vehicle, Jessica Boyett had standing to challenge
the search of the vehicle registered to her husband (Rodney Boyett) because
of community property laws. See State v. Bassano, 827 S.W.2d 557, 560
(Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1992, pet. ref’d).
B. Standard of Review: Motion to Suppress.
This Court reviews a trial court’s decision on a motion to suppress
evidence by applying a bifurcated standard of review. See Graves v. State,
307 S.W.3d 483, 489 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 2010, pet. ref’d).; Rogers v.
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State, 291 S.W.3d 148, 151 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 2009, pet. ref’d).
Because the trial court is the exclusive trier of fact and judge of witness
credibility at a suppression hearing, this Court affords almost total deference
to its determination of facts supported by the record. See State v. Ross, 32
S.W.3d 853, 856-57 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Carmouche v. State, 10
S.W.3d 323, 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85,
89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). This Court affords the same deference to a trial
court’s rulings on mixed questions of law and fact if the resolution of those
questions turns on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. See Villarreal
v. State, 935 S.W.2d 134, 138 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). This Court reviews
de novo the trial court’s application of the law and determination of
questions not turning on credibility. See Carmouche, 10 S.W.3d at 327;
Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 89. Since all the evidence is viewed in the light
most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, this Court is obligated to uphold
the denial of the appellant’s motion to suppress if it was supported by the
record and was correct under any theory of law applicable to the case. See
Carmouche, 10 S.W.3d at 327; State v. Ballard, 987 S.W.2d 889, 891 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1999).
The trial court’s evidentiary ruling “will be upheld on appeal if it is
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correct on any theory of law that finds support in the record.” See Flowers
v. State, 438 S.W.3d 86, 107 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 2014, pet. ref’d) (citing
Gonzalez v. State, 195 S.W.3d 114, 126 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Romero v.
State, 800 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990)).
C. Section 545.060 of the Texas Transportation Code.
Section 545.060 of the Texas Transportation Code stated in pertinent
part that “an operator on a roadway divided into two or more clearly marked
lanes for traffic: (1) shall drive as nearly as practical entirely within a single
lane; and (2) may not move from the lane unless that movement can be made
safely.” See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 545.060(a)(1)-(2) (West 2011). This
statute is violated only when the vehicle’s movement is unsafe.3 See Miller
v. State, 418 S.W.3d 692, 696-97 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet.
ref’d); Ehrhart v. State, 9 S.W.3d 929, 930 (Tex. App.--Beaumont 2000, no
pet.); Hernandez v. State, 983 S.W.2d 867, 871 (Tex. App.--Austin 1998,
pet. ref’d).
D. Application of Law to the Facts in the Present Case.
1. The Evidence Supported the Trial Court’s Finding of Fact
and Conclusion of Law that the Vehicle’s Movement Was Unsafe.
3
See RR, pg. 141 (“The holding here and the argument that I want to make to the Court
is that the language in this statute is that there has to be testimony that there was an
unsafe failure to stay in a lane.”). See also RR, pg. 146 (“there was no testimony that it
was unsafe.”).
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In the present case, Foreman testified during the suppression hearing
to the following:
Q. So what happened next?
A. We followed them to see if they would make any
other stops before leaving to go back towards Oklahoma. They
did not. In about the 1100 block of the northeast loop I
observed a traffic violation where they failed to maintain a
single lane, which is described as vehicles left side tires -- they
were in the right lane, and the vehicles left side tires crossed
over the center line into the left lane before going back.
Q. Okay. Is that a traffic violation under the Safety
Code In the State of Texas?
A. Under the Transportation Code.
Q. I’m sorry. Transportation Code?
A. Yes.
See RR, pgs. 21-22.
Although Rodney Boyett contended in his brief that “Foreman’s
description of what he saw was insufficient to fully describe a violation of §
545.060[,]”4 the evidence could have supported the trial court’s finding that
the vehicle movement was unsafe. See Tyler v. State, 161 S.W.3d 745, 749
(Tex. App.--Fort Worth 2005, no pet.) (holding that the evidence
supports the trial court’s implicit finding that appellant’s act of moving out
4
See generally Appellant’s Brief, pg. 30. See also RR, pgs. 141, 146.
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of his lane of traffic, “straddling” the white line separating the traveling lane
from the shoulder, and “erratically” re-entering his lane of traffic at an angle
was unsafe and therefore a violation of section 545.060). In Tyler, the court
of appeals held that the officer “could have stopped appellant because he
saw him fail to maintain a single lane of traffic.” See id (citing Martinez v.
State, 29 S.W.3d 609, 612 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. ref’d)
(holding that it was not unreasonable for the officer to conclude appellant’s
swerve onto the shoulder of a busy highway in the early hours of the
morning was unsafe).
Similarly, here, the evidence could have supported the trial court’s
finding and conclusion of law (CR, pgs. 196, 199) that the vehicle
movement was unsafe because Foreman testified that “there was really
heavy traffic” still on the Loop. See RR, pg. 22. Also, Foreman testified
that he “waited for them to exit on North Main headed northbound at which
time I initiated a traffic stop.” See RR, pg. 22. That testimony was
sufficient for the trial court to make finding of fact number 9. See CR, pg.
196. Further, Foreman’s testimony was sufficient to support the trial court’s
third conclusion of law that “Mr. Boyett moved from his lane when such
movement could not have been made safely.” See CR, pg. 199.
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As in Martinez, it was not unreasonable for Foreman to conclude that
the vehicle’s left side tires crossing over the center line was unsafe. See
Martinez, 29 S.W.3d at 612. In conclusion, Foreman could have stopped the
appellant, Rodney Boyett, because he saw him fail to maintain a single lane
of traffic. See Tyler, 161 S.W.3d at 749; Tex. Transp. Code Ann. §
545.060(a) (West 2011). The stop was justified, and that the trial court
properly denied the appellant’s motion to suppress. See Martinez, 29
S.W.3d at 612.
2. The Trial Court Could Have Found Additional Reasonable
Suspicion.
In her brief, Jessica Boyett claimed that the information about
pseudoephedrine purchases did not amount to reasonable suspicion, but a
court may find reasonable suspicion even though “each fact in isolation may
be insufficient.” See State v. Kerwick, 393 S.W.3d 270, 275 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2013). In the present case, the trial court heard Foreman’s testimony
that in the fall of 2013, Lieutenant Anson Amis with the sheriff’s department
had a program that monitored the purchase of pseudoephedrine. See RR, pg.
9. Through that system, he was allowed to “flag” (RR, pgs. 9, 13) people or
certain individuals that he thought might have suspicious buying patterns.
See RR, pgs. 9, 13. Through that system and the investigation of pharmacy
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logs, law enforcement in Lamar County has lawfully obtained search
warrants of residences. See Canada v. State, 446 S.W.2d 601, 603-04 (Tex.
App.--Texarkana 2014, no pet.); Vanderburg v. State, 365 S.W.3d 712, 713-
14 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 2012, no pet.).
When Amis contacted Foreman and stated that Jessica Boyett had just
purchased pseudoephedrine at CVS located at 507 Clarksville in downtown
Paris (RR, pgs. 9, 13), Foreman testified that he believed Jessica Boyett and
Rodney Boyett were being deceptive in their buying of pseudoephedrine,
and that they were purchasing pseudoephedrine for the use of making
methamphetamine. See RR, pg. 12. When Foreman observed the Boyett’s
vehicle make stops at pharmacies, he had developed reasonable suspicion of
a “pill run.” See RR, pg. 15 (“We usually call them a pill run.”).
While the fact of the pseudoephedrine purchase at CVS located at 507
Clarksville in downtown Paris (RR, pgs. 9, 13), in isolation, may have been
insufficient, the trial court could have still found reasonable suspicion
because the officers observed stops at other pharmacies. See Kerwick, 393
S.W.3d at 275. Foreman articulated specific facts that supported a “pill
run.” See id; RR, pg. 15.
Because the trial court could have found reasonable suspicion on that
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additional basis, Jessica Boyett’s argument in her brief should be rejected.
Accordingly, the appellant’s first issue/point of error should be overruled.
ISSUE PRESENTED IN REPLY NO. 2: THE TRIAL COURT DID
NOT ERR IN DENYING THE APPELLANT’S MOTION TO
SUPPRESS BECAUSE JESSICA BOYETT’S ARREST WAS
SUPPORTED BY PROBABLE CAUSE; THE APPELLANT’S
CONFESSION WAS VOLUNTARY; AND THE TRIAL COURT DID
NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN ADMITING THE RECORDED
STATEMENT/CONFESSION.
A. Standard of Review.
“[T]he trial court is the ‘sole and exclusive trier of fact and judge of
the credibility of the witnesses’ and the evidence presented at a hearing on a
motion to suppress, particularly where the motion is based on the
voluntariness of a confession.” See Colvin v. State, 467 S.W.3d 647 (Tex.
App.--Texarkana 2015, pet. ref’d) (citing Delao v. State, 235 S.W.3d 235,
238 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (citations omitted); Green v. State, 934 S.W.2d
92, 98 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); Romero v. State, 800 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1990); Bizzarri v. State, 492 S.W.2d 944, 946 (Tex. Crim. App.
1973)). Thus, in reviewing the trial court’s factual determination of the
circumstances surrounding the interrogation, this Court gives almost total
deference to the trial court. See Martinez v. State, 348 S.W.3d 919, 922-23
(Tex. Crim. App. 2011). However, because the question of whether a
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reasonable person would feel that he was not free to terminate the
questioning and leave is a mixed question of law and fact that does not
depend on the trial court’s credibility determination, this Court employs a de
novo standard when evaluating this question. See Thompson v. Keohane,
516 U.S. 99, 113-14; 116 S. Ct. 457; 133 L. Ed. 2d 383 (1995); State v. Saenz,
411 S.W.3d 488, 490 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).
B. This Court Should Give Almost Total Deference to the Trial
Court, Which Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Admitting the Recorded
Statement/Confession in State’s Exhibit 2.
With his second issue/point of error, Jessica Boyett alleged that the
trial court erred when it denied the appellant’s motion to suppress her
recorded statement because (1) it was given in response to custodial
interrogation by the police; (2) it was obtained as a result of his illegal arrest;
and (3) it was not shown to be freely and voluntarily made without
compulsion or persuasion as required by article 38.21 of the Texas Code of
Criminal Procedure.
1. The Appellant Had the Initial Burden of Proving that His
Statement Was the Product of “Custodial Interrogation”.
The United States Supreme Court has defined “custodial
interrogation” as “questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a
person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of
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action in any significant way.” See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 442-
457, 467-79; 86 S. Ct. 1602; 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966); Herrera v. State, 241
S.W.3d 520, 525 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). At trial, the defendant bears the
initial burden of proving that a statement was the product of “custodial
interrogation.” See Herrera, 241 S.W.3d at 526.
The mere filing of a motion to suppress does not thrust a burden
on the State to show compliance with Miranda . . . warnings
unless and until the defendant proves that the statements he
wishes to exclude were the product of custodial interrogation.
Thus, the State has no burden at all unless ‘the record as a
whole clearly establishe[s]’ that the defendant’s statement was
the product of custodial interrogation by an agent for law
enforcement. It is the defendant’s initial burden to establish
those facts on the record.
See id (italics added in the opinion).
In the present case, Jessica Boyett had the initial burden of proving
that her statement was the product of “custodial interrogation” at trial. See
id. Assuming that Jessica Boyett met her initial burden, the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in admitting the statement during the suppression
hearing. See Blanks v. State, 968 S.W.2d 414, 420 (Tex. App.--Texarkana
1998, pet. ref’d). In Blanks, an aggravated robbery case, this Court reasoned
that:
We agree with [the appellant] Blanks that, at the time he made
oral statements which implicated himself, the inquiry turned
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into a custodial interrogation. This is because at that point and
time there was probable cause to arrest Blanks, and he was
certainly a focus of the investigation. However, [officer]
Simmons testified, and the trial court found, that Blanks was
immediately given the statutory warnings before any other
statements were made. The inculpatory statements contained in
the “Statement of a Person in Custody” were taken after Blanks
had received the appropriate warnings and waived his rights.
Although Blanks was in custody, he was properly warned
before giving the statement which was admitted at trial. The
trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the
statement.
See id.
As in Blanks, at the time Jessica Boyett made the oral statements
which implicated herself, Foreman’s inquiry had turned into a custodial
interrogation. See id. As in Blanks, this is because there was probable cause
to arrest Jessica Boyett at that point and time. See id. However, Foreman
testified that Jessica Boyett was given the statutory warnings before any
other statement was made. See id. See also RR, pgs. 38, 40. Jessica Boyett
indicated that she understood her rights. See RR, pg. 39.
As in Blanks, the inculpatory statements contained in the recorded
statement were taken after Jessica Boyett had received the appropriate
warnings and waived her rights. See Blanks, 968 S.W.2d at 420. Although
Jessica Boyett was in custody, she was properly warned before giving the
statement. See id. That statement was properly admitted during the
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suppression hearing. See RR, pg. 57. See also State’s Exhibit 2.
As in Blanks, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting
the statement in State’s Exhibit 2. See Blanks, 968 S.W.2d at 420. This
Court should hold accordingly as to Jessica Boyett (and Rodney Boyett).
2. The Appellant’s Arrest Was Supported by Probable Cause,
And Not Illegal.
a. Applicable Law: Probable Cause.
With the second sub-part of his second issue/point of error, Jessica
Boyett contended in her brief that his recorded statement/confession was
obtained, and was tainted, by his illegal/unlawful arrest because “there was a
lack of probable cause to support the warrantless arrest.” But, article 14.01
of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provided that “[a] peace officer
may arrest an offender without a warrant for any offense committed in his
presence or within his view.” See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 14.01(b)
(West 2014); Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 90 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
In Guzman, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that the test for
probable cause for a warrantless arrest is:
“Whether at that moment the facts and circumstances within the
officer’s knowledge and of which [he] had reasonably
trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent
man in believing the arrested person had committed or was
committing an offense.”
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See Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 90. See also Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91; 85
S. Ct. 223; 13 L. Ed. 2d 142 (1964) (“whether at that moment the facts and
circumstances within their knowledge and of which they had reasonably
trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in
believing that the petitioner had committed or was committing an offense.”).
In determining whether probable cause existed, this Court’s
evaluation of the facts surrounding the event is completely objective. See
Rhodes v. State, 84 S.W.3d 10, 14 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 2002, no pet.)
(citing Garcia v. State, 827 S.W.2d 937, 942 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992)).
When several officers are involved in investigating a crime, the sum of
information known to cooperating officers at the time of arrest is to be
considered in determining whether probable cause to arrest existed. See
Butler v. State, 990 S.W.2d 298, 302 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 1999, no pet.).
b. Sufficient Probable Cause Existed in the Present Case.
In applying the law to the present case, several officers (Foreman,
Amis, Moore) in Lamar County were involved in investigating a crime that
began when Amis contacted Foreman and stated that Jessica Boyett had just
purchased pseudoephedrine at CVS located at 507 Clarksville in downtown
Paris. See RR, pgs. 9, 13. Amis had located a vehicle, a white pickup, that
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was registered to Rodney Boyett. See RR, pg. 14. The officers began
surveillance in unmarked vehicles at 3710 Lamar. See RR, pg. 16. When
the white pickup left, the officers began following the vehicle. See RR, pg.
17. The vehicle went to Home Depot, where it stayed for “a short while.”
See RR, pg. 17. When the vehicle went back towards Wal-Mart (RR, pg.
19), the officers continued their surveillance and followed them as they
traveled back to Wal-Mart. See RR, pg. 19. They were in Wal-Mart, again
for a short time, before “exiting Wal-Mart, getting in their vehicle and
leaving.” See RR, pg. 19. See also RR, pg. 21.
The officers followed them to see if they would make any other stops
before leaving to go back towards Oklahoma. See RR, pg. 21. “They did
not.” See RR, pg. 21. When they did not, Foreman, who already had
sufficient reasonable suspicion for a “pill run” (RR, pg. 15), initiated a
lawful traffic stop on Highway 271, which was the highway that leads back
to Oklahoma. See RR, pg. 22.
During the traffic stop, Foreman and Rodney Boyett conversed at the
rear of the vehicle (RR, pg. 29). According to Foreman, this conversation
was “approximately five, no longer than ten” minutes, a reasonable time.
See RR, pg. 31. During their conversation, Rodney Boyett said that they had
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purchased pseudoephedrine at Wal-Mart. See RR, pg. 26. Rodney Boyett
also said that he had liquid heat in the vehicle. See RR, pgs. 26, 29.
With that information, Foreman had sufficient probable cause to
search the vehicle. See RR, pgs. 30, 32. According to Foreman’s testimony,
he believed that he had probable cause to believe that there was evidence of
a crime in the vehicle. See RR, pg. 32.
The probable cause search revealed two boxes of ephedrine,
pseudoephedrine tablets that were consistent with the purchases that Amis
had “flagged.” See RR, pg. 33. The search also revealed two bottles of
liquid heat, rubber tubing and three bottles of hydrogen peroxide. See RR,
pg. 33. Foreman then took possession of these items and placed Rodney
Boyett under arrest for possession of certain chemicals. See RR, pgs. 33-34.
When the facts surrounding the investigation and traffic stop of
September 24, 2013 were viewed objectively, see Rhodes, 84 S.W.3d at 14,
sufficient probable cause existed for Foreman to place Jessica Boyett under
arrest without a warrant. See generally Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art.
14.01(b) (West 2014). Foreman’s surveillance of the vehicle, which
included stops at other pharmacies (other than the CVS at 507 Clarksville),
provided Foreman with sufficient probable cause to believe that
-27-
pseudoephedrine had been purchased and was within the vehicle at the time
of the lawful traffic stop. Foreman’s probable cause search of the vehicle,
which included pseudoephedrine tablets from pharmacies that Amis had
“flagged,” established that Jessica Boyett had committed an offense in
Foreman’s presence or within his view on September 24, 2013 in Paris,
Lamar County, Texas. Therefore, Foreman was authorized to arrest Jessica
Boyett without a warrant. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 14.01(b)
(West 2014); Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 90.
That arrest without a warrant was lawful, and supported by sufficient
probable cause. Therefore, the appellant’s second issue/point of error should
be overruled.
3. The Statement/Confession Was Voluntarily Given.
With the third and final sub-part of his second issue/point of error,
Jessica Boyett contended that the trial court erred when it denied his motion
to suppress because it was not shown to be freely and voluntarily made
without compulsion or persuasion as required by Article 38.21 of the Texas
Code of Criminal Procedure. In this regard, Jessica Boyett alleged that (1)
she was expressly denied access to counsel; and (2) was threatened with loss
of her children unless she told the officer what the officer wanted to hear.
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See Appellant’s Brief, pg. 45.
(a) Allegedly Denied Access to Counsel.
In the present case, Foreman testified that Jessica Boyett did not ask to
have a lawyer. See RR, pg. 45. More specifically, Foreman testified to
question and answer, as follows:
Q. Okay. Now, I want to ask you, at times during the
first interview, did Ms. Boyett ever use the word lawyer?
A. She did.
Q. Did she ask to have a lawyer?
A. She did not.
Q. What did she ask you when she used the word
lawyer?
A. She asked me if -- if I would still talk to her if we
waited for her to get an attorney and talk to her at a later date.
Q. What did you tell her?
A. I told her I would not.
Q. Did you tell her why?
A. I did.
Q. What did you tell her?
A. That her -- at that time, which it would be lengthy
time -- I knew this. I don’t think she knew it. But there’s a
time discrepancy, so it would make her information stale. So
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the information we gather at the time that we’re involved in this
investigation, the manufacturing of methamphetamine, we need
it to be relative in a timely manner to see how far it goes, where
it goes, who all is involved. So if we waited a month, three
months, six months, her information would obviously be stale.
Q. Did she at that point say, well, I want a lawyer?
A. No.
See RR, pgs. 45-46.
As the “sole and exclusive trier of fact and judge of the credibility of
the witnesses,” the trial court was in the best position to judge Foreman’s
credibility. In the present case, Jessica Boyett did not ask for a lawyer when
she was given her statutory and Miranda warnings by Foreman. See State’s
Exhibit 2, beginning at 00:48. Accordingly, the evidence supported the trial
court’s thirty-first (31) finding of fact. See CR, pg. 202.
(b) Allegedly Threatened With the Loss of Children.
In order for a confession to be rendered involuntary by promises by
law enforcement, the appellant must show that the promise (1) was positive;
(2) of some benefit to the defendant; (3) made or sanctioned by someone in
authority; and (4) of such an influential nature that a defendant would speak
untruthfully in response thereto. See Blanks, 968 S.W.2d at 421 (citing
Sossamon v. State, 816 S.W.2d 340, 345 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)); Renfro v.
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State, 958 S.W.2d 880, 884 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 1997, pet. ref’d).
Here, Jessica Boyett alleged that she “was threatened with the loss of
her children unless she told the officer what the officer wanted to hear, at
which time this would all just go away.” See Appellant’s Brief, pg. 45.
Jessica Boyett testified to the following:
Q. Okay. Wait a minute. Step-kids. How did he
know you had children?
A. Because I said that in the booking area that I -- the
kids were at home.
Q. Okay. So what else -- what other conversations
was had? Well, where did you go from there?
A. And from there, he said, all right. He said, well,
you’re going to tell us what we want to know. And if you do
this, then you can go home, and this will all just go away. If
you tell us what we want to know, what we want to hear, then
we can talk to the DA, and it will all just work itself out. There
won’t be no jail time and you get to go home.
See RR, pgs. 107-108. Foreman also testified to the following:
Q. Did you talk to her about your concern for her
children?
A. I did.
See RR, pg. 50.
Again, the trial court was the “sole and exclusive trier of fact and
judge of the credibility of the witnesses.” See Colvin, 467 S.W.3d at 647.
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As such, the trial court was in the best position to judge the credibility of the
witnesses, and the trial court could have believed Foreman’s testimony, in
whole or in part, over that of Jessica Boyett. Accordingly, the evidence
supported the trial court’s court thirtieth (30) finding of fact. See CR, pg.
202.
More specifically, the trial court could have resolved that there was no
threat to Jessica Boyett’s children, and that implicit/implied finding was
supported by the record. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the trial court’s ruling, the trial court made the implicit/implied finding that
there was no threat to Jessica Boyett’s children, and that implicit/implied
finding was supported by the record. See Wiede v. State, 214 S.W.3d 17, 25
(Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (a reviewing court must “view the evidence in the
light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling and assume that the trial court
made implicit findings of fact that support its ruling as long as those findings
are supported by the record.”).
In the end, the trial court resolved that the statement/confession was
given voluntarily, and the trial court’s fifteenth (15) conclusion of law was
supported by the record. See CR, pg. 205 (“The Defendants’ statements
were voluntarily given and not the product of coercion.”). In conclusion, the
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appellant’s second issue/point of error should be overruled.
ISSUE PRESENTED IN REPLY NO. 3: THE EVIDENCE WAS
SUFFICIENT TO SUBSTANTIATE THE APPELLANT’S, JESSICA
BOYETT’S, GUILT OF CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY UNDER
ARTICLE 1.15 OF THE TEXAS CODE OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE.
A. Standard of Review: Article 1.15 of the Texas Code of
Criminal Procedure.
It is well settled that a judicial confession, standing alone, is sufficient
to sustain a conviction upon a guilty plea, and to satisfy the requirements of
article 1.15 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. See Dinnery v. State,
592 S.W.2d 343, 353 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1979) (op. on reh’g);
Potts v. State, 571 S.W.2d 180, 182 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978).
See also Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 1.15 (West 2005).
B. Application of Law to the Confession in the Present Case.
Among the written plea admonishments (CR, pgs. 171-182), Jessica
Boyett signed a judicial confession, which reflected in pertinent part the
following:
Upon my oath I swear my true name is JESSICA
BOYETT and I request the papers in this cause reflect my true
name. I am 27 years of age. I have read (or have had read to
me) the indictment or information filed in this case and same
has been reviewed with me by my attorney and I understand all
matters contained therein; and I committed and am guilty of
each and every act as alleged therein, except those acts
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expressly waived by the State.5 All of the facts alleged in the
indictment or information are true and correct. I am guilty of
the offense(s) charged as well as all lesser included offenses.
* * *
See CR, pg. 181 (bold type added for emphasis).
At the plea hearing, the following exchange then occurred in open
court:
THE COURT: In the written plea admonishment, each
of you executed what’s called a judicial confession. This is the
evidence the State of Texas will introduce in each case in order
to prove your guilt. By executing that document, each of you
are giving up and waiving your right against self-incrimination.
Do you understand?
MS. BOYETT: Yes.
MR. BOYETT: Yes.
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Haslam, have you explained
these documents to your clients?
MR. HASLAM: I have.
THE COURT: In your opinion do you believe each of
them understand their admonishments, their rights, and
consequences of their pleas?
MR. HASLAM: I do.
5
The State abandoned Count 2 (RR, pgs. 173, 176) in the indictment, which charged in
pertinent part that Jessica Boyett “in Lamar County, Texas on or about September 24,
2013, did then and there, with intent to unlawfully manufacture a controlled substance,
namely, Methamphetamine, possess or transport a chemical precursor, to-wit:
pseudoephedrine, Against the peace and dignity of the State.” See CR, pg. 5.
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THE COURT: It’s the Court’s understanding in -- and
the plea agreement is identical, isn’t it?
MS. POLLARD: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: It’s the Court’s understanding in
exchange for your plea of guilty, Mr. and Ms. Boyett, as to
Count One the State is going to abandon Count Two in each
case. The State’s recommendation for punishment is five years
confinement in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice
Institutional Division; however, that will be probated for a
period of three years and a $500 fine. In addition, the State and
-- the State’s and your attorney -- part of the plea agreemetn is
that you have the right to appeal any pre-trial matters in each of
the cases, including the Motion to Suppress that was heard this
morning that the Court denied. Is that your understanding as
well?
MS. BOYETT: Yes.
MR. BOYETT: Yes.
THE COURT: Is that your understanding, Mr. Haslam?
MR. HASLAM: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Does either side have any reason to
believe the Defendants are incompetent?
MS. POLLARD: No, Your Honor.
MR. HASLAM: No.
THE COURT: Okay. Ms. Boyett, to the allegations
contained in the indictment, how do you plead -- as to the
allegations contained in the indictment as to Count One, how do
you plead, guilty or not guilty?
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MS. BOYETT: Guilty.
* * *
See RR, pgs. 175-177.
In addition to the open plea of guilty, the trial court admitted into
evidence “the plea papers,” which included the admonishments and judicial
confession (marked as State’s Exhibit No. 1). See RR, pg. 178. The “plea
papers” were also filed with the District Clerk of Lamar County and made a
part of the Clerk’s record in this appellate proceeding. See CR, pgs. 171-
182. Because the written judicial confession, as evidence, was sufficient to
substantiate Jessica Boyett’s guilt of criminal conspiracy, the appellant’s
third issue/point of error should be overruled.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the State of Texas prays
that upon final submission of the above-styled and numbered cause without
oral argument, this Court affirm the trial court’s final judgment of conviction
in all respects; adjudge court costs against the appellant; and for such other
and further relief, both at law and in equity, to which it may be justly and
legally entitled.
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Respectfully submitted,
Gary D. Young
Lamar County & District Attorney
Lamar County Courthouse
119 North Main
Paris, Texas 75460
(903) 737-2470
(903) 737-2455 (fax)
By:________________________________
Gary D. Young, County Attorney
SBN# 00785298
gyoung@co.lamar.tx.us
ATTORNEYS FOR THE STATE OF TEXAS
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
Pursuant to Rule 9.4(i)(3) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure,
the “Appellee’s (State’s) Brief” was a computer-generated document and
contained 9123 words--not including the Appendix, if any. The undersigned
attorney certified that he relied on the word count of the computer program,
which was used to prepare this document.
______________________________
GARY D. YOUNG
gyoung@co.lamar.tx.us
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that in accordance with Tex. R. App. P. 9.5, a true
copy of the Appellee’s (State’s) Brief has been served on the 4th day of
December, 2015 upon the following:
Kristin Brown
The Law Office of Kristin R. Brown, PLLC
18208 Preston Road, Suite D9375
Dallas, TX 75252
______________________________
GARY D. YOUNG
gyoung@co.lamar.tx.us
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