DocketNumber: NOS. PD-1358-15, PD-1359-15, PD-1360-15, PD-1361-15
Citation Numbers: 512 S.W.3d 335
Judges: Alcala, Hervey, Keasler, Keel, Keller, Newell, Richardson, Walker, Yeary
Filed Date: 3/1/2017
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 1/12/2023
delivered the opinion of the Court
Under the Private Security Act, people or entities that engage in certain private security businesses must have a license. Engaging in such a business without a license is a criminal offense. A subchapter of the Private Security Act contains a number of provisions that say the Act “does not apply to” certain classes of people, such as law enforcement personnel. We must determine whether these non-applicability provisions are exceptions that must be negated by the State in its charging instrument or are defenses that must initially be raised by the defendant.
I. BACKGROUND
Appellant acted as a security guard but had no license for doing so. He was charged with committing violations of the Private Security Act, in the Occupations Code. Each indictment alleged that appellant committed an offense by “act[ing] as a guard company, by engaging in the business of a guard on a contractual basis for another person ... to prevent, observe, or detect unauthorized activity on private property without holding a license as a security services contractor.”
On appeal, appellant again raised his claim that the indictments failed to negate applicable statutory exceptions. Relying indirectly on American Plant Food Corp. v. State,
Appellant now argues that American Plant Food relied on the common law rule for when a statutory exception to an offense had to be negated in the State’s pleading.
(a) An exception to an offense in this code is so labeled by the phrase: “It is an exception to the application of .... ”
(b) The prosecuting attorney must negate the existence of an exception in the accusation charging commission of the offense and prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant or defendant’s conduct does not fall within the exception.
(c)This section does not affect exceptions applicable to offenses enacted prior to the effective date of this code.7
If it were otherwise, he argues, then the provisions of Texas Penal Code § 46.15— providing that certain offenses for unlawfully carrying weapons do not apply to certain classes of people or in certain situations — would be mere defenses to prosecution rather than exceptions to criminal liability, and he contends that the legislature did not intend such a result. Appellant argues that the court of appeals’s construction is problematic because it blurs the line between exceptions (which have to be negated in the charging instrument) and defenses (which must be raised by defensive evidence at trial). He contends that “[a]n exception to the law excludes a person from criminal liability under special circumstances, while a defense is an excuse to relieve a person of liability for violating a law.”
The State contends that § 2.02 merely codified the common law. Alternatively, the State argues that, because § 2.02 explicitly requires that an exception be denoted by the language, “It is an exception to the application of ...,” the provisions found in the “Exceptions” subchapter of the Private Security Act (which do not use
II. ANALYSIS
A. Statutory Construction Principles
To determine the meaning of § 2.02, along with the relevant provisions of the Private Security Act, we employ the relevant principles of statutory construction.
B. Common Law
Because the parties dispute whether § 2.02 codifies the common law, we find it helpful to first address the common law rule regarding exceptions. The court of appeals accurately described the rule recited in American Plant Food,-. When the statutory exception “is in a separate section from the provision which states the offense, and a prima facie case can be made without proof negating the exception,” then the exception need not be negated in the charging instrument.
This rule had its origins in caselaw stretching at least as far back as 1878, to the decision of our predecessor court, the Court of Appeals, in Blasdell v. State.
In McKnight v. State, we concluded that exceptions to the Dental Practice Act did not need to be negated in the charging instrument.
Appellant does not now contend that he would prevail if the common law governed his case, but he did argue that to the court of appeals. He claimed that the statute that proscribed the offense, Occupations Code § 1702.388, essentially incorporates the entirety of the Private Security Act so as to include the “Exceptions” subchapter as elements of the offense. Although § 1702.388 contains broad language, “A person commits an offense if the person violates a provision of this chapter for which a specific criminal penalty is not prescribed,”
1. Caselaw Statements about § 2.02 and Common Law
The question then becomes, does Penal Code § 2.02 codify (or incorporate) the common law? In Threlkeld v. State, we said that, prior to the enactment of the Controlled Substances Act, the rule for exceptions was that, “where a penal statute embraces an exception which is part of the statute itself, or the exception appears within the enacting clause of the law, it is necessary for the State to negate such an exception in the indictment.”
Moreover, in Martinez v. State, we criticized a court of appeals for relying upon common law instead of applying § 2.02.
2. § 2.02 and Offenses Outside the Penal Code
Penal Code § 1.03(b) states, in relevant part, “The provisions of Titles 1, 2, and 3 apply to offenses defined by other laws, unless the statute defining the offense provides otherwise.”
We note that nothing in the Private Security Act prevents the application of § 2.02.
3. Prior Law Carve-Out in § 2.02(c)
As we have earlier explained, under § 2.02(c), at least some statutes that were enacted prior to § 2.02 are exempted from § 2.02,
4. Penal Code §§ 2.02(a) and 2.03(e)
As we have set out earlier, Penal Code § 2.02(a) provides, “An exception to an offense in this code is so labeled by the phrase: ‘It is an exception to the application of ....’”
Any ambiguity that might otherwise exist in that regard is eliminated by § 2.03(e), which provides, “Any ground of defense in a penal law that is not plainly labeled in accordance with this chapter has the procedural and evidentiary consequences of a defense.”
This conclusion is consistent with our cases that have refused to recognize implied exceptions. In Bermudez v. State, we held the voluntary conduct requirement in Penal Code § 6.01 was not an exception because it was not “so labeled” in accordance with § 2.02.
Consistent with appellant’s arguments, this construction of §§ 2.02(a) and 2.03(e) means that the weapons-offense exemptions in § 46.15 — employing the language “do[es] not apply” — are defenses rather than exceptions. But we have indicated as much,
The next question is, does this construction of §§ 2.02(a) and 2.03(e) extend to defensive matters outside the Penal Code? It is true that § 2.02(a) contains the qualifying language “in this code.”
We have once applied § 2.03(e) to hold that a defensive matter in an Election Code provision was “a mere defense.”
And there is at least one good reason why the legislature would want to be parsimonious when it comes to construing whether a defensive provision constitutes an exception. Some statutory schemes may be littered with dozens of provisions that exempt certain classes of people or certain types of circumstances from the operation of the scheme. For example, Penal Code § 46.15 contains seventeen provisions that exempt people from the § 46.02 offense of unlawfully carrying a weapon.
D. Occupations Code
As we have explained above, Occupations Code § 1702.388 makes it an offense if a person “violates a provision of this chapter for which a specific penalty is not prescribed”
Although the heading in Subchapter N is titled “Exceptions,”
We are left with two remaining issues. The rule of construction set forth in § 2.03(e) applies only to a “ground of defense” that is “in a penal law.”
To determine what a “ground of defense” is, we find it appropriate to look to the common law, which we have already discussed in part. If a failure to allege a matter appears to make the offense itself incomplete, so that it can be said that a prima facie case has not been alleged, then the matter was an element of the offense and not a defensive matter at common law.
We next turn to whether the Sub-chapter N provisions qualify as being “in a penal law.” Violations of Chapter 1702 could also subject a person to a civil penalty,
In summary, assuming that § 2.02(c) does not exempt the relevant Occupations Code provisions from the operation of § 2.02, it follows that the non-applicability provisions of Subchapter N, which do not plainly satisfy the labeling requirement of § 2.02(a), are defenses pursuant to § 2.03(e). Consequently, we conclude that these non-applicability provisions are defenses, not exceptions, and the State was not required to negate them in the charging instrument.
We affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
. The indictments alleged different dates for the commission of the offense. One of the indictments alleged a different person for whom appellant worked. The court of appeals sustained appellant’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence complaint as to the conviction on that indictment and that cause number is not before us.
. 508 S.W.2d 598 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
. Baumgart v. State, — S.W.3d ——, -, Nos. 14-14-00306-CR, 14-14-00307-CR, 14-14-00308-CR, 14-14-00309-CR, 14-14-00310-CR, 2015 WL 3986153, *2-3, 2015 Tex.App. LEXIS 6665, *6 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] June 30, 2015) (citing McClain v. State, 14-97-00355-CR, 1997 Tex.App. LEXIS 3085, 1997 WL 312309, at *1-2 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] June 12, 1997, pet. ref'd) (not designated for publication) (citing American Plant Food Corp.)).
. Id. at -, 2015 WL 3986153, at *2-3, 2015 Tex.App. LEXIS 6665, at *6-7.
. Id. at -, 2015 WL 3986153, at *3, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 6665, at *7.
. Appellant’s opening brief asserted that American Plant Pood, decided shortly after § 2.02 became effective, was simply wrong. In his reply brief, however, he acknowledges that the decision would have decided a criminal case arising before the enactment of § 2.02 and “at best was affirming common law doctrine that existed prior to Section 2.02.”
. See Tex. Penal Code § 2.02 (ellipsis in original).
. See Chase v. State, 448 S.W.3d 6, 11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).
. Id. (citing Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782, 785 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
. Id.; Tex. Gov’t Code § 311.023.
. Tex Gov’t Code § 311.024; Ex parte Crouch, 838 S.W.2d 252, 254-55 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
. Williams v. State, 273 S.W.3d 200, 215 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).
. American Plant Food, 508 S.W.2d at 604-05.
. See id. at 605.
. See infra, this section.
. See 508 S.W.2d at 600-01 (Statute the defendant claimed was controlling had been expressly repealed and repealed by implication before 1974.).
. See id. at 604-05.
. 5 Tex.App. 263, 269-70 (1878).
. See id. at 266; Tex. Gen. Laws 1876, p. 231.
. Tex. Gen. Laws 1876, Ch. 140, § 1, p. 231.
. Id. § 5, p. 232.
. Id. (“provided, that nothing in this act shall be so construed as to exclude or disqualify any person who may have been already qualified for the practice of medicine under the act of May 16, 1873; provided, that nothing in this act shall be construed as to apply to those who have been regularly engaged in the general practice of medicine in this State, in any of its branches or departments, for a period of five consecutive years in this State prior to the first day of January, 1875; nor to those who have obtained certificates of qualification under said act; nor to females who follow the practice of midwifery, strictly as such”) (emphasis in original).
. Blasdell, 5 Tex.App. at 269.
. Id.
. 132 Tex.Crim. 527, 531-32, 534, 106 S.W.2d 308, 310-12 (1937).
. 161 Tex.Crim. 472, 477-78, 278 S.W.2d 150, 153 (1955) (op. on State’s mot. for reh'g).
. See Tex. Penal Code arts. 747 ("It shall be unlawful for” any person to practice dentistry without a license), 753, 754, 754a (Main Volume 1948).
. 423 S.W.2d 297, 299 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968).
. See Tex Penal Code art. 489c, § 1 (Supp. 1950).
. See id. § 2.
. See id. § 4.
. Tex. Occ. Code § 1702.388(a).
. See id. §§ 1702.384 (offense for falsifying fingerprints or photographs submitted under § 1702.110), 1702.3841 (insufficient insurance coverage in violation of § 1702.124), 1702.386, 1702.3863, 1702.3867, 1702.387 (failure to surrender documents as required under § 1702.364), 1702.3875.
. See e.g., Tex. Occ. Code §§ 1702.102 ("guard company” must have a license), 1702.108 (defining “guard company”). See also supra at n.33,
. See Tex. Occ. Code § 1702.388(a) (making it an offense if a specific criminal penalty is not prescribed), (b) (prescribing level of punishment). See also supra at n.33.
. See Tex. Occ. Code §§ 1702.321-1702.332. And as we shall see below, the Occupations Code was a recodification of prior law with no substantive change intended. See infra at nn.53-54. Under the prior statute, the license provision expressly labeled the prohibited conduct "unlawful’! and referred to the punishment section, making it even clearer that the two statutes, read together, created a punishable offense, See Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 4413(29(bb), §§ 13(a) (“It shall be unlawful and punishable as provided in Section 44 of this Act for any person to engage in the business of ... [a] guard company ... unless he has obtained a license under the provisions of this Act.”, 44(c) (“Any person who violates any provision of this Act for which a specific criminal penalty is not prescribed commits an offense. An offense under this subsection is a Class A misdemeanor, except ....”) (LEXIS 1998). A "Revisor's Note” indicates that this was changed because § 13’s reference to § 44 was “unnecessary” and that § 1702.388 "provides general penalties for any violation of this chapter.” Tex. Occ. Code Ann. §§ 1702.101, p. 166 (Revisor's Note),
. 558 S.W.2d 472, 473 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
. Id.
. Id.
. See Wilson v. State, 448 S.W.3d 418, 422 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (Court's statement that "repeated” meant "close enough proximity to properly be termed a single episode” was dicta because it was not necessary to the reasoning or holding of the case and therefore was not controlling).
. 720 S.W.2d 490, 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (plurality op,).
. Blea v. State, 483 S.W.3d 29, 34 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016).
. 879 S.W.2d 54, 55 n.4 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (saying that "the court’s reliance on the common law is misplaced” and referring to § 2.02(b)).
. Tex. Penal Code § 2.02(c).
. Tex. Penal Code § 1.03(b). See also Chase, 448 S.W.3d at 13 ("The most obvious effect of this provision [§ 1.03(b)] is that, unless otherwise provided by statute, provisions contained in Titles 1, 2, and 3 of the Penal Code apply to offenses contained in statutes that are outside the Penal Code.”).
. See Tex. Penal Code, Title 1, Ch. 2.
. Dunavin v. State, 611 S.W.2d 91, 101 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (“It is by reason of this provision, coupled with operation of the ‘unless’ clause of § 1.03(b), supra, that § 2.02, supra, does not govern the manner of alleging and proving an offense proscribed by the Code.”).
. 879 S.W.2d at 55 n.4 ("The Texas Penal Code, and not the common law, applies to offenses defined by other statutes, unless the statute defining the offense provides otherwise. ... Under the Texas Penal Code, the charging instrument must negate the existence of an exception in the charging instrument.”) (citing §§ 1.03(b) and 2.02(b)).
. See Tex. Penal Code § 2.02(c).
. See Tex. Occ. Code, Ch. 1702, passim.
. See Tex. Penal Code § 2.02(c).
. See Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., ch. 399, §§ 1, 4.
. See Acts 1999, 76th Leg., ch. 388, §§ 1, 8.
. Id. § 7.
. See Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4413(29bb), § 3, p.191-92 (Vernon’s 1976) ("Exceptions’’); id. at § 44, p. 210 ("Penal provisions”); id. at p. 211 (prior history citations), 213-14 (historical notes) (discussing original wording of § 3 and amendments through 1975), 219 (historical notes) (discussing 1975 amendment to § 44). See also e.g. Tex. Occ. Code Ann. §§ 1702.102, p. 170; 1702.321, p. 280-81; 1702.322, p. 282-83; 1702.388, p. 325-26 (prior history citations, historical and statutory notes) (Vernon's 2012).
. Tex. Penal Code § 2.02(a) (ellipsis in original).
. See e.g., Harkcom v. State, 484 S.W.3d 432, 434 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (wording of notice of appeal); Bryant v. State, 391 S.W.3d 86, 91 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
. See e.g., VanNortrick v. State, 227 S.W.3d 706, 708 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (admonishments under Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 26.13); Bahm v. State, 219 S.W.3d 391, 393 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (unsworn declaration of inmate under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 132.003); Bible v. State, 162 S.W.3d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (fully effective equivalent of warnings under Article 38.22).
. See Nguyen v. State, 292 S.W.3d 671, 675 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (Article 38,22, § 3(a)).
. Tex. Penal Code § 2.03(e).
. See id. § 2.04(a) (“An affirmative defense in this code is so labeled by the phrase; “It is an affinnative defense to prosecution ....”),
. See id. § 2.03(b).
. 533 S.W.3d 806, 807 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
. 541 S.W.2d 831, 838 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (on State's mot, for reh’g). See also Williams v. State, 851 S.W.2d 282, (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (taking guidance from § 2.03(e) to treat the “safe place’’ issue like a defense, but at the punishment stage of trial); § 20.04(b) (West 1992) ("An offense under this section is a felony of the first degree unless the actor voluntarily releases the victim alive and in a safe place, in which event it is a felony of the second degree.").
. Johnson v. State, 571 S.W.2d 170, 172 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (characterizing the "traveling” exception to weapons offenses as "a defense to prosecution” and citing § 2.03(e)).
. In the Matter of A.G., 292 S.W.3d 755, 759 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2009, no pet.) (§ 46.15 exemption that says weapons offense “does not apply” to a person who is traveling is a defense under § 2.03(e)); Illingworth v. State, 156 S.W.3d 662, 664 (Tex. App.-Forth Worth 2005, no pet.) (same); Hafley v. State, 781 S.W.2d 642, 646 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, no pet.) (predecessor to § 46.15, saying that provisions of weapons-offense statute “do not apply" in certain circumstances is not an exception but a defense under § 2.03(e)); Ayesh v. State, 734 S.W.2d 106, 107 (Tex. App.-Austin 1987, no pet.) (same). See also Tafel v. State, — S.W.3d -, -, Nos. 10-14-00019-CR, 10-14-00020-CR, 2016 WL 4573106, *1-2, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 9703, *2-3 (Tex. App.-Waco August 31, 2016, pet. filed) (exception under concealed handgun statute, Penal Code § 46.035, using language “do not apply,” codifies a defense under § 2.03(e), not an exception under § 2.02(a)). But see id. at -, 2016 WL 4573106, *, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 9703, *40-53 (Gray, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that the statute codifies an exception, not a defense).
. Smith v. State, 959 S.W.2d 1, 22 n.35 (Tex. App.-Waco 1997, pet. ref’d) (exemptions under Penal Code § 36.10 to offenses involving gifts to public servants); Borkowicz v. State, 802 S.W.2d 115, 116-17 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1990, no pet.) (exemptions under Penal Code § 43.23, obscenity offense); Johnson v. State, 760 S.W.2d 797, 798-99 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, no pet.) (same).
. See Tex. Penal Code §§ 22.041(h) ("It is an exception to the application of this section that the actor voluntarily delivered the child to a designated emergency infant care provider under Section 262.302, Family Code.”), 25.08(b) ("It is an exception to the application of this section that the thing of value is” one of four things listed in the statute relating to adoption or care of a child), 28.02(b) ("It is an exception to the application of Subsection (a)(1) that the fire or explosion was a part of the controlled burning of open-space land.”), 30.06(e) ("It is an exception to the application of this section that the property on which the license holder carries a handgun is owned or leased by a governmental entity and is not a premises or other place on which the license holder is prohibited from carrying the handgun under Section 46.03 or 46.035,”), 30.07(e) (nearly identical provision), 36.02(d) (“It is an exception to the application of Subdivisions (1), (2), and (3) of Subsection (a) that the benefit is a political contribution as defined by Title 15, Election Code, or an expenditure made and reported in accordance with Chapter 305, Government Code.”), 36.03(c) ("It is an exception to the application of Subsection (a)(1) of this section that the person who influences or attempts to influence the public servant is a member of the governing body of a governmental entity, and that the action that influences or attempts to influence the public servant is an official action taken by the member of the governing body.”), 37.10(b) ("It is an exception to the application of Subsection (a)(3) that the governmental record is destroyed pursuant to legal authorization or transferred under Section 441,204, Government Code.”), 38.16(b) (“It is an exception to the application of this section that the actor evaded service of process by avoiding detection.”), 42.09 (f) ("It is an exception to the application of this section that the conduct engaged in by the actor is a generally accepted and otherwise lawful” activity regarding fishing, hunting, trapping, wildlife management and certain other enumerated activities relating to animals), 42.092(f) (same), 42.105 ("It is an exception to the application of Subsection (b)(6) that the actor is 15 years of age or younger at the time of the offense.”), 42.11(c) ("It is an exception to the application of this section that the act that would otherwise constitute an offense is done in conformity with statutes of the United States or of this state relating to the proper disposal of damaged flags.”), 46.03(i) ("It is an exception to the application of Subsection (a)(6) that the actor possessed a firearm or club; (1) while in a vehicle being driven on a public road; or (2) at the actor’s residence or place of employment.”), 46.035(a) ("It is an exception to the application of this subsection that the handgun was partially or wholly visible but was carried in a shoulder or belt holster by the license holder.”), 47.05(b) ("It is an exception to the application of Subsec
. Id. § 2.02(a).
. Id. § 2.03(e).
. The Practice Commentary to § 2.03 states that "Subsection (e) applies to penal laws outside this code — in fact, such will be its chief application because most defenses in this code are so labeled. This application will furnish a rule for the courts when faced with language used in the definition of an offense that could be either an exception or defense; this subsection directs its treatment as a defense.” Seth S. Searcy & James R. Patterson, Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 2,03, Practice Commentary, p. 61 (Vernon's 1974). See also Thompson v. State, 236 S.W.3d 787, 798 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (Practice Commentary was drafted by individuals involved in the Penal Code revision project, though the legislature did not always follow the committee’s recommendations.).
. Beck v. State, 583 S.W.2d 338, 344 n.3, 348 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
. Bean v. State, 691 S.W.2d 773, 775 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1985, pet. ref'd) (nepotism law exemption containing the language, "Provided, that nothing herein ....”)
. See Tex. Agric. Code § 63.157(f) ("It is an exception to the application of Subsection (b) that the person holds a permit or license issued under 18 U.S.C. Section 843.”); Id. § 132.082(b) (“It is an exception to the application of this section that: (1) the inedible eggs do not exceed five percent by count of the eggs sold; and (2) the eggs are sold to: (A) a dealer for candling and grading; or (B) a breaking plant for breaking purposes.”); Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 17.824 ("It is an exception to the application of Subsection (b) of Section 17.822 or Section 17.823 of this code that a person describes or labels food as
. See Tex. Penal Code § 46.15(a), (b).
. See infra at n. 81.
. Tex. Occ. Code § 1702.388(a).
. Id. § 1702.388(b) (Class A misdemeanor for first offense and third degree felony if previously convicted under Chapter 1702).
. Id. § 1702.102(a)(1). A different provision defines what a guard company is.
. Id. § 1702.108.
. See id. § 1702.321(a), 1702.322, 1702.323(a), 1702.324(b), 1702.325, 1702.326(a), 1702.327, 1702.328, 1702.329, 1702.330, 1702.331(b), 1702.332(b) (all using the phrase “does not apply”).
. See Tex. Occ. Code, Chapter 1702, Subchap-ter N (heading).
. See supra at n. 11 and accompanying text.
. See Tex. Penal Code § 2.03(e).
. See supra at part II.B.
. See id.
. See Lewis v. State, 7 Tex.App. 567, 568 (1880) ("Under the provisions of our present Penal Code regulating the keeping and bearing of deadly weapons, it is unnecessary in an indictment to allege more than that the defendant did unlawfully carry upon his person, etc., the forbidden weapon. Under former laws, the exceptions were contained in the enacting clause, and it was requisite that each should be substantially negatived. It was never necessary to prove these negative aver-ments, they being always held as matters of defence. ... If the defendant was a soldier or a peace-officer, etc., or was at the time on his own premises, or travelling, or in imminent danger, such fact was peculiarly within his own knowledge, and he should have shown it by the evidence either of his own witnesses or those of the State.”); Summerlin v. State, 3 Tex.App. 444, 446 (1878) ("That defendant was not a peace officer at the time, being an averment of fact peculiarly within defendant’s knowledge so that he could have no difficulty in showing the truth, no proof of such aver-ments on the part of the state would be required.”). See also supra at part II.B; Searcy & Patterson, Tex Penal Code Ann. § 2.03, Practice Commentary, p. 60 (discussing defenses as “involving facts peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant”).
. See Tex. Occ. Code § 1702.381.
. Chase, 448 S.W.3d at 15-17, 16 n.54.
. Beck, 583 S.W.2d at 344 n.3, 348 (mailbox rule construed to be defense to criminal prosecution "as it is understood and construed under V.T.C.A., Penal Code, sec. 2.03, in criminal prosecutions,” citing § 2.03(e)).
. See Tex Elec. Code art. 14.07(I)(1) (criminal liability), (J) (civil liability), (K) (civil liability) (1975).