DocketNumber: NO. WR-84,007-01
Citation Numbers: 507 S.W.3d 731
Judges: Alcala, Hervey, Johnson, Keasler, Keller, Meyers, Newell, Richardson, Yeary
Filed Date: 12/14/2016
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 1/12/2023
OPINION
delivered the opinion of the Court,
Does estoppel bar an applicant from seeking habeas corpus relief for a conviction based on a statute subsequently declared facially unconstitutional? We hold that it does not. We accordingly set aside Patrick Shay’s conviction and remand the cause to the trial court to dismiss the indictment.
I.
Pursuant to a plea bargain, Shay was convicted of improper photography or visual recording in violation of Texas Penal Code § 21.15(b)(1) and sentenced to two years’ confinement, the maximum confinement permitted for the state-jail felony. In consideration for Shay’s guilty plea, the State agreed not to file aggravated sexual assault or child pornography charges surrounding the same criminal episode. Shay’s writ application prays for habeas relief by relying on this Court’s opinion in Thompson v. State.
The State and the habeas judge recommended that this Court grant Shay relief under Thompson. We ordered Shay’s application be filed and set to determine whether an applicant, who negotiates a very favorable plea agreement resulting in a conviction for an offense later held to be unconstitutional, is estopped from challenging the conviction on the basis of its unconstitutionality.
II.
A.
Shay’s improper photography conviction has discharged, and he therefore is not physically confined by virtue of the challenged conviction. But because the State used Shay’s improper-photography conviction as a predicate for its later prosecution against him for being a felon in possession of a firearm, Shay suffers sufficient collateral consequences that we consider him “confined” for purposes of Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 11.07, § 3(c).
The dissent, however, would dismiss Shay’s application for failing to establish that the subsequent felon-in-possession case is a sufficient collateral consequence of his improper-photography conviction.
In this case, our Article 11.07 jurisdiction does not turn on whether a subsequent prosecution relying upon the contested conviction would be completely undermined if, upon review of the application’s merits, we were to grant relief. Shay’s potential culpability for the felon-in-possession offense is irrelevant to whether he demonstrates “any collateral consequences”
When the dissent merges the two unrelated issues, it discounts the inherent speculative nature of particular collateral consequences, at least to the extent that it would declare that relief must inevitably relieve the applicant of the pleaded collateral consequence. Harrington itself offers an illustration. In that case, our analysis began with the general rule that “a person who files a habeas-corpus application for relief from a final felony conviction must challenge either the fact or length of confinement.”
B.
Rhodes v. State was this Court’s seminal case applying the estoppel doctrine in barring certain claims.
Based solely on the written plea agreement, Shay negotiated what appears to be a “favorable” plea agreement. In pleading guilty to the maximum sentence for the state-jail felony, he avoided indictment for possession of child pornography and aggravated sexual assault, offenses exposing him to a maximum of ten years’ confinement and a life sentence, respectively.
We hold that the estoppel doctrines formulated and espoused by Rhodes are inapplicable to Shay’s request for relief under Thompson. When the statute supporting a charging instrument and judgment is rendered unconstitutional, the effect of that holding alters the balance of the equitable principles animating Rhodes’s formulation of estoppel—that a defendant should not accept the benefit of an agreement and the judgment it contemplates, only to challenge it later. Rhodes never contemplated a subsequent holding of unconstitutionality; it dealt with a statutorily too lenient punishment and easily identifiable “benefits” of a particular judgment. The equitable principles that applied fittingly in that context do not apply with equal force in this one.
In Smith v. State, decided a little over a year ago, the Court concluded that “an unconstitutional statute is void from its inception,” and that upon being declared
Because Smith tells us that Shay’s statute under which he was convicted “is as if it never existed,” then, as Shay argues in his brief, the statute’s “non-existence” undermines the trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction as well. Indeed, Smith’s logic lends support to Shay’s argument: If there is no law supporting Shay’s conviction, then there is no law over which the district court had subject-matter jurisdiction
III.
We hold that Shay is not barred by estoppel from seeking relief based on the subsequent invalidation of the statute under which he was convicted. Therefore, because the statute supporting Shay’s conviction is unconstitutional and is considered non-existent, we set aside Shay’s conviction and remand the cause to the trial court to dismiss the indictment.
. 442 S.W.3d 325 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).
. Id. at 349.
. Ex parte Shay, No. WR-84,007-01, 2015 WL 9243109 (Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 16, 2015) (not designated for publication).
. See Ex parte Harrington, 310 S.W.3d 452, 457 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).
. Post, at 736 (Keller, P J., dissenting).
. Id. (citing Ex parte Jimenez, 361 S.W.3d 679, 683-84 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012)).
. Post, at 737 (Keller, P J., dissenting).
. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 11.07, § 3(c).
. See Ex parte Harrington, 310 S.W.3d at 457 (holding that a showing of a collateral consequence, without more, sufficiently establishes confinement and triggers Article 11.07).
. Ex parte Harrington, 310 S.W.3d at 457. Accord Ex parte Renier, 734 S.W.2d 349, 353-54 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (dismissing "for want of jurisdictional requisites to granting relief, to wit: a final felony conviction and confinement”).
. Ex parte Harrington, 310 S,W.3d at 456 (citing Ex parte Lockett, 956 S.W.2d 41, 42 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)).
. Id. at 457-58.
. Id. at 459-60.
. 240 S.W.3d 882, 889 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
. At at 892.
. Id. at 891.
. Id.
. Id.
. Id.
. See TEX. PENAL CODE §§ 22.021(e), 43.26(d) (West 2008).
. 463 S.W.3d 890, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (citing Reyes v. State, 753 S.W.2d 382, 383 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988)) (internal quotations omitted).
. See id. at 895.
. Cf. Gutierrez v. State, 380 S.W.3d 167, 175-76 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (holding that a defendant could not "agree to submit to a condition of community supervision that the criminal justice system simply finds intolerable and which is therefore, by definition, not even an option available to the parties.”).
. See Rhodes, 240 S.W.3d at 891,
. Cf. Gutierrez, 380 S.W.3d at 177-78 (weighing Restatement (Second) of Contracts’ factors to conclude that Gutierrez’s deportation condition of her community supervision was unenforceable and that estoppel by contract did not apply).
. See Smith, 463 S.W.3d at 895. See also GEORGE E. DIX & JOHN M. SCHMOLE-SKY, 40 TEX. PRACTICE: CRIMINAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4:13 (3d ed.) ("A statute creating a criminal offense that is constitutionally invalid deprives the court and any official acting on the basis of the invalid statute of the authority to act, including the subject-matter jurisdiction of the convicting court[.]”).
. See Ex parte Chance, 439 S.W.3d 918 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).