Barbee, Stephen Dale

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
OF TEXAS
NO. WR–71,070–03
EX PARTE STEPHEN DALE BARBEE, Applicant
ON APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
FROM TARRANT COUNTY
KEEL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court in which KELLER, P.J., and HERVEY,
RICHARDSON, SLAUGHTER, and MCCLURE, JJ., joined. YEARY and NEWELL, JJ., joined
Part VI of the Court’s opinion and otherwise concurred. WALKER, J., filed a concurring
opinion.
OPINION
This is a subsequent application for writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to Texas
Code of Criminal Procedure Article 11.071, Section 5. Applicant seeks relief under
McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500 (2018), which he claims was a previously
unavailable legal basis for his claim. We filed and set his application to address whether
he is entitled to relief under McCoy. We conclude that the legal basis for the current
claim was previously available, and even if it were not, Applicant fails to allege facts that
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would entitle him to relief under McCoy. Consequently, we dismiss this subsequent
application as an abuse of the writ. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 11.071 § 5(c).
I. Article 11.071, Section 5
Unless an applicant for a writ of habeas corpus meets a very fine-tuned exception,
he is limited to one full and fair opportunity to present any claims that may entitle him to
relief from his judgment or sentence. Ex parte Kerr, 64 S.W.3d 414, 418-19 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2002). “[E]verything you can possibly raise the first time, we expect you to raise it
initially, one bite of the apple, one shot.” Id. (quoting S.B. 440, Acts 1005, 74th Leg.,
codified at TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 11.071 (Presentation by Representative Pete
Gallego at second reading of S.B. 440 on the floor of the House of Representatives, May
18, 1995)).
Applicant relies on the “previously unavailable legal basis” exception to the bar
against subsequent applications. Under that exception, we may consider the merits of a
subsequent application if it contains sufficient specific facts establishing that the claim
has not been and could not have been previously presented because the legal basis for the
claim was unavailable when the previous application was filed. The exception says:
(a) If a subsequent application for a writ of habeas corpus is filed after
filing an initial application, a court may not consider the merits of or grant
relief based on the subsequent application unless the application contains
sufficient specific facts establishing that:
(1) the current claims and issues have not been and could not have been
presented previously in a timely initial application or in a previously
considered application filed under this article or Article 11.07 because the
factual or legal basis for the claim was unavailable on the date the applicant
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filed the previous application[.]
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 11.071 § 5(a)(1).
A legal basis was previously unavailable if it “was not recognized by or could not
have been reasonably formulated from a final decision of” a relevant court “on or before”
the date the previous application was filed. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 11.071 § 5(d).
A legal basis was previously available if it “could have been rationally fashioned” from
relevant precedent, Ex parte Navarro, 538 S.W.3d 608, 615 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018)
(construing same language as found in Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 11.07,
Section 4(a)(1) and rejecting challenge to adequacy of juvenile transfer order), or if it is
founded on “familiar principles articulated in earlier cases” from relevant courts. See Ex
parte St. Aubin, 537 S.W.3d 39, 45 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (rejecting multiple-
punishments, double-jeopardy claim in subsequent writ because legal basis was
previously available). The likelihood of a claim’s success is irrelevant to determining
whether its legal basis was previously unavailable. Navarro, 538 S.W.3d at 615. But a
legal basis was previously unavailable if subsequent case law makes it easier to establish
the claim and renders inapplicable factors that had previously been weighed in evaluating
its merits. See Ex parte Chavez, 371 S.W.3d 200, 207 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (holding
that the legal basis for a due process violation based on the State’s unknowing use of
false testimony was previously unavailable).
In addition to establishing the previous unavailability of the legal basis for his
claim, the applicant must allege facts that, if true, would entitle him to relief on that basis.
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See Ex parte Staley, 160 S.W.3d 56, 63 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (per curiam).
Applicant claims that his attorney violated his Sixth Amendment right to
assistance of counsel by making a strategic concession of his guilt over his express
objection. He argues that the legal basis for his claim was unavailable until 2018 when
the Supreme Court issued its opinion in McCoy, 138 S. Ct. 1500. But the legal basis for
Applicant’s claim could have been reasonably formulated from existing precedent
because McCoy was the logical extension of Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175 (2004),
based on the factual distinctions—not legal ones—between the two cases. Furthermore,
Applicant does not allege facts that would entitle him to relief under McCoy’s terms even
if it were a previously unavailable legal basis for his claim. Consequently, we must
dismiss his application. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 11.071 § 5(c).
II. Applicant’s Confessions and Trial
Applicant was charged with capital murder for killing his pregnant ex-girlfriend,
Lisa Underwood, and her seven-year-old son, Jayden, in the same criminal transaction.
Lisa was reported missing when she failed to show up for her baby shower. At her
home, police found no signs of forced entry, but blood—later identified as hers—was on
the walls, the furniture, and the floor in the living room. More blood was on the floor of
the garage, and her car was gone.
Early that same morning, a deputy saw Applicant on foot, wet and covered in
mud, near a creek. Applicant gave him a false name and fled into the nearby woods.
Two days later, Lisa’s car was found in the creek near which the deputy had encountered
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Applicant.
Applicant became a suspect in Lisa and Jayden’s disappearance when police
learned that Applicant could be the father of Lisa’s unborn child. Lisa had been asking
Applicant to tell his wife about the pregnancy and to provide insurance for the child, but
Applicant refused to do so without a DNA test confirming that he was the father.
Applicant confessed to the police that he had killed Lisa and Jayden and showed
them where he had buried the bodies. He also met with his wife, Trish Barbee, in the
interrogation room, and that meeting was recorded. Trish asked Applicant how he killed
Lisa, and he tearfully explained that he “held her down too long” and “it was an
accident.” He also admitted to his ex-wife that he had killed Lisa and Jayden but that he
had not meant to do so.
Before trial, Applicant wrote a letter to his appointed attorneys recanting his
confessions. He stated that he initially told the police that he did not know what
happened to Lisa and Jayden, he was not there, and he did not do it. He told defense
counsel that the detective threatened him with the death penalty if he did not talk, so he
said the killings were an accident: he and Lisa got into an argument, she kicked him, he
hit her in the nose, he held her down too long, and he put his hand over Jayden’s face
until he stopped screaming. Applicant recanted his confessions and changed his story,
ultimately claiming that he was innocent of the murders. Applicant said he helped bury
the bodies after his ex-wife’s boyfriend and Applicant’s employee, Ron Dodd, killed Lisa
and Jayden.
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Faced with Applicant’s confessions, defense counsel concluded that the “Dodd did
it” theory would not work at trial, and they instead pursued the theory that Lisa’s death
was accidental. This theory was supported by Applicant’s confessions and by the
medical examiner’s testimony.
Dr. Marc Krouse, the medical examiner who performed the autopsy on Lisa,
testified that Lisa’s death resulted from traumatic asphyxiation, possibly caused by
smothering. He testified on cross-examination that, because Lisa was in a late stage of
pregnancy, she was susceptible to smothering and might have stopped breathing after as
little as thirty seconds of being held down.
The defense attorney summarized the theory in closing argument:
As hard as it is to say, the evidence from the courtroom shows that Stephen
Barbee killed Jayden Underwood. There is no evidence to the contrary.
The problem in the capital murder case is the evidence in this courtroom
that you heard doesn’t show that Stephen Barbee had the conscious
objective or desire or that he knew his conduct was reasonably certain to
cause the result, those two definitions there. And it is supported by the
testimony of the 25-year veteran of the medical examiner’s office, Dr. Marc
Krouse. Dr. Krouse told you that he could not be sure when Lisa
Underwood lost consciousness . . . And Stephen Barbee’s own words to his
wife, it matches. That’s the problem from their standpoint. What he told
Trish Barbee is I held her down too long. That’s exactly what matches the
testimony of Dr. Marc Krouse. And as hard as it is to do, I submit to you
that the evidence in this case, the conclusive beyond a reasonable doubt
evidence, does not support an intentional or knowing murder for Lisa
Underwood. Was he there? Yes. Did he hold her down? Yes. Did he
know or intend that she was going to die or was that his conscious
objective? The answer is no.
The trial court charged the jury on the lesser-included offenses of murder and
manslaughter, but the jury found Applicant guilty of capital murder. Pursuant to the
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jury’s answers to the special issues, the trial court sentenced Applicant to death.
Applicant did not testify at trial or object to the defense strategy.
III. Relevant Procedural History
We affirmed Applicant’s conviction and sentence on direct appeal. Barbee v.
State, No. AP–75,359, 2008 Tex. Crim. App. Unpub. LEXIS 900 (Tex. Crim. App., Dec.
10, 2008).
In his 2008 initial writ application, Applicant claimed that his Sixth Amendment
right to the assistance of counsel was violated by trial counsel confessing his guilt to the
jury during closing argument without his knowledge or consent. Applicant alleged that
he was abandoned by counsel at the trial stage and that it was structural error, meaning
that prejudice should be presumed, citing United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984).
The trial court recommended that relief be denied and entered findings of fact and
conclusions of law, including that the right to effective assistance of counsel extends to
closing arguments, counsel’s decision to focus closing argument on the defensive theory
of accident was reasonable in light of the evidence admitted at trial, and Applicant was
provided adequate counsel in closing arguments. We agreed with the trial court’s
recommendation and denied relief with written order. Ex parte Barbee, No. WR-71,070-
01, 2009 Tex. Crim. App. Unpub. LEXIS 5 (Tex. Crim. App., Jan. 14, 2009). The
Supreme Court denied certiorari. Barbee v. Texas, 2009 U.S. LEXIS 5631 (Oct. 5,
2009).
Applicant filed a subsequent writ in 2011, complaining that his ineffective
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assistance claim was analyzed under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984),
rather than the Cronic standard under which the claim was brought. We dismissed the
2011 subsequent application as an abuse of the writ. Ex parte Barbee, No. WR-71,070-
02, 2013 Tex. Crim. App. Unpub. LEXIS 526 at *2 (Tex. Crim. App., May 8, 2013).
Applicant also raised this issue in his 2015 federal habeas petition. He claimed
that counsel provided ineffective assistance by conceding his guilt to the jury without his
permission, and he characterized it as abandonment by counsel subject to the Sixth
Amendment standard in Cronic. Barbee v. Stephens, No. 4:09-CV-074-Y, 2015 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 88060 at *86 (N.D. Tex., July 7, 2015). The District Court determined that
the claim was properly analyzed under Strickland rather than Cronic and denied the
claim. Barbee v. Stephens, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88060 at *87 (“For Cronic to apply,
the attorney’s failure to subject the state’s case to meaningful adversarial testing must be
complete.”) (citing Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 124 n.1 (2008)).
After the Supreme Court issued its 2018 McCoy opinion, Applicant filed this
second subsequent application for writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his trial attorney
overrode his Sixth Amendment autonomy right to insist on his innocence. Because this is
a subsequent writ, the merits of Applicant’s claim cannot be considered unless it meets
the requirements of Article 11.071, Section 5.
IV. McCoy v. Louisiana
McCoy applied longstanding jurisprudence related to defendant autonomy and
structural error to a “stark scenario,” holding that a capital murder defendant has the right
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to insist that his counsel refrain from admitting guilt of the charged offense. McCoy, 138
S. Ct. at 1510-11. The violation of that right “was complete when the [trial] court
allowed counsel to usurp control of an issue within McCoy’s sole prerogative[,]” thus
foreclosing any need to demonstrate prejudice. Id.McCoy was accused of having killed his estranged wife’s son, mother, and
stepfather, and the evidence against him was strong. Id. at 1505-06. But he maintained
that he was innocent and that the victims had been killed by police in a drug deal gone
bad. Id. at 1506. McCoy instructed his attorney to pursue an outright acquittal and not to
concede guilt, but the attorney saw that as a futile effort that would make the death
penalty inevitable. Id. McCoy protested to the trial court before and during trial that he
was innocent and that his attorney was “selling him out” by making the concession. Id.McCoy’s protestations were futile. The trial court instructed the defense attorney to try
the case as he had planned, refused McCoy’s request for time to hire a new lawyer, and
cautioned McCoy against making outbursts in front of the jury. Id. at 1506-07.
In opening statement the attorney told the jury, “my client committed three
murders.” Id. at 1507. In closing argument he said that McCoy was the killer and that he
took the burden off the prosecutor on that issue. Id. Defense counsel conceded at
punishment that McCoy committed the crimes but urged the jury to consider McCoy’s
mental and emotional issues. Id. On appeal McCoy argued that his constitutional rights
were violated by his attorney conceding guilt over his objections. Id. The Supreme
Court agreed.
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IV.A. Sixth Amendment Assistance of Counsel
The Supreme Court noted that to gain the assistance of counsel, “a defendant need
not surrender control entirely to counsel.” Id. at 1508. The Sixth Amendment “speaks of
the ‘assistance’ of counsel, and an assistant, however expert, is still an assistant.” Id.(quoting Faretta v. California, 522 U.S. 806, 819-20 (1975)). Trial management is the
attorney’s province, but some decisions belong to the defendant, for example: “whether
to plead guilty, waive the right to jury trial, testify in one’s behalf, and forgo an appeal.”
McCoy, 138 S. Ct. at 1508 (citing Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983)).
The Court concluded, “Autonomy to decide that the objective of the defense is to
assert innocence” is reserved for the defendant. McCoy, 138 S. Ct. at 1508. “Just as a
defendant may steadfastly refuse to plead guilty in the face of overwhelming evidence
against her, or reject the assistance of legal counsel despite the defendant’s own
inexperience and lack of professional qualifications, so may she insist on maintaining her
innocence at the guilt phase of a capital trial.” Id. McCoy derived the defendant’s right
to assert innocence against counsel’s advice from the defendant’s right to decide whether
to plead guilty and from his right to reject the assistance of counsel. Id. (quoting Faretta,
422 U.S. at 819 and citing Barnes, 463 U.S. at 751).
Such decisions are not “about how best to achieve a client’s objectives; they are
choices about what the client’s objectives in fact are.” McCoy, 138 S. Ct. at 1508 (citing
Weaver v. Massachusetts, 137 S. Ct. 1899, 1908 (2017), and Martinez v. Court of Appeal
of Cal., Fourth Appellate Dist., 528 U.S. 152, 165 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring in
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judgment)). When a defendant “expressly asserts that the goal of ‘his defense’ is to
maintain innocence of the charged criminal acts, his lawyer must abide by that objective
and may not override it by conceding guilt.” McCoy, 138 S. Ct. at 1509 (quoting and
emphasizing U.S. CONST. AMEND VI). Once McCoy communicated “to court and
counsel” that he “strenuously” objected to counsel’s proposed strategy, “a concession of
guilt should have been off the table.” McCoy, 138 S. Ct. at 1512.
The McCoy majority dismissed the dissenting opinion’s claim about the rarity of
attorney-client disagreements over conceding guilt and noted that three state supreme
courts other than Louisiana’s had addressed the issue. Id. at 1510. It pointed out the
similarities of those cases to McCoy’s case, namely, “the defendant repeatedly and
adamantly insisted on maintaining his factual innocence despite counsel’s preferred
course: concession of the defendant’s commission of criminal acts and pursuit of
diminished capacity, mental illness, or lack of premeditation defenses.” Id. (citing
People v. Bergerud, 223 P.3d 686, 690-91 (Colo. 2010); Cooke v. State, 977 A.2d 803,
814 (Del. 2009); and State v. Carter, 14 P.3d 1138, 1141 (2000)). McCoy said that “these
were not strategic disputes” but “intractable disagreements about the fundamental
objective of the defendant’s representation.” McCoy, 138 S. Ct. at 1510. “In this stark
scenario, we agree with the majority of state courts of last resort that counsel may not
admit her client’s guilt of a charged crime over the client’s intransigent objection to that
admission.” Id. McCoy then turned its attention to prejudice.
IV.B. Structural Error/Presumed Prejudice
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McCoy said counsel’s admission of a defendant’s guilt over his express objection
was structural error meriting a presumption of prejudice for “at least” two reasons: the
effects of the error are too hard to measure, and the right at issue is designed to protect
“the fundamental legal principle that a defendant must be allowed to make his own
choices about the proper way to protect his own liberty.” Id. at 1511 (quoting Weaver,
137 S. Ct. at 1908).
McCoy opposed his counsel’s assertion of his guilt “at every opportunity, before
and during trial, both in conference with his lawyer and in open court.” McCoy, 138 S.
Ct. at 1509. McCoy had an outburst in court, objecting to his own counsel’s opening
statement. Id. at 1506-07. McCoy testified to facts in complete opposition to those
raised by his counsel. Id. at 1507. Defense counsel relieved the State of its burden to
prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. And the trial court erred in knowingly
allowing defense counsel to violate McCoy’s Sixth Amendment rights. Id. at 1506. The
error was structural because it impacted the framework within which McCoy’s trial
proceeded. See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 150 (2006) (violation of
certain rights is structural error when it impacts the framework within which the trial
proceeds). McCoy’s trial contrasted with Nixon’s, and that contrast justified the different
approaches to their cases.
IV.C. Nixon vs. McCoy
Like McCoy, Nixon claimed that his attorney violated his Sixth Amendment right
to counsel by conceding his guilt without his consent. Nixon, 543 U.S. at 185. But
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Nixon did not expressly object to the strategy; when it was explained to him, he was
unresponsive. Id. at 181. This unresponsiveness was the key to the Supreme Court’s
rejection of the Florida court’s opinion that the attorney’s concession was presumptively
deficient performance and prejudicial.
Nixon held that the concession was not unreasonable given Nixon’s
unresponsiveness. Id. at 189. “Nixon’s characteristic silence each time information was
conveyed to him, in sum, did not suffice to render unreasonable [his attorney’s] decision
to concede guilt and to home in, instead, on the life or death penalty issue.” Id. And
Nixon held that a presumption of prejudice would not be “in order based solely on a
defendant’s failure to provide express consent to a tenable strategy counsel has
adequately disclosed to and discussed with” him. Id. at 181. If Nixon had objected, then,
the concession might have been unreasonable and a presumption of prejudice might have
been warranted. Presented with such facts, McCoy took Nixon to its next logical step.
McCoy noted that Nixon was not contrary to its holding but was distinguishable
because McCoy, unlike Nixon, adamantly objected to the admission of guilt at every
opportunity, before and during trial and in and out of court. McCoy, 138 S. Ct. at 1509.
If a defendant “declines to participate in his defense, then an attorney may permissibly
guide the defense pursuant to the strategy she believes to be in the defendant’s best
interest. Presented with express statements of the client’s will to maintain innocence,
however, counsel may not steer the ship the other way.” Id. (citing Gonzalez v. United
States, 553 U.S. 242, 254 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (distinguishing
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“action taken by counsel over his client’s objection” from defendant’s failure to
personally express to the court his consent to waive certain rights)). Counsel “must still
develop a trial strategy and discuss it with her client, explaining why, in her view,
conceding guilt would be the best option.” McCoy, 138 S. Ct. at 1509 (citing Nixon, 543
U.S. at 178).
Although both Nixon and McCoy claimed that their Sixth Amendment rights were
violated by counsel conceding guilt without their permission, the differences between
their trials yielded different analyses. McCoy did not have to show prejudice because,
unlike Nixon, (1) McCoy told his attorney that his defensive objective was to assert
innocence at trial, (2) he told the trial court before and during trial that his attorney was
conceding his guilt against his wishes, and (3) the trial court nevertheless allowed defense
counsel to make the concession, causing structural error.
V. The Legal Basis for Applicant’s McCoy Claim Was Previously Available
McCoy was founded on “familiar legal principles” that dealt with the division of
labor between attorney and client, Barnes, 463 U.S. at 751, the duty of the attorney to
consult with his client about important matters, Nixon, 543 U.S. at 189, the client’s
exclusive right to make fundamental decisions about his own defense with the assistance
of counsel, Faretta, 422 U.S. at 819, and structural error, Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at
150. See St. Aubin, 537 S.W.3d at 34.
McCoy was a logical extension of Nixon and “could have been rationally
fashioned” from it. See Navarro, 538 S.W.3d at 615. Carter and Cooke demonstrated as
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much. See Carter, 14 P.3d 1138 (relying on, e.g., Faretta and Cronic to hold that guilt-
based defense imposed against defendant’s wishes violated Sixth Amendment right to
counsel); Cooke, 977 A.2d 803 (relying on, e.g., Faretta, Nixon, and Cronic to hold that
the defendant was denied counsel and presumptively prejudiced when his attorney
pursued a guilty-but-mentally-ill strategy over his objection).
McCoy did not make it easier to establish a claim. See Chavez, 371 S.W.3d at
207. McCoy merely required factually what Nixon explicitly lacked: a defendant’s
express objections to a concession of guilt disregarded by counsel and court and aired
before a jury during trial. Since the structural error analysis flowed from those
requirements, McCoy’s presumption of prejudice was not an abandonment of factors
previously weighed, either; it was an addition of factors.
Applicant argues that the legal basis for his claim was previously unavailable
because McCoy was the first case to uphold a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to
decide the objective of his defense, and its focus on the defendant’s wishes represented a
departure from Strickland. Even so, that is not the test for a previously unavailable legal
basis. Applicant points to McCoy’s purported disclaimer of Supreme Court ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel (IAC) jurisprudence where it said, “Because a client’s autonomy,
not counsel’s competence, is in issue, we do not apply our [IAC] jurisprudence,
[Strickland, 466 U.S. 668] or [Cronic, 466 U.S. 648].” McCoy, 138 S. Ct. at 1510-11.
But that disclaimer related to the showing of prejudice “ordinarily” required for IAC
claims. Id. at 1511. The violation of McCoy’s right was “complete” when the trial court
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allowed it to occur, and a showing of prejudice was thus unnecessary. Id. Significantly,
McCoy did not cite Nixon in connection with its disclaimer and instead contrasted it
based on the factual differences between the two cases. McCoy, 138 S. Ct. at 1509.
The legal basis for Applicant’s current claim was previously available under the
terms of Article 11.071, Section 5. Even if it were not previously available, Applicant
does not allege sufficient facts to show that his claim meets the requirements of McCoy.
VI. Failure to Allege Sufficient Facts
Applicant seeks to distinguish his McCoy claim from other such claims that have
been dismissed by this Court under Article 11.071, Section 5. Unlike those cases, he
argues, his application “contains extensive evidence demonstrating that he informed his
lawyers that he wished to maintain his innocence.” But it does not. His exhibits include
evidence that he told various people, including his attorneys, that he was innocent, he
would not plead guilty, and Dodd killed Lisa and Jayden; he told the forensic psychiatrist
that he would rather be executed than have his mother see him “plead guilty”; he
complained to the trial court about a “breakdown in communication” with his attorneys;
his attorney did not “explicitly” tell him that his closing argument would concede
Applicant’s identity as Lisa and Jayden’s killer; and Applicant was “shocked” when he
heard the argument. These facts demonstrate that Applicant told his attorneys that he was
innocent; they do not demonstrate that he told them that his defensive objective was to
maintain his innocence at trial. Thus, the application fails to allege facts that, if true,
would entitle him to relief under McCoy.
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VII. Conclusion
The legal basis for Applicant’s claim was available when his previous applications
were filed, and Applicant has not alleged facts that, if true, would entitle him to relief
under McCoy. This subsequent application does not meet the requirements of Article
11.071, Section 5, and we dismiss it as an abuse of the writ under Section 5(c).
Delivered: February 10, 2021
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