Hall, Gabriel Paul

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
OF TEXAS
NO. WR-86,568-02
IN RE GABRIEL PAUL HALL, Relator
ON MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
IN CAUSE NO. 11-06185-CRF-272 IN THE 272ND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
BRAZOS COUNTY
Per curiam.
OPINION
Before the Court is Relator and Real Party in Interest Gabriel Paul Hall’s Motion for
Leave to File a Petition for Writ of Mandamus and the accompanying Petition. Respondent
in this case is the Honorable J.D. Langley, the senior judge assigned to Hall’s initial Article
11.0711 writ proceedings which are currently pending before us in cause number WR-86,568-
1
Unless we specify otherwise, all references to articles in this opinion refer to the Texas
Code of Criminal Procedure.
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01.2 Hall asks that we grant him leave to file his mandamus petition. He further asks that we
grant him mandamus relief by ordering Judge Langley to rule on the merits of Hall’s “Motion
to Find Applicant’s Right to Due Process in [Initial Article 11.071] Proceeding Was Violated
Due to Article 26.052 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure” (“Article 26.052 Motion”),
filed in the trial court on March 16, 2023. For the reasons discussed below, we grant Hall’s
motion for leave to file his Petition, and we conclude that he has shown an entitlement to
mandamus relief in this matter.
Article 26.052 sets out the statutory requirements for appointed trial and appellate
counsel in death penalty cases. See Art. 26.052(d)(2). One of those requirements is that the
attorney
ha[s] not been found by a federal or state court to have rendered ineffective
assistance of counsel during the trial or appeal of any capital case, unless the
local selection committee determines under Subsection (n) that the conduct
underlying the finding no longer accurately reflects the attorney’s ability to
provide effective representation[.]
Art. 26.052(d)(2)(C).
In his Article 26.052 Motion, Hall argues that, when a capital habeas applicant claims
in an Article 11.071 application that his trial or appellate counsel rendered ineffective
assistance, Article 26.052(d)(2)(C) deprives the applicant of due process. More specifically,
2
Hall is an inmate in the custody of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice–Institutional
Division pursuant to a 2015 capital murder conviction and death sentence for the murder of Edwin
Shaar Jr. in the course of committing or attempting to commit burglary. This Court affirmed Hall's
conviction and death sentence on direct appeal. Hall v. State, 663 S.W.3d 15 (Tex. Crim. App.
2021).
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Hall posits that this subsection creates an incentive for an attorney accused of ineffectiveness
to be less than candid about the quality of his representation if the attorney wishes to continue
being appointed counsel in capital cases. In Hall’s initial Article 11.071 habeas application,
he alleges that his trial counsel, John Wright, was constitutionally ineffective. Hall
emphasizes that the evidence adduced at the live evidentiary hearing on that habeas
allegation shows that Wright wishes to be appointed as appellate counsel in future capital
cases. Thus, Hall contends, Wright allegedly labors under an unconstitutional incentive to
testify adversely to his former client. Halls asks the trial court to declare Article
26.052(d)(2)(C) unconstitutional on this basis.
In his Mandamus Petition, Hall argues that his Article 26.052 Motion is truly a
motion, and that he presented it to the trial court (i.e., Judge Langley) in a timely and proper
manner. Therefore, Halls contends, the trial court has a ministerial duty to rule on the motion,
but it has declined to do so. Hall further asserts that he has no adequate remedy at law should
the trial court continue its refusal to rule on the motion.
The habeas record in cause number WR-86,568-01 includes certain written findings
of fact and conclusions of law that Judge Langley made regarding Hall’s Article 26.052
Motion, as well as Judge Langley’s written clarifications (requested by this Court) of certain
language in those findings and conclusions. Also before us are supplemental findings of fact
and conclusions of law that Judge Langley entered in response to our invitation for him to
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respond to Hall’s motion for leave to file a mandamus petition.3
Based on the above-mentioned findings of fact and conclusions of law, we understand
Judge Langley to take the position that the Article 26.052 Motion is actually an untimely
attempt by Hall to amend his initial Article 11.071 habeas application to raise an entirely new
claim attacking Article 26.052(d)(2)(C) on due process grounds. This position is generally
consistent with the stance that the State took at a trial court hearing concerning Hall’s Article
26.052 Motion. Judge Langley’s further position, as we understand it, is that the Article
26.052 Motion should therefore be dismissed.4
But we disagree that Hall’s Article 26.052 Motion is an untimely amended or
subsequent habeas application. To constitute a habeas application under Article 11.071, the
application “must seek relief from a judgment imposing a penalty of death.” Ex parte Kerr,
64 S.W.3d 414, 419 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). As we have
explained,
[a] death penalty “writ” that does not challenge the validity of the underlying
judgment and which, even if meritorious, would not result in immediate relief
from [an applicant’s] capital murder conviction or death sentence, is not an
3
We also invited the State to respond to Hall’s motion for leave to file a mandamus petition.
To date, the State has not done so.
4
Under Article 11.071, Section 5(f), the trial court shall treat an untimely amended or
supplemental application as a subsequent application under Article 11.071, Section 5. Article 11.071,
Section 5(b) instructs a trial court that receives a subsequent application to forward that application
to this Court for us to determine whether it meets any of the exceptions (set forth in Article 11.071,
Section 5(a)) to the statutory bar on subsequent writ applications. Thus, if Hall’s Article 26.052
motion is an untimely amended initial or subsequent application, the appropriate response of the trial
court would be to forward Hall’s filing to this Court for a Section 5(a) determination.
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“initial application” for purposes of [Article 11.071, Section 5] which
generally bars consideration of a subsequent writ after filing the “initial
application.”
Id.Hall’s Article 26.052 Motion, if granted by the trial court, would result in the trial
court declaring Article 26.052(d)(2)(C) unconstitutional on due process grounds. But that
victory would not provide Hall with immediate relief from his capital murder conviction or
death sentence. Accordingly, Hall’s Article 26.052 Motion is not properly construed as an
untimely attempt to amend his initial Article 11.071 habeas application or as a subsequent
application. See Kerr, 64 S.W.3d ast 419.
Having determined that Hall’s Article 26.052 Motion is actually a motion rather than
an untimely amended initial or subsequent habeas application, the remaining question before
us is whether Hall has shown that he is entitled to a writ of mandamus. Mandamus relief may
be granted if the relator shows that: (1) the act sought to be compelled is purely ministerial,
and (2) no adequate remedy at law exists. Winters v. Presiding Judge of Crim. Dist. Ct
Number Three of Tarrant County, 118 S.W.3d 773, 775–76 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).
Additionally, the relator must have a “clear right to the relief sought,” meaning that the
merits of the relief sought are “beyond dispute.” Id. As we stated in In re McCann, “[t]o
show ‘a clear right to the relief sought,’ a relator must show that the facts and circumstances
of the case ‘dictate but one rational decision ‘under unequivocal, well-settled ... and clearly
controlling legal principles.’’” 422 S.W.3d 701, 704 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citing In re
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State ex rel. Weeks, 391 S.W.3d 117, 122 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013)). The clear-legal-right
requirement necessitates that the law plainly describes the duty to be performed, such that
there is no room for the exercise of discretion. Winters, 118 S.W.3d at 775–76. Because this
is a death penalty case, the mandamus action is properly filed directly in this Court instead
of the intermediate appellate court. See In re McCann, 422 S.W.3d at 704.
Hall has satisfied the first requirement for mandamus relief. We have said that a trial
court has a ministerial duty to rule upon a properly filed and timely presented motion,
although it generally has no ministerial duty to rule a certain way on that motion.5 In re Allen,
462 S.W.3d 47, 50 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015); State ex rel. Young v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court
of Appeals At Texarkana, 236 S.W.3d 207, 210 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
Hall has also satisfied the second requirement for relief by showing that he has no
adequate remedy at law. The trial court’s failure to rule on Hall’s Article 26.052 Motion is
not appealable. Hall’s inability to appeal leaves him with no adequate remedy at law.
Winters, 118 S.W.3d at 775.
We conditionally grant relief and direct Respondent to rule on the merits of Hall’s
Article 26.052 Motion. The writ of mandamus will issue only in the event that Respondent
fails to comply within fifteen (15) days of the date of this opinion.
5
Hall acknowledges that a trial court generally has no ministerial duty to rule on a motion
in a certain way, and he does not argue that his Article 26.052 Motion constitutes one of the rare
exceptions to this general rule. See In re Allen, 462 S.W.3d 47, 50 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015)
(explaining that “[i]t is proper to order a court to rule a particular way only when the law invoked
is ‘definite, unambiguous, and unquestionably applies to the indisputable facts of the case’”).
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IT IS SO ORDERED THIS THE 20th DAY OF DECEMBER, 2023.
Do Not Publish