FLORES, ROBERTO MEDINA v. the State of Texas

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
OF TEXAS
NO. PD-0562-22
ROBERTO MEDINA FLORES, Appellant
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS
ON APPELLANT’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
FROM THE FIRST COURT OF APPEALS
GALVESTON COUNTY
HERVEY, J., delivered the opinion of the unanimous Court.
OPINION
Can a trial court expand its jurisdiction and hold a hearing on a motion for new
trial outside the 75-day plenary period pursuant to the joint order of the Texas Supreme
Court and the Court of Criminal Appeals, titled First Emergency Order Regarding the
COVID-19 State of Disaster? No, it cannot. We will affirm the judgment of the court of
appeals.
Flores–2
I. BACKGROUND
On February 10, 2020, Appellant, Roberto Medina Flores, was convicted of
second-degree felony sexual assault and sentenced to 15 years’ confinement and fined.
He timely moved for a new trial and filed a notice of appeal. The trial court had until
April 25 to rule on the motion. On March 13, the Texas Supreme Court and Court of
Criminal Appeals issued a joint First Emergency Order Regarding the COVID-19 State
of Disaster (“Emergency Order”). The relevant part of the order, which applies here,
states:
2. Subject only to constitutional limitations, all courts in Texas may in
any case, civil or criminal—and must to avoid risk to court staff,
parties, attorneys, jurors, and the public—without a participant’s
consent:
a. Modify or suspend any and all deadlines and procedures,
whether prescribed by statute, rule, or order, for a stated period
ending no later than 30 days after the Governor’s state of
disaster has been lifted . . . .
First Emergency Order Regarding the COVID-19 State of Disaster, 596 S.W.3d 265(Tex. 2020) (relying on TEX. GOV’T CODE § 22.0035(b)). Seven days later, citing the
Emergency Order, Appellant moved to extend the 75-day deadline, and the trial court
granted the motion and issued an order to that effect. On May 8, the trial court held a
hearing on the motion for new trial. The trial court denied the motion, and Appellant
appealed.
The court of appeals concluded the trial court erred because the 75-day plenary
period is jurisdictional, not procedural, and a trial court cannot “create jurisdiction for
itself where . . . jurisdiction would otherwise be absent,” even based on an Emergency
Flores–3
Order. Flores v. State, No. 01-20-00213-CR, 2022 WL 961554, at *10 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 31, 2022) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (quoting In
re State ex rel. Ogg, 618 S.W.3d 361, 364 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021)). The court of appeals
also concluded that it could not consider the motion-for-new-trial claims 1 or the record.
Id. at *11 (relying on State v. Moore, 225 S.W.3d 556, 570 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007), in
which the Court of Criminal Appeals held that hearings on motions for new trial
overruled by operation of law are not authorized). Appellant petitioned for discretionary
review.
II. APPLICABLE LAW
A defendant must file a motion for new trial within 30 days after “the trial court
imposes or suspends sentence in open court.” TEX. R. APP. P. 21.4. “The court must rule
on a motion for new trial within 75 days after imposing or suspending sentence in open
court.” Id. at 21.8(a). “A motion not timely ruled on by written order will be deemed
denied when the [75-day] period . . . expires.” Id. at 21.8(c). “[O]nce a motion for new
trial is overruled by operation of law, the trial court loses jurisdiction to rule upon it.”
State v. Garza, 931 S.W.2d 560, 562 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). “[J]urisdiction over a case
is an absolute systemic requirement.” State v. Dunbar, 297 S.W.3d 777, 780 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2009). Actions taken by a court without jurisdiction are void. See Ex parte Lozoya,
666 S.W.3d 618, 626 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023) (quoting Ex parte Armstrong, 8 S.W.2d
674, 676 (Tex. Crim. App. 1928)).
1
Appellant made four claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Flores–4
III. DISCUSSION
We agree with the court of appeals. We made clear in Ogg that a trial court cannot
expand its jurisdiction by relying on an order similar to the Emergency Order authorizing
the suspension of deadlines and procedures here. Ogg, 618 S.W.3d at 364 (a trial court
cannot create its own jurisdiction based on an emergency order issued under Section
22.0035(b) of the Government Code). Here, the trial court tried to do just that. It entered
an order purporting to expand its jurisdiction by seven days. But the requirement that a
court must have jurisdiction is not procedural, and the 75-day jurisdictional deadline
cannot be suspended. Dunbar, 297 S.W.3d at 780 (jurisdiction is a systemic requirement);
Marin v. State, 851 S.W.2d 275, 279 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (“Implementation of . . .
[systemic] requirements is not optional and cannot, therefore, be waived or forfeited by
the parties.”). The trial court did not have the authority to preside over the hearing on the
motion for new trial, and its overruling of the motion is void. Appellant’s motion for new
trial was overruled by operation of law when the 75-day plenary period expired.
IV. CONCLUSION
We affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
Delivered: December 13, 2023
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