DocketNumber: CIVIL ACTION NO. H-19-1641
Citation Numbers: 389 F. Supp. 3d 473
Judges: Lake
Filed Date: 7/18/2019
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 7/25/2022
Plaintiff Jane Doe # 4 ("Plaintiff" or "Jane Doe") sued defendants Salesforce.com, Inc. ("Salesforce"); Michael Lacey; James Larkin; John Brunst; Scott Spear; Medalist Holdings, LLC; Leeward Holdings, LLC;
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Jane Doe claims that Defendants are responsible in varying capacities for the exploitation she experienced as a victim of sex trafficking.
Jane Doe's Petition also asserts claims against the non-diverse Hotel Defendants. Jane Doe alleges that she was sexually assaulted at a Motel 6 owned and operated by the Hotel Defendants.
Jane Doe alleges that Salesforce, the Backpage Defendants, and the Hotel Defendants were part of a single human trafficking venture under Texas law.
*476II. Removal Standard
"A party may remove an action from state court to federal court if the action is one over which the federal court possesses subject matter jurisdiction." Manguno v. Prudential Property and Casualty Insurance Co.,
III. Fraudulent Misjoinder Analysis
Fraudulent misjoinder is a concept developed by the Eleventh Circuit in Tapscott v. MS Dealer Service Corporation,
Tapscott's fraudulent-misjoinder analysis is two-fold: (1) has one defendant been misjoined with another defendant in violation of the applicable joinder rules;
Salesforce argues that the court has diversity jurisdiction over this action because the non-diverse Hotel Defendants *477were fraudulently misjoined. Jane Doe argues that the Hotel Defendants are properly joined because (1) her claims against all Defendants arise from injuries she sustained as a result of her victimization by a single sex trafficking venture and (2) common questions of law and fact will arise in resolving her claims against Defendants.
The court concludes that Jane Doe's joinder of the Hotel Defendants did not violate Texas's joinder rules. Jane Doe's claims against the Hotel Defendants, Salesforce, and the Backpage Defendants arise from the same transaction or series of transactions -- an alleged sex trafficking venture
Alternatively, even if Texas joinder requirements were not satisfied, Salesforce has failed to persuade the court that Plaintiff's joinder of the Hotel Defendants is so egregious as to be fraudulent. A survey of fraudulent misjoinder cases conducted by the Northern District of Texas recognized three situations in which a misjoinder is potentially so egregious as to be considered "fraudulent:"
(1) two or more lawsuits with little or no party overlap have been combined in the same action (i.e., there are multiple plaintiffs and defendants, but each plaintiff or discrete set of plaintiffs is suing only one defendant or a discrete set of defendants); (2) numerous plaintiffs have sued a common defendant and assert claims that have no shared factual element other than the presence of the common defendant; and (3) a single plaintiff or group of plaintiffs has joined multiple defendants in the same action and is asserting claims against each defendant *478that are both factually and legally unrelated.
See Texas Instruments,
IV. Conclusion and Order
For the reasons explained above, the court concludes that Salesforce has failed to carry its burden of proving that the court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action. Accordingly, Jane Doe's Motion to Remand (Docket Entry No. 26) is GRANTED . This action is REMANDED to the 157th Judicial District Court of Harris County, Texas. The Clerk will provide a copy of this Memorandum Opinion and Order of Remand to the District Clerk of Harris County, Texas.
Defendants Michael Lacey, James Larkin, John Brunst, Scott Spear, Leeward Holdings, LLC, and Medalist Holdings, LLC will be referred to collectively herein as the "Backpage Defendants." In its Notice of Removal, Salesforce claims that Plaintiff improperly named Medalist Holdings, LLC rather than Medalist Holdings, Inc., which is the parent company for Backpage. See Notice of Removal by Defendant Salesforce.com, Inc. ("Notice of Removal"), Docket Entry No. 1, pp. 2-3 ¶¶ 6 and 7.
G6 and NNJP, LLC will be referred to collectively herein as the "Hotel Defendants."
See Notice of Removal, Docket Entry No. 1.
See Plaintiff's Amended Petition and Request for Disclosure to Salesforce, Inc. ("Petition"), Exhibit 3 to Notice of Removal, Docket Entry No. 1-4, pp. 111-35.
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See id. at 124-26.
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See id. at 130-33.
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See Plaintiff's Motion to Remand, Docket Entry No. 26, p. 10; see Petition, Exhibit 3 to Notice of Removal, Docket Entry No. 1-4, p. 133 ¶ 132 (citing Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 98.005 ("A person who engages in the trafficking of persons or who intentionally or knowingly benefits from participating in a venture that traffics another person and is found liable under this chapter or other law for any amount of damages arising from the trafficking is jointly liable with any other defendant for the entire amount of damages arising from the trafficking." (emphasis added)), and p. 135 ¶ 141 (alleging that "Defendants knowingly and intentionally participated in a [sex trafficking] venture").
See Plaintiff's Original Petition, Exhibit 3 to Notice of Removal, Docket Entry No. 1-4, p. 2.
See Petition, Exhibit 3 to Notice of Removal, Docket Entry No. 1-4, p. 105.
See Notice of Removal, Docket Entry No. 1, pp. 7-10.
See Plaintiff's Motion to Remand, Docket Entry No. 26.
See Defendant Salesforce.com, Inc.'s Response and Brief in Opposition to Motion to Remand ("Salesforce's Response"), Docket Entry No. 27; Defendant G6 Hospitality, LLC's Response in Opposition to Jane Doe #4's Motion to Remand ("G6's Response"), Docket Entry No. 28.
See Jane Doe's Reply to Salesforce's Response to Jane Doe's Motion to Remand ("Jane Doe's Reply"), Docket Entry No. 31.
The Fifth Circuit has not indicated whether state or federal joinder laws should be used in fraudulent-misjoinder analyses. The court therefore concludes, consistently with its prior rulings and the rulings of other courts in this Circuit, that Texas joinder rules should govern since Plaintiff was required to follow Texas joinder rules when she originally filed this action. See Centaurus,
Salesforce argues that the court should not impose an "egregiousness" requirement in determining whether the Hotel Defendants have been fraudulently misjoined. See Salesforce's Response, Docket Entry No. 27, pp. 20-22. While courts in this Circuit have yet to agree on in what circumstances a misjoinder should qualify as egregious, they appear uniformly to apply the egregiousness requirement imposed by Tapscott. See Texas Instruments,
Jane Doe's Petition appears to allege the existence of a single sex trafficking venture, of which Defendants were participants: "Defendants knowingly and intentionally participated in a venture that violated" the Texas Penal Code's sex trafficking prohibition. See Petition, Exhibit 3 to Notice of Removal, Docket Entry No. 1-4, p. 135 ¶ 141 (emphasis added).
See Petition, Exhibit 3 to Notice of Removal, Docket Entry No. 1-4, pp. 124-26 (pleading claims for violations of Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Chapter 98, negligence, and gross negligence against Salesforce); pp. 126-30 (pleading claims for violation of Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Chapter 98, negligence, and gross negligence against the Backpage Defendants); pp. 130-33 (pleading claims for violation of Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Chapter 98 and negligence against the Hotel Defendants).