DocketNumber: EP-18-CR-3125-PRM
Citation Numbers: 368 F. Supp. 3d 1093
Judges: Martinez
Filed Date: 1/15/2019
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 7/25/2022
On this day, the Court considered Defendant Jesus Gerardo Alamo-Gutierrez's *1097[hereinafter "Defendant"] "Motion to Suppress" (ECF No. 21), filed on November 9, 2018; the Government's "Response to Defendant's Motion to Suppress" (ECF No. 29) [hereinafter "Response"], filed on November 29, 2018; and Defendant's "Reply to Government's Response" (ECF No. 32) [hereinafter "Reply"], filed on December 10, 2018, in the above-captioned cause. After due consideration, the Court is of the opinion that Defendant's Motion to Suppress should be granted in part and denied in part, for the reasons that follow.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On August 28, 2018, United States Border Patrol Agent Young stopped Defendant after the agent observed that Defendant was driving erratically. Mot. to Suppress 1-2. Prior to this traffic stop, Agent Young had been approached by a citizen who informed Agent Young that a motorist on the Border Highway was driving dangerously. Id. at 1. According to the Government, Agent Young "located the vehicle in question and observed the vehicle making several hazardous lane changes and hitting a guardrail." Resp. 1. Agent Young then called the El Paso Police Department to request assistance and conducted a traffic stop. Id.
Agent Young detained Defendant until the El Paso police arrived, and the El Paso police officer arrested Defendant under suspicion of driving while intoxicated. Mot. to Suppress 1-2. After Defendant was arrested, Agent Young conducted an immigration record check and discovered prior immigration offenses and removals. Id. at 2. Thereafter, Defendant pled guilty to driving while intoxicated and was sentenced to fifty days of confinement. Resp. 2. Based upon Agent Young's discovery of Defendant's immigration history and removals, an immigration detainer was placed on Defendant while he was incarcerated at the El Paso County Detention Facility. Id.
On October 3, 2018, Defendant was released from the El Paso County Detention Facility to the custody of the United States Border Patrol at the Paso Del Norte Border Patrol Processing Center. Id. At the Paso Del Norte Center, Border Patrol Agent Hernandez obtained information from Defendant regarding his citizenship and immigration status. Mot. to Suppress 2. Defendant admitted that he is not a citizen and does not have any documents allowing him to remain in the United States legally. Id. Thereafter, an Agent used Defendant's biometric information
Defendant filed his Motion to Suppress on November 9, 2018. Therein, Defendant avers that Agent Young's welfare stop on August 28 violated the Fourth Amendment.
Further, Defendant contends that Agents at the Paso Del Norte Center violated the Fifth Amendment on October 3, 2018, by questioning Defendant about his immigration history and collecting his biometric data before reading Defendant his Miranda rights.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. CONST. amend. IV. "A person is seized by the police and thus entitled to challenge the government's action under the Fourth Amendment when the officer, 'by means of physical force or show of authority,' terminates or restrains his freedom of movement 'through means intentionally applied.' " Brendlin v. California ,
"For a traffic stop to be justified at its inception, an officer must have an objectively reasonable suspicion that some sort of illegal activity, such as a traffic violation, occurred, or is about to occur, before stopping the vehicle." United States v. Lopez-Moreno ,
B. Fifth Amendment
In Miranda v. Arizona , the Supreme Court "established that the prosecution may not use statements stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination." United States v. Bennett ,
*1099Rhode Island v. Innis ,
C. Exclusionary Rule
"When [law enforcement officers] forego legal means of investigation simply in order to obtain evidence in violation of a suspect's constitutional rights, the need to deter is paramount and requires application of the exclusionary rule." United States v. Cherry ,
"The primary limit on this rule is that otherwise suppressible evidence will still be admitted if the connection between the alleged illegality and the acquisition of the evidence is 'so attenuated as to dissipate the taint.' "
III. ANALYSIS
A. Fourth Amendment
First, the Court considers whether Agent Young violated Defendant's Fourth Amendment rights during the August 28, 2018, traffic stop. Defendant does not contest that reasonable suspicion or probable cause existed at the time of the arrest. Rather, Defendant challenges the agent's authority to conduct a traffic stop as well as the scope of the stop. Defendant seeks to suppress evidence obtained as a result of this stop as fruit of the poisonous tree. Mot. to Suppress 3. The Court concludes that whether the traffic stop exceeded the scope of Agent Young's authority is a close question. However, even if the stop violated the Fourth Amendment, the evidence at issue would be admissible because a defendant's identity and A-file are not suppressible.
1. Whether the Border Patrol agent had the authority to stop Defendant is a close question.
According to Defendant, a Border Patrol agent's Congressionally-circumscribed authority limits him from stopping a vehicle for any reason outside of the "illegal alien context." See Mot. to Suppress 3. However, the statute that governs a Border Patrol agent's authority-
for any felony cognizable under the laws of the United States, if the officer or employee has reasonable grounds to believe that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing such a felony, if the officer or employee is performing duties relating to the enforcement of the immigration laws at the time of the arrest and if there is a likelihood of the person escaping before a warrant can be obtained for his arrest.
Defendant mistakenly cites only to the district court's decision in Perkins but fails to discuss the Fifth Circuit's analysis. Reply 2. Defendant asserts that, pursuant to the district court's analysis, immigration officers may only stop a car for a reason directly related to immigration. Id. at 2-3. Initially, although the Perkins district court denied the defendant's motion to suppress, it stated that "Border Patrol agents may not make a roving patrol stop based solely on a reasonable suspicion of a non-immigration law violation."
However, on appeal, the Fifth Circuit delineated Border Patrol agents' authority more broadly than the district court had and asserted that agents may stop motorists "on the basis of reasonable suspicion of any criminal activity, and are not limited to suspicion of violation of immigration laws."
As previously stated, a law enforcement officer may conduct a traffic stop if he has reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. "[T]he facts giving rise to reasonable suspicion must be judged *1101against an objective standard." United States v. Ibarra-Sanchez ,
a. Whether a reasonable officer would believe an immigration offense was occurring
Erratic driving may support reasonable suspicion that an immigration-related offense is occurring. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce ,
In the Fifth Circuit, factors that may be considered to determine whether reasonable suspicion of an immigration offense exists include:
(1) the area's proximity to the border; (2) characteristics of the area; (3) usual traffic patterns; (4) the agents' experience in detecting illegal activity; (5) behavior of the driver; (6) particular aspects or characteristics of the vehicle;
*1102(7) information about recent illegal trafficking of aliens or narcotics in the area; and (8) the number of passengers and their appearance and behavior.
United States v. Soto ,
b. Whether a reasonable officer would believe a felony was occurring
Reckless driving is not a felony in Texas; it is a misdemeanor offense. TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 545.401. Further, although driving while intoxicated is a felony in limited circumstances (for example, if the driver has prior similar convictions or a child in the car), driving while intoxicated is typically a misdemeanor. See TEXAS PENAL CODE §§ 49.04, 49.045, 49.09. Thus, whether Agent Young had reason to believe that a driving-related felony was occurring is murky: although driving while intoxicated is typically not a felony in Texas, it may be in limited circumstances. Further, reasonable suspicion is a lower standard than probable cause, and it is certainly possible that a driving-related felony was occurring. The Court determines that it is unclear whether this possibility rises to the level of reasonable suspicion.
In sum, whether Agent Young could have reasonably believed a felony or immigration-related offense was occurring appears to be a close question. Nonetheless, evidence of a defendant's identity and the information contained in his A-file are never suppressible, as is further discussed below in part III(A)(4). Thus, even if no reasonable suspicion existed, the evidence at issue in this case could not be suppressed. Accordingly, the Court need not determine whether Agent Young's traffic stop was based on a reasonable suspicion that a felony or immigration-related offense was occurring.
2. The traffic stop did not impermissibly "exceed the scope of [Agent Young's] welfare check."
Defendant also contends that Agent Young "reportedly checked to see if [Defendant] was ok[ay]" and that "a stop extended beyond the time for which it was originally made violates the Fourth Amendment." Mot. to Suppress 4-5. It appears that Defendant believes that the Border Patrol agent could not, after stopping Defendant and determining that there was reason to believe that Defendant *1103had committed a crime, detain Defendant until the El Paso police arrived.
As support for his proposition, Defendant cites Rodriguez v. United States , --- U.S. ----,
Here, the traffic stop did not extend beyond its original scope. Agent Young stopped Defendant because he was driving recklessly, and Agent Young continued the stop until El Paso police arrived because he believed that Defendant was intoxicated. Based on Defendant's reasoning, Agent Young should have conducted a "welfare check" and then allowed Defendant to keep driving even though Agent Young reasonably believed that Defendant was an intoxicated motorist. Defendant does not offer a clear definition as to what he would consider the stop's appropriate scope. At any rate, the Court declines to adopt a rule that would require an officer to release a motorist onto the road after determining that the motorist appears to be intoxicated.
In conclusion, Agent Young did not unlawfully extend the stop beyond the amount of time reasonably required to complete the stop's mission. Rather, the agent believed that Defendant was intoxicated after pulling Defendant over for reckless driving. Thus, detaining Defendant until the El Paso police arrived was within the scope of the traffic stop. Because Agent Young did not unnecessarily prolong the stop, the Court determines that the scope of the seizure was reasonable.
3. The Border Patrol agent's immigration record search was not unlawful.
Finally, Defendant contends that Agent Young violated the Fourth Amendment because he researched Defendant's immigration record after Defendant was arrested. Mot. to Suppress 5. Specifically, Defendant asserts that "[Agent] Young had neither consent nor probable cause to believe an immigration violation had occurred, and this immigration check was therefore unreasonable."
4. Evidence of a Defendant's identity and information contained in his A-File are not suppressible.
In general, a person's identity is never suppressible, and a non-citizen has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his A-file. I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza ,
Defendant asserts that the Court should not rely on Lopez-Mendoza because the case "was decided in an era before mandatory criminal prosecution of immigration crimes." Reply 4. Although the Court recognizes that executive branch priorities regarding immigration enforcement change, the Court cannot disregard applicable precedent because of increased immigration enforcement.
Further, Defendant points out that, in Lopez-Mendoza , the Supreme Court opined that the exclusionary rule should not apply in civil immigration proceedings, in part because "only a very small percentage of arrests of aliens are intended or expected to lead to criminal prosecutions." Reply 4 (quoting Lopez-Mendoza ,
The evidence that Defendant seeks to suppress as a result of the traffic stop-fingerprints, A-file, and criminal and immigration history-is all evidence of identity or information that can be found in his A-file. Because a person's identity is never suppressible and non-citizens do not have standing to challenge the introduction of their A-file into evidence, the Court determines that evidence should not be suppressed.
B. Fifth Amendment
Second, the Court considers whether the Border Patrol Agents at the Paso Del Norte Processing Center violated Defendant's Fifth Amendment rights. As a threshold matter, the Government does not dispute that Defendant was in custody. See Resp. 4. Thus, the Court must only analyze: (1) whether Defendant's statements were within the scope of Miranda protections, and (2) if asking Defendant about his immigration status violated the Fifth Amendment, what evidence-if any-should be suppressed as fruit of an illegal custodial interrogation.
1. Asking Defendant about his immigration status violated Defendant's Miranda rights.
Whether Defendant's Fifth Amendment rights were violated hinges on whether asking about his immigration status was a routine booking question. "Routine booking questions" fall outside of Miranda's scope; therefore, any answers to routine booking questions are not required to be suppressed. Pennsylvania v. Muniz ,
While the routine booking question exception is broadly recognized, courts have *1105struggled when deciding whether questions about immigration status are best understood as routine booking questions or as questions likely to elicit an incriminating response. The Fifth Circuit has not yet squarely addressed this issue. See United States v. Lugo ,
In determining whether a question regarding immigration status should be considered within Miranda 's purview, the Court finds the district court's analysis in United States v. Lugo to be instructive:
The question of whether or not a detainee will eventually be prosecuted is relevant only to the extent that it pertains to whether an interrogator's questions are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response regarding the defendant's immigration status. In other words, a situation where the individual asking questions has reason to believe that prosecution will result from the information he or she is gathering is more likely to require a Miranda warning prior to questioning because, based on the nature of the questions, certain answers should be reasonably expected to lead to prosecution-thus making the answers, by definition, incriminatory.
Here, Agent Hernandez's questioning of Defendant was likely to elicit an incriminating response. When Defendant was brought to the Paso Del Norte Center, he had completed serving the sentence imposed for driving while intoxicated, and the Border Patrol agents sought information specifically about his immigration status. Stated differently, Defendant was not being questioned about some other offense unrelated to immigration. Instead, it appears that the Border Patrol agents were seeking to elicit responses that would reveal an immigration offense-i.e., the offense of illegal reentry, a crime with which Defendant has been charged and remains pending.
Because the Court is of the opinion that questioning Defendant about his immigration status prior to providing the Miranda warnings violated his Fifth Amendment rights, the Court also determines that Defendant's statements regarding his immigration status at the Paso Del Norte Center should be suppressed.
2. Although Defendant's statements are inadmissible, his fingerprints, A-file, and criminal and immigration history should not be suppressed.
When a Defendant's Miranda rights are violated, illegally obtained statements *1106and the fruits of illegally obtained evidence may not generally be admitted into evidence. However, exceptions to this general prohibition exist. Relevant here, evidence that is derived from an independent source or would have inevitably been discovered through independent, lawful means is excepted from the exclusionary rule. See United States v. Palacios , No. CR H-17-221-01,
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Defendant Jesus Gerardo Alamo-Gutierrez's "Motion to Suppress" (ECF No. 21) is GRANTED only as to the statements Defendant made on October 3, 3018.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Jesus Gerardo Alamo-Gutierrez's "Motion to Suppress" (ECF No. 21) is DENIED as to Defendant's fingerprints, A-file, and criminal and immigration history.
According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation's website, "biometric information" is information related to a person's "fingerprints ... palm prints, irises, and facial recognition." FBI, Next Generation Identification (NGI), https://www.fbi.gov/services/cjis/fingerprints-and-other-biometrics/ngi (last visited Jan. 14, 2019). Through the use of a "rapid search service," law enforcement officers may use a person's fingerprints to quickly obtain information regarding the person.
In Perkins , Border Patrol agents received a tip that a motorist was smuggling drugs in a recreational vehicle.
Defendant also asserts that Border Patrol agents "cannot stop vehicles to 'enforce community health and welfare regulations.' " Id. at 4 (quoting Almeida-Sanchez v. United States ,
To support this distinction between questions that are reasonably likely to illicit incriminating responses and those that are more akin to routine booking questions, the Lugo Court relied on Ninth Circuit case law that had developed the same distinction. Id. at 797-99.
The Court notes that the Government asserts that it "does not seek to admit at trial any of the statements made by Defendant on October 3, 2018" and this portion of Defendant's motion is, therefore, moot. Resp. 3, 7. Nonetheless, in the interest of thoroughness, the Court considers Defendant's arguments regarding these statements and determines that they were obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment.