Sanganza v. United States

In the United States Court of Federal Claims
THEMBA BERNARD SANGANZA,
Plaintiff,
v. No. 22–cv–836
Filed: January 31, 2023
THE UNITED STATES,
Defendant.
Themba Bernard Sanganza, White Deer, Pennsylvania, Plaintiff, appearing pro se.
Augustus Jeffrey Golden, United States Department of Justice, Civil Division, Commercial
Litigation Branch, Washington, D.C., appearing for Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff Themba Bernard Sanganza, proceeding pro se, brings this action against the
United States for unjust conviction and imprisonment under 28 U.S.C. § 1495. See Complaint
(ECF No. 1) (Compl.) at 1–2; see id. Ex. 1 at 122. 1 Plaintiff also appears to bring other claims
related to his conviction and imprisonment, including for negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and
violations of his constitutional rights. Compl. at 1, 5. Presently before the Court is Defendant
United States’ Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the
Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims (Rule(s)). See Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
(ECF No. 8) (Mot.). Defendant argues this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s
1
Citations throughout this Memorandum and Order reference the ECF-assigned page numbers,
which do not always correspond to the pagination within the document.
1
Complaint or, in the alternative, that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted. Mot. at 1. This Court agrees with Defendant that this Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims. Accordingly, and for the reasons explained below, this Court
GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(h)(3).
BACKGROUND
In 2016, Plaintiff was indicted for fraud in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
of Virginia. See United States v. Sanganza, No. 4:16–cr–00050, ECF No. 18 (E.D. Va. Aug. 9,
2016). 2 Plaintiff ultimately pleaded guilty to mail fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1341), bank fraud (18 U.S.C.
§ 1344), and aggravated identity theft (18 U.S.C. § 1028A), based on fraudulent federal income
tax returns and other fraudulent schemes. See id., ECF Nos. 28 (Plea Agreement), 29 (Statement
of Facts). Plaintiff was sentenced to 168 months imprisonment and remains imprisoned. See id.,
ECF No. 78; see also Compl. at 1 (Plaintiff is “currently being held . . .”); Compl. Ex. 1 at 122
(Plaintiff listing his “Prisoner #” and noting his location as “Allenwood FCI-Medium”).
On July 29, 2022, Plaintiff filed his Complaint alleging unjust conviction and
imprisonment, and on August 2, 2022, this Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed
In Forma Pauperis. Compl.; ECF No. 6. According to the Complaint, Plaintiff “was abducted at
his residen[ce] in Arlington, Virginia” and has been “held in custody in absence of a criminal
2
Plaintiff references his criminal proceeding throughout his Complaint and opposition to
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. See Compl. at 5 (Plaintiff referencing “criminal trial no: 4:16–
cr–0050”); Response at 16 (“On September 11, 2017 [U.S. District Judge] Mark S. Davis
conspired with the defendants in criminal trial 4:16–CR–0050 to detain the complainant in custody
unlawfully.”). In addition to the information referenced in the Complaint, this Court may consider
information in the public domain when assessing subject matter jurisdiction. See Jarvis v. United
States, No. 2022–1006, 2022 WL 1009728, at *3 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 5, 2022) (“[C]ourts may consider
public records when resolving a [12(b)(1)] motion to dismiss.”); Indium Corp. of Am. v. Semi-
Alloys, Inc., 781 F.2d 879, 884 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“In deciding . . . a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the court
can consider . . . evidentiary matters outside the pleadings.”).
2
complaint that established [a] basis for probable cause, but rather on an indictment that was never
presented to a grand jury to issue charges describing the offense.” Compl. at 5. The Complaint
alleges Plaintiff “was detained without due executive authority, in absence of territorial
jurisdiction, in absence of commercial jurisdiction, in absence of subject matter jurisdiction, upon
the basis of case-precedents which are not law, and with conflicts of interest.” Id. The Complaint
states the “seminal documents which justify detention,” including “documentary evidence proving
that he was detained with requisite authority jurisdiction . . . . simply do not exist in [Plaintiff’s]
case.” Id. at 5–6. As a result, the Complaint alleges, Plaintiff “has been deprived of his
constitutional and statutory rights” because “the defendants have exercised constitutionally
derived powers in such a way that is illegal.” Id. Plaintiff’s Complaint and briefing also cite
various other grounds for relief, including negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, violations of the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, and a taking without just compensation in violation of
the Fifth Amendment. See Compl. at 1, 5; Plaintiff’s Sur-Reply to Defendant’s Reply in Support
of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss 3 (ECF No. 14) (Sur-Reply) at 3.
Plaintiff requests “a finding of fact and law to establish whether the government even had
probable cause to arrest him [or] subject matter jurisdiction over him” and whether the government
allegedly withholding critical documents “until after the conviction is a due-process violation.”
Compl. at 2. Plaintiff also seeks approximately $6 million in nominal, compensatory, and punitive
damages. Sur-Reply at 1; Compl. at 3.
To support his allegation of unlawful detention, Plaintiff makes six assertions in his
Complaint. First, the Complaint alleges that “there is no evidence in the District Court’s record
3
Though this Court’s Rules do not allow a Sur-Reply to be filed in opposition to a Motion to
Dismiss, this Court permitted Plaintiff to file his Sur-Reply by leave of court. See Rule 7.2
3
proving that the respondents had the requisite [United States Constitution Article II] Presidential
authority to detain the petitioner.” Compl. Ex. 1 at 2 (alteration in original); see generally id. at
1–30. As a result, Plaintiff argues his “detention was illegal.” Id. at 2. Second, the Complaint
alleges that Plaintiff’s detention “required invasion of his residential State, in areas not owned by
the Federal government.” Id. at 31. It further states that, as Defendant allegedly cannot prove
“that commencement of the instant ‘infraction’ occurred on Federal territory, [and] that all of the
buildings used to detain and try the petitioner are also Federally owned,” Defendant is “subjecting
[Plaintiff] to unlawful detention in violation of constitutional due-process.” Compl. Ex. 1 at 31–
32; see generally id. at 31–69. Third, the Complaint states Plaintiff “was detained Federally
without any evidence that his conduct had an aggregate economic impact on either interstate or
foreign commerce of the United States of America.” Id. at 70. Accordingly, Plaintiff asserts that
he was “deprived of his constitutional and statutory rights.” Id.; see generally id. at 70–80.
Fourth, the Complaint states that documents necessary to support Plaintiff’s detention,
including a “criminal complaint, indictment, or arrest warrant . . . do not exist.” Compl. Ex. 1 at
85. Therefore, according to the Complaint, Plaintiff’s “detention was illegal from the beginning
and, therefore, continues to be illegal.” Id. at 86; see generally id. at 81–93. Fifth, the Complaint
alleges that Plaintiff’s conviction “was not based upon the Supreme Law of the Land” and was
instead “based upon unofficial dicta.” Id. at 94. Plaintiff states that “he is detained upon the basis
of ‘case precedent’ which, in addition to being an illegitimate grounds for detention, plainly
contradicts the Constitution.” Id.; see generally id. at 94–108. Finally, the Complaint alleges that
Plaintiff’s detention is unlawful because Defendant purportedly had a financial incentive to detain
Plaintiff; Plaintiff asserts “the judge presiding over the case, the prosecutor, the defense
attorney(s), and all other court functionaries[]” had “incentives to incarcerate [Plaintiff]
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irrespective of legality.” Id. at 109. That incentive, according to Plaintiff, was a “penal judgment
bond” that allegedly enriched “the District Judge; officers of the executive department/branch,
including the respondents, the sitting USAG at the time of [Plaintiff’s] criminal case, the detaining
USAG, the prosecutors, the defense attorney(s), and all other court functionaries.” Id. at 117; see
generally id. at 109–21.
Based on the foregoing, allegedly unlawful actions by Defendant, Plaintiff contends he was
unjustly convicted and imprisoned by the United States. See Compl. at 1; Compl. Ex. 1 at 122;
Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 11) (Response) at 1; Sur-Reply
at 3. Plaintiff invokes this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1495, which
affords the United States Court of Federal Claims jurisdiction “to render judgment upon any claim
for damages by any person unjustly convicted of an offense against the United States and
imprisoned.” 28 U.S.C. § 1495; see also Compl. at 1 (“This court has jurisdiction under [28 U.S.C.
sect. 1495], to hear this suit.”) (alteration in original); Compl. Ex. 1 at 122 (“Unjust convictions
and imprisonment by District court[s] are within purview of [28 U.S.C. sect. 1495] . . . .”)
(alteration in original); Response at 1 (“The [Plaintiff] commenced this civil action against the
United States pursuant to the Act of Congress evidenced at [28 U.S.C. section. 1495], seeking
damages for unjust imprisonment.”) (second alteration in original); Sur-Reply at 3 (“The claims
before this Court are for unjust imprisonment. [Plaintiff’s] claims are based on substantive rights
to money damages against federal government pursuant to [28 U.S.C. § 1495].”) (second alteration
in original).
Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule
12(b)(1) or, in the alternative, for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant
to Rule 12(b)(6). Mot. at 1. Defendant argues this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over
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Plaintiff’s Section 1495 claim because Plaintiff “failed to plead that his conviction was reversed
or that he was provided a pardon on the stated ground of innocence” in compliance with 28 U.S.C.
§ 2513. Mot. at 3–5. Defendant also alternatively argues that even if this Court determines it has
subject matter jurisdiction, Plaintiff’s Section 1495 allegations “are insufficient to provide him
with a plausible claim for relief” under Rule 12(b)(6) because “he has neither had his conviction
reversed nor been granted a pardon on the grounds of innocence.” Id. at 6. Defendant further
contends this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s various tort, breach of
fiduciary duty, and constitutional claims because such claims are not money-mandating or
otherwise fall outside this Court’s limited jurisdiction. Mot. at 5 n.3.
APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARD
The Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491, affords this Court jurisdiction over “any claim against
the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation
of an executive department, . . . or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in
tort.” 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). The Tucker Act serves as a waiver of sovereign immunity for
“certain claims for monetary relief against the United States,” but it does not create a right to relief
itself. Estes Express Lines v. United States, 739 F.3d 689, 692 (Fed. Cir. 2014); United States v.
Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212, 218 (1983). To establish a right to relief under the Tucker Act, a
“substantive right must be found in some other source of law.” Mitchell, 463 U.S. at 216; see Todd
v. United States, 386 F.3d 1091, 1094 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[J]urisdiction under the Tucker Act
requires the litigant to identify a substantive right for money damages against the United States
separate from the Tucker Act itself.”). The constitutional, statutory, or regulatory provision must
be “fairly . . . interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government for the damage
sustained.” United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 400 (1976) (internal quotations omitted)
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(quoting Eastport S.S. Corp. v. United States, 372 F.2d 1002, 1009 (Ct. Cl. 1967)). Thus, this
Court’s jurisdiction under the Tucker Act does not extend to “every claim invoking the
Constitution, a federal statute, or a regulation.” Mitchell, 463 U.S. at 216.
While an unjust conviction and imprisonment claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1495 invokes
a money-mandating statute, a claimant must also comply with 28 U.S.C. § 2513 to establish this
Court’s subject matter jurisdiction over such a claim. See Jackson v. United States, 162 Fed. Cl.
282, 296–99 (2022); see also Francis v. United States, No. 2022–1188, 2022 WL 1655689, at *1
(Fed. Cir. Jan. 26, 2022) (noting plaintiff “could not invoke the [U.S. Court of Federal Claims’]
jurisdiction to award money damages for wrongful convictions under 28 U.S.C. § 1495 without
having alleged that her conviction had been reversed or that she had been pardoned”) (citing 28
U.S.C. § 2513). Additionally, this Court’s jurisdiction does not extend to cases against private
parties or government employees in their individual capacities. See United States v. Sherwood,
312 U.S. 584, 588 (1941) (United States Court of Federal Claims’ limited jurisdiction does not
include relief “against others than the United States”); Brown v. United States, 105 F.3d 621, 624
(Fed. Cir. 1997) (“The Tucker Act grants the Court of Federal Claims jurisdiction over suits against
the United States, not against individual federal officials.”).
This Court must dismiss claims outside its subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rules
12(b)(1) and 12(h)(3). It is well-established that in deciding a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, this Court “accepts as true all uncontroverted factual allegations
in the complaint, and construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Estes Exp. Lines,
739 F.3d at 692; see also Banks v. United States, 741 F.3d 1268, 1277 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Pixton v.
B&B Plastics, Inc., 291 F.3d 1324, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2002). When assessing subject matter
jurisdiction, this Court may “consider . . . evidentiary matters outside the pleadings.” Indium Corp.
7
of Am. v. Semi-Alloys, Inc., 781 F.2d 879, 884 (Fed. Cir. 1985); see also Jarvis v. United States,
No. 2022–1006, 2022 WL 1009728, at *3 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 5, 2022) (“[C]ourts may consider public
records when resolving a [12(b)(1)] motion to dismiss.”).
When considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), this Court must “take as
true all undisputed facts alleged in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences based on those
allegations.” Vasko v. United States, 581 F. App’x 894, 897 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (citing Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–56 (2007)). To avoid dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), the complaint
“must allege facts ‘plausibly suggesting (not merely consistent with)’ a showing of entitlement to
relief.” Acceptance Ins. Cos., Inc. v. United States, 583 F.3d 849, 853 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). This Court may consider evidence outside the four corners of the
complaint to determine whether a plausible claim for relief exists; under Rule 10(c), a “copy of a
written instrument that is an exhibit to a pleading is part of the pleading for all purposes.” Rule
10(c). Thus, on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), this Court
considers “documents incorporated into the complaint by reference.” Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues
& Rts., Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007); Rocky Mt. Helium, LLC v. United States, 841 F.3d 1320,
1325 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Tellabs, Inc., 551 U.S. at 322).
In considering a motion to dismiss, this Court must liberally construe a complaint filed by
a pro se plaintiff because pro se complaints, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,
94 (2007) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)); see
also Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Although held to a less stringent standard, pro
se plaintiffs must still prove by a preponderance of the evidence that this Court has subject matter
jurisdiction. See Curry v. United States, 787 F. App’x 720, 722 (Fed. Cir. 2019); Reynolds v. Army
8
& Air Force Exch. Serv., 846 F.2d 746, 748 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Kelley v. Dep’t of Labor, 812 F.2d
1378, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1987). While a pro se complaint may include ambiguities, pro se filing
status “does not excuse . . . failures” on the merits. Henke v. United States, 60 F.3d 795, 799 (Fed.
Cir. 1995).
DISCUSSION
I. This Court Lacks Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over Plaintiff’s Unjust
Conviction Claim
As noted above, Plaintiff asserts an unjust conviction and imprisonment claim pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1495. See Compl. at 1; Compl. Ex. 1 at 122; Response at 1; Sur-Reply at 3. Plaintiff
contends he is “currently being held unlawfully and unconstitutionally within a Bureau of Prisons
facility” and argues this Court “is an appropriate venue for redress under [28 U.S.C. sect. 1495].”
Compl. at 1–2 (alteration in original). Defendant counters that this Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Section 1495 claim because the Complaint does not comply with 28
U.S.C. § 2513. See Mot. at 3–5. Specifically, Defendant argues that “[a]bsent an allegation and
accompanying documentation showing a certificate of pardon on the ‘stated ground of innocence
and unjust conviction,’” as required by Section 2513, “this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear
[Plaintiff’s] claims.” Mot. at 5 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2513(a)(1)).
Sections 1495 and 2513 have an intertwined relationship. See Jackson, 162 Fed. Cl. at
296–99. The United States Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction over “any claim for damages
by any person unjustly convicted of an offense against the United States and imprisoned.” 28
U.S.C. § 1495. Section 2513 prescribes what a plaintiff “suing under Section 1495 . . . must allege
and prove,” including that: (1) plaintiff’s previous conviction was reversed or set aside “on the
ground that he is not guilty of the offense of which he was convicted” or plaintiff was pardoned
“upon the stated ground of innocence and unjust conviction,” (2) plaintiff “did not commit any of
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the acts charged, or his acts . . . constituted no offense against the United States or any State,
Territory, or the District of Columbia,” and (3) plaintiff did not “by misconduct or neglect” bring
about his own prosecution. 28 U.S.C. § 2513(a)(1)–(2). Such facts must be presented to the Court
in a “certificate of the court or pardon,” informally termed a “certificate of innocence.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2513(b); see Jackson, 162 Fed. Cl. at 297; Humphrey v. United States, 52 Fed. Cl. 593, 596–97
(2002). The “certificate of the court or pardon” required by Section 2513 “must provide, either
explicitly or by factual recitation, that a plaintiff has met the requirements of [S]ection 2513.”
Humphrey, 52 Fed. Cl. at 597.
Satisfying the requirements of Section 2513, including furnishing a compliant certificate
of innocence, is a jurisdictional prerequisite for a Section 1495 unjust conviction and imprisonment
action. See Jackson, 162 Fed. Cl. at 296–99 (relying on Grayson v. United States, 141 Ct. Cl. 866,
1958 WL 100160 (1958)). “[T]his Court has subject matter jurisdiction over a 28 U.S.C. § 1495cause of action only if the plaintiff complies with 28 U.S.C. § 2513, including its requirement of
a certificate of innocence.” Jackson, 162 Fed. Cl. at 299; see also Grayson, 141 Ct. Cl. at 866;
Wood v. United States, 91 Fed. Cl. 569, 577 (2009) (“Accordingly, this court holds that compliance
with § 2513, including submission of a certificate of innocence . . . is a prerequisite to the
jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims.”); Faircloth v. United States, No. 21–958, 2022 WL
908953, at *4 (Fed. Cl. Mar. 29, 2022) (“[T]he Court finds that a certificate of innocence is a
jurisdictional prerequisite under §§ 1495 and 2513.”). Accordingly, this Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over an unjust conviction and imprisonment claim unless the claimant satisfies the
requirements of Section 2513.
Here, Plaintiff did not provide a certificate of innocence, or allege any similar facts that
may be construed as compliant with 28 U.S.C. § 2513. Plaintiff’s Complaint does not include or
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even reference a “certificate of the court,” or any equivalent facts or information, that would satisfy
the requirements of Section 2513. See generally Compl. For example, Plaintiff did not allege that
his conviction was reversed or set aside; indeed, he is currently imprisoned for the convictions at
issue here. See Compl. at 1 (Plaintiff is “currently being held . . .”); Compl. Ex. 1 at 122 (Plaintiff
listing his “Prisoner #” and noting his location as “Allenwood FCI-Medium”). Nor did Plaintiff
state, likely because he cannot, that he was found not guilty in a subsequent new trial or rehearing.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2513(a)(1). Likewise, Plaintiff did not proffer a judicial finding that he did not
commit any of the acts charged, or that his acts did not constitute an offense against the United
States; nor did Plaintiff provide a certificate or decision stating that he did not by misconduct or
neglect cause or bring about his own prosecution. Id. § 2513(a)(2). Furthermore, it appears that
Plaintiff is currently incarcerated at Allenwood FCI Medium, a corrections facility in
Pennsylvania. 4 See, e.g., Compl. at 1 (Plaintiff is “currently being held . . .”) (emphasis added);
Compl. Ex. 1 at 122 (Plaintiff listing his “Prisoner #” and noting his location as “Allenwood FCI-
Medium”). “[G]iven that [Plaintiff] is currently incarcerated in a federal prison, it seems likely
that his conviction has not been reversed or set aside.” Castro v. United States, 364 F. App’x 619,
620 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Complaint does not comply with 28 U.S.C. § 2513. As compliance
with 28 U.S.C. § 2513 is a jurisdictional prerequisite to bringing a viable claim under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1495, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s unjust conviction and
imprisonment claim. See Jackson, 162 Fed. Cl. at 296–302.
4
FCI Allenwood Medium, Federal Bureau of Prisons,
https://www.bop.gov/locations/institutions/alm/ (last visited Jan. 17, 2023).
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II. This Court Lacks Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over Plaintiff’s Other Claims
Though the gravamen of Plaintiff’s Complaint is an unjust conviction and imprisonment
cause of action under 28 U.S.C. § 1495, the Complaint vaguely references other alleged claims for
relief. As pro se plaintiffs are held to relaxed pleading standards and “are not expected to frame
issues with the precision of a common law pleading,” this Court liberally construes and addresses
Plaintiff’s potential remaining claims. Roche v. U.S. Postal Serv., 828 F.2d 1555, 1558 (Fed. Cir.
1987). For the reasons discussed below, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over such
claims.
Plaintiff contends Defendant is liable for “breach of fiduciary duty and negligence.”
Compl. at 1. Negligence is a tort, and it is well-established that the United States Court of Federal
Claims “lacks jurisdiction over tort actions against the United States.” Brown v. United States,
105 F.3d 621, 623 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (“The United States Court of
Federal Claims shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim against the United States
. . . for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.”); Souders v. S. C. Pub.
Serv. Auth., 497 F.3d 1303, 1307–08 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (holding that plaintiff’s tort claims, including
negligence, “are clearly outside the limited jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims”).
With respect to Plaintiff’s breach of fiduciary duty claim, see Compl. at 1, 5, the United
States is only subject to fiduciary duties that it “specifically accepts by statute or regulation,” Hopi
Tribe v. United States, 782 F.3d 662, 667 (Fed. Cir. 2015), or that are “grounded in a contractually
based obligation,” Fairholme Funds, Inc. v. United States, 26 F.4th 1274, 1296–99 (Fed. Cir. 2022)
(internal citations and quotations omitted) (quoting Cleveland Chair Co. v. United States, 557 F.2d
244, 246 (Ct. Cl. 1977)). See also Grady v. United States, No. 13–15, 2013 WL 4957344, at *3
(Fed. Cl. July 31, 2013) (“[A] fiduciary duty only arises if it is plain from the relevant statutes or
12
regulations that the government has accepted such a responsibility.”). Plaintiff’s Complaint does
not identify either a statutory or regulatory foundation or a contractual obligation establishing
Defendant’s alleged fiduciary duty to Plaintiff. Though Plaintiff references a “contractual
agreement” allegedly granting Plaintiff “immunity from any further prosecution in the United
States,” he does not specify what this alleged agreement is, nor does the record include such an
agreement. Compl. at 5. As there is not an underlying money mandating statute or alleged contract
establishing that Defendant owed a fiduciary duty to Plaintiff, this Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s breach of fiduciary duty claim. See Schneiter v. United States, 159
Fed. Cl. 356, 373–74 (2022).
The Complaint also vaguely invokes the United States Constitution and several of its
provisions. For instance, Plaintiff states he is “being held unlawfully and unconstitutionally” and
“has been deprived of his constitutional and statutory rights.” Compl. at 1, 5. Plaintiff contends
Defendant is “depriving him of any substantive due process as stipulated for in the Fourteenth
Amendment.” Compl. at 2. He further claims Defendant used illegal indictments to detain him
“[i]n violation of the [US Constitution Thirteenth Amendment].” Compl. Ex. 1 at 81 (second
alteration in original). However, the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments are not money
mandating and therefore do not confer subject matter jurisdiction on the United States Court of
Federal Claims. See Starnes v. United States, 162 Fed. Cl. 468, 474 (2022) (“It is well-established
that the Thirteenth Amendment does not mandate the payment of money from the United States.”);
Smith v. United States, 709 F.3d 1114, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“The law is well settled that the Due
Process clauses of both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments do not mandate the payment of
money and thus do not provide a cause of action under the Tucker Act.”); Humphrey v. United
States, 60 F. App’x 292, 295 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“Claims against the United States brought under
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the 5th, 8th, 13th, and 14th Amendments to the Constitution do not mandate money damages under
the circumstances presented here.”). This Court therefore lacks subject matter jurisdiction over
Plaintiff’s constitutional causes of action.
Plaintiff further alleges a “Fifth Amendment taking clause violation because application of
penal bond without plaintiff’s permission constitute[s] taking of property in violation of the
Constitution.” Sur-Reply at 4. This claim, however, was raised for the first time in the Sur-Reply.
Because Plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment takings claim “was not properly raised” in the Complaint,
Plaintiff “waived any claim [he] may have against the government based on such a theory.” Casa
de Cambio Comdiv S.A. v. United States, 291 F.3d 1356, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002); see also Kimble
v. United States, 991 F.3d 1238, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (“[D]istinct claims are waived if not pled
in a complaint.”).
Even if this Court were to set aside Plaintiff’s waiver of this claim, however, Plaintiff’s
allegation based on Defendant’s “application of penal bond without plaintiff’s permission” is not
a valid Fifth Amendment taking claim. Though Plaintiff’s reference to a “penal bond” is far from
clear, Plaintiff is presumably describing property forfeited or otherwise taken by the United States
as part of his criminal conviction. See, e.g., United States v. Sanganza, No. 4:16–cr–00050, ECF
Nos. 80, 82 (E.D. Va. Sept. 11, 2017) (ordering Plaintiff pay restitution and ordering forfeiture).
However, “when property has been seized pursuant to the criminal laws . . . such deprivations are
not ‘takings’ for which the owner is entitled to compensation.” Acadia Tech., Inc. v. United States,
458 F.3d 1327, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Therefore, to the extent Defendant lawfully seized
Plaintiff’s property in connection with his criminal conviction and sentence, that seizure is not a
compensable Fifth Amendment taking as a matter of law. See id.; see also Kaetz v. United States,
158 Fed. Cl. 422, 430 (2022) (Court of Federal Claims cannot entertain claims under Just
14
Compensation Clause “when they arise from the government’s seizure of property in conjunction
with a criminal matter”); Myles v. United States, No. 2021–1758, 2022 WL 126911, at *3 (Fed.
Cir. Jan. 13, 2022); Kam-Almaz v. United States, 682 F.3d 1364, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“Our
precedent is clear: ‘Property seized and retained pursuant to the police power is not taken for a
“public use” in the context of the Takings Clause.’”) (quoting AmeriSource Corp. v. United States,
525 F.3d 1149, 1153 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). Plaintiff does not allege a taking outside the context of his
criminal proceeding. See generally Complaint; Response; Sur-Reply. Accordingly, even if
Plaintiff’s contention of a Fifth Amendment taking was not waived, it would nevertheless still be
dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) because Plaintiff did not state a claim upon which relief can
be granted. See Anaheim Gardens v. United States, 444 F.3d 1309, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“The
trial court may dismiss sua sponte under Rule 12(b)(6) . . . .”).
Finally, Plaintiff requests this Court insert itself in the criminal proceedings before the
district court. Plaintiff “respectfully requests this court to make a finding of fact and law to
establish whether the government even had probable cause to arrest him” or “subject matter
jurisdiction over him.” Compl. at 2. Plaintiff further seeks a “declaratory judgment . . . to order
the Bureau of Prisons to release the plaintiff from custody immediately, thereby terminating his
fraudulent sentence, conviction, and probation.” Id. This Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction
to entertain any of Plaintiff’s requests, as the United States Court of Federal Claims “does not have
the authority” to “review any of the judgments of” “federal courts with respect to [Plaintiff’s]
criminal case.” Jones v. United States, 440 F. App’x 916, 918 (Fed. Cir. 2011); see also Joshua
v. United States, 17 F.3d 378, 380 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“[T]he Court of Federal Claims does not have
jurisdiction to review the decisions of district courts . . . relating to proceedings before those
courts.”); Zakiya v. United States, 79 Fed. Cl. 231, 234–35 (2007) (“The Court of Federal Claims
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does not have the power to review and overturn convictions or to review in detail the facts
surrounding a conviction or imprisonment.”). Therefore, even liberally construing Plaintiff’s
Complaint, it is evident that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over such claims or requests
for relief.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 8) is
GRANTED pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(h)(3), and Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED
without leave to replead. This dismissal shall count towards the limitations prescribed by 28
U.S.C. § 1915(g) regarding Plaintiff’s ability to proceed in forma pauperis in future matters. This
Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that any appeal from this Order would not be
taken in good faith, and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose of an appeal.
See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444–45 (1962); Harrison v. United States, No. 2020–
1765, 2020 WL 6482121, at *1 (Fed. Cir. July 21, 2020), dismissing appeal from No. 19–1785,
2020 WL 1492211 (Fed. Cl. Mar. 23, 2020); Kaetz v. United States, 159 Fed. Cl. 378, 383 n.1
(2022) (“Section 1915(a)(3) applies to both prisoners and nonprisoners.”). The Clerk of Court is
DIRECTED to enter Judgment accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Eleni M. Roumel
ELENI M. ROUMEL
Judge
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