Marion Energy, Inc. v. KFJ Ranch Partnership

AMENDED OPINION^*

Associate Chief Justice DURRANT,

opinion of the Court:

INTRODUCTION

1 Appellants, Marion Energy, Inc. (Marion) and the State of Utah School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration (the Trust), lease and own oil and gas deposits that lie underneath property owned by the KFJ Ranch Partnership (KFJ). In order to build a road to access these deposits, Marion and the Trust seek to condemn a portion of KFJ's land. To do so, they rely upon a statute that permits the exercise of eminent domain for the construction of "roads ... to facilitate ... the working of ... mineral deposits." ¹ The question for our resolution is whether the phrase "mineral deposits," as used in this statute, was intended by the Legislature to encompass oil and gas deposits.

12 We conclude that the answer to this question is not apparent from the statute's plain language, as is evident from the fact that the phrase "mineral deposits" is defined in some sections of the Utah Code to include oil and gas, but defined in other sections to exclude oil and gas. Because we find that this phrase is susceptible to either of these reasonable interpretations, we conclude that the statute upon which Marion and the Trust rely is ambiguous. When faced with such an ambiguity in a statute purporting to grant the power of eminent domain, we strictly construe the ambiguity against the condemning party.² Accordingly, we hold that Marion and the Trust are not authorized by this statute to condemn KFJ's land. We therefore affirm the district court's dismissal of Marion and the Trust's condemnation action.

BACKGROUND

13 KFJ is the owner of the KFJ Ranch, which consists of approximately 9,400 acres of land located near Price, Utah. Approximately 6,600 acres of this land are owned by KFJ in fee simple The remaining 2,800 acres are leased from the state and federal governments.

4 Marion is the lessee of two oil and gas deposits located in Price, Utah. Marion leased these deposits from the Trust. Both of the leases lie beneath surface land owned or leased by KFJ.

€ 5 In an effort to exploit its leased oil and gas deposits, Marion wishes to construct two wells on surface lands owned by KFJ. Due to the topography of the land and the proposed well locations, Marion contends that it is "impossible ... to access [its] leases without crossing surface lands owned and/or controlled by" KFJ. To resolve this dilemma, Marion attempted to negotiate an easement with KFJ that would allow Marion to cross KFJ's land to access its oil and gas deposits. KFJ refused these requests.

16 Following KFJ's refusal, Marion and the Trust brought a condemnation action in the district court seeking to condemn nearly fifteen acres of KFJ's property to construct a four-mile-long road giving Marion access to the proposed well locations. An appraiser hired by Marion estimated that the total value of the land sought to be condemned was $28,000.

T 7 In their condemnation action before the district court, Marion and the Trust attempted to invoke what they refer to as the "express rights of eminent domain granted by the legislature and codified as Utah Code [section] 78B-6-501(6)(a)." Section 501(6)(a) permits the exercise of eminent domain for the construction of "roads, railroads, tramways, tunnels, ditches, flumes, pipes, and dumping places to facilitate the milling, smelting, or other reduction of ores, or the working of mines, quarries, coal mines, or mineral deposits including minerals in solution.³

18 After initiation of the condemnation action, KFJ moved to dismiss based on its contention that section 501(6)(a) does not grant Marion and the Trust the power of eminent domain to condemn land to build a road to access leased oil and gas deposits. In response to KFJ's motion, the district court conducted a hearing to determine whether section 501(6)(a) "provide[s] authority to take lands for roads to access oil and gas deposits."

T9 To resolve this question, the district court began by noting that it was "required to consider the plain language of the statute, to consider that each word has been used advisedly, and to presume any omissions are purposeful." Looking to the statute's text, the court then observed that section 501(6)(a) "lists the substances for which land can be condemned for roads, and [that] oil and gas are not included." Additionally, the court determined that the fact that "oil and gas are specifically mentioned in Utah Code [section] 78B-6-501(6)(d) ... shows [that] the legislature purposefully intended to exclude oil and gas from [section] 78B-6-501(6)(a)." Based on this analysis, the district court granted KFJ's motion to dismiss, concluding that section 501(6)(a) "does not provide authority to take land for roads to access oil and gas deposits."

T 10 On appeal, Marion and the Trust contend that the district court erred in concluding that section 501(6)(a) does not provide authority to condemn land to build a road to access the leased oil and gas deposits. In support of this position, Marion and the Trust argue that the plain language of seetion 501(6)(a) and over one hundred years of precedent demonstrate that the phrase "mineral deposits" includes oil and gas. Additionally, Marion and the Trust argue that any interpretation of the phrase "mineral deposits" that excludes oil and gas would create an absurd result.

T 11 In contrast, KFJ argues that the plain language of section 501(6)(a) does not authorize Marion to condemn land to build a road to access its leased oil and gas deposits. Alternatively, KFJ contends that section 501(6)(a) is ambiguous and that we must strictly construe this ambiguity against Marion-the party seeking to exercise the power of eminent domain. We have jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to section 78A-3-102(8)(j) of the Utah Code.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

(12 "We review questions of statutory interpretation for correctness, affording no deference to the district court's legal conclusions." ⁴

ANALYSIS

I. SECTION 501(6)(@) DOES NOT AUTHORIZE MARION TO CONDEMN LAND TO BUILD A ROAD TO ACCESS ITS OIL AND GAS DEPOSITS

T 13 In relevant part, section 501(6)(a) of the Utah Code provides that the right of eminent domain may be exercised for the building of "roads ... to ... facilitate the ... working of ... mineral deposits."⁵ The central question presented for our review is whether subsection (6)(a)'s use of the phrase "mineral deposits" encompasses the terms "oil" and "gas" and thereby provides Marion with authority to condemn KEFJ's property to build a road to access its leased oil and gas deposits. Because we conclude that section 501(6)(a) is ambiguous, and because we strictly construe this ambiguity against the condemning party, we hold that section 501(6)(a) does not provide Marion with authority to condemn KFJ's land.

114 It is well settled that when faced with a question of statutory interpretation, "our primary goal is to evince the true intent and purpose of the Legislature."⁶ The best evidence of the legislature's intent is 'the plain language of the statute itself' ⁷ " Thus, "[when interpreting a statute, we assume, absent a contrary indication, that the legislature used each term advisedly according to its ordinary and usually accepted meaning."⁸ Additionally, we "presume[] that the expression of one [term] should be interpreted as the exclusion of another.⁹" We therefore seek to give effect to omissions in statutory language by presuming all omissions to be purposeful.

115 When the "'meaning of [a] statute can be discerned from its language, no other interpretive tools are needed.¹⁰ But when statutory language is ambiguous-in that its terms remain susceptible to two or more reasonable interpretations after we have conducted a plain language analysis-we generally resort to other modes of statutory construction and "seek guidance from legislative history" and other accepted sources.¹¹ In some specific contexts, however, we have adopted unique rules that guide our construction of ambiguous terms.¹²

¶16 For instance, because the exercise of eminent domain results in the derogation of a property owner's right to use and enjoy his land, we have stated that any ambiguity in statutory language purporting to grant the power of eminent domain must be strictly construed in favor of the property owner and against the condemning party.¹³ In that context, we stated in Bertagnoli that "the extent to which the power [of eminent domain] may be exercised is limited to the express terms and clear implication of the statute." ¹⁴ Not only is this rule of strict construction supported by our precedent, it is also consistent with the "majority rule" for interpreting eminent domain statutes expressed in numerous authorities on this topic.¹⁵

T 17 Given this rule of strict construction, Marion is authorized to condemn KFJ's land to build a road to access its leased oil and gas deposits only if such authority is expressly granted or clearly implied by the plain language of section 501(6)(a).¹⁶ In support of their position that section 501(6)(a) provides this authority, Marion and the Trust contend that "as a matter of law" the phrase "mineral deposits" encompasses oil and gas. They also argue that any interpretation of the phrase "mineral deposits" that does not include oil and gas would create an absurd result. As explained below, we disagree with these arguments and conclude that section 501(6)(a) does not provide Marion with the authority it seeks to exercise.

A. The Language of Section 501(6)(a) Is Ambiguous and Does Not Clearly or Implicitly Provide Authority to Take Land to Build a Road to Reach Oil and Gas Deposits

118 When interpreting statutory language, we generally seek to "read each term according to its ordinary and accepted meaning."¹⁷ But the phrase "mineral deposits" does not have a single "ordinary and accepted meaning." Instead, the phrase's meaning may vary and must be interpreted based upon the context in which it is used.

{19 In Carrier, this court was asked to determine whether a zoning ordinance's use of the phrase "mineral extraction" encompassed gravel pit operations.¹⁸ To resolve this issue, we began by noting that "[iJn its broadest sense, the term 'mineral' necessarily encompasses the term 'gravel'¹⁹ But rather than adopting this broad definition, we determined that what "the term 'mineral' actually incorporates ... in any given situation ... is largely contextual."²⁰ This is because the term "'mineral' is a word of general language, and [is] not per se a term of art.'²¹ Instead, the term "'is used in many senses' " and is " 'susceptible to limitation or expansion according to the intention with which it is used in the particular instrument or statute.'²² Recognizing that the term "mineral" is ambiguous when read in isolation, we looked to its context in the statute and in other related statutes. After doing so, we held that the term "mineral extraction" did not encompass gravel pit operations.²³

{20 Like the term "mineral," the phrase "mineral deposit" may be "used in many senses" and is "susceptible to limitation or expansion according to the intention with which it is used." Thus, to determine what the phrase "mineral deposits" actually incorporates in any given situation, we must look to the context in which the phrase is used. Unfortunately, the context in which the phrase "mineral deposits" is used in section 501 does not indicate whether the Legislature intended the phrase to encompass oil and gas deposits. Indeed, looking at the text of section 501(6)(a) and its accompanying subsections, we are persuaded that reasonable arguments can be made in favor of defining "mineral deposits" so broadly as to include oil and gas, or so narrowly as to exclude oil and gas.

4 21 In examining the text of section 501 as "a whole," ²⁴ we find it highly relevant that subsection (6)(d) provides that the right of eminent domain may be exercised to condemn property to build "gas, oil, or coal pipelines." ²⁵ On one hand, this language may be read as suggesting that the Legislature did not intend for oil and gas to be provided for in subsection (6)(a). Indeed, KFJ has argued that because the terms "oil" and "gas" are expressly included in subseection (6)(d) and omitted from subsection (6)(a) we must presume that this omission was purposeful and must interpret subsection (6)(a) as mot reaching oil and gas deposits.

4 22 On the other hand, one could reasonably read subsection (6)(d)'s inclusion of the terms "oil" and "gas" as an indication that the Legislature intended for these substances to be encompassed in subsection (6)(a)'s use of the phrase "mineral deposits." For instance, Marion has argued that the Legislature intended subsection (6)(a) to relate to the working and exploitation of mineral products, and that subsections (6)(b) through (6)(f) were intended to provide for the storage and transportation of such mineral products. Accordingly, Marion contends that because the Legislature included the terms "oil" and "gas" in subsection (6)(d), it must have intended subsection (6)(a)'s use of the phrase "mineral deposits" to encompass oil and gas. After considering the text of section 501 as a whole, we conclude that both of these arguments provide reasonable interpretations of subsection (6)(a)'s use of the phrase "mineral deposits."

T23 In reaching this conclusion, we also find relevant that other sections of the Utah Code specifically define the phrase "mineral deposits" as both including or exeluding oil and gas. For instance, section 58C-1-103(4) of the Utah Code-the School and Institutional Trust Lands Management Act (SIT-LA)-defines the term "mineral" as including "oil, gas, and hydrocarbons." ²⁶ Alternatively, the Utah Mined Land Reclamation Act specifically defines the phrase "mineral deposit" as "an accumulation of mineral matter in the form of consolidated rock, unconsolidated material, [and] solutions ex-clud[ing] ... oil and gas." ²⁷

[ 24 In the instant case, both parties have cited to these sections of the code and have argued that these definitions support their respective interpretations of "mineral deposits." But rather than support the proposition that the phrase "mineral deposits" generally encompasses or excludes oil and gas, these statutory definitions merely reinforce the conclusion that whether oil and gas are appropriately deemed mineral deposits depends on the context in which the phrase is used.²⁸ Moreover, these varied definitions provide further support for our conclusion that it is reasonable to interpret "mineral deposits" so broadly as to include oil and gas, or so narrowly as to exclude these substances.

€ 25 In sum, the phrase "mineral deposits" does not have a single fixed meaning. Instead, the phrase may be used in a variety of ways and must be interpreted based on the context in which it is used. Because the context of section 501(6)(a) does not indicate whether the Legislature intended the phrase "mineral deposits" to include oil and gas, and because the Legislature has defined the phrase in other sections of the code as both including or excluding oil and gas, we conclude that the phrase is susceptible to two reasonable interpretations. Based on these competing reasonable interpretations, we hold that section 501(6)(a)'s use of the phrase "mineral deposits" is ambiguous.

B. Narrowly Interpreting Section 501(6)(a) Would Not Create an Absurd Result

126 In opposition to the conclusion that section 501(6)(a) is ambiguous, Marion and the Trust contend that narrowly interpreting the phrase "mineral deposits" would create an absurd result. We disagree. Generally, when interpreting statutes we seek to avoid interpretations "which render some part of a provision nonsensical or absurd."²⁹ Thus, when "'statutory language ... presents the court with two alternative readings, we prefer the reading that avoids absurd results'" ³⁰ In defining the parameters of what constitutes an absurd result, we have noted that such a "result must be so absurd that the legislative body which authored the legislation could not have intended it.³¹

127 Here, Marion and the Trust argue that narrowly interpreting "mineral deposits" would create an "irrational and absurd [result] in at least two distinet manners." First, they contend that this interpretation would permit "one landowner [to] effectively prevent the Trust from accessing and exploiting its oil and gas deposits for the benefit of the Trust." Second, they claim that it "would give parties the power of condemnation to store oil and gas under section 501(6)(d) but not to produce it under section 501(6)(a)." We find these arguments unpersuasive.

128 While a narrow interpretation of the phrase "mineral deposits" may deprive Marion of one means of accessing its leased oil and gas deposits, Marion still has other available means of accessing and exploiting them. For instance, Part 4 of SITLA-which governs the minerals leased by Marion-provides that "[al mineral lessee ... has the right at all times to enter upon the leasehold for prospecting, exploring, developing, and producing minerals and shall have reasonable use of the surface."³²

29 The same section also provides specific means of gaining access to privately owned property such as "securing the written consent or waiver of the surface owner or lessee" ³³ or "execut[ing]l ... a ... bond." ³⁴ Thus, while Marion may not have authority to permanently deprive KFJ of its property through condemnation, Marion may have a statutory right to enter the portions KFJ's property on which Marion has mineral rights so long as it complies with the requirements contained in Part 4 of SITTLA.

130 Because Marion has alternative avenues of access to its leased mineral rights, we do not believe that it would be absurd to interpret section 501(6)(a)'s use of the phrase "mineral deposits" as not encompassing oil and gas. In further support of this conclusion, we also note that we do not think that such a narrow interpretation would create a "result ... so absurd that the legislative body which authored the legislation could not have intended it."³⁵ Indeed, given the importance of private property rights and the extreme burden associated with permanently condemning a property owner's land, we believe the Legislature could reasonably have intended to require parties to use means less intrusive than building a permanent road to transport oil and gas across private property-such as securing an easement or condemning a smaller portion of land to build pipelines. For these reasons, we conclude that narrowly interpreting the phrase "mineral deposits" so as not to include oil and gas would not create an absurd result.

C. Because We Find That Section 501(6)(a) Is Ambiguous, We Strictly Construe Its Language in Favor of KFJ

131 Given our conclusion that seetion 501(6)(a) is susceptible to two reasonable interpretations, and that neither of these interpretations would create an absurd result, we must turn to other rules of statutory construction. As discussed above, because the exercise of eminent domain results in the derogation of a property owner's right to use and enjoy his land, we strictly construe any ambiguity in statutory language purporting to grant the power of eminent domain in favor of the property owner and against the condemning party.³⁶ Strictly construing the ambiguity at issue in this case in favor of KFJ compels us to conclude that section 78B-6-501(6)(a) of the Utah Code does not provide Marion authority to condemn KFJ's land to build a road to access its leased oil and gas deposits.

32 In reaching this conclusion, we recognize that Marion and the Trust have advanced public policy arguments in support of their interpretation of section 501(6)(a). But given our rules of statutory construction in the context of eminent domain statutes, we feel these arguments should be directed to the Legislature rather than to this court.³⁷ Thus, without considering these policy concerns, and relying solely on our eminent domain canon of interpretation, we resolve seetion 501(6)(a)'s ambiguity against Marion and conclude that the section does not provide Marion with the authority it seeks to exercise.

CONCLUSION

133 In interpreting statutory language, our primary goal is to give effect to the legislature's intent. To accomplish this goal, we begin by looking to the statute's plain language. When the language of a statute purporting to grant the power of eminent domain is ambiguous, we strictly construe all ambiguities against the condemning party.

4 34 In the instant case, we conclude that section 501(6)(a)'s use of the phrase "mineral deposits" is ambiguous because it may be understood to have at least two reasonable meanings: either including or excluding oil and gas. Given this ambiguity, we must construe the statute in favor of KFJ and against Marion. Based on this rule of strict construction, we hold that section 78B-6-501(6)(a) of the Utah Code does not provide Marion with authority to condemn land to build a road to access its leased oil and gas deposits. We therefore affirm the district court's dismissal of Marion and the Trust's condemnation action.

4 35 Chief Justice DURHAM, Justice PARRISH, and Justice NEHRING concur in Associate Chief Justice DURRANT's opinion.

* The court has rewritten paragraphs 28-30.

1 . Cope Ann. § 78B-6-501(6)(a) (2008). Since this appeal was filed the language of section 501(6)(a) has been amended. Except where otherwise indicated, we refer to the 2008 version of the statute throughout this opinion.

2 . See Bertagnoli v. Baker, 117 Utah 348, 215 P.2d 626, 627-28 (1950) ('The right of eminent domain, being in derogation of the rights of individual ownership in property, has been strictly construed by the courts so that no person will be wrongfully deprived of the use and enjoyment of his property."); Great Salt Lake Auth. v. Island Ranching Co., 18 Utah 2d 45, 414 P.2d 963, 969 (1966) (Callister, J., dissenting) ("When the right to exercise the power [of eminent domain] can only be made out of argument and inference, it does not exist.").

3 . Utah Cope Ann. § 78B-6-501(6)(a) (2008).

4 . State v. Gallegos, 2007 UT 81, ¶ 8, 171 P.3d 426.

5 . See Utah Cope Ann. § 78B-6-501(6)(a) (2008).

6 . Salt Lake Cnty. v. Holliday Water Co., 2010 UT 45, ¶ 27, 234 P.3d 1105 (internal quotation marks omitted).

7 . State v. Miller, 2008 UT 61, ¶ 18, 193 P.3d 92 (quoting State ex rel. Z.C., 2007 UT 54, ¶ 6, 165 P.3d 1206).

8 . Hutter v. Dig-It, Inc., 2009 UT 69, ¶ 32, 219 P.3d 918.

9 . Carrier v. Salt Lake Cnty., 2004 UT 98, ¶ 30, 104 P.3d 1208 (internal quotation marks omitted).

10 . State v. Harker, 2010 UT 56, ¶ 12, 240 P.3d 780 (quoting LPI Servs. v. McGee, 2009 UT 41, ¶ 11, 215 P.3d 135); see also Nelson v. Salt Lake Cnty., 905 P.2d 872, 875 (Utah 1995) ("When language is clear and unambiguous, it must be held to mean what it expresses, and no room is left for construction." (internal quotation marks omitted)).

11 . Taylor ex rel. Taylor v. Ogden City Sch. Dist., 927 P.2d 159, 167 (Utah 1996) (Durham, J., dissenting).

12 . See, e.g., Cnty. Bd. of Equalization v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 944 P.2d 370, 373-74 (Utah 1997) (noting that we construe ambiguities in tax imposition statutes "liberally in favor of the taxpayer" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Bertagnoli v. Baker, 117 Utah 348, 215 P.2d 626, 627-28 (1950) (holding that all ambiguities in statutes granting the power of eminent domain must be construed strictly against the condemning party).

13 . See, e.g., Bertagnoli, 215 P.2d at 628 (''The right of eminent domain, being in derogation of the rights of individual ownership in property, has been strictly construed by the courts so that no person will be wrongfully deprived of the use and enjoyment of his property."); see also Salt Lake Cnty. v. Murray City Redevelopment, 598 P.2d 1339, 1345 (Utah 1979) (" 'Statutes conferring the power of condemnation under the right of eminent domain are strictly construed." (quoting Tremonton v. Johnston, 49 Utah 307, 164 P. 190, 191 (1917))); Great Salt Lake Auth. v. Island Ranching Co., 18 Utah 2d 276, 421 P.2d 504, 505-06 (1966) (applying the rule of strict construction articulated in Bertagnoli ).

14 . 215 P.2d at 627 (emphasis added). The dissenting opinion contends that the rule articulated in Bertagnoli is not "well-settled" because it conflicts with our statement in Monetaire Mining Co. v. Columbus Rexall Consolidated Mines Co. that 'it is generally agreed that where the right of eminent domain is granted for a particular purpose, then the statute must be given a liberal construction in furtherance of such purpose." 53 Utah 413, 174 P. 172, 175 (1918). But unlike the rule of strict construction articulated in Ber-tagnoli, the rule announced in Monetaire Mining Co. does not apply to ambiguous eminent domain statutes. See id. Instead, the rule announced in Monetaire Mining Co.-under which we are to liberally construe eminent domain statutes-applies only when a statute "clearly] and explicit{ly] ... grants the right of eminent domain for [a particular] purpose." Id. (emphases added). Accordingly, because these rules are designed to resolve entirely distinct issues, we disagree that they conflict with one another.

15 . See, e.g., Norman J. Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer, Suturrtanp Statutes anp Staturory ConsTRUcTION § 64:6 (7th ed. 2010) ("Grants of the power of eminent domain must be found expressly or by necessary implication in legislation, and the policy has become well established that such grants are strictly interpreted against the condemning party and in favor of the owners of property sought to be condemned."); 26 Am. Jur. 2p Eminent Domain § 24 (2010) ("A grant of the power of eminent domain is to be strictly construed against the condemning party and in favor of the property owner, and the prescribed method of taking must be strictly pursued."); 29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain: Who May Exercise Power § 24 (2010) ("The right to exercise the power of eminent domain must be conferred by statute, either in express words or by necessary implication. Because such power is in derogation of common right, the acts conferring it generally should not be enlarged or extended by inference or implication. Instead, they are to be strictly construed in favor of the landowner so that no person will be deprived of the use and enjoyment of his or her property except by a valid exercise of the power.").

16 . See Bertagnoli, 215 P.2d at 627-28; see also Island Ranching Co., 414 P.2d at 969 (Callister, J., dissenting) ("When the right to exercise the power [of eminent domain] can only be made out of argument and inference, it does not exist."). The dissenting opinion contends that the canon articulated in Bertagnoli should not be applied in cases "where the interests of two private property holders are at issue." Infra 151. We disagree. Although Marion and the Trust have property interests at issue in this case, only KFJ faces the possibility of being permanently deprived of its property through the unauthorized use of the power of eminent domain. The protection of private property owners against such unauthorized condemnations is the very purpose for which the rule of strict construction announced in Bertagnoli was created; we therefore feel it is applicable to the instant case.

17 . Harker, 2010 UT 56, ¶ 12, 240 P.3d 780 (internal quotation marks omitted).

18 . 2004 UT 98, ¶ 1, 104 P.3d 1208.

19 . Id. ¶ 32.

20 . Id.

21 . Id. (quoting Bumpus v. United States, 325 F.2d 264, 266 (10th Cir.1963)).

22 . Id. (quoting Bumpus, 325 F.2d at 266).

23 . Id. ¶ 41.

24 . Harker, 2010 UT 56, ¶ 12, 240 P.3d 780 (internal quotation marks omitted).

25 . Utah Cope Ann. § 78B-6-501(6)(d) (2008).

26 . Id. § 53C-1-103(4) (2009).

27 . Id. § 40-8-4(6) (2010) (emphasis added).

28 . See Carrier, 2004 UT 98, ¶ 34, 104 P.3d 1208.

29 . O'Dea v. Olea, 2009 UT 46, ¶ 32, 217 P.3d 704 (internal quotation marks omitted).

30 . Encon Utah, LLC v. Fluor Ames Kraemer, LLC, 2009 UT 7, ¶ 73, 210 P.3d 263 (quoting State ex rel. Z.C., 2007 UT 54, ¶ 15 n. 5, 165 P.3d 1206).

31 . State ex rel. Z.C., 2007 UT 54, ¶ 13, 165 P.3d 1206.

32 . Utah Cope Ann. § 53C-2-409(2)(a) (2009) (emphases added).

33 . Id. § 409(3)(a).

34 . Id. § 409(3)(c).

35 . See State ex rel. Z.C., 2007 UT 54, ¶ 13, 165 P.3d 1206.

36 . See, e.g., Bertagnoli, 215 P.2d at 628 ("The right of eminent domain, being in derogation of the rights of individual ownership in property, has been strictly construed by the courts so that no person will be wrongfully deprived of the use and enjoyment of his property.").

37 . See, e.g., State v. Ireland, 2006 UT 82, ¶ 21, 150 P.3d 532 ("[SJhould any part of our interpretation bring[] about a result contrary to the intention of the Legislature, it is a matter for the Legislature to remedy." (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Kincheloe v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Ogden, 656 P.2d 440, 442 (Utah 1982) ("[AJuy recommended change to [statutory] law should be addressed to the legislature and not the court.").