DocketNumber: No. 6457.
Citation Numbers: 125 P.2d 794, 101 Utah 552
Judges: PRATT, Justice.
Filed Date: 5/15/1942
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 1/13/2023
I concur. If actual tangible matter is projected by the blast on the property of another, it is held to be a trespass. One can sympathize with the view that if property is immediately injured by a force caused by a blast transmitted by concussion of air it is still a trespass. As stated in the opinion, there is a division of authority on that matter.
In the case of O'Neill v. San Pedro, Los Angeles SaltLake Railroad Company,
"The vibration of a train in itself is not dangerous like a blast from an explosion. Its single influence is imperceptible but the accumulated results may be injurious, but only if it can be shown that the accumulated results were the result of negligent construction or operation can we give damages. Otherwise, the property owner must submit to the greater needs of society."
Be that as it may, jurisdictions which hold that trespass lies where damage is directly and immediately caused by concussion arising from a blast on neighboring property cannot be said to hold that trespass lies for ultimate damage caused by an animal or a human who is affected by the concussions.
Scott v. Shephard, 1 Smith Leading Cases 337, 2 W. Bl. 892, 3 Wils. 403 (Squib Case), is not to the contrary. That was treated as a ricochetting Squib, the transfer by human hands being automatic. Distinctions based on the nature of the mental reaction may, in some cases, be too refined to be of practical use. We may say at least that where the reaction is purely reflex and automatic according to the Squib case the person so acting is as if an inanimate link in the chain of causation and the action lies in trespass. Where the animal or person commits an injury concededly acting in response to certain stimuli, but not purely automatically, which were the result of forces set in motion by the defendant, the action, if any, lies in case.
Being an action in case, negligence must be alleged and proved. We do not need to determine whether if negligence had been alleged a cause of action would have been stated under the circumstances of this case. A discussion of the "range of apprehension" as expressed in Palsgraf v. Long *Page 558 Island R. Co.,