Chase v. Morgan

HENRIOD, Justice

(concurring).

I concur, since I believe the statute so broad as to include the type of transaction here, where there was a price “per acre” stipulated, there was a “lease” for 5 years, to continue “so long thereafter as oil or gas is produced,” and particularly since we have construed gas and oil as “mineral” in the Western Development case. This determination springs from my belief that the factual situation here, the legal principles involved, and a reasonable statutory construction compel the conclusion that unless the plaintiff had written authorization to do what he did, the transaction was vulnerable to the legislation.

As to good conscience, this case is disturbing. The defendant, after all, promised that plaintiff should have the last three payments. That promise still persists, though unenforceable since defendant sought refuge behind legislation. Such sanctuary may be legally justified by a statute, to the exclusion of equitable attack, but there would seem to be little or no consolation in the making of a sacred promise only to break it with a statute.

The defendant not only promised that plaintiff would receive the money, but he reiterated his promise when, in a letter to plaintiff, the former said “This letter confirms our verbal tinderstanding * * * that the remaining three payments * * * be made direct to you.” Why defendant received the three payments but turned two of them over to McDonald, president of Sierra Madre and one to an escrow, would seem explainable only because of the statute and not by defendant’s actions which, he must concede, were the antithesis of his promise and understanding.

It would appear to this writer that defendant’s letter to plaintiff had the earmarks of an assignment substantiating his understanding and promise. Whether, had McDonald, the escrow and Sierra Madre been joined as parties they effectively could have asserted the statute as could the defendant, is a problem not present here.